THE

No. 83.-VOL. VII.

MONEY ON MORTGAGE.

APRIL, 1854.

GUILDFORD and REIGATE.

Norwich.

10 to 20 Acres of LAND, containing Chalk, and with or without buildings. Apply by letter to Mr. CULLIS, 22, Percy-circus, Pentonville,

London. SHROPSHIRE.

KILGOUR, who was a conductor of the army, and a native of Scotland, and who died abroad in 1827. Apply at Mouillard and Co.'s next-of-Kin offices, 4, Crescent-place, Blackfriars, London.

BALLINGER GROVE, GREAT MISSENDEN, BUCKS.

Acres, about half Arable and half Grass, situate two miles from a market town and railway. Apply to Messrs. TENCH, Estate Agents, Ludlow.

containing ten rooms, dairy, coach-house, stable, large garden and shrubbery, and productive meadows, about 18 acres, combining a healthy Residence and a profitable occupation. Rent, 501.

Coach daily to London from Great Missenden, about eight miles from the Tring and Berkhampstead stations of the Apply to Mr. HATTEN, Solicitor, Aylesbury.

Private Treaty, a desirable FREEHOLD ESTATE, comprising six compact farms, and sundry small tenements; and also several pieces of wood land and plantations, abutting upon and lying near to each other, in the parishes of The estate contains in the aggregate 975a. 2r. 28p., of which 21a. 3r. 14p. consist of wood land, and pools, and is compact and well situate as regards roads and markets. Valuable seams of coal have been recently discovered under lands adjoining, and no doubt extend und r a large portion of this property; the whole affords an excellent opportunity of investment for capitalists.

For particulars and to treat apply to Messrs. BURD and SON, land agents; or to Messrs. How and Sox, solicitors, Shrewsbury.

GLOCESTERSHIRE.—To be SOLD,

in the parish of Berkeley, a FREEHOLD ESTATE, 104

£300, £500, and several other larger amounts ready TO BE ADVANCED on Mortgage Security. Apply to N. MILLIGAN, Accountant, Basnett-street, Liverpool.

PURSUANT to a Decree in the High

Court of Chancery, made in a cause of John Newington and Emily Julia, his wife, against George Frederick Richards and others; all persons claiming to be INCUMBRANCERS, or to have any charge upon or affecting the real ESTATE of MARY MARTHA RICHARDS, late of Maismore-terrace, Park-road, Old Kent-road, in the county of Surrey, widow, who died on or about the 22d day of April, 1853, are by their solicitors, on or before the 1st day of May next, to come in

house, and necessary buildings, and let at 2007. per annum. Land-tax redeemed.

Apply to Mr. W. BROWNE, Land Agent, 6, Oxford-place, Cheltenham.

with fine views; on a dry soil; containing drawing-roota, dining-room, breakfast-parlour, 7 grounds and kitchen-garden, stables, loose-box, and other bed-rooms, pleasure convenient outbuildings, Rent, 457. Six miles from Aylesbury Railway Station, and two from Thame. Apply to Mr. HATTEN, Solicitor, Aylesbury.

SEEDLEY HOUSE, HEREFORDSHIRE.

TO be LET, for a TERM, well and

completely FURNISHED, this compact RESIDENCE, situated on an eminence commanding the confluence of the rivers Teme and Clun, and close to the picturesque village of Leintwardine. The house contains entrance hall, dining and drawing-rooms, about 19ft. by 16ft., study, four best bedrooms, two dressing-rooms, nursery and three servants' rooms, excellent offices, well supplied with water; kitchen, and flower gardens, coach-house, three-stalled stable, loose box, and upwards of three acres of excellent meadow LAND

GODALMING, SURREY.-To be Sold, or a greater quantity as may be desired.

a valuable PLOT of FREEHOLD BUILDING LAND, five minutes' walk from the station, commanding the most delightful and extensive prospect for many miles round, having a frontage of 140 feet to Shadyhanger-grove, opposite to the Manor-road, and a depth of above 200 feet. Good soil and drainage. Lowest price, which will include the conveyance, 957. Apply to Mr. G. T. CONGREVE, 11, Hanover-street, Peckham.

Stuart, 12, Old-square, Lincoln's-inn, Middlesex; or, in default thereof, they will be peremptorily excluded from the benefit of the said decree. FRIDAY the 12th day of MAY next, at TWELVE of the clock at noon at the said chambers is appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon the said claims.

Dated this 28th day of March, 1854.

ROBERT WILLIAM PEAKE, Chief Clerk. HOLME, LOFTUS and YOUNG, New-inn Strand, London, Agents for Messrs. Austen and Holcroft, of Sevenoaks, Kent, Solicitors for the Plaintiffs and Defendant-.

PURSUANT to a Decree of the High

Court of Chancery made in a certain cause of Herman v. Dunbar, and in other causes, all PERSONS CLAIMING to have CHARGES and INCUMBRANCES upon one-fourth part or share of a certain real ESTATE in the parish of Shorne, near Rochester, in the county of Kent, formerly belonging to Katherine Herman, late of Dean's-place, Vauxhall, Lambeth, in the county of Surrey, spinster, are, by their solicitors, on or before the 24th day of APRIL, 1854, to come in and establish their claims in respect of such charges and incumbrances, at the Chambers of the Right Honourable the Master of the Rolls, Rolls-yard, Chancerylane, Middlesex, or in default thereof they will be peremptorily excluded the benefit of the said Decree; and FRIDAY, the 28th day of APRIL next, at TWELVE of the clock at Eoon, at the said Chambers, is appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon the said claims." Dated the 20th day of March, 1854.

GEORGE WHITING, Chief Clerk. W. F. Low, Plaintiff's Solicitor, No. 67, Wimpole-street, Cavendish-square.

PURSUANT to a Decree of the High

Court of Chancery made in a cause LADY LANGDALE against BRIGGS and others, dated the 10th day of February, 1854, all persons CLAIMING to have any INCUMBRANCES affecting the FREEHOLD, COPYHOLD, and LEASEHOLD ESTATES of the Right Hon. EDWARD Earl of OXFORD and Earl MORTIMER, late of Eywood, in the county of Hereford (who died in or about the month of December, 1848), are, by their solicitors, on or before the 6th day of April next, to come in and establish their claims at the Chambers of the Vice-Chancellor Sir John Stuart, No. 12, Old-square, Lincoln's-inn, Middlesex, or in default thereof they will be peremptorily excluded from the benefit of the said Decree.-THURSDAY, the 20th day of APRIL next, at TWELVE o'clock at noon, at the said Chambers, is appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon the claims. Dated this 4th day of March, 1854. ROBT. WM. PEAKE, Chief Clerk. MARTINEAU and REID, 2, Raymond-buildings, Gray'sinn, Plaintiff's Solicitors.

LET, at a nominal rent, at Sutton, where the rates are very low. The situation is very healthy and dry, commanding beautiful views, upon a chalk subsoil, and close to the railway station. A train to London-bridge in 35 minutes. Also (belonging to the same proprietor), several plots of Freehold Land in choice situations, suitable for Villas; with or without meadow land.

For particulars apply to Mr. ARTHUR TAYLOR, Architect and Surveyor, 18, a. Basinghall-street.

The house is situate five miles from a railway station, and eight from Ludlow, close to fox hounds and harriers, and in the neighbourhood celebrated for its trout and greyling fishing. There is a post office in the village, where there are medical men, and a pew in the parish church.

For particulars, apply to Mr. FREDERICK JONES, 72, Parkstreet, Grosvenor-square, House Agent; or to Messrs. TENCH, Estate Agents, Ludlow.

MAN

ANSION and PARK, on the borders of the New Forest.-To be LET, unfurnished, from Lady-day next, an excellent FAMILY RESIDENCE, called Laneford Lodge, with a park of 30 acres surrounding the same, situate midway between Southampton and Salisbury, about six miles from the Romsey Station on the SouthWestern Railway. Rent, 1254

For further particulars apply to Messrs. ATTWOOD and
RIGDEN, the Close, Salisbury.

TO CAPITALISTS and Others.-To semi-detached VILLA and TERRACE HOUSES, situate on the Stanford and Merton rouds, Victoria-road, Kensington,

five minutes' walk of the Kensington-gardens and the Park. near to the site of the proposed new National Galleries, within Omnibus to and from the neighbourhood every quarter of an hour.

For full particulars apply at Mr. STREDDER's Office, 12, Stanford-road.

AKA

By THOMAS SCOTT, Land Agent, London. London: T. HARRISON (late J. Olivier), 59, Pall-mall; and of all Booksellers.

TEXT-of-KIN WANTED, of THOMAS

Mouillard and Co.'s next-of-kin offices, 4, Crescent-place, Blackfriars.

AINS' SYSTEM of SOLICITORS' BOOKKEEPING. The Fifth (revised and improveed Edition of the Work, illustrative of this simple and rapidlyextending System, is now ready, price 6s., post-free. Postoffice orders payable at the Holborn Branch, to GEORGE JAMES KAIN, 8, Brownlow-street, Holborn, London.

OLLOWAY'S PILLS, an

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EFFECTUAL. CURE for DROPSY.-Extract of a letter from Mr. Wm. Tomlinson, of Bangor, dated May 1, 1853."To Professor Holloway,-Sir,-For several years I was afflicted with dropsy; at times my feet and legs were so much

NEXT-of-KIN WANTED. If the swollen that I was quite unable to walk. I consulted many

COUNTY COURTS CHRONICLE.

SATURDAY, APRIL 1.

2nd. Who is a guest or traveller ?-Inns are established for the accommodation of travellers, and, therefore, if a neighbour, who is no traveller, as a friend, at the request of the innholder lodges there, and his goods be stolen | or lost, he shall not have an action: (Calye's THE LIABILITY OF INN-KEEPERS. case, 8 Co. 32.) And if a person comes upon Ir is the policy of our law to impose upon a special contract to board and sojourn at an different classes of persons a responsibility inn, he is not a guest, but a boarder: (Bac. proportionate to the confidence necessarily re- Abr. Inns and Inn-keepers, c. 5.) But if a posed in them, and the increased temptation person comes with goods to London, and stays to fraud or danger of plunder to which they there for a week, month, or longer, and is there may be subjected. Thus the liability of com- robbed of them, he shall have an action against mon carriers and inn-keepers is more stringent his host, though he is at the end of his jourthan that imposed upon the other classes of ney, and not strictly transeuns, and the length bailees in proportion to their increased danger of his stay is immaterial, so long as he retains and temptation to dishonesty. The principle his character of traveller: (Bac. Abr. ib.) It was probably adopted from the civil law, but its is not necessary, in order that a man may be a application has been more thoroughly carried out guest, so as to fix the inn-keeper with liability, amongst us than the Roman lawyers would that he should have come for more than temhave sanctioned. By the Roman law inn-porary refreshment: (Bennett v. Mellor, 5 T. R. keepers were liable in every case of loss or 273.) But if a man comes to an inn, leaves damage, although happening without any de- goods there for which the inn-keeper receives fault on their part, unless it happened by what no compensation, goes away, and does not was called a fatal damage, and amongst such return for some days, the inn-keeper will not fatal damages were included losses by light be responsible for the loss of the goods. ning, and other casualty, fire, burglary, and But if a traveller leaves his horse at an inn, robbery, but simple theft was not included and lodges elsewhere, or departs to another among them, and that on the ground that it town with intent to return, he will be deemed might have been guarded against by superior a guest, and the inn-keeper will be held revigilance. They were held responsible for the sponsible if the horse be stolen or injured: negligence or dishonesty of their servants with (Jelly v. Clerk, Cro. Jac. 188; York v. respect to acts committed within the house or Grindstone, 2 Lord Raym. 866.) premises, but not with respect to acts done elsewhere. Their responsibility also extended to the acts of their regular boarders and other inmates of their houses, but not to those of casual guests or travellers. And unless the goods were delivered to the custody of the innkeeper, or to his servant authorized in that behalf, he was not responsible for the loss, except where it was occasioned by the dishonesty of his servants on the premises.

It was stated by the judges in Calye's case (8 Co. 32), that the Common Law was founded upon the following original writ, "by which all the cases concerning hostlers may be decided:"

"Cum secundum legem et consuet' regni nostri Anglia hospitatores qui hospitia com' tenent ad hospitandos homines per partes ubi hujusmodi hospitia existunt transeuntes, et in eisdem hospitantes, eorum bona et catalla infra hospitia illa existentia absque subtractione seu amissione custodire die et nocte tenentur, ita quod pro defectu hujusmodi hospitatorum seu servientium suorum hospitibus hujusmodi damnum non eveniat ullo modo, quidam malefactores quendam equum ipsius A. precii 40s. infra hospitium ejusdem B. inventum, pro defectu ipsius B. ceperunt," &c. The principles set forth in the words of this ancient writ have since been developed by numerous decisions, and this branch of law may now be said to be complete and well settled.

We propose to consider the subject under the following heads:-1st. Who is an innkeeper? 2nd. Who is a guest or traveller? 3rd. The peculiar rights of inn-keepers. 4th. Their liability.

1st. Who is an inn-keeper.—An inn is defined as "a house where the traveller is furnished with everything he has occasion for while on his way" (Thompson v. Lacy, 3 B. & A. 283.) And an inn-keeper may be defined to be a person who makes it his business to entertain travellers and passengers, and provide lodging and necessaries for them and their horses and attendants: (Bac. Abr. Inns and Inn-keepers, B.) It must be a common inn, kept for travellers generally, and not merely for lodgers during the season, and the keeper of a mere coffee-house is not an inn-keeper: (Doe v. Laming, 4 Camp. 77.) But a house may be an inn though it has no sign put up: (Bac. Abr. Inns and Inn-keepers, B.) And where a house of entertainment was kept in London, in which the keeper provided lodgings and entertainment for travellers and others, it was held to be an inn, although it had no stables, and no stage coaches or waggons stopped there: (Thompson v. Lacy, 3 B. & Ald. 283.)

3rd. The peculiar rights and privileges of an innkeeper.-An innkeeper is bound to receive a guest if he has room for him, but if a guest conducts himself in a disorderly manner he may not only refuse to receive him, but he may compel him, under such circumstances, to leave the inn, even after he has been received as a guest: (Howell v. Jackson, 6 C. & P. 742; R. v. Ivers, 7 C. & P. 213.)

An innkeeper is not bound to inquire into the nature or quantity of the articles ordered by his guest, nor the propriety of supplying them with reference to his just wants, provided his guest be possessed of his reason, and he is not a minor, in which case he can only recover for necessaries supplied: (Proctor v. Nicholson, 7 C. & P. 67.) But the most beneficial privilege of an innkeeper is the lien which the law gives him on the goods and chattels of his guest for his charges. This lien was at one time thought to extend to wearing apparel actually in use, and even to the persons of his guests (Bac. Abr. ib. D.); but that doctrine is now entirely repudiated, and it is well settled that it does not extend to the person of the guest, nor to articles of clothing in actual wear: (Sunbolp v. Alford, 1 Horn & H. 13.) But the lien extends to all his goods at the inn, and his luggage, with the above exceptions only: (Thompson v. Lacy, 3 B. & Ald. 287.) And if a traveller leaves his horses with an innkeeper, and departs, the latter has a lien upon the horses for their keep: (Bac. Abr. ib. B.) Whether the lien upon a traveller's horses extends to his general expenses, or whether it is confined to the charge made for the keep of the horses, is not settled. The older authorities tend to show that the lien upon a particular chattel only extends to the debt which arises from the thing itself, and that the lien for the personal expenses of a guest only affects his personal luggage, whilst Mr. Justice Story (Law of Bailments, s. 476) inclines to the opinion that the lien is general, and that the horses of a guest may be detained for meals supplied to their owner as well as for their own keep.

4th. The liabilities of innkeepers.-An innkeeper is bound to take in all travellers, and to entertain them for a reasonable compensation, if he has accommodation for them, and if he improperly refuses to receive and provide for a guest, he renders himself liable to an indictment: (Rex v. Ivens, 7 C. & P. 213; Hawthorn v. Hammond, 1 C. & K. 614.) But he is only bound to provide convenient lodgings, and the law does not require him to furnish his guests with rooms in which to expose their goods:

(Burgess v. Clements, 4 M. & S. 206.) And travellers have no right to select a particular apartment, or to use a room for purposes for which it was not intended, if the innkeeper offers to supply another room for such purposes: (Fell v. Knight, S M. & W. 269.)

In order to render an innkeeper liable for the loss of or injury to the goods and chattels of his guests it is necessary, 1st. That the goods or chattels be brought within the inn (infra hospitium); and 2ndly. That the loss or damage be not occasioned by the default or neglect of the guest himself.

1st. The goods, &c., must have been brought within the inn.-If, therefore, an inn-keeper, at the request of his guest, sends his horse to pas ture, and the horse is stolen, the inn-keeper is not liable unless the loss has been occasioned by his own negligence: (Calye's case, 8 Co. 32.) But if the guest does not request it, but the inn-keeper does it of his own accord, he is liable for the loss: (ib.) So, where the plaintiff drove his gig to the defendant's inn on Bewdley fairday, and asked whether there was room for the horse, the cstler of the defendant took the horse out of the gig and put him into a stable, and the plaintiff carried his coat and whip from the gig into the house, and took some refreshment there, the ostler placed the gig outside of the inn-yard, in a part of the open street in which the defendant was in the habit of placing the carriages of his guests on fair days. The gig was stolen thence, and the Court held the inn-keeper responsible, for it did not appear that the defendant put the gig in the street at the request or instance of the plaintiff: the place was, therefore, a part of the inn, for the defendant by his conduct treated it as such. If he wished to protect himself, he should have told the plaintiff that he had no room in his yard, and that he would put the gig in the street, but could not be answerable for it: (Jones v. Tyler, 1 Ad. & Ell. 522.)

A delivery of the goods into the custody of the inn-keeper is not necessary to charge him with them; for, although the guest doth not deliver them, or acquaint the inn-keeper with them, still the latter is bound to pay for them if they are stolen or carried away, even although the persons who stole then or carried them away are unknown: (Calye's case, ib.) And it may be taken as a general rule that if the goods are delivered at the usual place for such goods, though not within the inn, the innkeeper is chargeable with them. Thus, if wheat in a sleigh is put into the outer house, appurtenant to the inn and used for such purposes, and afterwards it is stolen, the inn-keeper is chargeable for the loss: (Bennett v. Mellor, 5 T. R. 273.) And so, if a horse be delivered to the ostler at the inn to be fed, and the ostler takes off the saddle and bridle, and deposits them in a barn belonging to the inn, and they are stolen, the innkeeper will be responsible for the loss: (Story on Bailments, 509.)

3rdly. The loss must have happened through the default of the inn-keeper.-By the common law, as laid down in Calye's case, an innkeeper is not chargeable unless there is some default in him, or in his servants, in the safe keeping of his guest's goods and chattels within the inn. But the loss of or damage to such goods or chattels affords primâ facie evidence of negligence on the part of the inn-keeper, so as to throw upon him the burden of proving that the loss or damage happened without his default: (Bennett v. Mellor, 5 T. R. 273; Burgess v. Clements, 4 M. & S. 306.)

Where the defendant's ostler placed the plaintiff's horse in a stable with another horse that kicked him, and the defendant to rebut the presumption of negligence gave evidence to show that the horse had been properly taken care of, Cresswell, J., told the jury that the defendant was liable, if he or his servants had been guilty of direct violence or negligence; otherwise, not: the jury found for the defendant, and the Court (though they held that evidence of the damage or loss of the goods of a guest raises a presumption of negligence in

the inn-keeper) considered the direction proper: (Dawson v. Chauncey, 5 Q. B. 164.)

or other place by the guest, which is not objected to, although it is for his own personal convenience, will not discharge the inn-keeper from his general responsibility, if the guest does not thereby acquire an exclusive possession of the room or place. And if the habit of the servants at an inn be to place the guests' goods in their bedrooms, and a guest should request his to be carried into the commercial room, to which travellers generally resort, and they are there stolen, the innkeeper will, nevertheless, be held responsible for the loss, unless he has given notice to the guest that he will not be responsible unless the goods are put in the bedroom: (Richmond v. Smith, 8 B. & C. 9.)

LEGISLATIVE PROJECTS.

THE Lord Chancellor, we are informed, has it in contemplation to make some alteration as regards the present practice of assigning the same judges to the different districts of the County Courts, instead of varying their circuits by rotation as has been the invariable rule with the judges of the Superior Courts at Westminster. No decision has, we believe, as yet, been arrived at by his lordship as to what course he shall pursue in this very important matter; but we understand that strong representations have been made to him to induce him to assimilate the practice of the judges of the County Courts to that invariably pursued by the other judges of the land. We have already expressed ourselves favourable to such an alteration as this, and some of our correspondents have from time to time urged this measure. Very possibly, indeed, there may be no solid ground for supposing that the learned judges of the County Courts, either actually have been, or are really liable to be, influenced by partiality from residing near the advocates or suitors who come before them, and whom they may sometimes also meet on non-professional and much pleasanter occasions; but so long as the suspicion exists that this undue influence may be exercised, an evil exists which ought to be remedied, and the prejudice thereby created against the administration of justice may be most injurious in its consequences. An occasional change of judges may be also expedient on other accounts. It is often desirable to have one to whom the advocates are not personally so well known from coming before him on every occasion, as they must be in the case of a County Court judge whose circuit extends through two or three small counties. Indeed, it is impossible, where this is the case, for the most discreet and the most desirous of doing strict justice, not to imbibe some partialities and prejudices in favour of or against particular parties; or should he even not be subject to this weakness, the suspicion of it will be beyond his power wholly to escape from. Again, a judge may occasionally commit a slight indiscretion, or make an error in laying down the law-to which the most able and learned are even liable-calculated to create a prejudice against him in the Courts where he presides, which may also render it very desirable that another judge should take his place, who, though not more able or learned, may not be under this prejudice, and against whom

The transfer of the business of the Ecclesiastical Courts in London to the Court of Chancery, bids us to enquire why a corresponding measure should not be introduced for the transfer of the business of such, if not all, of the Prerogative Courts in the country, to the County Courts. The probate of wills might very advantageously be given to them, and very great benefits would result from giving the County Courts jurisdiction to try the validity of wills, by submitting the parties to due examination on the subject. The project also for giving the County Courts jurisdiction over the trust matters in the county where the amount of the property is limited, will probably be revived. At present, however, the commission on the subject of the County Courts will prevent any very leading measures being introduced, at any rate until the report of that commission shall have been made, and the recommendations of the commissioners are made known.

The existence of this commission, inasmuch as it afford a full opportunity for all those who have grievances to complain of connected with the County Courts, to make their cases known, ought to satisfy the public that the interest that would be required has been effected to obtain the fullest information respecting the working of the system, and to remedy all real imperfections. That the commission should be expected to meet all possible objections that may be urged against the constitution or operation of the system, no reasonable man will require. That the system as a whole has worked well, is best attested by the immense amount of business transacted by these courts, which evinces however the confidence reposed in them by the public as well as by the profession, which is still further shown by the demands made for their extension, for in the case of a newly-established institution which is in many respects almost of an experimental nature, ought the appointment of a commission to enquire into its operation to be considered as throwing any doubts on the character, or as to the expediency of the continuance of the system. On the contrary, inquiry as to how far it has answered the ends for which it was designed, and how far its sphere of usefulness may be yet further extended, is the best guarantee that no hasty or blind measures of legislation will be adopted.

result we do not fear would on the whole be satisfactory alike to the suitors and to the public.

LATE CASES ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE COUNTY COURTS. (a)

18. Cases on questions of Residence. We have next to inquire into the decisions as regards the residence of the parties to the suit. By some of the statutes for the establishment of local courts, it is required, in order to enable arise, and the defendant or plaintiff, or both, a party to sue, that the cause of action shall reside, within the jurisdiction of the court; but this depends entirely on the wording of the statute in each particular case. It has been held, that where the act of Parliament of the parties, as a general rule the plaintiff makes no express provision as to the residence need not, but the defendant must be resident within the jurisdiction: (2 Arch. Prac. 1400.) By the County Courts Act (9 & 10 Vict. c. 95, s. 60), it is enacted that a summons may issue in any district in which the defendant or one of the defendants shall dwell or carry on his business at the time of the action brought; or, by leave of the court for the district in which the defendant or one of the defendants shall have dwelt or carried on his business, at some time within six calendar months next before the time of the action brought, or in which the cause of action arose, such summons may issue in either of such last mentioned

courts.

To entitle a defendant to enter a suggestion to deprive a plaintiff of costs under the 10 & 11 Vict. c. 71 (The London Local Court Act), it must be shown distinctly that the plaintiff, at the time of commencing the action, dwelt abode. A suggestion that the plaintiff did not within twenty miles of the defendant's place of dwell more than twenty miles from the place where the defendant carried on his business, was held bad on demurrer. A previous application for such a purpose to a judge at chambers does not preclude the defendant from afterwards applying to the court upon the Davis, 6 C. B. 235.) A plaintiff carried on same, or upon amended affidavits (Peterson v. business by his agent within twenty miles of, but dwelt more than that distance from, the residence of A., his agent having supplied A. with goods under 201. value. It was held that the plaintiff might sue A. in the Superior Courts for the debt: (Shields v. Prail, 18 L. J. 120, C. B.) The 112th section of the City of London Small Debts Act, which reserves to the plaintiff the right of suing in the Superior Court, where he dwells more than twenty miles from the defendant, is meant to apply where the plaintiff dwells more than twenty miles from the place of residence of the defendant. Therefore a suggestion to deprive the plaintiff of costs, alleging that the plaintiff did not live the defendant carried on his business in the more than twenty miles from the place where city of London, was held bad on a demurrer, though the 40th section of that act gives juriscition to the local court in cases where the defendant either dwells or carries on his business in the city of London: (Paterson v. Davies, 18 L. J. 343, C. B.)

When the report of the commission on the County Courts has been presented, and its On a motion for a suggestion to deprive recommendations are known, something defi- plaintiff of costs under the County Courts Act, nite will of course be decided as to the it appears by the particulars of demand that measures which are to be introduced into the legislature for altering or amending the sys- 1848, and the defendant's affidavit stated that some of the goods had been supplied in July, tem. So many statutes relating to the County the residence of the defendant, and dwellingCourts have however been already passed, that house and place of business of the plaintiff, it seems very desirable that a consolidation of them should be effected, which might be done Court of Surrey. It was held that the existwere within the jurisdiction of the County by a general comprehensive measure ence of the District County Court at the time bodying all the extracts in force, as also the of the cause of the action, and the residence rules and regulations put forth by the judges of the parties within the jurisdiction, suffiWhen this has been accomplished, the grand ciently appeared to entitle the defendant to a desideratum for the County Courts would be suggestion; (Walker v. Wall, 19 L. J. 43, Ex.) to have respite from a legislation, and indeed To deprive a plaintiff of costs under the County from changes of any kind, experimental or Courts Act, sect. 129, the defendant must have otherwise, for ten years at least, by which a a fixed place for some certain time within the full and fair opportunity would be afforded for testing the real merits of the system, and the (a) By GEORGE HARRIS, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

em

jurisdiction of the court within which the cause of action, or a material part thereof, arose. Where, therefore, the defendant held the office of deputy sealer in the Court of Chancery, and followed the person of the Lord Chancellor, performing his duties partly at Westminster Hall, partly in the House of Lords, and partly in Lincoln's-Inn; and, when the Lord Chancellor was not sitting, at the Great Seal Patent Office, Quality-court, Chancery-lane, it was held that he could not be said to have any fixed place of business within the meaning of the 128th sect. of the act, so as to entitle him to a suggestion to deprive the plaintiff of his costs: (Rolfe v. Learmouth, 19 L. J. 10, Q. B.) By sect. 78 of the County Courts Act, the judges of the County Court have power to admit persons to sue in formâ pauperis in their courts. A pauper will be deprived of costs who sues in a Superior Court when his plaint might have been entered in a County Court: (Chinn (a pauper) v. Bullen, 19 L. J. 42, C. P.) A clerk to the Board of Admiralty, in the General Register and Record Office of Seamen, No. 70, Lower Thames-street, is not a person seeking a livelihood, carrying on, trading, or dealing within the limits of the city of London, to enable him to enter a suggestion to deprive the plaintiff of costs under the London Small Debts Act (10 & 11 Vict. c. 71) already referred to: (Buckley v. Hunn, 14 L. T. 444.) A clerk in the office of the Privy Council is not a person carrying on business within the meaning of the County Courts Act, to entitle him to enter a suggestion to deprive the plaintiff of costs: (Sangster v. Kay, 15 L. T. 186.) In this case, Pollock, C. B., in delivering his opinion, observed, "The question whether a clerk is a person carrying on business? Businsss, as to be found in Johnson's Dictionary, may very probably comprehend anything which he has to do; but carrying on a business seems to imply something more. I think it means an independent business, not the occupation of a clerk who may be at any time dismissed." Rolfe, B., observed, "Even if the business of a clerk in the Privy Council be a business within the meaning of this act, I do not think that this person carries on a business. I do not know whether it has ever been decided, but if not, I should be very much inclined to hold that the foreman in a haberdasher's shop carries on no business. He has no permanent independent occupation. He may be discharged at any time."

The plaintiff, a tailor, residing at Pentonville, within the jurisdiction of the Clerkenwell County Court, sued the defendant for the amount of a bill sent in, containing several items for clothes supplied, repaired, and altered. The defendant resided at Hammersmith, within the jurisdiction of the Brompton County Court, and carried on his business at the Burlington Arcade, within the jurisdiction of the Westminster County Court. As to three of the items, the orders were given, the work done, and the goods delivered at Hammersmith; as to ten other items, the orders were given, and the goods delivered at the Burlington Arcade; and with regard to one, the order was given, the work done, and the goods delivered at the plaintiff's residence. It was held, on motion to enter a suggestion to deprive the plaintiff of costs, that the whole bill formed one cause of action; that the cause of action did not wholly occur within the jurisdiction of the County Court either of Brompton or Middlesex, part being within that of Clerkenwell; but that as one item arose within the jurisdiction of a County Court, the cause of action was to be considered as arising in some material point within the jurisdiction of a County Court under the 128th section of the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 95, and that the action ought not to have been brought in the Superior Court: (Wood v. Perry, 18 L. J., N. S., 161, Exch.) A plaintiff having obtained a verdict for 30s. in an action for money paid, a rule was made absolute to enter on the roll a suggestion that the defendant resided in the jurisdiction of the Middlesex County Court, and

"that the plaintiff pay the defendant his costs of suit, pursuant to 23 Geo. 2, c. 33, and 5 & 6 Vict. c. 97." Held, that, as the defendant's right to the costs depended on the event of the trial of the suggestion, the court had no power by rule to order the plaintiff to pay them: (Samson v. Price, 2 Exch. 338.) A rule was made absolute to enter a suggestion to deprive a plaintiff of costs in an action on a bill of exchange for 121. 8s. 4d., drawn on and accepted by the defendant at P., the plaintiff residing at B., and within twenty miles of P.: (Ruff v. Mees, 40 L. O. 37.) Where, on a motion to enter a suggestion to deprive the plaintiff of costs, there are counter affidavits as to whether the defendant resides within twenty miles of the plaintiff, the court will not decide the question on the affidavits, but will grant the application; and will leave the plaintiff to raise the question of fact by a traverse to the suggestion: (Pollock v. Crook, 19 L. J. 185, Q. B.)

In the following case the affidavit in support of a motion for a suggestion, stated that the plaintiff resided at Birmingham, and the defendant at West Bromwich at the time of action brought, and it averred that the plaintiff did, at that time, reside within twenty miles of the defendant. It was held, first, that the aver

ment of residence was insufficient, and that it should have stated "that the plaintiff did at the time of action brought, reside within twenty miles of the defendant's residence;" secondly that it is not sufficient to follow the words of the statute in traversing the exceptions in sect. 128 of 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95: (Room v. Cottam, 16 L. T. 197, Ex.)

The defendant who resided within the district of the Waltham County Court, purchased goods in London, and directed them to be sent to him by the Eastern Counties Railway, to be left at a station not within the district of the Waltham County Court. It was held that the delivery was complete when the goods arrived at the railway station, and that no part of the cause of action arose within the district of the Waltham County Court: (De Porquet v. Berry 2 Monthly Dig. 117.)

QUESTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE COMMON LAW JURISDICTION OF THE COUNTY COURTS.

1. Would it be convenient that a plaintiff suing in a Superior Court in an action of tort, and recovering less than 207., should be deprived of costs, unless the judge certifies that the case is fit to be tried in the Superior Court?

See sect. 129 of 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95, and sect. 11 of 13 & 14 Vict. c. 61.

I think not, since it is an extremely difficult matter for a plaintiff, in most actions of tort, to estimate the amount of damages he is likely to recover.

2. Would it be convenient that a plaintiff suing in a Superior Court in an action of contract, and recovering less than 50%, should be deprived of costs?

See sect. 119 of 15 Vict. c. lxxvii. Small Debts Act.

London City

11. Would it be convenient to extend that jurisdiction to tenements of greater value, where the relation of landlord and tenant exists?

I do not see any necessity for such extension.

12. Would it be convenient that that jurisdiction should be extended to cases of forfeiture where the annual rent does not exceed 50%.?

I think not, as such extension would alter the character of that jurisdiction, since cases of forfeiture are likely to involve nice questions of law.

13. Is it desirable to repeal so much of the proviso contained in sect. 11 of 13 & 14 Vict. c. 61, as excepts part of the clause? judgments by default from the operation of the enacting

See Glynne v. Roberts, 9 Ex. R. 253.

A provision may advantageously be introduced to meet such a case as the above.

8. Has any inconvenience arisen in consequence of any member of the bar belonging to your circuit or sessions having acted as a deputy of a County Court judge, within the districts in which the assizes or sessions are held?

I have not heard of any.

CHARITY ESTATES IN THE COUNTY
COURTS.

AN extensive jurisdiction over charity estates being now vested in the County Courts, we propose to devote a distinct department of the COUNTY COURTS CHRONICLE to a subject which henceforth will have an especial interest for our readers. Under this department we shall collect all the Rules, Orders, and Instructions of the Commissioners as they are issued; all decisions relating to Charities which are likely to be useful to the officers and practitioners in the County Court; all the reports and proceedings upon such Charities as come within the County Courts jurisdiction; all necessary forms and precedents for proceedings; and, in short, every kind of information likely to instruct and interest our readers, and to assist I think that the present state of the law on them in the administration of the very importhat subject is satisfactory.

I think not; and the provision seems to have been introduced into the London City Small Debts Act by mistake.

3 Would it be convenient that the County Courts should have jurisdiction when the title to any corporeal or incorporeal hereditament comes in question?

4. Would it be convenient that the County Courts should have jurisdiction where the validity of a devise, bequest, or limitation under a will or settlement is in dispute?

tant branch of the law that has just been confided to them.

To make this department of our Journal still more complete, may we ask the assistance of our readers by communication of facts and proceedings taken by them in promoting the objects of the Charity Estates Act, and we 5. Is it desirable to repeal sect. 128 of 9 & 10 Vict. should be especially thankful for short accounts

I think not.

c. 95?

No.

6. What, in your opinion, is the cause of parties not having more generally availed themselves of the

of Charities that come within the jurisdiction of the County Courts. The following new Orders have just been issued by the Commissioners.