may state facts upon which his opinion is based. | to send her to jail unless she repeated former
-State v. Stegner, 207 S. W. 826.

491(1) (Mo.) Expert witness testifying to
identity of handwriting under Rev. St. 1909, §
6382, may testify in regard to difference or sim-
ilarity of letters or words and in regard to any
matter appearing on the face of the writings.-
State v. Stegner, 207 S. W. 826.

(J) Testimony of Accomplices and Code-

fendants.

511(1) (Tex.Cr.App.) In view of statute
as to required proof, conviction of perjury can-
not be sustained upon testimony of two accom-
plices, or upon the testimony of one credible
witness and one accomplice.-Melton v. State,
207 S. W. 316.

511(10) (Tex.Cr.App.) In view of statute
as to required proof, conviction of perjury can-
not be sustained upon testimony of two ac-
complices.-Melton v. State, 207 S. W. 316.

(K) Confessions.

once

519(1) (Ark.) A confession having
been voluntarily made, the fact that appellant
afterwards repeated the confession under du-
ress did not destroy or lessen the effect of the
voluntary confession.-Lind v. State, 207 S. W.

47.

519(3) (Tex. Cr.App.) Under Code Cr. Proc.
1911, art. 810, as to oral confession made by
accused while in custody of an officer being in-
admissible, it is unnecessary that arrest be
made in formal words if it clearly appears from
the surrounding facts.-Clark v. State, 207 S.
W. 98.

testimony which she said was false and in-
duced by coercion and which she finally repeat-
ed, judgment of conviction must be reversed.-
Venable v. State, 207 S. W. 520.

(C) Reception of Evidence.
673(4) (Mo.) If evidence is admissible as
against one of several coconspirators, it will not
be excluded because it is incompetent as against
the proper application, purpose, and effect of
others; an instruction being then required as to
such evidence.-State v. Bersch, 207 S. W. 809.
(E) Arguments and Conduct of Counsel.

706 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where the district at-
torney and prosecuting officer threatened pros-
ecutrix, a girl under 15 years of age, with a
prosecution for perjury unless she repeated her
testimony as given before court of inquiry and
grand jury which she said was false and in-
duced by coercion, and she was thus induced to
testify, a conviction based thereon must be re-
versed.-Venable v. State, 207 S. W. 520.

714 (Mo.) Prosecuting attorney's remarks
as to former conviction of defendant were im-
proper under Rev. St. 1909, § 5283.-State v.
Stegner, 207 S. W. 826.

7202 (Mo.) In prosecutor's remark to jury
that, if trial judge had not been satisfied that
a finding of guilt was authorized, he would
have "grabbed the prosecutor and the principal
witness and thrown them out of the window."
held improper, tending to make jury think that
court thought defendant guilty or he would not
have permitted prosecution.-State v. Stegner,
207 S. W. 826.
com-723(5) (Tex.Cr.App.) That the county at-
torney in a larceny case, referring to defendant,
said, "He is no account trifling negro," and
asked the jury if they would like to credit him
with $20 did not constitute reversible error.-
Watkins v. State, 207 S. W. 926.

535(2) (Ark.) Although under Kirby's Dig.
§ 2385, one could not be convicted of seduc-
tion upon his confession alone, yet, when
bined with testimony of prosecutrix establish-
ing the corpus delicti, it is sufficient.-Lind v.
State, 207 S. W. 47.

(M) Weight and Sufficiency.
552(3) (Ky.) A conviction may be rested on
circumstantial evidence, when it is of such a
nature as to establish with reasonable cer-
tainty the guilt of accused.-Taylor v. Com-
monwealth, 207 S. W. 456.

In a prosecution of a negro for larceny of
cotton, a statement by the county attorney to
the jury that they knew "that last fall cotton
was good, and any negro could have had money
sufficient to go to the Dallas fair," did not con-
stitute reversible error.-Id.
tes-726 (Ky.) That in a homicide case the pros-
ecuting attorney, after defendant had objected
to exhibition of deceased's garments, made
remarks relative to deceased's dying groans,
was not error, when introduced as repartee to
defendant's unwarranted objections.-Slone v.
Commonwealth, 207 S. W. 464.

553 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where the examination
of a prosecuting witness shows that her
timony on which a conviction for rape is based
was induced by threats and coercion, her tes-
timony is not sufficiently creditable to sustain
a conviction.-Venable v. State, 207 S. W. 520.
XI. TIME OF TRIAL AND CONTINU-
ANCE.

597(2) (Ky.) Where witnesses had testified
defendant said to his father, "Pap, by God, get
out of the way," refusal to pass case on ground
that absent witness would testify that witness-
es testified on examining trial that defend-
ant had said, "Get out of the way, Pap, get
out of the way, get out of the way," was not
error; the discrepancy between the two state-
ments being so slight as not to amount to a
material contradiction.-Hurley V. Common-
wealth, 207 S. W. 451.

XII. TRIAL.

(B) Course and Conduct of Trial in Gen-
eral.

641(6) (Mo.) In a prosecution for arson,
where, after one of the jurors had said that
defendant's brother-in-law had attempted to
bribe him, defendant's counsel withdrew from
the case, it was not an abuse of discretion for
the trial court to permit them to do so.-State v.
Bersch, 207 S. W. 809.

655(1) (Tex.Cr.App.) Where the trial judge
mainly in the absence of the jury reminded
prosecutrix in a rape case, a girl under 15
years of age, that he had power to inflict the
death penalty and had just sent a woman to the
penitentiary, and committed prosecutrix to
custody overnight, and subsequently threatened

730(9) (Ky.) In a burglary prosecution, a
believe that this robbery was deliberately plan-
statement by the prosecuting attorney that "I
ned" by defendants was not reversible error, as
expressing the prosecuting attorney's individual
opinion, when he immediately corrected it by
from the testimony, and in view of cautionary
saying he believed such facts could be inferred
instructions.-Crowe v. Commonwealth, 207 S.
W. 699.

(F) Province of Court and Jury in Gen-

eral.

742(1) (Tex.Cr.App.) The credibility of wit-
nesses is a question for the jury.-Martinez v.
State, 207 S. W. 930.

752 (Mo.) Where defendant demurs to evi-
dence at the close of the state's testimony and
subsequently offers testimony in his own behalf
after the demurrer has been overruled, the
demurrer will be deemed waived; but, where
he renews demurrer at the close of all the tes-
timony and preserves error in motion for new
trial, he may have a review of the entire testi-
mony.-State v. Starling, 207 S. W. 767.

763, 764(3, 4) (Mo.) Instruction that there
is no evidence showing or tending to show that
defendant was justified in killing deceased was
error, it being for the jury to find as one of
the vital issues in the case that defendant killed
deceased.-State v. Fox, 207 S. W. 779.

763, 764(17) (Mo.) In a prosecution for ar- and distinct offenses, a general verdict, without
son, an instruction restricting the effect and op-designating of which offense he is found guilty,
eration of certain evidence to one of the cocon- cannot stand.-State y. McHenry, 207 S. W.
spirators was not therefore bad as a comment 808.
on the evidence.-State v. Bersch, 207 S. W.
809.

For cases in Dec.Dig. & Am.Dig. Key-No.Series & Indexes see same topic and KEY-NUMBER

Rev. St. 1909, § 4528, permitting burglary
and larceny to be charged in the same count and
indictment, constitutes an exception to the gen-
eral rule that a person cannot on the same trial
be convicted of two different and distinct felo-
nies, but does not operate to avoid the necessity
of a finding by a jury of what particular of-
fense or offenses defendant has been guilty.-Id.
ceny charged in the same count as permitted by
Rev. St. 1909, § 4528, the verdict, if finding de-
fendant guilty of both offenses, should fix a
separate penalty for each offense.-State v. Mc-
Henry, 207 S. W. 808.

778(2) (Mo.) An instruction in a murder
case as to circumstantial evidence and as to
what was essential in order to convict held
not erroneous, as authorizing inferences found-884 (Mo.) In a trial for burglary and lar-
ed on inferred facts.-State v. Garrett, 207 S.
W. 784.

779 (Ark.) In prosecution for assault
with intent to rape, instruction that defendant
would not be responsible for the act of an-
other, unless there was some agreement, com-
bination, or conspiracy between him and such
other, etc., was misleading and properly re-
fused.-Lockett v. State, 207 S. W. 55.

XIII. MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL
AND IN ARREST.

925/2(3) (Tex.Cr.App.) That the jury, in
785(9) (Mo.) A cautionary instruction in a
their deliberations, referred to the fact that
murder trial as to the credibility of witnesses defendant during the trial dozed off to sleep
that in hearing their testimony the jury may and nodded several times, does not require a
take into consideration his or her interest, feel-new trial, since the jury was not inhibited from
ing for, or relation to defendant was not errone
ous, as not including state's witnesses, since it
would embrace antagonism as well as friend-
ship. State v. Garrett, 207 S. W. 784.

800(2) (Mo.) In a prosecution for arson,
that the court defined the word "attempt" by
using the words of Rev. St. 1909, § 4894, was
not prejudicial; it being a word of general
significance and easily understood.-State v.
Bersch, 207 S. W. 809.

800(6) (Mo.) In a prosecution for murder in
the first degree, it was reversible error to fail to
define the word "deliberately" as descriptive of
the offense.-State v. Garrett, 207 S. W. 784.

814(3) (Ky.) An instruction not sustained
by the evidence should not have been given.-
Hurley v. Commonwealth, 207 S. W. 451.
814(17) (Mo.) Where there was direct evi-
dence of defendant's guilt, an instruction on the
weight to be given circumstantial evidence was
not required.-State v. Stegner, 207 S. W. 826.

823(17) (Mo.) Failure to define "heat of
passion" was without prejudice to defendant,
where the court set out concretely the facts
that would warrant such heat of passion, as
would reduce the crime from murder to man-
slaughter in the fourth degree.-State v. Fox,
207 S. W. 779.

(H) Requests for Instructions.

talking of his manner and conduct in passing
upon the weight of his testimony.-Wright v.
State, 207 S. W. 99.

939(1) (Ark.) A party asking for a new
trial in a criminal case for newly discovered
evidence should show facts from which it will
obtained the evidence by reasonable diligence.
appear that he could not have ascertained or
-Lind v. State, 207 S. W. 47.

XIV. JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, AND
FINAL COMMITMENT.

984 (Mo.) In a prosecution for burglary in
the second degree and for grand larceny under
each designating the offense of which defendant
one count, a verdict in separate paragraphs,
was found guilty and prescribing the punish-
ment within the limits of the statute, imposes
cumulative sentences.-State v. Starling, 207
S. W. 767.

XV. APPEAL AND ERROR, AND
CERTIORARI.

(B) Presentation and Reservation in Low-
er Court of Grounds of Review.
~1035(3) (Mo.) Act of wife of deceased at the
trial of a homicide case in drawing a pistol
and wounding defendant was "conduct of spec-
tators," and cannot be reviewed, where no ef-
~829(1) (Ark.) There was no error in omit- fort was made to preserve and present the mat-
ting matter from a requested instruction where it was set up in motion for new trial.-State
ter for review by bill of exceptions, nor until
the court expressly charged as to such omitted
matter in another instruction.-Lind v. State, 1036(1) (Mo.) Where testimony in a prose-
v. Jones, 207 S. W. 793.
tion for arson is not objected to, it will not be
considered on appeal.-State v. Bersch, 207 S.

207 S. W. 47.

829(1) (Mo.) It was not error to refuse to
grant instructions fully covered by instructions
given.-State v. Jones, 207 S. W. 793.
(J) Custody, Conduct, and Deliberations

of Jury.

858(3) (Ky.) It is better practice not to
permit former verdicts written upon an in-
dictment to be taken to the jury room, and, if
the attention of the trial court should be call-
ed to the fact, it would be his duty to prevent
it, either by withholding indictment or requir-
ing obliteration of former verdict.-Williams v.
Commonwealth, 207 S. W. 447.

W. 809.

1036(4) (Ky.) In a homicide case where de-
cedent's shirt was allowed to be introduced in
evidence without objection, it was not reversible
error to allow the admission of both the vest
and shirt without showing that they were in
the same condition as at the time of the diffi-
culty, where no objection was made thereto,
because without objection the evidence will
not be presumed to be incompetent.-Slone v.
Commonwealth, 207 S. W. 464.

1038(1) (Ark.) If language of instruction
was thought to be ambiguous, specific objection
ought to have been made at the time.-Lockett
v. State, 207 S. W. 55.

867 (Mo.) In a prosecution for arson, where
defendant's counsel withdrew upon a juror's
announcement that defendant's brother-in-law 1039 (Ky.) It was not reversible error for
had attempted to bribe him, it was not an abuse
of discretion to refuse to discharge jury, where
they on their oath stated the incident would
have no influence on their verdict.-State v.
Bersch, 207 S. W. 809.

(K) Verdict.

881(4) (Mo.) Where defendant is charged
in the indictment with two or more different

jury to take to its room indictment for larceny
on which was written former verdict acquitting
defendant's codefendant; defendant's attorney
not having objected, and not having known of
indorsement on indictment, discoverable by in-
spection.-Williams v. Commonwealth, 207 S.
W. 447.

1043(1) (Mo.) Where defendant demurs to
evidence at the close of the state's testimony

and subsequently offers testimony in his own|1111(5) (Ark.) Entries in judgment rec-
behalf after the demurrer has been overruled, ord prevail over statements contained in bill of
the demurrer will be deemed waived; but, where exceptions, where inconsistent therewith.-
he renews demurrer at the close of all the tes- Brooks v. State, 207 S. W. 209.
timony and preserves error in motion for new
trial, he may have a review of the entire testi-
mony.-State v. Starling, 207 S. W. 767.

1056(1) (Mo.) Although there was abundant 1134(4) (Ky.) Since the amendment of 1910
evidence that defendant's general reputation to Code Cr. Prac. § 281, Court of Appeals may
was good upon the specified phase of character consider error of trial court in its rulings on
involved, where no exception was saved, the act motions for new trial, and reverse a convic
of trial court in failing to instruct on “the sub- tion, where the verdict is against the evidence.
ject of good character," as provided by Rev. St.-Williams v. Commonwealth, 207 S. W. 447.
1909, § 5231, cannot be reviewed.-State v.
Cook, 207 S. W. 831.

1090 (16) (Tex.Cr.App.) Where the only
question suggested in the motion for a new trial 1170(1) (Tex.Cr.App.) In a prosecution of
is that the judgment is contrary to the law and a town marshal for aggravated assault while
the evidence, the same cannot be considered in making an arrest for violation of a traffic ordi-
the absence of a statement of facts; there be-nance, there was no reversible error in reject-
ing no bill of exceptions.-Martinez v. State,
207 S. W. 930.

For cases in Dec.Dig. & Am.Dig. Key-No.Series & Indexes see same topic and KEY-NUMBER

issue being whether a forcible resistance was
being made.-Harper v. State, 207 S. W. 96.

III. GROUNDS AND SUBJECTS OF
COMPENSATORY DAMAGES.

(A)

or

Direct
Remote, Contingent,
Prospective, Consequences or Losses.

or

32 (Mo.App.) "Suffering in the future"
from injury is distinguished from "permanent
injury," in that the former will persist after
the trial, but may cease, while the latter will
last throughout life.-Colby v. Thompson, 207
S. W. 73.

1170(2) (Mo.) Where defendant was permit-
ted, on cross-examining mother of prosecutrix
in a prosecution for manslaughter in producing
an abortion resulting in the death of a quick
child, to inquire fully as to time when she ac-
quired knowledge of her daughter's condition,
exclusion of evidence of another witness on
cross-examination as to conversation with the
mother to show her prior knowledge was harm-
less; purpose being only to discredit the tes-40(1) (Tex.Civ.App.) In action for slander
timony of the prosecutrix to the fact that her and for wrongful interference in contractual
mother was aware of her condition prior to the relations, resulting in tie-up of plaintiff's ship-
alleged abortion.-State v. Dinkelkamp, 207 S. ment of cotton, damages cannot be recovered
for loss of profits plaintiff might have made
by engaging in other business during period of
tie-up, instead of devoting his time to effort to
settle shipment controversy; such damages be-
ing too remote and speculative.--Providence-
Washington Ins. Co. v. Owens, 207 S. W. 666.
in-55 (Ky.) In an action for damages for in-
juries to sheep, crops, and loss of time for tres-
pass committed by defendant's dogs, damages for
the mental distress of plaintiff are not recov-
erable.-Stephens v. Schadler, 207 S. W. 704.

W. 770.

11702(1) (Ark.) In prosecution for as-
sault with intent to rape, permitting state to
introduce testimony tending to establish pros-
ecutrix's general reputation for truth and
morality, contrary to Kirby's Dig. § 3140, pro-
viding that evidence of good character is
admissible until general reputation has been
impeached, was reversible error.-Lockett v.
State, 207 S. W. 55.

(H) Determination and Disposition of
Cause.

1184 (Tex.Cr.App.) Where the trial court
on conviction for murder failed to apply the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, Vernon's Ann.
Code Cr. Proc. 1916, art. 865a, the judgment
entering the sentence will be reformed so that
it will provide for confinement in the state
penitentiary within the period fixed by law as
the minimum and maximum penalty for the
offense.-Wright v. State, 207 S. W. 99.

1186(4) (Mo.) While the Supreme Court is
required to render judgment on the record in
criminal cases, under Rev. St. 1909, § 5312,
there is no more authority for the reversal of a
criminal than a civil case, where it is disclosed
that the error complained of does not affect the
merits of the action, under section 2082.-State
v. Porter, 207 S. W. 774.

CROPS.

VI. MEASURE OF DAMAGES.

(B) Injuries to Property.

112 (Tex.Com.App.) In action for the negli-
gent burning of grass in a pasture, a charge,
permitting recovery for the cost of feed and ex-
penses of caring for cattle, does not furnish a
certain rule of damages, but the correct rule is
to permit recovery for the value of the grass at
the date of its destruction.-Chicago, R. I. &
G. Ry. Co. v. Word, 207 S. W. 902.

The market value of grass for the purpose for
which it was used is the measure of damages
for its negligent burning, but if there was no
market value, then recovery should be for the
reasonable value of the grass for the purpose for
which it was being used or for which intended.
-Id.

VII. INADEQUATE AND EXCESSIVE

DAMAGES.

See Appeal and Error, 1048; Chattel Mort-
gages, 117; Evidence, 108, 114; Hus-132(6) (Ky.) Where the bones in plain-
band and Wife, 248% Insurance, 163; tiff's ankle were broken when forced to jump
Sales. 181; Trial, 240; Witnesses,
from a runaway railroad car, causing painful
255, 275, 398.
and permanent injuries, a verdict for $600 was
not excessive.-Cumberland R. Co. v. Gibson,
207 S. W. 301.

CURTESY.

8 (Ky.) A husband has no rights in land
which the wife before marriage sold by exec-
utory contract, although she did not convey the
legal title until after marriage.-Lockart v.
Kentland Coal & Coke Co., 207 S. W. 18.

CUSTOMS AND USAGES.

See Evidence, 457; Master and Servant,
270, 289; Railroads, 278; Sales, 23.

CUSTOMS DUTIES.

See Carriers, 123.

DAMAGES.

132(6) (Mo.App.) A verdict for $1 was so
grossly inadequate as to indicate prejudicial
passion or bias. where an eight year old boy
struck by a falling gate sustained an oblique
fracture of the upper thigh bone, the lower pel-
vic bone; the thigh joint and the hip bone re-
quiring the wiring of the bones, causing great
suffering and necessitating confinement to the
hospital for eight weeks, leaving plaintiff with
a shortened leg.-Bock v. Rinderknecht, 207 S.
W. 245.

132(7) (Tex.Civ.App.) Although plaintiff,
when he received permanent injuries to his
foot and other injuries, was 60 years old, where
he was able to and did superintend a large
business and injuries had largely impaired his
ability to do so, besides causing him suffering
and expense, a verdict for $10,000 will not be
held excessive.-Burnett v. Anderson, 207 S.
W. 540.

VIII. PLEADING, EVIDENCE, AND

ASSESSMENT.

(A) Pleading.

See Appeal and Error, 1048, 1066, 1068,
1151, 1170, 1171; Carriers, 227, 229;
Commerce, 28; Covenants,
132;
Death, 85, 99; Eminent Domain, 107
Evidence, 113, 568, 571; Fraud, ~59;
Husband and Wife, 235; Injunction,
260; Insurance, 668; Judgment, 252;157(4) (Mo.App.) In an action against a
Jury, 28; Landlord and Tenant, 200;
Libel and Slander, 119; New Trial,
75; Telegraphs and Telephones, 68, 71;
Trespass, 58; Trial, 252; Work and
Labor, 29.

carrier to recover for goods destroyed by fire,
plaintiff cannot recover for interest on the
amount of loss, where its complaint or state-
ment asks no interest.-Central Nat. Bank v.
Pryor, 207 S. W. 298.

(B) Evidence.
173(1) (Ky.) In servant's action for inju-
ries, trial court properly refused to permit em-
ployer to prove that two or three days before
plaintiff quit work and filed action, he was told
he could stay and do what he could, and would
be paid full wages; evidence not being compe-
tent to rebut servant's evidence that power
to earn had been reduced.-Lexington Roller
Mills Co. v. Fields, 207 S. W. 477.

182 (Mo.App.) The fact that defendant in
a personal injury suit has paid plaintiff's hos-
pital and doctor bills cannot be considered by
the jury in determining compensation for in-
juries sustained by defendant's negligence.-
Bock v. Rinderknecht, 207 S. W. 245.

DEATH.

See Abatement and Revival, 48; "Appeal
and Error, 1060; Commerce, 8; Ev-
idence, 471, 539; Limitation of Actions,
127: Master and Servant, 107, 190,
264, 274, 281, 286, 289; Negligence, 7,
111, 134, 135; Trial, 351; Witnesses,
154.

I. EVIDENCE OF DEATH AND OF
SURVIVORSHIP.

2(1) (Tex.Com.App.) Where the evidence
shows that a man was unmarried and had re-
moved from the state many years ago and has
not been heard from for 15 years, such facts
are insufficient to raise presumption of death
under Rev. St. 1911, art. 5707.-Stiles v. Hawk-
ins, 207 S. W. 89.

II. ACTIONS FOR CAUSING DEATH.
(A) Right of Action and Defenses.
14(1) (Tex.Civ.App.) In actions to recover
damages for injuries to or the death of chil-
dren, as in cases to recover damages for the
death or injuries to adults, suit cannot be main-
tained unless defendant has been guilty of a
breach of duty.-Flippen-Prather Realty Co.
v. Mather, 207 S. W. 121.

(B) Jurisdiction, Venue, and Limitations.
39 (Tex.) Under federal Employers' Liabili-
ty Act (U. S. Comp. St. 1916, §§ 8657-8665),
cause of action in case of death does not ac-
crue until appointment of a personal represent-
ative of deceased, and, where deceased's wife
filed petition within two years after she was
appointed administratrix, action was not barred.
-Bird v. Ft. Worth & R. G. Ry. Co., 207 S. W.
518.

(E) Damages, Forfeiture, or Fine.

85 (Tex.Civ.App.) Surviving wife, in action
for death of husband, is entitled to recover for
the pecuniary loss, if any, suffered by her in
husband's death.-San Antonio Portland Ce-
ment Co. v. Gschwender, 207 S. W. 967.

86(2) (Tex.Civ.App.) In action for death,
where deceased leaves widow and children, dam-
ages are not limited to loss of actual earning
power of deceased, and jury may award chil-
dren damages for loss of a father's nurture and
admonition.-Lancaster & Wight v. Allen, 207
S. W. 984.

and contribution which they might reasonably
have expected from a son of 23, and, where
they were not in need of the financial aid of the
son, though he was at home and devoted all
his time to their service, an award of $3,500
was excessive.-Panhandle & S. F. Ry. Co. v.
Huckabee, 207 S. W. 329.

DEDICATION.

I. NATURE AND REQUISITES.

16(1) (Tex.Civ.App.) Where road had long
been used as public roadway, a judgment sanc-
tioning agreement that road be opened up and
dedicated as a public road, in connection with
another judgment ordering road to be opened
and an obstruction removed and the acts of
the parties to the judgment, owners of land
upon which right of way was located and public
officials treating road as public highway, con-
stituted a dedication to public use.-Santa Fé
Town Site Co. v. Norvell, 207 S. W. 960.

District court's judgment giving legal sanction
to agreement of parties, whereby road long used
as public road was opened up and dedicated as
a public road, was not invalid as an infringe-
ment upon exclusive rights of commissioners'
court to lay out public road.-Id.

18(1) (Tex. Civ.App.) Deed expressly stat-
ing that all streets and alleys are dedicated to
the public generally, and especially to the city,
that red lines on map indicate public sidewalks,
four feet wide, and that green shadings indi-
cate private parking between the sidewalk and
curbing, would constitute a dedication to the
public of an easement in sidewalk space, but
not in strip designated private parking.-Sum-
mit Place Co. v. Terrell, 207 S. W. 145.

19(4) (Tex. Civ.App.) If intention of maker
of map was to include sidewalk space and pri-
vate parking space as portions of corner lots.
such intention was adopted by the owner when
it recorded the map.-Summit Place Co. v. Ter-
rell, 207 S. W. 145.

See Adverse Possession, 70, 100; Appeal
and Error, 1177; Courts, 18; Dedi-
cation, 18, 48; Dower, 13; Easement.
10: Escrows, 3, 9; Evidence, 83,
158, 177, 186, 317, 318, 419; Exchange of
Property, 4; Fixtures, 21: Fraudu-
Husband and
lent Conveyances, 283;
Wife, 119, 193, 198. 273; Injunction,
128; Judgment, 788; Limitation of Ac-
tions, 72; Mortgages; Pleading, ~8;
Quieting Title, 35; Specific Performance,
12: Subrogation, 23; Trespass to
Try Title, 4, 25, 35, 41, 47; Trusts,
114; Wills, 88.

I. REQUISITES AND VALIDITY.

ces in General.

99(3) (Tex.Civ.App.) A verdict of $10,000 (A) Nature and Essentials of Conveyan-
for the death of a healthy, robust, and bright17(2) (Tex.Civ.App.) Where, in payment of
son about seven years old, is not so large as to indebtedness of about $1,000, land was convey-
indicate that jury was actuated by impropered which the evidence offered by grantor tended
motives, and will not be disturbed on appeal.
-Flippen-Prather Realty Co. v. Mather, 207

S. W. 121.

99(4) (Tex. Civ.App.) In action for death of
48 year old fireman, a $27,000 judgment, award-
ed to widow and seven children, was not so ex-
cessive as to require reduction by Court of Civil
Appeals.-Lancaster & Wight v. Allen, 207 S.
W. 984.

to show was worth about $1,500, the difference
between its value and the indebtedness was not
so great as to require court to set aside deed
for inadequacy of consideration alone.-Grun-
dy v. Greene, 207 S. W. 964.

(D) Delivery.

56(3) (Tex. Civ.App.) For a deed to operate
99(5) (Tex.Civ.App.) Parents are entitled as a conveyance, there must have been deliv-
to recover only compensation for the services ery with intent and purpose on the part of the