been somewhat affected by the state of the law, in order to ascertain what the judgment of these Churches and of their founders was, while, at the same time, it is manifest, that it is only the mature and deliberate judgment of the great Reformers which should possess the slightest weight, either in influencing our opinions, or in assisting us in ascertaining the views of the Reformers of our own country.

Now, Mr Robertson, we presume, will not deny that the Reformed Churches in general, and the great body of the Reformers, maintained, as a scriptural principle, the right of the Christian people to the substantial choice of their own ministers, and the necessity of their consent to the formation of the pastoral relation. It would have been strange, indeed, if the Reformers had denied to the Christian people a right which they enjoyed "until the Kirk was corrupted by Antichrist," and which is even sanctioned by the provisions of the canon law. And it should farther be observed, that the general doctrine of the Reformers about the choice or consent of the people in the appointment of ministers, was not an isolated opinion, founded solely upon the consideration of particular statements of Scripture bearing more or less directly upon this subject, or on the general dictates of reason and common sense. It was also founded on, and was the natural result of, those great fundamental principles on which the whole Reformation from Popery was built and defended. It was seen to be clearly involved in, or logically deducible from, the great principles, that God alone is Lord of the Conscience-that every man is possessed of the right of private judgment, is responsible for his own salvation, and must bear his own burden-that Jesus Christ is the only King and Head of the Church-that he has left no vicegerent on earth, and authorised none to lord it over his heritage; and it was, if possible, still more explicitly involved in the principle on which they generally defended the validity of their mission, their right to administer ordinances, as set forth in the declaration of our own Confession, that "to this Catholic visible Church, consisting of all those throughout the world that profess the true religion, together with their children, Christ hath given the ministry, oracles, and ordinances of God."

It was justly, then, reckoned a principle of the Reformation, that ministers should be settled only upon the choice or with the consent of the people; and accordingly, Bellarmine states this as one of the doctrines of the Reformers, which he, as a Papist, undertook to refute :

"Sententia est Martini Lutheri, Joannis Calvini, Matthiae Illyrici, Joannis Brentii, Martini Kemnitii, aliorumque hujus temporis sectariorum, electionem et vocationem jure divino ad ecclesiam universalem, hoc est, ad clerum et populum spectare, ita prorsus ut sine populi consensu et suffragio nemo legitime electus aut vocatus ad episcopatum habeatur."-(De Clericis, lib. i., c. ii., tom. ii., p. 94.)

And not one of the great champions of Protestantism, who answered Bellarmine, denied that this was a correct account of the doctrine of the Reformers on this subject. Hence the truth of the assertion which we made in the Strictures (p. 26),

vire debet," goes on to say, "Servatur haec eadem consuetudo etiamnum in multis ecclesiis Reformatis sed in pluribus etiam summa est confusio, et contra constitutionem apostolicam veteresque canones eliguntur ministri, et nescientibus atque etiam invitis ecclesiis obtruduntur."-(De Statu peccati et legali, pp. 1016 and 1018.)

“Dr Muir and our opponents can produce no authorities in support of their notions, except from Popish, and perhaps a few Prelatic writers, and from some of those ungodly ecclesiastical politicians, who sprung up and acquired influence in other Protestant Churches, as well as our own, during last century."

Even Hooker, in an important passage which we have quoted more than once, admits the necessity of the people's consent to the formation of the pastoral relation (b. vii., sect. 14). We have no hesitation in saying, that our opponents, in maintaining the right of Church Courts to thrust ministers upon reclaiming Christian Congregations, prove, that they are either Popish in spirit (for Luther used to say, that every man had a Pope in his own belly), or else, that they are deplorably ignorant of the fundamental principles of the Reformation.

CHAPTER III.

FIRST BOOK OF DISCIPLINE-SECOND BOOK OF DISCIPLINE DOES NOT DIFFER VERY MATERIALLY FROM THE FIRST IN REGARD TO THE APPOINTMENT OF MINISTERS-SECOND BOOK CLEAR AND EXPLICIT IN FAVOUR OF THE PRINCIPLE OF THE VETO ACT-IMPOSSIBILITY OF FAIRLY EXPLAINING ITS STATEMENTS IN ANY OTHER SENSE-INSTRUCTIONS TO THE VISITORS IN 1576.

IN proceeding to consider the acknowledged laws and constitutions of the Church, Mr Robertson says,

"It will be rather singular, if, in the Reformed Church of Scotland, we find no traces of a doctrine which seems to have prevailed so generally among the Continental Churches."

This doctrine is, that the people have only the right of stating objections of which the Church Courts are to judge, and that Church Courts, when they think the grounds of the people's objections insufficient, are entitled to intrude a minister upon the reclaiming congregation. The only evidence he has produced, that "this doctrine prevailed generally among the Continental Churches," is the quotation from Böehmer, which, we think, has been satisfactorily disposed of. We hold ourselves much better entitled to introduce this subject by saying, that, considering the place and influence assigned to the people in the appointment of ministers by the canon law, and by the Confessions of the Reformed Churches, it would be strange indeed if the Church of Scotland allowed them no higher place or influence than the right of objecting on cause shown.

The fundamental doctrine or principle on this point laid down in the First Book of Discipline, in accordance with the doctrine of the primitive Church, and of the Reformed Churches on the Continent, is, that “it appertaineth to the people, and to every several congregation, to elect their minister;" and on the grounds already explained, it is manifest, that the men who maintained this doctrine could not, without gross and palpable inconsistency, admit the right of Church Courts, as a general principle, and according to their discretion, to thrust ministers upon

reclaiming congregations. The whole character and spirit of this doctrine are flatly opposed to the doctrine of Mr Robertson and his friends. The two principles could not possibly dwell together in one and the same mind. Every man who holds the leading principle of the First Book of Discipline on this subject, must regard with scorn and indignation the Popish principle of Mr Robertson; and it is not possible to conceive that the authors of this book could have produced the arguments on which they defended this principle, without demolishing, a fortiori, every ground on which the pretended right of Church Courts to intrude ministers upon reclaiming congregations is founded. Reformers certainly took the best means of preventing the possibility of intrusion, when they gave the people the right of choosing their own ministers.

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But Mr Robertson, and others who support the same views, have endeavoured to gain some countenance to their notions from another statement in this book. We shall give the passage at length, and not in the garbled and mutilated way in which it is usually put forth by our opponents

"It appertaineth to the people, and to every several congregation, to elect their minister. And in case that they be found negligent therein the space of forty days, the best reformed church, to wit, the church of the superintendent, with his councell, may present unto them a man whom they judge apt to feed the flock of Christ Jesus, who must be examinated as well in life and manners, as in doctrine and knowledge. If his doctrine be found wholesome, and able to instruct the simple, and if the church justly can reprehend nothing in his life, doctrine, nor utterance, then we judge the church, which before was destitute, unreasonable, if they refuse him whom the Church did offer; and that they should be compelled, by the censure of the Councell and Church, to receive the person appointed and approved by the judgment of the godly and learned, unless that the same church have presented a man better, or as well qualified to the examination, before that this foresaid trial was taken of the person presented by the Councell of the whole Church. As, for example, the Councell of the Church presents to any church a man to be their minister, not knowing that they are otherwise provided; in the meantime, the church is provided of another, sufficient, in their judgment, for that charge, whom they present to the learned ministers and next reformed church to be examined. In this case, the presentation of the people to whom he should be appointed pastor must be preferred to the presentation of the Councell or greater Church, unless the person presented by the inferior church be judged unable of the regiment by the learned. For altogether this is to be avoided, that any man be violently intruded or thrust in upon any congregation; but this liberty, with all care, must be reserved to every several church to have their votes and suffrages in election of their ministers. But violent intrusion we call not when the Councell of the Church, in the fear of God, and for the salvation of the people, offereth unto them a sufficient man to instruct. them, whom they shall not be forced to admit before just examination, as before is said."

Here let us first notice the confirmation which the whole passage affords of the general principle of election by the people. It lays down the position, that "altogether this is to be avoided, that any man be violently intruded or thrust in upon any congregation; but this liberty, with all care, must be reserved to every several church to have their votes and suffrages in the election of their ministers,”—a declaration plainly introduced for the very purpose of guarding against the impression that, in making provision for a certain case, they were renouncing or violating

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the general principle with which the whole statement commences. farther provides, that even where the people neglect to choose a minister in due time, and the Council or Church Court propose to them a wellqualified man to be their minister, but the people, in the meantime, choose a well-qualified person for themselves, "the presentation of the people must be preferred to the presentation of Councell," a provision which some of our opponents must regard with horror, as flatly inconsistent with their Popish notions about the lordly authority of Church Courts. These considerations confirm the general position, that the First Book of Discipline is decidedly opposed to the idea that Church Courts have a general right to intrude at their discretion, or that the people are not entitled, in all ordinary circumstances, to be protected against intrusion.

We admit that the First Book of Discipline contemplates the possibility of cases occurring in which Church Courts might settle a minister even when the congregation were averse to his settlement, if they could not substantiate reasons of objection. But none of us disputes this, and it is not in the least inconsistent with our principles. The great question is, In what circumstances, or upon what grounds, may such a power be exercised? Mr Robertson, in commenting upon this passage, says, "It is abundantly evident, that in the only circumstances in which the non-intrusion principle could have been brought into operation, it is completely excluded." We say, that the non-intrusion principle is brought into operation, wherever, by giving the people the election of their own ministers, the best and most effectual provision is made against intrusion. And it will not do for Mr Robertson to wrap up his account of the special case provided for in such vague and general terms, as "the only circumstances in which the non-intrusion principle could have been brought into operation," or, "the moment that the right of electing passes fully into the hands of another party." It may be convenient for him to slur over the account of the special case in this way; but we must state it distinctly, and explain in what circumstances, and upon what grounds, "the right of election passed into the hands of another party." It is only when the people are found negligent in discharging the duty, or exercising the privilege, of choosing a minister for themselves. This, of course, was an extraordinary case, and one which required to be provided for. It could be provided for on right principles, in no other way than by extending pro hac vice the authority of the Church Courts, for no other party but the presbytery and the congregation ought to have any thing to do with the settlement of ministers. The case, then, in which "the right of electing passed into other hands," was one in which the people had acted in such a way as rightly to expose themselves to the exercise of ecclesiastical discipline, in which they fairly incurred a forfeiture of their ordinary rights and privileges, and in which there was a necessity for some provision different from the ordinary mode of procedure. It is scarcely fair to talk vaguely of the case, when "the election passed into other hands," without adverting to the distinct specification given of the circumstances which determine the true character of the case, and evince the manifest contrariety between the doctrine of the First Book of Discipline and that of our opponents. The intrusion of our opponents is the general rule, the ordinary principle of procedure, founded upon general views of a Popish character in regard to the authority of

Church Courts, and the subordination of the people. The First Book of Discipline repudiates all such Popish principles, and the ordinary right founded upon them, and merely makes provision in the only way in which provision could be made for a special and extraordinary case, calling for the exercise of discipline, warranting a forfeiture, for the time, of ordinary rights, as involving a neglect of duty on the part of the people, and a refusal to exercise their privileges,-a case which rendered it not only lawful but necessary to deal with the congregation in this instance as if they were not properly speaking a Christian flock, but a body of men who needed a minister, rather in the character of a missionary than a pastor.

The Non-Intrusionists have never disputed that the Church Courts may be entitled, on adequate grounds, and in the exercise of discipline, to suspend a congregation from the ordinary rights of Church membership, including the right of electing or dissenting. We are fully aware that this power of Church Courts is liable to be abused and converted into an instrument of tyranny and oppression; but believing, in common with all Presbyterians, that this right rests upon scriptural authority, we will not withhold or oppose it because the exercise of it may be liable to abuse; and we wish that our opponents would act upon the same principle in regard to the Christian people, and not trample upon their rights, or rather deny that they have any rights, merely because power in their hands, like power in the hands of any other party, may sometimes be abused.

It is thus manifest how unreasonable and unfair it is for Intrusionists to appeal to the First Book of Discipline in support of their principles, since the fundamental doctrine which it lays down on this subject is flatly opposed to intrusion, and since the only thing in it that even seems to countenance intrusion, is an extraordinary provision for a special case, resting upon peculiar grounds, and affording not a shadow of foundation for the general position of our opponents about the right of Church Courts to intrude ministers upon reclaiming congregations.

The provision in the First Book of Discipline, which our opponents pervert to serve their own purposes, is substantially analogous to that provision in our statute law, by which, when the patron neglects to present within six months, the Presbytery are entitled to present jure devoluto; and when our opponents appeal to the First Book of Discipline in support of their principles, their conduct is exactly like that of men who should lay down the broad and general position, that the statute law of Scotland sanctioned the right of Presbyteries to elect ministers, and should appeal, in support of the allegation, to the statutory provision about the jus devolutum. Some years ago, when the subject of slavery was much discussed in this country, we remember that some foolish persons endeavoured to defend or palliate that infamous system, by alleging that it could not be so radically and essentially wrong as it was alleged to be, to keep men in a state of slavery, since substantially the same thing was done with universal approbation when men were forced to labour in the hulks. The answer to this poor pretence was obvious and conclusive. Slavery was a general interference with men's liberties, resting solely upon force, and not upon any right lawfully acquired by the master, or upon any forfeiture incurred or any punishment