For cases in Dec.Dig. & Am.Dig. Key-No.Series & Indexes see same topic and KEY-NUMBER
ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL.
See Criminal Law, 706-730.
ARMY AND NAVY.
See Appeal and Error, 1050; Intoxicating Liquors, 17; Principal and Agent, 34; War, 4.
37(2) (Mo.) In a prosecution against co- conspirators for arson with intent to defraud insurer, as defined by Rev. St. 1909, § 4511, evidence held sufficient to show that the de- fendant who actually brought combustible ma- terials into the building knew that it was in- sured, and that he was guilty.-State v. Bersch, 207 S. W. 809.
ASSAULT AND BATTERY.
34 (Mo.App.) In action to enjoin defend- ants' breach of their contract making plaintiff See Criminal Law, their exclusive sales agent for coal produced by them, it was no defense that he had joined the army, where he did not abandon his busi- ness, but by himself and assistants carried it on as before, as contract never contemplated that plaintiff's part should be performed by him individually.-Warren v. Ray County Coal Co., 207 S. W. 883.
I. CIVIL LIABILITY, (B) Actions.
43(1) (Mo.App.) Instruction for plaintiff in action for assault should not include any refer- ence to defendant having sought out plaintiff and called him names, these facts being un- necessary to predicate the rule of law therein
See Assault and Battery, 64, 92; Criminal stated, it being enough to entitle plaintiff to re- Law,
II. ON CRIMINAL CHARGES. 63(3) (Tex.Cr.App.) An officer inay make an arrest without a warrant, where a felony or an offense against the public peace is commit- ted in his presence, under Code Cr. Proc. 1911, arts. 254-260.-Harper v. State, 207 S. W. 96. A town marshal may make an arrest without a warrant for a felony or an offense against the public peace committed in his presence, where the ordinances of the city confer such authority, under Code Cr. Proc. 1911, art. 261.
cover that defendant, without just cause or ex- cuse, unlawfully and violently assaulted him.- Colby v. Thompson, 207 S. W. 73.
43(6) (Mo.App.) It was error for instruc- tion in action for assault to authorize the jury to consider whether the injuries were perma- nent; the petition not alleging they were, but merely that plaintiff would suffer in the future therefrom.-Colby v. Thompson, 207 S. W. 73. II. CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY.
64 (Tex.Cr.App.) An officer making a law- ful arrest may use reasonable means neces- sary, taking care that the force used is com- mensurate with the necessity, under Pen. Code, 1911, art. 1014, subd. 5.-Harper v. State,
See Criminal Law, 371, 423, 427, 641, 763, 207 S. W. 96. 764, 800, 867, 1036.
3 (Mo.) One accused of burning a build- ing to collect the insurance thereon could not have been guilty of intending to defraud the insurer, unless he knew that insurance existed. -State v. Bersch, 207 S. W. 809.
18 (Mo.) An indictment for arson, under Rev. St. 1909, § 4511, denouncing the burning of goods with intent to defraud insurer, need not set forth the name of the owner who was the beneficiary of the insurance, nor state facts constituting intended fraud upon the in- surer.-State v. Bersch, 207 S. W. 809.
In a prosecution for arson, under Rev. St. 1909, § 4511, the indictment was not bad be- cause, in alleging that the property was insur- ed to a named corporation and the policies transferred to the corporation owning the buildings destroyed, it failed to state by whom such policies were transferred.-Id.
22 (Mo.) An indictment for arson, under Rev. St. 1909, § 4511, is not defective, because it does not allege that any of defendants were stockholders of the corporation owning the property or otherwise interested in it; it not being necessary under such statute that de- fendant should have had any interest in the property burned.-State v. Bersch, 207 S. W. 809.
(B) Prosecution and Punishment.
92 (Tex.Cr.App.) In prosecution of town marshal for aggravated assault, evidence held sufficient to sustain a finding that a "serious bodily injury" was inflicted.-Harper v. State, 207 S. W. 96.
In a prosecution of a town marshal for ag- gravated assault and infliction of serious bod- ily injury, evidence held to sustain a finding that the injured party was not making a forc- ible resistance to arrest.-Id.
See Drains, 66; Municipal Corporations, 566-567; Taxation, 450.
See Action, 57; Executors and Adminis- trators, 158; Injunction, 118; Jus- tices of the Peace, 124; Limitation of Actions, 95, 167; Mechanics' Liens, 204; Public Lands, 151, 178; Subroga- tion. 31; Taxation, 889; Trusts, 20, 25.
I. REQUISITES AND VALIDITY. (A) Property, Estates, and Rights Assign-
28 (Mo.) In a prosecution for arson, un- der Rev. St. 1909, § 4511, evidence showing what defendant paid for the stock in the build-8 ing burned was admissible, as showing his es- timate of its value as compared with the amount of insurance carried.-State v. Bersch, 207 S. W. 809.
In prosecution for arson, under Rev. St. 1909, § 4511, denouncing the burning of goods to defraud the insurer, policies of insurance on the property were admissible in evidence. -Id.
In a prosecution for arson, rejection of evi- dence that defendant's former fellow stock- holder was addicted to drink and guilty of other improper conduct, which caused a dis- agreement between himself and defendant, was irrelevant.-Id.
(Tenn.) An agreement or covenant to convey by an heir expectant and sui juris, if fairly made and based on an available consid- eration, will be enforced as against the gran- tor and privies, whenever the property comes into his possession, but not until then.-Tate v. Greenlee, 207 S. W. 716.
(B) Mode and Sufficiency of Assignment,
52 (Tex.Civ.App.) An agreement whereby merchants were to furnish to laborers goods for which their employers were to pay from wages due amounted to an equitable assign- ment of the claims for wages.-Hess & Skinner Engineering Co. v. Turney, 207 S. W. 171. A transaction by which a bank loaned money
to contractors for payment of wages due labor- ers, which money was so used, held not to con- stitute an equitable assignment of labor debts, nor subrogate the bank to the laborers' claims against contractor's surety.-Id.
See Judgment, 590; Trusts, 359; Work and Labor.
ASSUMPTION OF RISK.
An agreement by which laborers were paid partly in cash and partly in board, but not showing that the laborers agreed that any See Master and Servant, 204–226. part of their wages should be paid for gro- ceries, or that they knew such were bought from claimant, does not constitute an equitable assignment of laborers' wages to claimant.-Id.
II. OPERATION AND EFFECT.
85 (Tex.Civ.App.) Assignment by bridge- building contractor of balance retained by coun- ty on his contract, to bank, to secure its ad- vance of a sum which contractor used to pay laborers' wages, was superior in equity to prior assignment of the same fund to contractor's surety to secure it against liability on its bond, which had been previously executed. since surety parted with nothing, of value as consid- eration for the assignment.-Hess & Skinner Engineering Co. v. Turney, 207 S. W. 171.
In order that a prior assignment may have precedence over a subsequent assignment, no- tice of former assignment must have been giv- en to the holder of the fund prior to the subse- quent assignment.-Id.
ASSIGNMENTS FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS.
See Limitation of Actions, 167.
I. REQUISITES AND VALIDITY. (A) Nature and Essentials of Trusts for Creditors.
3 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where sellers and buyers agreed that proceeds of note representing part of consideration for goods should be applied to payment of any and all debts or claims against goods, held, that creditors of sellers had an interest in note and were entitled to judgment for proportional amount of their claims. Warren v. Parlin-Orendorff Implement Co., 207 S. W. 586.
44 (Tex.Civ.App.) Although creditors of sellers did not know, at time of its creation of trust in note given as part consideration for goods, they had a right thereafter to affirm it and to enforce it in their favor, and, when they affirmed trust, they were no longer simple contract creditors.-Warren v. Parlin-Oren- dorff Implement Co., 207 S. W. 586.
V. RIGHTS AND REMEDIES OF CREDITORS.
(A) In Aid of Assignment. 295(8) (Tex.Civ.App.) In suit by creditors of sellers to enforce a trust in note given by purchasers, allegation that purchasers, parties defendant, executed the note and signed the contract, creating the trust, authorized a judg- ment against the purchasers for the amount of the note.-Warren v. Parlin-Orendorff Im- plement Co., 207 S. W. 586.
See Appeal and Error, 1056; Evidence, 181, 472; Fraudulent Conveyances, Garnishment; Justices of the Peace, 86; Mortgages, 151; Statutes, 93; Trial, 25.
VIII. CLAIMS BY THIRD PERSONS.
309 (Tex.Civ.App.) Claimant of attached property, who alleged ownership, did not, by admitting for purpose of opening and closing that plaintiffs had good cause of action as set forth, under District and County Court Rule 31 (142 S. W. xx), admit that he was not owner of property.-Frost v. Smith, 207 S. W. 392.
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT.
See Appeal and Error, 171; Covenants, 132; Criminal Law, 641, 714, 720%. 723, 730, 867, 1090; District and Prosecut- ing Attorneys; Divorce, 227; Evidence, 265; Exchange of Property, 7; High- ways, 90; Infants, 84, 90; Insurance. 668; Partition, 106; Receivers, 154; Vendor and Purchaser, 320; Wit- nesses, 154.
(A) Fees and Other Remuneration.
145 (Mo.App.) Where attorney dismissed suit before judgment on second demurrer was formally entered, after having alleged in pe- tition all facts he had or was furnished with, and after having made effort to secure over- ruling of demurrer upon intimation by court that it was about to sustain demurrer, such dismissal was not an abandonment of the case within contract requiring him to fight case
(C) Claims and Liens Prior or Superior to through to a final determination.-King v. Assignment.
Where attorney, having agreed to fight case to final determination, abandons case by dis- missing it on demurrer before rendition of judgment thereon, he is not entitled to recover compensation for services.-Id.
167(2) (Mo.App.) In attorney's action for compensation after having voluntarily dismiss- ed action on demurrer before court's judgment thereon, whether attorney had made effort to obtain a favorable judgment before dismissing case was for jury.-King v. Mann, 207 S. W. 836.
In attorney's action for compensation, wheth- er attorney fully performed his contract with client held for the jury.-Id.
For cases in Dec.Dig. & Am.Dig. Key-No.Series & Indexes see same topic and KEY-NUMBER
II. IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS. 59 (Mo.) All examining magistrates, under Rev. St. 1909, § 5027, and, in view of Rev. St. 1899, § 7, p. 2543, the judge of the St. Louis court of criminal correction, may in felony eases condition a recognizance upon the ap- pearance of the accused, not only on a day certain, but also in addition thereto "on any future day to which the cause may be continu- ed."-State v. Berger, 207 S. W. 777.
90 (Mo.) In scire facias by state upon a forfeited recognizance requiring the appear- ance of the principal before the court on May 22, 1916, and on "any future date to which this said cause may be continued," the burden was upon the state to show that the cause had been continued to the 2d day of June, at which time default was entered because the principal fail- ed to appear on the latter date.-State v. Berger, 207 S. W. 777.
54(1) (Mo.App.) Where the clearing house refused to continue to clear for a bank unless its directors put up a large sum in cash im- mediately to take the place of assets which were then charged off, held, that the advance- ment to the bank by directors was supported by a consideration, the advancement protect- ing their interest, as it appeared the bank could not continue to do business if refused the privileges of the clearing house; so that directors could not recover such money from the bank in action for money had and received. -Deibel v. Jefferson Bank, 207 S. W. 869.
Where a clearing house declined to continue to clear for a bank unless its assets were in- creased, and directors advanced a sum to the bank, which transferred to them assets written off of its books, held, that the direct- ors could not recover from the bank the sum advanced; there being no agreement to repay, on the theory that they must be considered as trustees for the stockholders and entitled to be indemnified for the sum advanced.-Id.
Though directors of a bank who advanced sums to it to enable it to continue enjoying the privileges of a clearing house, which refused to clear its checks unless its assets were in- creased, acted under duress, held that, where the directors by subsequent resolution turned over to the president, as trustee for directors, assets which the clearing house had directed should be written off, and they accepted pay- ments by the trustee, this was a ratification of the contract.-Id.
96 (Ky.) Ky. St. §§ 3155 and 3162, relating to fines, penalties, and costs collected in police court for a city of the second class, held not to entitle a city of that class to the proceeds 159 (Tex. Civ.App.) Where of a bail bond given to secure the appearance in police court of one to answer a warrant charging him with the crime of grand larceny; for, in view of section 3147 and Crim. Code Prac. $$ 58 and 94, a police court has no final jurisdiction in felony cases, but can sit only as an examining court, and the bond could be forfeited only in circuit court.-Reagan v. Greenfield, 207 S. W. 707.
III. FUNCTIONS AND DEALINGS. (D) Collections.
a bank. at plaintiff's request, had forwarded a draft to defendant bank which was accepted and paid by defendant's cashier's check, but defendant subsequently stopped delivery of its check be fore it was received by the first bank, facts held to support a finding that the first bank merely acted as plaintiff's agent, and was not therefore a proper party to the suit as a pur- chaser of the draft.-Farmers' Guaranty State Bank of Jacksonville v. Burrus Mill & Ele- vator Co., 207 S. W. 400.
Under Ky. St. § 1139, relating to fines and forfeitures, the proceeds of a forfeited bail bond given in city police court to secure the appearance of one to answer a warrant charg-|(F) ing him with grand larceny belong to the state, and not the city.-Id.
1882 (Tex.Civ.App.) In suit to recover damages for wrongful failure of defendant bank to make timely remittance in payment of pre- 15; mium on life policy, where evidence failed to show that agreement to remit on the day in question was based on a valuable consideration, there could be no recovery based upon con- tract liability.-Washington V. Austin Nat. Bank, 207 S. W. 382.
See Assignments for Benefit of Creditors; Champerty and Maintenance, 7.
V. RIGHTS, REMEDIES, AND DIS- CHARGE OF BANKRUPT.
227 (3) (Tex.Civ.App.) In suit to recover damages for wrongful failure of defendant bank to make timely remittance in payment of pre- mium on life policy, evidence held insufficient to show that defendant was negligent in not
438 (Tex.Com.App.) Title of a bankrupt to land. though not scheduled as an asset, passes to his trustee, and, notwithstanding the bank- rupt's discharge, he cannot recover the same; no facts being shown revesting title in him.-remitting on the day in question.-Washing- Raley v. D. Sullivan & Co., 207 S. W. 906.
ton v. Austin Nat. Bank, 207 S. W. 382.
In suit to recover damages for wrongful fail- ure of defendant bank to make timely remit- tance in payment of premium on life policy, evidence held to show contributory negligence on the part of plaintiffs.-Id.
BENEFICIAL ASSOCIATIONS.
See Insurance, 723-826.
tute notice of infirmity, person to whom instru- ment is negotiated must have had actual notice, is either actual knowledge of the particular in- firmity or actual knowledge of facts which, if investigated, would disclose the defect.-Citi- zens' State Bank of Greenup v. Johnson Coun- ty, 207 S. W. 8.
whom instrument is negotiated must have had actual knowledge of infirmity, or of such facts See Alteration of Instruments, 9, 12; As- that his taking the instrument amounted to signments for Benefit of Creditors, 3, 44, bad faith, is declarative of the pre-existing 295, 333; Banks and Banking, 159; Chat-law.-Id. tel Mortgages, 260; Continuance, 26; 332 (Ky.) "Actual notice," under Ky. St. Counties, 184; Courts, 121; Election § 3720b, subsec. 56, providing that, to consti- of Remedies, 7; Evidence, 76, 459, 568; Exchange of Property, 7; Execu- tors and Administrators, 158, 227; For- gery, 5, 12, 26, 29, 34, 37; Fraud, 59; Fraudulent Conveyances, 213; Hus- band and Wife, 156, 171, 273; Indictment and Information, 110; Insurance, 138, 1792, 187; Interest, 36; Judgment, 342 (Ky.) The same standard for measur- 104, 145, 585, 948, 956; Limitation of Ac- ing the good or bad faith of a purchaser of tions, 167, 180; Lis Pendens, 4; Mort-negotiable paper applies when he acts upon evi- gages, 28; Partition, 97; Pleading, dence furnished by the face of the paper as 104; Principal and Agent, 123, 177; when he is governed by facts aliunde the paper. -Citizens' State Bank of Greenup v. Johnson Subrogation, 23, 31; Tender, 7; Tres- pass to Try Title, 4; Trial, 253; Us- County, 207 S. W. 8. ury, 140: Vendor and Purchaser, 89, 187, 254, 320; Venue, 72, 77.
I. REQUISITES AND VALIDITY. (B) Form and Contents of Promissory Notes and Duebills.
47 (Tex.Civ.App.) A mere recital in a con- tract order that the purchase price of the goods might be paid in notes attached thereto did make the payer's obligation a conditional one. Commercial Credit Co. v. Giles, 207 S. W. 596.
363 (Tex. Civ.App.) In action on notes orig- inally attached to a contract order and detach- ed by the payee, as permitted by the order, and sold to plaintiff, an innocent holder, for 76 per cent. of the face of the notes until the remainder should be paid by the maker, the holder's re- covery should be limited to 76 per cent. of the face of the notes.-Commercial Credit Co. v. Giles, 207 S. W. 596. not365(1) (Tex.Civ.App.) The maker of nego- tiable notes attached to a contract order per- mitting their detachment by the payee would be liable to an innocent holder even though the or- der contract and notes were revoked in the 69 (Tex.Civ.App.) Acceptance of a draft hands of the payee and it could not maintain an may be verbal, and need not be in writing.- action thereon against the maker.-Commercial Farmers' Guaranty State Bank of Jacksonville Credit Co. v. Giles, 207 S. W. 596. v. Burrus Mill & Elevator Co., 207 S. W. 400.378 (Ky.) To defeat the rights of a holder 70 (Ark.) Under Negotiable Instrument Act, of commercial paper in due course, a fraudu- lent alteration must be a material one.-Citi- § 132, providing that drawee who destroys a bill will be deemed to have accepted the same, zens' State Bank of Greenup v. Johnson Coun- drawee upon willfully destroying bill which he ty, 207 S. W. 8. had not accepted in writing was liable thereon, regardless of whether he had verbally accepted bill.-Bailey & Co. v. Southwestern Veneer Co., 207 S. W. 34.
VII. PAYMENT AND DISCHARGE.
426 (Mo.App.) Where a stranger to a note paid the amount thereof to the holder through of a 70 (Tex.Civ.App.) An acceptance a bank, it is a question of intention whether the draft may be implied from the drawee's con- duct.-Farmers' Guaranty State Bank of Jack-payment was in discharge of the note or in sonville v. Burrus Mill & Elevator Co., 207 purchase thereof.-Stark v. Scherf, 207 S. W.
Where a bank to which a note was sent for collection paid the holder and transferred the note to a stranger, who paid the amount due with intent to keep alive the obligation, the makers of the note cannot complain and the in- strument remains a subsisting obligation against them.-Id.
72 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where the drawer of bill of exchange presents it to his bank which transmits it to defendant bank, which pays it by its cashier's check under an agreement with the drawee, incloses the remittance in an ad- dressed and stamped envelope, and mails it, such action makes defendant's acceptance a finality, depriving both it and the drawee of the right to withdraw the acceptance given.-467 (2) (Tex.Com.App.) Petition, in action Farmers' Guaranty State Bank of Jacksonville on vendor's lien note, alleging the appointment v. Burrus Mill & Elevator Co., 207 S. W. 400. of vendor's foreign administrator, who trans- ferred all notes to one S., and that note in suit II. CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION. was put in escrow by administrator and anoth- er did not allege title under S. or any owner- ship by S., and the word "transferred" meant the written indorsement thereon, and not a le- gal assignment and delivery, or that the trans- fer to S. postdated the escrow agreement.— Webb v. Reynolds, 207 S. W. 914.
129(2) (Tex.Civ.App.) A note payable in installments, and providing that on default of any installment the entire debt may be declar- ed due, does not become due by the nonpay- ment of an installment, in the absence of a declaration to that effect by the holder.-Drink- ard v. Jenkins, 207 S. W.-353.
V. RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES ON IN- DORSEMENT OR TRANSFER.
(D) Bona Fide Purchasers. 329 (Ky.) Ky. St. § 3720b, subsec. 56, de- claring that, to constitute notice of infirmity, person to whom instrument is negotiated must have had actual knowledge of the infirmity, having been passed since the execution of the bond sued on, its provisions will not govern the rights of the parties, unless declarative of the of pre-existing law.-Citizens' State Bank Greenup v. Johnson County, 207 S. W. S. Ky. St. § 3720b, subsec. 56, declaring that, to constitute notice of infirmity, person to
485 (Tex.Com.App.) Rev. St. 1911, art. 588, and article 1906. subd. 9, requiring a de- nial under oath of genuineness of indorsement or assignment of note, were not intended to dispense with proof of an administrator's au- thority to sell or assign, as such authority, un- der article 3480, depends upon an order of court, so that absence of any verified denial of administrator's assignment thereof to plaintiff did not dispense with proof of its validity.- Webb v. Reynolds, 207 S. W. 914.
absence of a 488 (Tex.Com.App.) The sworn pleading questioning genuineness of a written instrument does not dispense with its production in court; and, where a written in- strument is declared on and there is a general denial, it is necessary to establish plaintiff's
For cases in Dec.Dig. & Am.Dig. Key-No.Series & Indexes see same topic and KEY-NUMBER
case for him to offer the instrument in evidence. I not render survey void, as distances called for -Webb v. Reynolds, 207 S. W. 914. would be extended to reach the objects.-Spear- 496 (1) (Tex.Com.App.) In action upon ven- man v. Mims, 207 S. W. 573. dor's lien note, where plaintiff's pleadings show-3(5) (Tex.Civ.App.) Distance being regard- ed that it had been the property of an estate ed as more unreliable than course, it follows of which an administrator was appointed in that, the greater the distance, the greater the Kentucky and been placed with a bank under probability of error, and vice versa.-Matador an escrow agreement between one of the own- Land & Cattle Co. v. Cassidy-Southwestern ers and the administrator, the burden was on Commission Co., 207 S. W. 430. plaintiff to show an order of court under Rev. St. 1911, art. 3480, authorizing a sale or as- signment by administrator to him.-Webb v. Reynolds. 207 S. W. 914.
511 (Mo.App.) In an action on a note which defendant claimed had been paid, it appearing that the holder had transmitted it to a bank which took up the same and paid the holder, held that correspondence between the holder and such bank was admissible, as tending to show payment.-Stark v. Scherf, 207 S. W. 863. 524 (Tex.Com.App.) The rule that plain- tiff's possession or production in court of a note sued on is prima facie evidence of owner- ship had no application, where the pleadings and evidence showed that he was not in posses- sion of a note sued on, but that it was held in escrow, and that its production was procured by an order requiring it to be brought into court.-Webb v. Reynolds, 207 S. W. 914.
537(1) (Tex. Civ.App.) Telephoning to holder of note regarding extension, and failure of holder to keep promise then made to meet maker, did not even raise a question for the jury on the issue as to whether there was agreement for extension.-Thomas v. Derrick, 207 S. W. 140.
537(8) (Mo.App.) In an action on a note which had been taken up by a bank which paid the holder, held that the question whether the note had been discharged and paid was, under the evidence, for the jury.-Stark v. Scherf, 207
3 (6) (Tex.Civ.App.) An established original corner must control.-Chew v. De Ware, 207 S. W. 988.
The identification on the ground of the foot- steps of the surveyor determines the true boundary. Id.
3(7) (Tex.Civ.App.) When unmarked lines of adjacent surveys are called for, and when, from the other calls of such adjacent surveys, the position of such unmarked lines can be ascertained with accuracy, the unmarked lines will prevail over course and distance.-Mata- dor Land & Cattle Co. v. Cassidy-Southwestern Commission Co., 207 S. W. 430.
The fact that in field notes of a survey there is a call for an unidentified corner of a sur- vey ought not to be given controlling effect, if to do so is to entirely disregard calls for ad- joining surveys and cause confusion and dis- agreement.-Id.
20(1) (Tex. Civ.App.) The owner of a lot abutting on a street acquires the fee to the middle of the street.-Summit Place Co. v. Terrell, 207 S. W. 145.
25 (Tex.Civ.App.) If there was a conflict between the two surveys in question, the older survey would hold the land.-Erwin v. Morgan, 207 S. W. 556.
II. EVIDENCE, ASCERTAINMENT, AND ESTABLISHMENT.
37(1) (Tex.Civ.App.) In suit to determine true boundary between adjoining surveys, held, that boundary was as claimed by plaintiff.- Matador Land & Cattle Co. v. Cassidy-South- western Commission Co., 207 S. W. 430.
40 (1) (Ky.) Extraneous evidence offered to identify lands included in a patent to land is- sued by the state, which was void for uncer- tainty, held not sufficient for submission to jury. Sproul v. Interstate Coal Co., 207 S. W. 715.
54(7) (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action, under Rev. St. 1911, art. 3915, to recover statutory penalty from county surveyor on account of excessive fees charged for a survey made under Vernon's Sayles' Ann. Civ. St. 1914, art. 5904c, the fees prescribed in Rev. St. 1911, art. 3876, for surveying "land" will not be held to apply, where the land was covered by waters of Nue- ces Bay.-Redus v. Blucher, 207 S. W. 613.
39; See Criminal Law, 641, 867.
See Adverse Possession, 16, 66, 100; Ap-. peal and Error, 1010; Dedication, 19; Easements, 58; Evidence, Waters and Water Courses, 111; Wills, 561.
See Assignments, 85; Counties, 210.
83; See Appeal and Error, 756–773.
See Accord and Satisfaction, 1; Trial,
3(2) (Tex.Civ.App.) In establishing bound- aries, those calls will be adopted which are more certain, avoid conflicts in surveys, etc., and harmonize with the evident purpose of the II. EMPLOYMENT AND AUTHORITY. state in making the grant, even though a nat-8(3) (Tex. Civ. App.) In a cross-action, ural object must be disregarded.-Matador wherein commissions, damages, etc., were Land & Cattle Co. v. Cassidy-Southwestern sought by defendant broker for breach of a Commission Co., 207 S. W. 430. contract to receive cattle purchased by plain- tiff, evidence held sufficient to sustain a find- ing that such cattle were purchased upon plain- tiff's order.-Hollis Cotton Oil, Light & Ice Co. v. Marrs & Lake, 207 S. W. 367.
3(3) (Tex.Civ.App.) Where calls of survey were for objects specified as on the ground at distances indicated, the fact that survey may not have closed according to a calculation made of distances called for in the field notes would
In an action wherein commissions, damages,
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