no deed of trust was in fact executed (citing | sence of fraud, the election was not invalid for
Words and Phrases, First and Second Editions, failure to advertise it for ten days, as required
Equitable Liens and Equitable Mortgages).- by Rev. St. 1911, art. 1037.-Id.
Luse v. Rea, 207 S. W. 942.

III. CONSTRUCTION AND OPERA-

TION.

(D) Lien and Priority.

Where county judge, in response to petition,
ordered election on specified date to determine
whether town should be incorporated, and that
election was temporarily restrained, he could
order another election on dissolution of the
injunction, without new petition.-Id.

termine whether town should be incorporated
Fact that promoters of town election to de-
procured order for election without ten days'
statutory notice in order to beat neighboring
town election did not invalidate the election
when the judge acted fairly and without cor-
rupt motive.-Id.

151(4) (Tenn.) Where plaintiff was entitled
to subject to the payment of his debt, incurred
by the original church, funds which a second
church received from the first, held that, where
the second church did not complete its corpo-
rate organization until after complainant filed
his bill, complainant was entitled to satisfac-
tion out of its property prior to mortgages exe-
cuted by the second church as a corporation,
though such mortgages were valid as against II. GOVERNMENTAL POWERS AND
the church; he having fixed a prior lien by at-
tachment.-Hunter v. Swadley, 207 S. W. 730.57 (Tenn.) A purely ministerial function of

FUNCTIONS IN GENERAL.

a municipal officer is one as to which nothing is
left to discretion, while legislative acts involve
the exercise of discretion and judgment.-Lots-
peich v. Mayor and Aldermen of Town of Mor-
ristown, 207 S. W. 719.

62 (Tenn.) The powers possessed by mu-
nicipal officers must be viewed as public trusts.
and legislative powers of the board of mayor
and aldermen cannot be delegated to the mayor,
although mere ministerial powers may be so
delegated. Lotspeich v. Mayor and Aldermen of
Town of Morristown, 207 S. W. 719.

Where Acts 1903, c. 103, under which a city
was incorporated, vested in the board of may-
or and aldermen all power to contract, an ar-
bitration agreement made by the mayor with
one whose property the city desired to condemn
for a new city hall building was void, for.
though the board of mayor and aldermen by
resolution directed the mayor to enter into a
written agreement of arbitration, and select ar-
bitrators, held, that such acts involved discre-
tion, and the power to perform the same could

See Appeal and Error, 184, 270, 359; Plead- not be delegated.-Id.
ing,

360.

MOTORCYCLE.

See Master and Servant, 89.

MOVING PICTURES.

See Conspiracy, 18; Libel and Slander,
80.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

63(2) (Mo.App.) Municipal corporations are
prima facie the sole judges of the necessities
of their ordinances, and the courts will not
ordinarily review the reasonableness of such
ordinances when passed in compliance with
authority given by the state, but should declare
an ordinance void if on inspection it appears
to be unreasonable.-City of Lancaster v. Reed,
207 S. W. 868.

IV. PROCEEDINGS OF COUNCIL OR
OTHER GOVERNING BODY.

See Abatement and Revival, 71; Appeal
and Error. 1050, 1051; Arrest, 63; (B) Ordinances and By-Laws in General.
Bail, 96; Boundaries, 20; Carriers, 111(1) (Ky.) Neither an unconstitutional
12; Constitutional Law, 43, 83, 297; statute nor ordinance founded thereon can cre-
Counties; Criminal Law, 252; Dedica- ate any rights or bestow any powers.-Cohen v.
tion, 18. 19. 48; District and Prosecuting City of Henderson, 207 S. W. 4.
Attorneys, 5, 7; Eminent Domain, ~2;
Escrows, 9; Insurance, 574; Manda-
mus. 151, 164: Pleading, 204, 403;
Schools and School Districts; Statutes,
279; Street Railroads; Telegraphs and Tel-
ephones. 12; Trial, 252; Waters and
Water Courses, 210.

I. CREATION, ALTERATION, EXIST-
ENCE, AND DISSOLUTION.
(A) Incorporation and Incidents of Ex-
istence.

12(8) (Tex.Civ.App.) Order, purporting to
be only notice of election to determine whether
town should be incorporated, signed by county
judge, held a valid and sufficient order for the
election.-State v. Troell, 207 S. W. 610.

Requirement of Rev. St. 1911, art. 1037. that
election to determine whether town shall be
incorporated shall be held after ten days' no-
tice, is directory.-Id.

That 102 of 115 town electors voted at elec-
tion to determine whether town should be incor-
porated is proof of actual notice, and, in the ab-

V. OFFICERS, AGENTS, AND EM-
PLOYÉS.

(A) Municipal Officer in General.

138 (Tenn.) Under charter of city of Jel-
lico embodied in Acts 1903, c. 336, §§ 6, 9, 13,
declaring no one eligible to office of mayor un-
less he shall be a citizen of the state and
city, and a voter in the city, and shall have re-
sided in the city for six months next preceding
the election, the term "voter" means one having
the qualifications entitling him to vote, and not
one who has registered as a voter.-Trammell
v. Griffin, 207 S. W. 726.

Thomp. Shan. Code, §§ 1012, 1014, relating to
the registration of voters, as authorized by
Const. art. 4, § 1, do not prescribe qualifica-
tións of electors, but were enacted to regulate
the exercise of the elective franchise, and reg-
istration is not necessary to make one a voter
in a city so as to be eligible under its charter
(Acts 1903, c. 336, §§ 6, 9, 13) to election as
mayor.—Id.

For cases in Dec.Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No.Series & Indexes see same topic and KEY-NUMBER

340 (Ky.) Municipal corporation contract
for street improvements must conform to the
statute which authorizes the work to be done.-
Cohen v. City of Henderson, 207 S. W. 4.

350 (Ky.) Municipal corporations cannot be
held liable for costs of street improvements,
where the statute prohibits a municipal corpo-
ration from constructing streets at the cost of
the municipality.-Cohen v. City of Henderson,

207 S. W. 4.

to make the abutting property liable to an as-
sessment for the costs.-Id.

(F) Enforcement of Assessments and Spe-
cial Taxes.

566 (Mo.) Persons whose names appear in
a petition to enforce a special tax bill cannot
be served by publication as unknown persons,
under Rev. St. 1899, § 580.-Cole v. Parker-
Washington Co., 207 S. W. 749, 766.

Where a petition stated that certain persons
in a suit to foreclose a special tax bill were
nonresidents of the state, and that ordinary
process of law could not be served upon them,
an order of publication was properly issued,
under Rev. St. 1899, § 575.-Id.

was

In a suit to foreclose a tax bill, where the pe-
tition stated that one of three owners
dead, that his unknown heirs had inherited his
interest therein, the court properly issued an
order of publication.-Id.

567 (1) (Mo.) Whether a petition in a suit
to foreclose a special tax bill is good or bad
must be tested by the rules of pleading and not
Ky. St. § 3459a, being unconstitutional, an or-aided or pieced out by the statutes regarding
dinance directing mayor to enter into street the issuance and service of process.-Cole v.
improvement contract under such statute, and Parker-Washington Co., 207 S. W. 749, 766.
contract entered into pursuant to such ordi-
nance, are void, and city cannot be held liable
X. POLICE POWER AND REGULA-
for improvements made pursuant thereto.-Id.
TIONS.

(A) Delegation, Extent, and Exercise of
Power.

Under Ky. St. §§ 3449, 3457, and section 3290,
subsec. 7, city entering into street improvement
contract, void because made pursuant to uncon- 625 (Mo.App.) Notwithstanding R. S. 1909,
stitutional statute, section 3459a, and ordinance
founded thereon, cannot be held liable for im-
provements made under the powers it had to
contract for street improvements other than
the supposed powers it attempted to exercise.
-Id.

351 (Ky.) City, by accepting street improve-
ments made under contract, void because made
pursuant to Ky. St. § 3459a, which is unconsti-
tutional, was not estopped to claim that the
work was done without a valid contract, not
being able to ratify a contract which it had no
authority to make.-Cohen v. City of Hender-
son, 207 S. W. 4.

374(1) (Ky.) Where statute imposes condi-
tions upon municipal corporation's power to
construct street at its own cost, the municipali-
ty cannot be made liable for street improve-
ments, unless such conditions are complied with.
-Cohen v. City of Henderson, 207 S. W. 4.

Statute providing that municipal corporation
cannot be made liable for street improvements,
unless it shall have the right to enforce the
payment of costs against property benefited
thereby, applies only where a corporation has
the right and authority to make the improve.
ment at the cost of abutting property.-Id.

§§ 9371, 9572, authorizing cities of fourth class
to enact ordinances not repugnant to Constitu-
tion and laws and to suppress public indecen-
cies, an ordinance declaring the association of
two or more persons of opposite sex upon
streets, one of them being a person of ill re-
pute, to be a misdemeanor was unreasonable
and void, as infringing the rights of personal
liberty.-City of Lancaster v. Reed, 207 S. W.
868.

(B) Violations and Enforcement of Regu-

lations.

642(1) (Mo.App.) Prosecution for violation
of municipal ordinances are not to be classed
as criminal cases, so far as appellate procedure
is concerned, and an appeal will be dismissed
upon motion therefor, where defendant, appel-
lant, failed to comply with rule 15 (169 S. W.
xiii) of the Kansas City Court of Appeals, in
reference to the filing and serving of a printed
abstract of the record.-Kansas City v. Proud-
fit, 207 S. W. 845.

XI. USE AND REGULATION OF PUB-
LIC PLACES, PROPERTY,
AND WORKS.

(A) Streets and Other Public Ways.
657(5) (Mo.App.) Rev. St. 1909, § 9258,
vesting exclusively in city legislative authorities
the vacation of streets and alleys, does not de-
prive county court of the jurisdiction of va-
cating a block, given it by section 9505.-State
ex rel. and to Use of Lancaster v. Kennedy,
207 S. W. 71.

Municipal corporation will be liable to con-
tractor for street improvements, although con-
tract provided that improvements should be
made at the costs of abutting property, where
the corporation has the right to contract for
improvements and is not prohibited by statute
from paying for them; but the property, on
account of its nature or ownership, cannot be
subjected to costs, notwithstanding statutory
provision that corporation cannot be made liable 682(2) (Tex.Civ.App.) Petition alleging
for street improvements, unless it shall have
right to enforce payment of costs against prop-
erty benefited thereby.-Id.

In absence of statute prohibiting municipality
from improving street at its costs, generally,
municipality having power to contract for street
improvement, but no authority to make the
costs a charge upon abutting property, is prima
facic liable to contractor.-Id.

that defendant city granted to a named com-
pany exclusive franchise for 25 years to use
streets and alleys for constructing, equipping,
and operating a water system, and that plain-
tiff became owner of the system, was, in so far
as it sought recovery for a breach of contract,
subject to special exceptions; the grant of ex-
clusive privilege being void.-Templeton v. City
of Wellington, 207 S. W. 186.

injuries sustained when struck by defendant's
automobile at a street intersection, held that
there was substantial evidence that minor, be-
fore starting to cross street, looked from a
point from which he could have seen the auto-

City authorized to contract for street improve-706 (5) (Mo.App.) In action by minor for
ment, and not prohibited from paying for them,
is liable to contractor, though contract provid-
ed that improvements should be made at the
costs of abutting property, where city having
authority so to do fails to take the proper steps
207 S.W.-67

mobile for practically a block.-Brooks v. Har-955(3) (Ky.) Plaintiff, the purchaser of a
ris, 207 S. W. 293.

negotiable county bond, held not to have had
any actual notice of infirmities in the instru-
ment, which would deprive it of rights as pur-
chaser without notice.-Citizens' State Bank of
Greenup v. Johnson County, 207 S. W. 8.

(D) Taxes and Other Revenue, and Appli-
cation Thereof.

706(7) (Tex.Civ.App.) In action for inju-972(3) (Mo.App.) Where city block was va-
ries sustained by plaintiff pedestrian when run cated by county court, under Rev. St. 1909. §
down by an automobile, driven by defendant's 9505, the assessment of the block, by describ-
chauffeur, held, that court did not err in denying ing it as block 21, was invalid, but should have
peremptory instruction for defendant who plead been made by describing land by its proper legal
ed contributory negligence as a defense.-Bur- description, which came back into effect when
vacation was made.-State ex rel. and to Use of
nett v. Anderson, 207 S. W. 540.
Lancaster v. Kennedy, 207 S. W. 71.

980(1) (Mo.App.) In order to support a pro-
ceeding to enforce by judgment and sale the col-
lection of taxes on real estate, the assessment
thereof must be by, a valid and accurate descrip-
tion.-State ex rel. and to Use of Lancaster v.
Kennedy, 207 S. W. 71.

706(8) (Tex. Civ.App.) In action for person- See Forgery, 12, 26.
al injuries sustained by plaintiff pedestrian
when run down by an automoblie, driven by de-
fendant's chauffeur, held, that court's main
charge was not subject to objection that it sub-
mitted issue of discovered peril.-Burnett v. An-
derson, 207 S. W. 540.

See Appeal and Error. 931, 1002, 1051,
1060, 1064, 1066, 1071, 1212;
Banking, 227; Carriers,
219, 228, 229, 280; Commerce,
112, 132, 182;
ages,
Deeds. 69; Explosives,
25; Husband and Wife, 113, 235; Inn-
keepers, 11; Insurance, 579; Judg-
ment, 460; Master and Servant, 89-
313; Municipal Corporations, 706, 724-
851; Pleading, 9; Railroads, 113,
262-484; Street Railroads. 85-114; Tri-
al, 105, 191, 194, 240, 252, 260, 296, 306,
331, 349, 350, 352; Waters and Water Cours-
es, 171.

734 (Ky.) Where a patient in a city hospi-
tal was scalded by a nurse's negligence, the city
maintaining the hospital under the power given
it by Ky. St. § 3290, cl. 4, as a governmental I.
function, was not liable for the injury.-Brow-
der v. City of Henderson, 207 S. W. 479.

That some of the patients in a hospital main-
tained by a city, under Ky. St. § 3290, cl. 4, are
pay patients, does not make the city liable
for injuries to a patient therein.-Id.

(E) Condition or Use of Public Buildings
and Other Property.

851 (Ky.) Contractors who deal with mu- 207 S. W. 121.
nicipal corporations, in regard to matter pro-9 (Tex.Civ.App.) Negligence is essential to
vided for by its charter, are bound to see that liability for unintentional injury.-Southern Pac
charter provisions are complied with, and up- Co. v. Berkshire, 207 S. W. 323.
on failure so to do must suffer consequences.--
Cohen v. City of Henderson, 207 S. W. 4.

For cases in Dec.Dig. & Am.Dig. Key-No.Series & Indexes see same topic and KEY-NUMBER
(C) Condition and Use of Land, Buildings, an open, unguarded well on defendant's vacant
and Other Structures.
property, held on the evidence, that son was
not, considering his age and discretion, guilty
of contributory negligence. Flippen-Prather
Realty Co. v. Mather, 207 S. W. 121.

(C) Trial, Judgment, and Review.

32(4) (Tex.Civ.App.) If owner of premises
invites or allures a child into a place of danger
and negligently injures such child while there,
he may be held liable, in the absence of con-
tributory negligence for such injury.-Flippen.
Prather Realty Co. v. Mather, 207 S. W. 121.136(14) (Tex.Civ.App.) In actions for per-
33(3) (Tex.Civ.App.) Owner, who neither
expressly nor impliedly invites public to come
upon his premises, is under no obligation to
keep them free from pitfalls or in a condition
of safety for persons, whether adults or in-
fants, who in pursuit of pleasure or convenience
go upon or pass over such premises.-Flippen-
Prather Realty Co. v. Mather, 207 S. W. 121

39 (Tex.Civ.App.) To warrant inference of
implied invitation, the object or thing which
induced injured person to go upon premises
must, on account of its nature and surround-
ings, be especially and unusually attractive.
Flippen-Prather Realty Co. v. Mather, 207 S.
W. 121.

sonal injuries, whether the parties exercised
the required care is for the jury, except in cas-
es where the alleged negligent act is in viola-
tion of law, or when the undisputed facts dis-
close that it was the proximate cause of the in-
jury.-Texas Midland R. R. v. Butler, 207 S. W.
344.

136(14) (Tex.Civ.App.) It is always a ques-
tion of law for the court to say whether or not
any care is required under a given state of
facts. Ferrell v. Beaumont Traction Co., 207
S. W. 654.

136(18) (Tex.Civ.App.) Whether or not
there has been negligence in the use of danger-
ous instrumentalities is a question for the jury.
-Missouri Iron & Metal Co. v. Cartwright, 207
S. W. 397.

If owner maintains upon his premises some-
thing which, on account of its nature and sur-
roundings, is especially and unusually calculat-136 (20) (Mo.App.) Where an eight year
ed to attract and does attract children, invita- old boy standing on the sidewalk was injured
tion of the owner may be inferred.-Id.
by the fall of a nearby gate pulled off its
hinges by the hub of defendant's wagon, the
question as to defendant's negligence was for
the jury.-Bock v. Rinderknecht, 207 S. W.
245.

39 (Tex. Civ.App.) A lessee of an unused
open air theater attractive to children, who
places a bomb containing explosives therein, so
that it may be set off by electric contact on
opening the door, is liable for injuries to a child
caused by the explosion of the bomb, although
the person injured was a trespasser.-Phelps v.
Hamlett, 207 S. W. 425.

II. PROXIMATE CAUSE OF INJURY.

59 (Tex.Civ.App.) The wrongful act or
omission relied upon as constituting "proximate
cause" of injury must be such as that there-
from the injury or some similar injury might
be reasonably contemplated.-Haney v. Texas
& Pacific Coal Co., 207 S. W. 375.

62(3) (Tex.Civ.App.) To be a "proximate
cause," act or omission must be the direct or
immediate cause having a continuous and nat-
ural causal connection between negligence and
the injury. and, if broken by another's inter-
vening, independent act, the original negligence
is not the proximate cause.-Haney v. Texas
& Pacific Coal Co., 207 S. W. 375.

IV. ACTIONS.

(A) Right of Action, Parties, Preliminary
Proceedings, and Pleading.

(1) (Tex.Civ.App.) In suit for death of
a son about seven years old due to his falling
into an open, unguarded well on defendant's va-
cant property, allegations of petition held to
state a cause of action.-Flippen-Prather Real-
ty Co. v. Mather, 207 S. W. 121.

119(7) (Tex.Civ.App.) In order for a de-
fendant to recover on contributory negligence,
he must prove negligence in the way he special-
ly pleaded it, and the court is restricted to
grounds alleged in the answer.-Texas Midland
R. R. v. Brown, 207 S. W. 340.

(B) Evidence.

136 (24) (Tex.Civ.App.) It is the duty of
persons engaged in dangerous operations to
give notice to all persons passing within limits
of possible danger, and the question of neg-
ligence in omitting to do so is for the jury.-
Missouri Iron & Metal Co. v. Cartwright, 207
S. W. 397.

138(2) (Mo.App.) An instruction to find
for defendant if the evidence "leaves it uncer-
tain" as to whether the accident was due to
negligence, held misleading, as requiring proof
to be beyond reasonable doubt.-Davidson v. St.
Louis & S. F. Ry. Co.. 207 S. W. 277.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.
See Bills and Notes.

NEW TRIAL.

See Appeal and Error, 254, 256, 281, 285,
301, 302, 672, 759, 854, 933, 978, 981, 1177;
Courts, 66; Criminal Law, 752, 925-
939, 1043, 1064, 1090, 1134, 1144; Jury,
34.

II. GROUNDS.

(F) Verdict or Findings Contrary to Law
or Evidence.

75(3) (Mo.) Under Rev. St. 1909, § 2022, a
verdict in action on contractor's bond, which
by mistake or in disregard of instruction was
only about one-half of the amount shown to be
due by plaintiff's uncontradicted evidence, could
not be permitted to stand.-Southern Real Es-
tate & Financial Co. v. Bankers' Surety Co.,
207 S. W. 506, 513.

(G) Surprise, Accident, Inadvertence, or
Mistake.

134(1) (Tex.Civ.App.) Jury finding that un-85 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where defendant failed
guarded, open well on defendant's vacant prop-
erty into which plaintiff's intestate, a son about
seven years old, fell, was attractive to children
by reason of its nature and surroundings, held
warranted.-Flippen-Prather Realty Co. V.
Mather, 207 S. W. 121.

to appear at either the first or second time
for which case was set, and. though notified
that it was again set for 9:30 a. m. the next
morning, failed to start from his home, 20
miles in the country, till that morning, and, be-
cause of mud and automobile troubles, arrived
after judgment, there was no abuse of discre-
tion in refusing new trial.-Scaling v. Collins,
207 S. W. 424.

134(11) (Tex. Civ.App.) In suit for death of
a son about seven years old due to his falling
into an open, unguarded well on defendant's va-
cant property, held, on the evidence, that neg-
ligence of defendant caused death of son.-Flip-
(H) Newly Discovered Evidence.
pen-Prather Realty Co. v. Mather, 207 S. W.99 (Tex.Civ.App.) Motions for new trial
121.
for newly discovered evidence are addressed to
the sound discretion of the trial judge.-Sher-
rill v. Union Lumber Co., 207 S. W. 149.

135 (Tex.Civ.App.) In suit for death of a
son about seven years old due to his falling into

OBSCENITY.

102(5) (Ky.) In an action for loss by fire
from sparks from defendant's locomotive, a
new trial will not be granted plaintiff on the See Constitutional Law, -83.
ground of newly discovered evidence, in view of
Civ. Code Prac. § 340; it appearing that the
evidence could have been discovered by inquiry

from a witness in the case.-Home Ins. Co. v.
Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co., 207 S. W.
487.

102(8) (Tex.Civ.App.) Where the existence
of evidence was known at the time of the trial,
but not the whereabouts of the witness, and no
continuance or postponement was requested,
new trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence was properly refused, although great
effort was made to find the witness before trial.
-Sherrill v. Union Lumber Co., 207 S. W. 149.

104(1) (Tex.Civ.App.) New trials are not
granted upon newly discovered evidence which
is merely cumulative.-Texas & P. Ry. Co. v.
Duff, 207 S. W. 580.

104(3) (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action involv-
ing question whether a contract had been made
over telephone, there being a conflict as to
whether there was one or two conversations,
court did not abuse its discretion in denying
motion for new trial on ground of newly dis-
covered evidence, consisting of affidavit of tele-
phone company employé that files showed two
conversations had been had between the par-
ties.-Hollis Cotton Oil, Light & Ice Co. v.
Marrs & Lake, 207 S. W. 367.

See

OFFICERS.

Appeal and Error, 153; Arrest,

63; Assault and Battery, 64, 92; Banks
and Banking, 54; Boundaries, 54;
Corporations, 415; Counties, 64; Dis-
trict and Prosecuting Attorneys; Evidence,
83; Extortion, 11; Insurance,
129, 724; Judgment, 552; Justices of
the Peace; Municipal Corporations, 57,
62, 138, 350; Pleading, 403; Public Serv-
ice Commissions; Receivers: Religious So-
cieties, 31: Schools and School Districts,
20, 34, 39; Sheriffs and Constables;
States, 61, 62, 173, 187; Taxation,
450.

III. RIGHTS, POWERS, DUTIES, AND
LIABILITIES.

103 (Mo.) Whenever a duty or power is
conferred by statute upon a public officer, all
necessary authority to make such powers ful-
ly efficacious, or to render the performance of
such duties effectual, is conferred by implica-
tion.-State ex rel. Bybee v. Hackmann, 207 S.
W. 64.

OIL.

78, 81.

PARENT AND CHILD.

108(1) (Ky.) A new trial will not be grant- See Mines and Minerals,
ed on the ground of newly discovered evidence,
unless the evidence be of a decisive character
and such as to render a different result reason-
ably certain.-Home Ins. Co. v. Cincinnati, N.
O. & T. P. Ry. Co., 207 S. W. 487.

III. PROCEEDINGS TO PROCURE
NEW TRIAL.

152 (Tex.Civ.App.) Refusal to permit
amendment to amended motion for new trial on
last day of term, and after a hearing had begun
on the amended motion, was a proper exercise of
court's discretion.-San Antonio Portland Ce-
ment Co. v. Gschwender, 207 S. W. 967.

See Death, 99; Divorce, 240, 242, 298,
308; Guardian and Ward; Infants; Judg-
ment, 335.

PARTIES.

For parties on appeal and review of rulings as
to parties, see Appeal and Error.
For parties to particular proceedings or in-
struments, see also the various specific topics.
V. DEFECTS, OBJECTIONS, AND

AMENDMENT.

165 (Tex.) Order granting new trial may be
vacated by court at term at which it was ren-94(2) (Tenn.) Where a bill against an un-
dered.-Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Muse, 207
S. W. 897.

NOTES.

See Bills and Notes.

NOTICE.

See Adverse Possession, 31, 66; Arbitra-
tion and Award, 31; Assignments, 85;
Assignments for Benefit of Creditors,
333; Bills and Notes, 329, 332; Brokers,

105; Chattel Mortgages, 49, 225, 261;
Criminal Law, 252; Evidence, ~65;
Fraudulent Conveyances, 47, 181, 283;
Highways, 76, 153; Infants, 84, 90;
Insurance, 230, 390, 539; Judgment,~
151, 162, 495; Landlord and Tenant,
277; Master and Servant, 125, 280, 289;
Mines and Minerals, 78, 81; Mortgages,

353; Municipal Corporations, 12, 942,
955: Negligence, 25; Partition, 106;
Partnership. 290, 291, 296; Principal and
Agent, 177, 178; Receivers, 125, 128;
Taxation, 637; Telegraphs and Tele-
phones, 65, 66; Vendor and Purchaser,
236, 243, 244.

incorporated religious association named as de-
fendants trustees who had gone out of office
shortly before, but the association defended the
suit employing counsel, held, that the judgment
was binding against the association; the case
being one of misnomer which was waived unless
raised by plea in abatement.-Hunter v. Swad-
ley, 207 S. W. 730.

PARTITION.

See Courts, 163: Husband and Wife,
273: Infants,
Judicial Sales,
38.

84, 90; Judgment, 566;
31; Tenancy in Common,

II. ACTIONS FOR PARTITION.
(B) Proceedings and Relief.
77(3) (Ky.) Where lands are susceptible of
division without material impairment of their
value, a division thereof will be had if de-
sired by the owners, rather than a division of
the proceeds after a sale for that purpose.~
King v. King, 207 S. W. 1.

77(4) (Ky.) In a partition action, evidence
held to show lands to be susceptible of divi-
sion, without materially affecting their useful-
ness or value.-King v. King, 207 S. W. 1.

83 (Tex. Civ.App.) As no distinction is made
between law and equity, questions of conflicting
claims may be decided in partition suits, and,
where raised, should be disposed of.-Burns v.
Nichols, 207 S. W. 158.

86 (Ky.) Where owner of farm died intes-
tate and childless, but left surviving him widow,
father, and mother, the mother was not entitled
to recover from widow and father, alleged to
have had use and rental of land during year fol