Causation in International Relations: Reclaiming Causal AnalysisCambridge University Press, 3. apr 2008 World political processes, such as wars and globalisation, are engendered by complex sets of causes and conditions. Although the idea of causation is fundamental to the field of International Relations, what the concept of cause means or entails has remained an unresolved and contested matter. In recent decades ferocious debates have surrounded the idea of causal analysis, some scholars even questioning the legitimacy of applying the notion of cause in the study of International Relations. This book suggests that underlying the debates on causation in the field of International Relations is a set of problematic assumptions (deterministic, mechanistic and empiricist) and that we should reclaim causal analysis from the dominant discourse of causation. Milja Kurki argues that reinterpreting the meaning, aims and methods of social scientific causal analysis opens up multi-causal and methodologically pluralist avenues for future International Relations scholarship. |
Contents
Section 22 | 157 |
Section 23 | 161 |
Section 24 | 167 |
Section 25 | 173 |
Section 26 | 176 |
Section 27 | 187 |
Section 28 | 190 |
Section 29 | 194 |
Section 9 | 83 |
Section 10 | 88 |
Section 11 | 94 |
Section 12 | 99 |
Section 13 | 101 |
Section 14 | 106 |
Section 15 | 117 |
Section 16 | 122 |
Section 17 | 124 |
Section 18 | 147 |
Section 19 | 149 |
Section 20 | 152 |
Section 21 | 153 |
Section 30 | 196 |
Section 31 | 206 |
Section 32 | 210 |
Section 33 | 213 |
Section 34 | 220 |
Section 35 | 229 |
Section 36 | 269 |
Section 37 | 287 |
Section 38 | 289 |
Section 39 | 291 |
Section 40 | 299 |
Section 41 | 308 |
Other editions - View all
Causation in International Relations: Reclaiming Causal Analysis Milja Kurki No preview available - 2008 |
Causation in International Relations: Reclaiming Causal Analysis Milja Kurki No preview available - 2008 |
Common terms and phrases
accepted account of cause actions agents arguably argued Aristotelian Aristotle behaviour Bhaskar causal accounts causal analysis causal explanation causal powers causal relations challenge chapter characterised closed system Cold War complex concept of cause conceptualisation constitutive constructivists context counterfactual critical realists crucial debates defined democratic peace Dessler deterministic discipline efficient cause emphasise empirical empiricist entail epistemological example explanatory factors formal causes frameworks framing generalisation hermeneutic historical Hume Humean approach Humean assumptions ideas important international system interpretive Keohane and Verba logical logical positivist mainstream material causes meaning methodological nature neoliberal neorealist non-causal notion of cause objects observable ontological Patomäki patterns philosophically realist philosophy of causation philosophy of science political realists positivism positivist postpositivists poststructuralists pragmatist rational rationalist reality recognise refer reflectivists regularities regularity-deterministic rejected role seen social ontology social relations social science social structures social world Suganami theoretical theoretical reductionism theorists theory tion understanding variables Wendt Wight world politics
Popular passages
Page 36 - Upon the whole, necessity is something that exists in the mind, not in objects; nor is it possible for us ever to form the most distant idea of it considered as a quality in bodies.
Page 35 - An object precedent and contiguous to another, and where all the objects resembling the former are plac'd in like relations of precedency and contiguity to those objects, that resemble the latter', [or, secondly] 'A CAUSE is an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it.
Page 48 - To give a causal explanation of an event means to deduce a statement which describes it, using as premises of the deduction one or more universal laws, together with certain singular statements, the initial conditions.
Page 39 - An object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it in the imagination, that the idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other...
Page 39 - But as to the causes of these general causes, we should in vain attempt their discovery; nor shall we ever be able to satisfy ourselves, by any particular explication of them. These ultimate springs and principles are totally shut up from human curiosity and enquiry.
Page 34 - ... from what impression is that supposed idea derived? And if it be impossible to assign any, this will serve to confirm our suspicion. By bringing ideas into so clear a light we may reasonably hope to remove all dispute...
Page 149 - Let me now say only this, that truth is one species of good, and not, as is usually supposed, a category distinct from good, and co-ordinate with it. The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite, assignable reasons.