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the transaction.-Miller v. Guaranty Trust &
Banking Co., 207 S. W. 642.

23(3) (Tex. Civ.App.) A creditor, who pays
off mortgages on property and takes a new
mortgage in the aggregate amount, will be
subrogated to the rights of the old mortgagees
or against an existing inferior mortgage, al-
though formal releases were made and record-
ed; the holder of the inferior mortgage, of
whom the creditor had no actual knowledge, not
being prejudiced thereby.-Sanger Bros. v. Ely
& Walker Dry Goods Co., 207 S. W. 348.

23 (6) (Tex. Civ.App.) A grantee named in
deed which never became effective, because the
grantor during his life retained control there-
of, held not subrogated to the lien of vendor's
lien notes against the property, which he dis-
charged.-Eckert v. Stewart, 207 S. W. 317.

23(8) (Tex.Civ.App.) A transaction by
which a bank loaned money to contractors for
payment of wages due laborers, which money
was so used, held not to constitute an equitable
assignment of labor debts, not subrogate the
bank to the laborers' claims against contrac-
tor's surety. Hess & Skinner Engineering Co.
v. Turney, 207 S. W. 171.

31(4) (Tex. Civ.App.) Payment of debt
through payment of judgment in mechanic's
lien suit and procuring assignment of judgment
held to create privity of contract between as-
sigror, assignee, and debtor, and a substitution
of the assignee in the place of the assignor in
its relation to the debt.-Miller v. Guaranty
Trust & Banking Co., 207 S. W. 642.

Bank which paid judgment in mechanic's lien
suit and took assignment of all rights of as-
signor held not a "volunteer" in payment of the
debt.-Id.

Bank which paid judgment in mechanic's lien
suit and took assignment under an arrangement
with one of judgment debtors that debt should
be carried forward under a new arrangement
held subrogated to rights of assignor, so that,
where judgment was set aside because of lack
of service upon one defendant, the original debt
and lien would be recognized as a subsisting
charge upon the property.-Id.

Purchaser of notes at receiver's sale, part of
consideration for notes being amount of debt
represented by judgment in mechanic's lien
suit, which judgment was set aside, held entitled
by reason of doctrine of subrogation to valid
lien on premises to secure payment of amount
paid for notes with interest.-Id.

SUICIDE.

See Insurance, 819, 825.

SUPERSEDEAS.

See Appeal and Error, 1234.

SURETYSHIP.

See Principal and Surety.

SURVEYORS.

See Evidence, 83; Extortion, 11.

SURVIVAL.

See Abatement and Revival, 48.

TAXATION.

take all evidence it may deem necessary to as-
certain the true value of property, the board
may employ a stenographer to take such evi-
dence. State ex rel. Bybee v. Hackmann, 207
S. W. 64.

VI. LIEN AND PRIORITY.

501 (Tex.Civ.App.) The general rule is that
taxes are never a lien on property, unless ex-
pressly made so.-State v. Hunt, 207 S. W. 636.

507 (Tex. Civ.App.) Under Const. art. 8. §
15, and Vernon's Sayles' Ann. Civ. St. 1914,
art. 7528, poll taxes and personal property
taxes do not become a lien on the real property
of the person against whom they were assess-
ed, and cannot be enforced against a subse-
quent grantee of such property.-State v. Hunt,
207 S. W. 636.

IX. SALE OF LAND FOR NONPAY-
MENT OF TAX.

637 (Tex.Civ.App.) Under Acts 34th Leg.
c. 147. § 1 (Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. Supp. 1918,
art. 7687a), the tax collector must mail to the
address of the record owner of land which was
delinquent a notice showing the amount of tax-
es appearing delinquent according to the rec-
ords before the state can maintain an action to
recover such taxes.-State v. Hunt, 207 S. W.
636.

Under Acts 34th Leg. c. 147, § 2 (Vernon's
Ann. Civ. St. Supp. 1918, art. 7687b), declar-
ing that it shall be the duty of tax collectors
to rely on the delinquent tax record, it is suf-
ficient for tax collector, in mailing notice of
delinquent taxes, to send notice to one who ap-
peared to be owner of land in delinquent rec-
ords, and it is no defense, in action to recover
such delinquent taxes from one who subse-
quently became owner of land, that his title
appeared upon county records.-Id.
XIII. LEGACY, INHERITANCE, AND
TRANSFER TAXES.

889 (Tenn.) The only interest that neph-
ews and nieces had in estate before intestate's
death was the possibility that they might out-
live intestate, and assignment by them of
rights in estate did not transmit any vested
interest, and estate would be liable to collateral
inheritance and succession tax under Acts
1893, c. 174, and Acts 1893, c. 89, § 7.-Tate v.
Greenlee, 207 S. W. 716.

905 (1) (Tenn.) Where bill is filed in chan-
cery to settle an estate, clerk of county court,
under Acts 1893, c. 174, § 22, can maintain
petition in such suit to collect inheritance tax.
-Tate v. Greenlee, 207 S. W. 716.

TELEGRAPHS AND TELEPHONES.
See Commerce, 28; Constitutional Law,
297; Eminent Domain, 2; New Trial,
104; Pleading, 291, 406.

I. ESTABLISHMENT, CONSTRUCTION,
AND MAINTENANCE.

12 (Tex.) Order of Childress city council.
pursuant to Acts 30th Leg. (1st Ex. Sess.) c. 12,
requiring physical connection between two phone
companies and interchange of service, held
to authorize fair toll rates in addition to con-
nection charge fixed therein, and not to warrant
requiring one company to accept, from other,
calls originating on its own line.-Southwestern
Telegraph & Telephone Co. v. State, 207 S. W.
308.

See Appeal and Error, 185; Descent and
Distribution, 82; Drains, 66; Ex-
change of Property, 7; Judgment,
604; Levees, 2; Municipal Corporations,24 (Tex.) Where two phone companies, or-
566, 567, 972, 980; Schools and School
Districts, 34, 39, 100.

V. LEVY AND ASSESSMENT.
(F) Equalization of Assessments.
450(1) (Mo.) Under Rev. St. 1909, § 11410,
empowering the state board of equalization to

dered to make physical connection and inter-
change service pursuant to Acts 30th Leg. (1st
Ex. Sess.) c. 12, refused to do so, complaint of
state seeking penalty therefor held not demur-
rable for failure to allege, as was the fact, that
one company had attempted to comply.-South-
western Telegraph & Telephone Co. v. State,
207 S. W. 308.

For cases in Dec.Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No.Series & Indexes see same topic and KEY-NUMBER

appear

II. REGULATION AND OPERATION. cotenant, and assertion of adverse claims, must
37(9) (Tex. Civ.App.) It did not
be more certain and unequivocal in character
from telegram reading, "Ruth is not expected than is necessary in ordinary cases where no
to live unless change in condition," or from privity of estate exists, and notice of the ad-
telegram reading, "Ruth very bad. Can't live
verse holding must be brought home to the
long," that either was sent for the benefit of cotenant either by information or by acts of
the sender.-Western Union Telegraph Co. v.
unequivocal notoriety.-Stiles v. Hawkins, 207
Barrett, 207 S. W. 976.
S. W. 89.

54(7) (Tex.Civ.App.) Those who deal with
telegraph corporations are entitled, if they in-
sist upon it, to have their messages transmit-

ted and delivered free from all conditions or

limitations, except those imposed by the law of
the land.-Western Union Telegraph Co. v.
Armstrong, 207 S. W, 592.

A rule of a telegraph company that tele-
grams should be written on certain forms, and
the stipulations on the back of such forms,
were not binding on the sender of a telegram,
having no knowledge thereof, who telephoned
a message, although the agent recorded the
message upon one of such blanks.-Id.

15(10) (Tex.Com.App.) The possession of a
cotenant, or tenant in common, will be presum-
ed to be in right of the common title, and he
will not be permitted to claim protection of the
statute of limitations unless it clearly appears
that he has repudiated his cotenant's title and
is holding adversely thereto.-Stiles v. Hawkins,
207 S. W. 89.

38(2) (Tex. Civ.App.) Where a part owner
wrongfully withheld personal property, another
part owner could not bring action for the prop-
Miller v. Fenton, 207 S. W. 631.
erty, but should sue for a partition thereof.-

TENDER.

See Insurance, 230; Mines and Minerals,
78; Specific Performance, 12; Trover
and Conversion, 22.

65(1) (Tex.Civ.App.) In action by plaintiff
for damages due to failure to promptly deliver
to her son telegram with reference to serious
condition of plaintiff's daughter, the fact that
the company had notice that the telegram was
sent for benefit of plaintiff sender held to
sufficiently appear from allegations of peti-7 (Tex.Civ.App.) A tender by the maker to
tion.-Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Bar- the payee of a note does not constitute a tender
rett, 207 S. W. 976.
as to the holder of the note, where the maker
knows that the payee no longer has any au-
thority in the matter.-Thomas v. Derrick, 207
S. W. 140.

66(1) (Tex.Civ.App.) Those who deal with
telegraph corporations are entitled, if they in-
sist upon it, to have their messages transmit-
ted and delivered free from all conditions or

limitations, except those imposed by the law
of the land, and, when a surrender of any part
of that right is claimed, the telegraph com-
pany must be able to establish a valid
agree-
ment to that effect.-Western Union Telegraph
Co. v. Armstrong, 207 S. W. 592.

17 (Mo.App.) Where defendant tendered
and deposited in court a sum of money and
costs, and it was refused by plaintiff's counsel,
acceptance by plaintiff's counsel from the clerk
of the amount of the filing fee he had paid
held, under the circumstances, not a partial
acceptance of the tender, which would restrict
plaintiff's recovery to the amount of such ten-
der. Ogle v. W. M. Sutherland Building &
Contracting Co., 207 S. W. 848.

66(4) (Tex.Civ.App.) In action by plaintiff
for damages due to failure to promptly deliver
to her son a telegram with reference to serious
condition of plaintiff's daughter, testimony
held sufficient to charge defendant with notice
that plaintiff sender had an interest in prompt
transmission and delivery. Western Union See Conspiracy,
Telegraph Co. v. Barrett, 207 S. W. 976.

68(1) (Tex.Civ.App.) Plaintiff could not re-

cover from telegraph company for mental an-

THEATERS AND SHOWS.

158.

8, 18; Negligence, 39.
THREATS.

TIME.

guish suffered by his wife, where, on learning See Criminal Law, 553, 655, 706; Homicide,
that his wife, away from home, among stran-
gers desired to bring on her mother's body, he
wired her funds, which she received in time
to take train she had intended, though there
was delay causing her apprehension; anguish
resulting from apprehension of a situation
which did not occur.-Western Union Tele-
graph Co. v. Deaver, 207 S. W. 972.

71 (Tex.Civ.App.) Verdict of $1,250.64 for
mental suffering resulting from being deprived
of opportunity to be with and nurse a sister
during her last illness and to be present at the
burial was excessive, and will be reduced to
$500.-Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Arm-
strong, 207 S. W. 592.

TENANCY IN COMMON.

See Executors and Administrators, 129.
II. MUTUAL RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND
LIABILITIES OF COTENANTS.

15(5) (Tenn.) Where the possession of a
tenant in common was open and notorious and
he cultivated for the statutory period, remov-
ed practically all the merchantable timber, sold
some 15 tracts off of the land, deeds being re-
corded in the register's office, and never made
nor was asked for an accounting, the posses-
sion was adverse and the right of the other
tenants was barred.-Taylor v. Blackwell, 207
S. W. 738.

See Adverse Possession, 44, 60; Appeal and
Error, 193, 220, 346, 933, 1051, 1127;
Arbitration and Award, 31; Assignments,
85; Brokers, 46; Carriers, 32,
213, 229; Chattel Mortgages, 117;
Courts, 66, 93; Criminal Law, 1038,
1111; Curtesy, 8; Divorce, 139, 254;
Evidence, 41, 213, 271; Gifts, 16, 49;
Homicide, 166, 189, 325; Husband and
Wife, 78, 205, 304; Insurance, 1791⁄2,
668; Intoxicating Liquors, 187; Judg-
ment,298, 341, 342, 853; Landlord and
Tenant, 277; Larceny, 15; Limitation
of Actions, 127; Lis Pendens, 4; Me-
chanics' Liens, 281; Mines and Minerals,
78; Municipal Corporations, 138;
New Trial, 152, 165; Pleading, ~408;
Quieting Title, 12; Receivers, 90;
Street Railroads, 60; Trespass to Try
Title, 25; Trusts, 114; Vendor and
Purchaser, 334; Wills, 481.

8 (Mo.) There is no fiction in this state
contemplation of the law, but a single day.-
that an entire term of court is, within the
Cole v. Parker-Washington Co., 207 S. W. 749,
766.

TOLL ROADS.

15(7, 8) (Tex.Com.App.) Acts relied on by a
tenant in common in showing an ouster of his See Turnpikes and Toll Roads.

plaintiff admitted that in 1913, less than a
TORTS.
year after her deed to defendant, she learned
See Action; Assault and Battery, 43; Con- that he was claiming the land, a suit in tres-
spiracy, 8-18; Fraud, 59; Libel and
pass to try title not filed until latter part of
Slander, 6-125; Municipal Corporations, February, 1916, justified a finding that the
724-851; Negligence, 7-138; Plead-right of possession had been lost.-Grundy v.
ing, 369; Principal and Agent, 159; Greene, 207 S. W. 964.
Trespass, 19-58; Trover and Conver-35 (2) (Tex.Civ.App.) Much latitude is al-

sion.

10 (Mo.App.) Picketing by members of la-
bor organizations for the sole purpose of peace-
ful persuasion, argument, or entreaty is not
unlawful or actionable.-Root v. Anderson, 207
S. W. 255.

TOWNS.

See Animals, 50; Assault and Battery,
92; Counties, 1; Criminal Law, 1170.
TRADE UNIONS.

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lowed in suits to recover the title and posses-
sion of realty when plaintiff's petition is in
the ordinary form of an action of trespass to
try title and is only met by a plea of not
guilty.-Grundy v. Greene, 207 S. W. 964.

In trespass to try title met only by a plea
of not guilty, either party may offer evidence
by way of confession and avoidance, and, un-
der certain conditions, may prove that a deed
relied upon by his adversary is void because
procured by fraud, or as the result of mistake.

-Id.

41(1) (Tex.Civ.App.) In trespass to try
8, 18; Libel and Slander, title, where defendants claimed under a deed
by an alleged attorney in fact, and plaintiffs
10.
filed affidavit that the deed was forged, the
burden was on defendant to establish their
defense by a preponderance of the testimony:
plaintiffs having shown title to the land and
being entitled to recover, unless they had part-
ed with title.-Lancaster v. Snider, 207 S. W.
560.

TRAIN SHEET.

See Evidence, 370, 383.

TRESPASS.

See Damages, 55; Ejectment, 95; In-
junction, 128; Master and Servant,
89; Negligence, 39: Pleading. 52;
Quieting Title. 44; Vendor and Purchas-
er, 244; Trusts, 372.

II. ACTIONS.

(A) Right of Action and Defenses.
19(1) (Ky.) In an action for damages for
cutting and removing timber on land, title to
which plaintiffs claimed, plaintiffs can recover
only on the strength of their own title, and not
on the weakness of defendant's title.-H. F.
Davis & Co. v. Sizemore, 207 S. W. 16.

31 (Ky.) A "joint trespass" is where two
or more persons unite in committing it, or
where some actually commit the tort, the oth-
ers command, encourage, or direct it.-Ste-
phens v. Schadler, 207 S. W. 704.

(D) Damages.

58 (Ky.) Where defendant entered upon
plaintiff's land, dug four post holes, tore down
and hauled away some fencing, cut down one
tree, and injured another, which furnished
shade to plaintiff's lot, damages for the tres-
pass in the sum of $50 was not excessive.-Mc-
Mahon v. Robinett, 207 S. W. 301.

TRESPASS TO TRY TITLE.

See Adverse Possession, 115; Appeal and
Error, 1056; Arrest, 63; Evidence,

186, 317; Executors and Administrators,
129, 439; Husband and Wife, 132,
273; Judgment, 566; Public Lands,
174; Vendor and Purchaser, 236; Wit-
nesses, 149.

1. RIGHT OF ACTION AND DEFENSES.
4 (Tex. Civ.App.) Surviving wife and chil-
dren, suing in trespass to try title after de-
cedent's notes secured by a vendor's lien had
been barred by limitations, might satisfy the
debt or offer to pay it as a condition to can-
cellation of surviving wife's deed to defend-
ant, and so enable court to adjust their equi-
ties.-Grundy v. Greene, 207 S. W. 964.

6(1) (Tex.Civ.App.) The holder of a nak-
ed legal title may maintain an action of tres-
pass to try title.--Masterson v. Pullen, 207
S. W. 537.

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47(1) (Tex.Civ.App.) In trespass to try
title, met only by a plea of not guilty, affirm-
ative relief to plaintiff, because the deed re-
lied upon by his adversary was void for fraud
or mistake, will be granted in response to ap-
propriate pleadings bringing himself within
the conditions that entitle him to a rescission.
-Grundy v. Greene, 207 S. W. 964.

III. DAMAGES, USE AND OCCUPA-
TION, IMPROVEMENTS,
AND TAXES.

53 (Tex.Com.App.) One who has never been
in possession of property, the subject of suit
for trespass to try title, and has never collected
or received any of the rents, is not personally
liable to plaintiff for rent.-Stiles v. Hawkins,
207 S. W. 89.

TRIAL.

See Boundaries, 40; Continuance; Costs;
New
Criminal Law, 641-884; Jury;
Trial; Reference; Stipulations, 14; Ven-

ue.

For trial of particular actions or proceedings,
see also the various specific topics.
For review of rulings at trial, see Appeal and
Error.

II. DOCKETS, LISTS, AND CALEN◄
DARS.

11(3) (Ky.) In surviving wife's action for
dower and distributable share of personalty,
involving question of whether ante-nuptial con-
tract relinquishing such rights had been pro-
cured by fraud, the chancellor properly trans-
ferred cause to common-law docket for trial
by jury on issue of fraud.-Early v. Early, 207
S. W. 466.

III. COURSE AND CONDUCT OF
TRIAL IN GENERAL.

25(1) (Tex.Civ.App.) In action involving
ownership of attached property claimed by
third party, where court ruled that burden of
proving title was upon claimant, claimant was
entitled to open and conclude without invoking
District and County Court Rule 31 (142 S. W.
xx).-Frost v. Smith, 207 S. W. 392.

29(2) (Ark.) In suit for labor performed,
with counterclaim for money paid on team
bought for plaintiffs, the exclusion of question
to seller of team with remark that it was a
question of law and with inquiry whether de-
fendant had not proven himself out of court
was objectionable as an expression of opinion

For cases in Dec.Dig. & Am.Dig. Key-No.Series & Indexes see same topic and KEY-NUMBER

on weight of evidence.-Stallings v. Bradshaw, I released a defective brake, it was not error
207 S. W. 435,

IV. RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE,
(A) Introduction, Offer, and Admission of

Evidence in General.

46(1) (Mo.App.) Court did not err in
sustaining an objection to question, where
counsel did not state to the court what he
expected to prove by the witness.-William
Wurdack Electric Mfg. Co. v. Elliott & Barry
Engineering Co., 207 S. W. 877.

(C) Objections, Motions to Strike Out, and
Exceptions.

83 (2) (Mo.App.) An objection that evi-
dence is "irrelevant and immaterial" is suffi-
cient, where the evidence is clearly immaterial
and there is but one issue.-Sexton v. Lock-
wood, 207 S. W. 856.

85 (Tex.Civ.App.) Offer of evidence in
part consisting of hearsay is properly reject-
ed when offered as a whole.-McBride v. Kaul-

bach, 207 S. W. 576.

105(2) (Tex. Civ.App.) Though evidence of
negligence not pleaded is admitted without ob-
jection, defendant's requested instruction that
it be disregarded, and that damages cannot be
found by reason of such negligence, should be
given.-Jamison Gin Co. v. Measels, 207 S.

W. 365.

105(3) (Tex.Com.App.) A bare conclusion
or opinion of witness, without basis of fact,
has no probative force though not objected to.
-Webb v. Reynolds, 207 S. W. 914.

VI. TAKING CASE OR QUESTION
FROM JURY.

(A) Questions of Law or of Fact in Gen-
eral.

139(1) (Ky.) Where the evidence is such
that reasonable men would not draw different
conclusions therefrom, it is the duty of the
court to direct the jury accordingly.-Citizens'
State Bank of Greenup v. Johnson County,
207 S. W. 8.

139(1) (Tex.Com.App.) To authorize the
court to take a question of fact from the jury,
the evidence must be of such character that

there is no room for ordinary minds to differ
as to the conclusions to be drawn from it.
Daugherty v. Wiles, 207 S. W. 900.

Texas, 207 S. W. 904.

to refuse an instruction for defendant, erro-
neously assuming that plaintiff knew, or ought
to have known, of the defective brake, and
that he moved the car without inspection.-
Texas Midland R. R. v. Brown, 207 S. W. 340.
Where an employé of a third person was in-
jured while attempting to block a moving car
upon which the brake was defective, an instruc-
tion, assuming contributory negligence on plain-
tiff's part in going in front of the car, was
properly refused; evidence showing that plain-
tiff thought it necessary to act as he did to
prevent accident to others on the track.-Id.

194(1) (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for de-
lay, in shipment of live stock, where plaintiff
preventing loading, an instruction that the
relies on negligent condition of switch track,
degree of diligence required in construction
of main track is not the diligence required in
construction of switch track held properly
Kansas City, M. & O. Ry. Co. of Texas v.
refused, as on the weight of the evidence.-
Bomar, 207 S. W. 570.

194 (8), (Tex. Civ.App.) The court in its
charge could not assume as untrue proof suf-
ficient to support allegations as to actual ap-
plication of payments.-Lovelady v. Harding,
207 S. W. 933.

that, even if defendants' embankment had slip-
194(14) (Mo.App.) Requested instructions
ped and was seepy, they were not therefore
required to anticipate it would slide into the
creek, invades the province of the jury.-Bailey
v. Wabash Ry. Co., 207 S. W. 82.

(B) Necessity and Subject-Matter.

203(3) (Tex. Civ.App.) Where a case is sub-
mitted either under a general charge or upon
special issues, a party is entitled to an af-
firmative presentation of an issue raised by
pleadings and evidence.-Sherrill v. Union Lum-
ber Co., 207 S. W. 149.

203 (3) (Tex.Civ.App.) Defendant had the
right to have his defense presented to the
jury in an affirmative manner.-Quanah, A. &
P. Ry. Co. v. Lancaster, 207 S. W. 606.

(C) Form, Requisites, and Sufficiency.

234(7) (Mo.App.) It was improper to in-
struct in effect that the burden was on plain-
tiff to prove facts conceded by defendant.-
Sexton v. Lockwood, 207 S. W. 856.

139(1)(Tex.Com.App.) The jury are the
judges of the weight to be given the testimo-236(1) (Mo.App.) Provision of requested
ny.-Weisner v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co., of instructions, that in determining credibility of
a witness his "general reputation for truth and
139(1) (Tex.Civ.App.) It is the province veracity, chastity, and morality as shown by
of jury to pass on credibility of witnesses and the evidence," may be considered, is unwar-
weight of their testimony.-Falfurrias Mer-ranted.-Beck v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
cantile Co. v. Citizens' State Bank, 207 S. W. 207 S. W. 248.

568.

140(1) (Tex.Com.App.) The jury are the
judges of the credibility of the witnesses and
weight to be given the testimony.-Weisner v.
Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co., of Texas, 207 S. W.
904.

140(1) (Tex. Civ.App.) It was the province
of the jury to pass upon the credibility of the
witnesses. Washington v. Austin Nat. Bank,
207 S. W. 382; Falfurrias Mercantile Co. v.
Citizens' State Bank. Id. 568: Quanah, A. &
P. Ry. Co. v. Lancaster, Id. 606.

145 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where plaintiff sued on
contract, or in the alternative on a quantum
meruit, he was entitled to the submission of
a quantum meruit, although in his testimony
he insisted that he only performed the services
by virtue of the alleged contract.-Guyer v.
Chapman, 207 S. W. 428.

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240 (Mo.App.) In an action for the pur-
chase price of an interest in a growing crop
in the possession of defendant, an instruction
so worded as to create the impression that, in
addition to an agreement to sell and buy the
crop, something else must have been done in
the way of a transmission or delivery of pos-
session, was argumentative and erroneous.-
Sexton v. Lockwood, 207 S. W. 856.

240 (Tex.Civ.App.) In an action for delay
in shipment of live stock, where plaintiff re-
lies on negligent condition of switch track
preventing loading, an instruction that the
degree of diligence required in construction
of main track is not same diligence required
as to switch track held properly refused as
argumentative in form.-Kansas City, M. &
O. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Bomar, 207 S. W. 570.
(D) Applicability to Pleadings and Evi-
dence.

248 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where trial judge
sought to leave to the jury, not only the find-
ings of facts, but also whether in law they
were sufficient to render further relation of
husband and wife insupportable, he should
have carefully applied the law to the facts, and

not simply announced abstract propositions of
law in his charge.-McNabb v. McNabb, 207 S.

W. 129.

(E) Requests or Prayers.

255(12) (Ark.) In real estate broker's
action for commission where only conflict of
252(1) (Tex.Civ.App.) A requested in- evidence was on question of whether broker
struction was properly refused, where there procured purchaser, court's charge was not
was no proof upon which to base it.-Missouri defective because of failure to submit ques-
Iron & Metal Co. v. Cartwright, 207 S. W. 397.
tion of whether in making sale owner acted in
252 (8) (Tex.Civ.App.) In action for inju- good faith, where specific instruction submit-
ries sustained by pedestrian when run down ting such issue was not requested.-Harris &
by an automobile, giving of a special request- White v. Stone, 207 S. W. 443.
ed charge on discovered peril held not errone-260(1) (Tex.Civ.App.) It is not error to
ous as against objection that there was no refuse an instruction on a matter sufficiently
evidence that chauffeur saw plaintiff.-Burnett covered in the court's main charge.-Missouri
v. Anderson, 207 S. W. 540.
Iron & Metal Co. v. Cartwright, 207 S. W.
397.

In action for injuries sustained by plaintiff
pedestrian when run down by an automobile, 260(1) (Tex.Civ.App.) Refusal to give in-
held, under the evidence, that court did not structions requested is not reversible error,
err in refusing to give special charge submit- where the substance thereof has been given
ting issue whether chauffeur was an employé in other instructions.-Lancaster v. Snider, 207
or servant of defendant.-Id.
S. W. 560.
in-260(5) (Mo.App.) Requested instruction, to
the effect that plaintiff administrator could re-
cover only if deceased's son was his mother's
agent when he made demand to repurchase
shares of stock, held correctly and fully cover-
ed by instruction given by the court.-Grass-
muck v. Ehrler, 207 S. W. 287.

252 (11) (Tex.Civ.App.) Refusal of
struction on contributory negligence of serv-
ant injured was not error where there was no
evidence of such negligence.-San Antonio
Portland Cement Co. v. Gschwender, 207 S.

W. 967.

252(12) (Mo.) In action on contractor's
surety bond, defendant's requested instruc-260 (8) (Tex.Civ.App.) It was not error to
tion on measure of damages, predicated on the refuse an instruction that defendant railroad
view that the evidence shows plaintiff's vio-
was not liable if plaintiff's horse was more
lation of a building contract so as to release readily frightened than an ordinary horse.
surety from injury to plaintiff by reason of where the issue of contributory negligence was
its overpayments to contractor, was properly sufficiently covered by an instruction given.-
refused, where the undisputed evidence show- Texas Midland R. R. v. Butler, 207 S. W. 344.
ed that plaintiff had not overpaid contractor. 260 (8) (Tex. Civ.App.) Where under the in-
-Southern Real Estate & Financial Co. v. structions the jury could find for plaintiff, a
Bankers' Surety Co.. 207 S. W. 506, 513.
railroad fireman, injured in a collision, only
if the engineer was negligent in failing to dis-
cover the open switch, etc., held, that the re-
fusal of further instructions that the engineer
was not negligent in doing no more than he
did to stop the train after discovering the
open switch, that negligence could not be
based on the fact the switch was open, etc.,
was proper.-Lancaster v. Mays, 207 S. W.
676.

252(20) (Mo.App.) Instruction should not
submit the question of permanency of plain-
tiff's injury, there being no evidence that it
would be or was permanent.-Colby v. Thomp-
son, 207 S. W. 73.

253 (3) (Mo.App.) An instruction directing
a verdict in action under Rev. St. 1909, § 3150.
against a railroad for flooding from insufficient
drains and opening, ignoring the question of it 261 (Tex. Civ.App.) Requested charge that
being from an unprecedented rain, is errore-
acts or quarrels, the result of sudden outbursts
ous.-Riffe v. Wabash Ry. Co., 207 S. W. 78. of temper, are not grounds for divorce, where
253(3) (Mo.App.) A defense in action not correct in its entirety, was properly re-
against railroad for flooding land from embank- fused, but sufficiently called court's attention to
ment sliding into creek being unprecedented omission.-McNabb v. McNabb, 207 S. W. 129.
rainfall, of which there was evidence, instruc- 261 (Tex.Civ.App.) Where instructions are
tion covering entire case and directing verdict requested as a whole, some of which are in-
ignoring that question is erroneous.-Bailey v. consistent with each other and others obvious-
Wabash Ry. Co., 207 S. W. 82.
ly improper, the court need not separate the
good from the bad and is justified in refusing
them all.-St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Pipkin, 207 S. W. 360.

253(5) (Mo.App.) In an action on a note
which defendants claimed had been discharged,
where it appeared that the holder had sent
the same to a bank for collection and received
from it the amount due, and it further appear-
ed that the note passed into the possession of
a stranger thereto, who transferred it to
plaintiff, an instruction that if the holder sent
it to a bank for collection and the amount
thereof was paid to the bank and remitted to
the holder, plaintiff could not recover, held er-
roneous, disregarding the question whether a
third person acquired the note.-Stark

Scherf, 207 S. W. 863.

(G) Construction and Operation.

295 (6) (Mo.App.) It cannot be said that,
taking the instructions as a whole, there was
no error where one instruction in and of it-
self authorized a verdict against a railroad for
overflow from insufficient opening, without re-
gard to whether the flood was unprecedented,
though another instruction submitted that ques-
Vtion.-Riffe v. Wabash Ry. Co., 207 S. W. 78.

253(8) (Mo.App.) Instruction that there
could be no recovery if deceased's son, when
and if he made a demand on defendant to re-
purchase stock, was not the agent of deceas-
ed was properly refused, since plaintiff admin-
istrator could have recovered if jury believed
that deceased herself made such demand.-
Grassmuck v. Ehrler, 207 S. W. 287.

296(3) (Ky.) In servant's action for in-
juries, error in instruction defining employ-
er's duty to be to keep elevator in reasonably
safe condition held cured by limiting right to
recover to negligent breach of duty, with_prop-
er definition of negligence.-Lexington Roller
Mills Co. v. Fields, 207 S. W. 477.

In servant's action for injuries, instruction
was not erroneous as failing properly to quali-
fy right of recovery, where such qualifications
were correctly set out in other instructions,
and criticized instruction closed with state-
ment requiring finding under such other in-
structions.-Id.

253 (10) (Mo.App.) In replevin to recover
materials and tools furnished under a contract
for the manufacture of metal cabinets, an in-
struction requiring the jury to find facts enti-
tling plaintiff to possession of the property un-
der the contract was not insufficient as ignor-296(3) (Tex.Civ.App.) Contention that from
ing performance of the contract on plaintiff's
part. Ideal Reversible Hinge & Cabinet Co.
v. Metallic Specialty Mfg. Co., 207 S. W. 273.

special instruction given jury might have be-
lieved that railroad company owed plaintiff
employé no duty even after discovering his per-

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