olution were unlawful, and the chancellor | the property of the defendant Queenie Johnwas correct in so holding. His decree is son; and, after being legally condemned, the therefore affirmed, with costs.

lot was sold by order of the court and purchased by the complainant. This lot was owned by Mrs. Johnson at the time of her marriage to her codefendant, W. R. John

son.

After the time for redeeming said lot had expired, the sheriff executed a deed to complainant to said lot, and, the defendants refusing to surrender possession of same to Complainant, the original bill was filed in this cause for the purpose of ejecting the said W. R. Johnson, Queenie Johnson, and their tenants from said property.

The defendant Queenie Johnson filed her answer as a cross-bill, asking the court to decree that said condemnation proceeding and the sale made thereunder were null and void, and that the complainant acquired no title to said lot by virtue of its purchase there

2. HUSBAND AND WIFE 125-WIFE'S SEP- under. ARATE PROPERTY-RENTS.

Under the Emancipation Act of 1913, a wife has a right to rent out her lands and to collect the rents accruing therefrom. 3. HUSBAND AND WIFE 147

WIFE'S

SEPARATE PROPERTY-EMANCIPATION ACT. Under the Emancipation Act of 1913, fully relieving married women from all disabilities on account of coverture and giving them the same right to acquire, hold, and dispose of realty and personalty as if unmarried, a married woman can hold no separate property as such, and all her property to which she has title is subject to her debts.

4. HUSBAND AND WIFE 115 MARRIED

WOMEN-WIFE'S TITLE TO PROPERTY.

Under the Emancipation Act of 1913, a husband had no interest in a lot owned by the wife at time of her marriage, and the entire title thereto remained in the wife and might be levied upon and sold by her creditor as her property.

Appeal from Chancery Court, Washington County; Hal H. Haynes, Chancellor.

Bill by the Henderson Grocery Company against W. R. Johnson and Queenie Johnson, his wife, with cross-bill by the latter. De cree for complainant, dismissing the crossbill, and cross-complainant appeals. Affirmed.

Geo. C. Sells, of Johnson City, for Henderson Grocery Co.

Divine & Guinn, of Johnson City, for W. R.

Johnson and wife.

MCKINNEY, J. On January 20, 1915, the complainant, Henderson Grocery Company, recovered a judgment before a justice of the peace against the defendants, W. R. Johnson and wife, Queenie Johnson, for $337.59, upon which judgment execution was issued and levied upon the lot involved in this suit as

The chancellor dismissed the cross-bill, and decreed in favor of complainant on its original bill, and the cross-complainant has appealed from the decree of the chancellor to this court. Among the errors assigned are the following:

(1) "That defendant W. R. Johnson had a freehold interest in the lot involved, by the common law, by statute, jure mariti, and jure uxoris, not subject to levy and sale for his debts, on execution at law or otherwise, specifically protected by the law from such levy and sale; and protected from dispossession under any process running as arising out of the debts of the husband."

(2) "That the contingent remainder interest of the wife was not an estate subject to levy at law."

(3) "That, as against her creditors, proceeding at law, the rights and interest and estate of the husband was paramount and dominant, as an estate or right of use for life, in præsenti; and any sale, if otherwise valid, only passed to the purchaser a servient and contingent right, conditioned upon the husband predeceasing the wife, or the wife predeceasing the husband when childless; and not effective to disturb in the least the tenure of the husband, as tenant by the curtesy initiate or consummate, or his dominant estate as one of present enjoyment."

(4) "That, upon marriage of W. R. Johnson to Queenie Johnson, the realty she then owned (that now involved) ipso facto became split up into two estates as a matter of law, instead of

the one; the fee was divided, the present, domi

nant user or contingent freehold vesting in the husband, the remainder, a contingent remainder, vesting in the wife, or her original fee diminishing to that estate, lesser than the fee."

(5) "That, there being two estates, after marriage, the levy upon both, and sale of both, as appearing from the levy, order, sale, deed, etc., each debtor had a right to have his interest sold together for a lump sum, was void, for that separately, to the end that each could redeem separately."

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

We will treat these five assignments of error together as they raise the question as to whether the husband of cross-complainant had an interest in the lot of land in question in this suit. The insistence of the crosscomplainant is that, under the common law, the husband, by marriage, took a freehold estate in his wife's lands held as a general estate by inheritance during their joint lives, and possibly, by curtesy, during his life; and that the Acts of 1835-36, 1849-50, and 1879, Shannon's Code, §§ 4225, 4234, and 4239, respectively, did not take away or deprive him of this common-law interest in his wife's land, but only modified it. Treating this as true, it remains to be determined whether the Emancipation Act of 1913 (Pub. Acts 1913, c. 26), annulled or took away this right of the husband and left the wife holding the

entire estate in her lands.

[1] Originally, under this common-law estate in the wife's lands, the husband could dispose of his interest therein; such interest might be sold by his creditors; he was entitled to rent out the land and to collect and appropriate the rents. But by various legislative enactments, as held in Ables v. Ables, 86 Tenn. 333, 9 S. W. 692, the common-law estate jure uxoris has been so materially modified that only a bare privilege is left to the husband to rent out his wife's lands and to collect the rents for the benefit of the family in the capacity of governor of the family, but for the family and not for himself individually.

[2, 3] And in Parlow v. Turner, 132 Tenn. 339, 178 S. W. 766, it was held that, under and by virtue of the act of 1913, the wife had a right to rent out her lands and to collect the rents accruing from same, thus depriving the husband of the last vestige of his common-law estate, jure uxoris.

The act of 1913 is very broad and comprehensive, and provides that married women are fully emancipated from all disability on account of coverture, and that the common law as to the disability of married women and its effect on the rights of the property of the wife is totally abrogated, and that marriage shall not impose any disability or incapacity on a woman as to the ownership, acquisition, or disposition of property of any sort, or as to her capacity to make contracts and do all acts in reference to property which she could lawfully do if she were not married, and that every woman now married, or hereafter to be married, shall have the same capacity to acquire, hold, manage, control, use, enjoy, and dispose of, all property, real and personal, in possession, and to make any contract in reference to it, and to bind herself personally, and to sue and be sued with all the rights and incidents thereof as if she were not married.

So that, by this act, the status of a married woman, with respect to her property, is the same as though she were a feme sole, and, as stated in Levy v. Davis, 125 Tenn. 349, 142 S. W. 1120:

"An unmarried woman, as a matter of course, can hold no separate estate as such. All her property to which she has title is subject to her debts."

[4] So that we are of the opinion that the husband had no interest in this property, but that the entire title to same was vested in the cross-complainant, and, same having been levied on and sold as her property, the purchaser acquired a good title.

The question of curtesy does not arise in this cause, for the reason that the record does not show that a child has been born of

this marriage, but, even if there were issue, under the authority of Day v. Burgess, 139 Tenn. 559, 202 S. W. 911, the husband had no vested interest in this property.

The other assignments of error were disposed of orally.

We find no error in the decree of the Chancellor, and it is affirmed, with costs.

SOUTHERN RY. CO. v. STATE.

(Supreme Court of Tennessee. Nov. 30, 1918.) 1. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION 32(1)— RAILROADS 255(4) - CONCLUSION - (B. STRUCTING PUBLIC HIGHWAY AT Crossing -RAILROADS.

Under the common law, a railroad can be indicted for obstructing a public crossing, but the indictment or presentment must conclude

"to the common nuisance."

111(1)

2. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION
PROVISO OBSTRUCTION OF PUBLIC CROSSING
BY A RAILROAD COMPANY.

1879, c. 183), applies only to highways within
As Shannon's Code, § 6514 et seq. (Acts
limits of incorporated towns or cities where in-
corporating laws are repealed or charters for-
feited, or the towns have failed to keep an organ-
ized board of mayor and aldermen, a present-
ment thereunder, which fails to show that the
excluded by proviso, is insufficient.
highway obstructed is within the act and not

Appeal from Circuit Court, Hamblen Coun ty; John B. Holloway, Judge.

The Southern Railway Company was convicted of obstructing a public highway, and it appeals. Judgment of conviction reversed, and presentment quashed.

W. N. Hickey, of Morristown, and Susong & Biddle, of Greeneville, for Southern Ry. Co.

H. M. Rankin, of Dandridge, and Wm. H. Swiggart, Jr., of Union City, for the State.

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

authority, permitted their streets, sidewalks, etc., to become obstructed.

So far as obstructing the highways, roads, etc., of the state, outside of the incorporated cities and towns, they were aware that the offender, was subject to indictment under the common law, and so the act in question was intended to apply in the three instances set forth in the third section of the act not provided for by either of the remedies above set forth. Take for example the case of a street, in an incorporated town that has no organized board of mayor and aldermen, becoming obstructed: If the offender is indicted under the common law, he would defend on the ground that the street was within an incorporated town, over which the corporation had exclusive authority and control; there is no corporate organization to punish the offender, and the result would be that he would go unpunished. To meet such a case and to extend the law so as to provide a remedy whereby all persons who obstruct highways can be called to account the act in question was passed. This appears to us to be what the Legislature had in mind.

Now, there is no allegation in the presentment involved in this case that would bring it within the third section of this act. It was evidently drawn under the first section of the act upon the theory that the act applied to all of the roads, highways, and streets within the state.

It results that the judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the presentment is quashed.

Under charter of City of Jellico embodied in Acts 1903, c. 336, §§ 6, 9, 13, declaring no one eligible to office of mayor unless he shall be a citizen of the state and city, and a voter in the city, and shall have resided in the city for six months next preceding the election, the term "voter" means one having the qualifications entitling him to vote, and not one who has registered as a voter.

[Ed. Note. For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Voter.] 2. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 138-MAYOR -ELIGIBILITY-REGISTRATION AS VOTER.

Thomp. Shan. Code, §§ 1012, 1014, relating to the registration of voters, as authorized by Const. art. 4, § 1, do not prescribe qualifications of electors, but were enacted to regulate the exercise of the elective franchise, and registration is not necessary to make one a voter in a city so as to be eligible under its charter (Acts 1903, c. 336, §§ 6, 9, 13), to election as mayor.

Error to Criminal and Law Court, Campbell County; Xen Hicks, Judge.

GREEN, J. This suit challenges the eligibility of defendant Griffin to hold the office of mayor of Jellico, to which office he was elected in January, 1918. From a judgment in favor of the defendant contestant has appealed in error.

The proposition of plaintiff in error is that Griffin was not a qualified voter of the city of Jellico at the time of his election to the office of mayor, and it is urged that Griffin is accordingly incapable of holding said office by reason of certain provisions of the charter of that city.

The election was held January 5, 1918, Griffin did not register in August, 1917, or at the supplemental registration held 20 days prior to the election. He did register in August, 1915, and had paid his poll tax for He has been a bona fide resident and 1917. citizen of Jellico since 1914.

[1] The present charter of the city of Jellico is embodied in chapter 336 of the Acts of 1903. Section 6 of that act is as follows:

"Be it further enacted, that the officers of the city of Jellico to be chosen by the people shall be a mayor and six (6) aldermen, who shall constitute the city council, each of whom shall be | a citizen of and voter in said city; said mayor and board of aldermen shall be chosen by the voters of said city every two (2) years. No person shall be eligible to the office of mayor or alderman unless he has been for six months, and then be a bona fide resident of the city. Any of said officers removing from the city shall thereby vacate his said office."

Section 13 of the act is in these words:

"Be it further enacted, that the mayor shall hold his office for two years, and until his successor shall be elected and qualified. No person shall be elected mayor who is not at the time of his election a citizen of the state of Tennessee, and has not been for six months, and is not thus a bona fide citizen of and voter in said city."

Does the word "voter," as used in said charter, mean a person having the qualifications entitling him to vote, or does it mean such a person who has registered and thus lawfully evidenced his right to vote-in other words, a registered voter? This is the question for determination.

Section 9 of chapter 336 of the Acts of 1903 is in these words:

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

"Be it further enacted, that the election for mayor and board of aldermen of said city of Jellico shall be held by the marshal of the corpo ration, aided by two clerks only, and three judges, all of whom shall be legal voters in said city, on the first Saturday in January of every two years, after giving ten days' notice. The voters shall vote by ballot and under such rules and regulations as the board of mayor and aldermen shall prescribe as to the place, house, etc., of voting by ordinance. The officers of the city thus chosen shall go into office on the third Saturday in January, to hold office for two years, or until their successors are elected and qualified. The following shall be the qualifications for voting in city elections:

"1. He shall be qualified to vote for state and county officers.

"2. He shall have resided for six months next preceding the election within the city limits, or shall be a male and a bona fide owner of real estate within the city limits.

“3. A voter's residence is hereby defined as the

place at which he habitually sleeps."

From the foregoing it appears that a qualified voter in state and county elections becomes a qualified voter in Jellico city elections if he reside in that municipality, or own property therein. Residence or ownership of property in that city are the only additional and peculiar qualifications of voters in Jellico.

[2] This court has repeatedly held that our registration laws did not impose an additional qualification on the right of suffrage.

ment from Cooley on Constitutional LimitaThe court has quoted and approved a statetions, page 601, that:

"The provision for a registry deprives no one of his right, but is only a reasonable regulation under which the right may be exercised." Moore v. Sharp, 98 Tenn. 491, 499, 41 S. W. 587, 589. In a later case, the court said:

"The registration laws of the state do not prescribe qualifications of electors, but were enacted elective franchise, and are authorized by the for the purpose of regulating the exercise of the concluding clause of section 1, art. 4, of the Constitution, ordaining that the General Assembly shall have power to enact laws to secure the freedom of elections and the purity of the ballot box." State v. Weaver, 122 Tenn. 198, 122 S.

W. 465.

In Ruling Case Law it is said that:

"The theory upon which registration laws may be supported is that they do not impair or abridge the elector's privilege, but merely regulate its exercise by requiring evidence of the right. * * The requirement of registration does not add new qualification, unless such voter is deprived of the right to prove himself to be an elector, or, as it has been held, is denied the right to register and vote at any time prior to the closing of the polls on election day." 9 R. C. L. p. 1036.

The contention of plaintiff in error is that
registration is a condition precedent to vot-
ing in those parts of the state to which our
registration laws apply, and that an elector
cannot be described as a qualified voter un-ed,
less he is registered.

This argument is plausible, but it leads
into grave constitutional difficulties.

Section 1 of article 4 of the Constitution

of Tennessee is in these words:

"Every male person of the age of twenty-one
years, being a citizen of the United States, and
a resident of this state for twelve months, and
of the county wherein he may offer his vote for
six months, next preceding the day of election,
shall be entitled to vote for members of the Gen-
eral Assembly and other civil officers for the
county or district in which he resides; and there
shall be no qualification attached to the right of
suffrage, except that each voter shall give to the
judges of election where he offers to vote, satis-
factory evidence that he has paid the poll taxes
assessed against him, for such preceding period
as the Legislature shall prescribe, and at such
time as may be prescribed by law; without
which his vote cannot be received. And all male
citizens of the state shall be subject to the pay-
ment of poll taxes and to the performance of
military duty, within such ages as may be pre-
scribed by law. The General Assembly shall
have power to enact laws requiring voters to
vote in the election precincts in which they may

reside, and laws to secure the freedom of elec-
tions and the purity of the ballot box."

So it is obvious, from the authorities quotthat we cannot properly speak of registration as a qualification for voting in state

and county elections. One qualified to vote in those elections is likewise a qualified voter in Jellico, provided he resides there, or owns property there. It follows that registration is not necessary to make one a "voter in said city."

An inspection of our election and registration laws demonstrates that the word "voter" is used therein in the sense of one who is qualified to vote, and not in the sense of a registered voter.

Thus, in section 1210 of Thompson's Shannon's Code, it is made a misdemeanor for any registrar of voters to willfully refuse "to register any qualified voter."

In section 1214, Thompson's Shannon's Code, prescribing the oath for registrars of election, it is provided that they shall swear that they will not "knowingly register, or allow to be registered, any person not a legally qualified voter," and that they will not prevent "any person from registering who is a legally qualified voter."

the word "voter" is used to describe a perIn these and other sections of the Code, son entitled to register, and not a person The Constitution forbids that any qualifi- actually registered. Indeed, it appears from cation be attached to the right of suffrage, the sections quoted persons are referred to except that the Legislature may prescribe as "qualified voters" before registration. poll tax regulations.

Such being the general meaning given to