PRIV. Co.] EDISON GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. v. WESTMINSTER, &C., TRAM. Co., &c. [PRIV. Co. the tramway company, and they sought conse Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. quential relief. They based their claim on the - Law of British Columbia-Insolvency-Fraudulent preference Collusion - Consolidated Statutes of British Columbia, c. 51, s. 1. By the Consolidated Statutes of British Columbia, c. 51, s. 1, it is enacted: •In case any person being at the time in insolvent circumstances. voluntarily or by collusion with a creditor gives a confession of judgment. with intent to defeat or delay his creditors wholly or in part, or with intent thereby to give one or more of his creditors a preference every such confession shall be null and void as against the creditors." The respondent tramway company was insolvent, and the appellant company obtained a judgment against them. A summons was taken out to set aside this judgment with a stay of proceedings till the day of the return of the summons. Before that date the respondent bank issued a writ against the tramway company, and before the summons came on for hearing the tramway company consented to a judgment on that writ. The summons to set aside the appellants' judgment was afterwards dismissed with costs, a writ of fi. fa. was issued, and a return made of nulla bona. Held (reversing the judgment of the court below), that, though pressure by a creditor might be an answer to a case of fraudulent preference, it was no answer to a case of collusion, and that the bank's judgment was made null and void by the statute. Martin v. Macalpine (8 Ontario Appeal Rep. 675) approved. THIS was an appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court of British Columbia (Davie, C.J. and Drake, J., McCreight, J. dissenting), who had affirmed a judgment of Crease, J. at the trial. The appellants, who were the plaintiffs in the action, sued for themselves and other creditors of the Westminster and Vancouver Tramway Company. They alleged that they had, on the 29th Dec. 1893, recovered judgment against the tramway company for 18,470 dollars and costs, and that they had been deprived of the fruits of that result by a judgment obtained on the 24th Jan. 1894, by the Bank of British Columbia against the tramway company for 261,217 dollars and costs, which judgment they alleged had been given by the tramway company, then in insolvent circumstances, voluntarily and by collusion with the bank, with intent to defeat and delay the appellants and to give the bank a preference over them and the other creditors. They alleged that their judgment was a first charge on the lands of (a) Reported by C. E. MALDEN, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. The ground that the bank's judgment was null and void under the Fraudulent Preference Act. respondents denied that the judgment obtained by the bank was given voluntarily or collusively and with the intent alleged, and stated that it was given for a debt justly due by the tramway company to the bank and under pressure exercised by the latter. The action was tried before Crease. J. without a jury, and judgment was entered for the respondents, with costs. The Supreme Court affirmed that decision. Blake, Q.C. (of the Canadian Bar), and Cravford appeared for the appellants. Robinson, Q.C. (of the Canadian Bar) and R. M. Bray, for the respondents, the Bank of British Columbia. The following authorities were referred to in the course of the arguments: Martin v. Macalpine, 8 Ontario Appeal Rep. 675: Ex parte Hill, 49 L. T. Rep. 278: 23 Ch. Div. 695: Re Fleming, Fraser, and Co., 60 L T. Rep. 154. Sir R. COUCH. The suit in this case was brought by the appellants in the Supreme Court of British Columbia, against the respondents, to have a judgment obtained by the Bank of British Columbia against the Westminster and Vancouver Tramway Company declared null and void. and the executions issued thereon, and the certificates thereof, registered as a charge against the lands of the tramway company, set aside and cancelled. It was dismissed with costs by the judge of the Supreme Court before whom it was heard, and on appeal by the plaintiffs to the full court the appeal was dismissed with costs. At the hearing of that appeal, and also of the present appeal, the Bank of British Columbia alone appeared and defended the appeal. The suit was founded upon sect. 1, c. 51 of the Consolidated Statutes of British Columbia, which is as follows: In case any person being at the time in insolvent circumstances, or unable to pay his debts in full, or knowing himself to be on the eve of insolvency, voluntarily or by collusion with a creditor or creditors gives a confession of judgment, cognovit actionem, or warrant of attorney to confess judgment, with intent in giving such confession, cognovit actionem, or warrant of attorney to confess judgment, to defeat or delay his creditors wholly or in part, or with intent thereby to give one or more of the creditors of any such person a preference over his other creditors, or over any one or more of such creditors, every such confession, cognovit actionem, or warrant of attorney to confess judgment shall be deemed and taken to be null and void as against the creditors of the party giving the same, and shall be invalid and ineffectual to support any judgment or writ of execution." It was not disputed that the tramway company was insolvent on the 29th Dec. PRIV. CO.] EDISON GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. v. WESTMINSTER, &C., TRAM. Co., &c. [PRIV. CO. 1893, and that the appellants and the bank were its principal creditors. On that day the appellants obtained a judgment against the tramway company for 18,470 dollars 12 cents and costs. On the 13th Jan. 1894 a summons was taken out by the tramway company to set aside this judgment, with a stay of proceedings till the 24th Jan. 1894, the return day of the summons. On the 17th Jan. 1894 the bank issued a writ of summons against the tramway company for 261,217 dollars 67 cents and costs. On the 24th Jan. the tramway company entered an appearance, and before the hearing of the summons to set aside the appellants' judgment, on the application of the solicitors of the bank, with the written consent of the tramway company's solicitor, judgment was given by the judge sitting in chambers for the bank for 261,217 dollars 67 cents debt and costs. Afterwards on the same day the summons to set aside the appellants' judgment came on for hearing in court before the same judge, and on the 27th he gave judgment dismissing it with costs. On the 31st Jan. a writ of fieri facias on the appellants' judgment was issued to the sheriff, and a return made of nulla bona. The material facts with regard to the validity of the judgment for the bank are to be found in the evidence of the defendant Oppenheimer, the president of the tramway company, of Mr. William Murray, the manager of the bank, and Mr. E. A. Jenns, the solicitor for the tramway company. In his evidence Mr. Jenns said that he was solicitor for the tramway company from the middle of 1893 to the then present date; that he first heard of the judgment for the appellants having been signed on the 5th Jan. 1894, that about the 20th Jan. he had a conversation with Mr. Davis (the senior partner of the firm who were solicitors for the bank), and spoke to him about the company having decided to allow the bank to take judgment. Mr. Davis said he would prefer to wait and take judgment by default. Mr. Jenns thought he first heard on the 24th that the judgment was to be by consent, and even on the 24th he understood that the arrangement was that the bank was not to sign judgment in the event of "the Edison judgment" being set aside. It had been arranged by him with Mr. Davis, on the instructions he got from the company, that he was to consent to judgment. His instructions were to consent to judgment. As their Lordships are satisfied that there was pressure by the bank it is not necessary to refer to his evidence on that matter, or to his evidence about the summons to set aside the appellants' judgment. It was not proved that the bank or their solicitors in any way caused the summons to be issued. Mr. Murray, the manager of the bank at Vancouver, in his evidence said that, on hearing of the appellants' judgment, he asked Mr. Davis's advice on the subject, and then sent for Mr. Oppenheimer and told him that they would have to get in ahead of the Edison judgment, that they must have the first judgment. The arrangements were left with the solicitors. Mr. Oppenheimer said that, having received from Mr. Murray and Mr. Ward (the superintendent of the Vancouver branch of the bank) the intimation that the bank insisted upon having judgment prior to the Edison Company, he gave instructions to the solicitor to give the bank first judgment. He was cross-examined at some length as to the reasons for taking out the summons to set aside the judgment. It is not necessary, as before observed, to refer to this part of his evidence. Mr. Oppenheimer was also asked as to the reason for giving the bank the first judgment and his evidence as to this may be summed up in one of his answers; he said that the controlling reason was to give the company time to make financial arrangements. It is apparent to their Lordships on the evidence that the bank did not intend immediately to enforce the judgment. The object both of the bank and the company was to protect the latter against the claim of the appellants, so that an attempt might be made to reconstruct the company and raise money to meet its liabilities. Mr. Ward in his evidence said that the object of the bank in trying to obtain priority for their judgment was that they should be able to protect the company so as, if possible, to carry it on. If the appellants' case had only been that there was a fraudulent preference of the bank, the pressure by the bank might have been an answer to it; but their Lordships do not see how pressure alone can be an answer to a case which alleges collusion. The statute is in the alternative. The confession of judgment may be given either voluntarily or by collusion with a creditor. In either case, if there is the intent to defeat or delay creditors or to give a preference over other creditors, the confession is made null and void against creditors. In Gill v. The Continental Gas Company (27 L. T. Rep. 424; L. Rep. 7 Ex. 332) Bramwell, B. said that the word collusion only signified agreement. In their Lordships' opinion" collusion" in this section means agreement or acting in concert. It is plain from the evidence that there was an agreement between the tramway company and the bank, the effect of which was that the bank should have a judgment, and that their judgment should have priority to the appellants' judgment, the object being, as Mr. Ward said, that the bank should be in a position to protect the company, if possible, so as to carry it on. The case comes within the provision in the section. It has been argued for the respondents that the confession must be fraudulently given. The section does not use that word, but the giving a judgment by confession by a person in insolvent circumstances, voluntarily or by collusion with a creditor, with intent to defeat or delay his creditors, or to give a preference to one of them over the others, is treated by the statute as a fraudulent act. Their Lordships approve of the decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario in Martin v. Macalpine (8 Ontario Appeals 675). Their Lordships are of opinion that the statute makes the bank's judgment null and void as against the creditors of the tramway company. They will therefore humbly advise Her Majesty to reverse the decree and order of the Supreme Court on the trial and on the appeal, and to declare the judgment of the bank against the tramway company to be null and void, and to order the executions issued thereon, and the certificates thereof, registered as a charge against the lands of the company to be set aside and cancelled with costs of the suit, including costs of the appeal to the Supreme Court, but with liberty for the appellants to apply to the Supreme Court for any consequential relief for the purpose of enforcing their judgment. Respondents, the Bank of British Columbia must pay the costs of this appeal. Solicitor for the appellants, J. Cornelius Wheeler. Solicitors for the respondent bank, Freshfields and Williams. Supreme Court of Judicature. COURT OF APPEAL. Dec. 1 and 2, 1896. (Before Lord RUSSELL, C.J., LINDLEY and SMITH, L.JJ.) ATKINSON v. MORRIS. (a) APPEAL FROM THE PROBATE DIVISION. Probate-Will-Revocation-Destruction of one of duplicate wills-Declarations of testator-Evidence as to-Admissibility-Directions to jury in respect to evidence-Wills Act 1837 (1 Vict. c. 26), s. 20. Although the destruction of one of duplicate wills, with the intention of revoking it, operates as a revocation of the will, yet hearsay evidence of declarations made by the testator that he executed the will in duplicate and destroyed one of the duplicates is not admissible. Sugden v. Lord St. Leonards (34 L. T. Rep. 372; I Prob. Div. 154); Doe d. Shallcross v. Palmer (16 Q. B. 747); and In the Goods of Ripley (1 Sw. & Tr. 68) applied. Decision of Barnes, J. affirmed. Circumstances considered in which the Court of Appeal will decline to interfere with the directions to the jury by the judge in the court below with respect to the evidence adduced in support of a will propounded for probate, where the will has been prepared by, and executed at the instance of, a person taking considerable benefit thereunder. ANN KEBLE ATKINSON by her will, dated the 8th Aug. 1878, after appointing Emma Atkinson and the testatrix's nephew, Charles Thomas Atkinson, executrix and executor of her will, and bequeathing certain legacies, devised and bequeathed to her said nephew all her residuary real and personal estate whatsoever and wheresoever. The will was written and prepared by Charles Thomas Atkinson at the request of the testatrix. It was duly executed by the testatrix in the presence of Francis Howell and Sarah Phoebe Howell. Charles Thomas Atkinson was present when the will was signed, but he did not interfere in any way. Francis Howell died on the 28th Oct. 1882. The testatrix died on the 16th Nov. 1895. On the 4th Jan. 1896 John Chandler Morris, one of the next of kin of the testatrix, obtained a grant of letters of administration to her personal estate and effects as having died intestate. On the 4th Feb. 1896 an action was commenced by Emma Atkinson and Charles Thomas Atkinson against J. C. Morris and William Hatcher Morris, another of the next of kin of the testatrix, in which they claimed probate of the will of the 8th Aug. 1878 in solemn form and revocation of the grant of administration. The defence was, that the will was not properly executed; that it was obtained by the undue in(a) Reported by E. A. SCRATCHLEY, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. [CT. OF APP. fluence of Charles Thomas Atkinson; that the testatrix did not know and approve of its contents; that it was executed in duplicate; and that the testatrix had revoked the will by burning the duplicate thereof, with the intention of thereby revoking the will. At the trial of the action before Barnes, J. and a special jury, on the 22nd July 1896, the defendants tendered evidence to the effect that, after the execution of the will, the testatrix had made declarations to Edith Lockyer, who lived with her, that she had executed her will in duplicate, and that she had destroyed one of the parts with the intention of revoking the will. This, if it could have been proved, would have amounted to revocation of the will, but the learned judge decided that the evidence was inadmissible. In the will as propounded it appeared that the testatrix had run her pen through her own sig. nature and partly through the signature of one of the attesting witnesses, and had written the following note at the foot of the will, to which she had added her initials: Null and void. A. K. A. Through injustice on the part of Mrs. Emma Atkinson and family from time to time. By sect. 20 of the Wills Act 1837 it is enacted: That no will or codicil, or any part thereof, shall be revoked otherwise than as aforesaid [i.e., by marriage under sect. 18] or by another will or codicil executed in manner herein before required, or by some writing declaring an intention to revoke the same, and executed in the manner in which a will is herein before required to be executed, or by the burning, tearing, or otherwise destroying the same, by the testator, or by some person in his presence and by his direction, with the intention of revoking the same. A verdict for the plaintiffs was returned by the jury, and the learned judge pronounced for the will with costs against both the defendants. On the 29th July 1896 notice of motion was given by the defendant J. C. Morris, that the verdict of the jury and the judgment entered for the plaintiffs might be set aside, and that a new trial might be ordered on the following grounds: 1. Misdirection or non-direction of the learned judge-(a) In telling the jury that the evidence was all one way; (b) That the learned judge ought to have directed the jury that, as the plaintiff Charles Thomas Atkinson had written and prepared the will by which he took a considerable benefit, that was a circumstance that ought generally to excite the suspicion of the court, and called on it to be vigilant and zealous in examining the evidence in support of the will, in favour of which it ought not to pronounce unless the suspicion was removed, and it was judicially satisfied that the paper propounded did express the true will of the deceased; and that the learned judge ought to have directed the jury that there was no sufficient evidence to remove the suspicion. 2. That the learned judge improperly rejected certain evidence tendered on behalf of the defendants: (a) That the learned judge refused to receive in evidence declarations made by the deceased that she had executed the will in duplicate; (b) That the learned judge refused to receive in evidence declarations made by the deceased that she had destroyed one part of the will with the intention of revoking it. The motion now came on to be heard. Bayford, Q.C. and Barnard for the appellant.First, we ask the court to say that the defendant is entitled to a new trial of this action on the ground of misdirection or non-direction to the jury by the learned judge in the court below, for the reasons stated in the notice of motion. The case on this point is governed by Barry v. Butlin, 1 Curt. 637, at p. 638; 2 Moo. P. C. 480, at p. 482; Tyrrell v. Painton, 70 L. T. Rep. 453, at p. 455; (1894) P. 151, at p. 157. Secondly, that the learned judge improperly rejected evidence of declarations made by the testatrix to the effect that her will was executed in duplicate, and that she had destroyed one part with intent to destroy the whole, the two duplicates constituting one will. That evidence having been excluded, the jury found no evidence of execution in duplicate. [Lord RUSSELL, C.J.-Is there any case in which it has been held that obliteration of a signature to a will except by cutting it out amounts to a revocation of the will? If a testator erases his name and declares the will to be null and void, is that a sufficient revocation?] We are not aware of one exactly to that effect. [Inderwick, Q.C.-In Cheese v. Lovejoy (37 L. T. Řep. 294; 2 Prob. Div. 251) a testator drew his pen through the lines of various parts of his will, wrote on the back of it, This is revoked," and threw it away. But, on its being discovered otherwise uninjured on his death some years afterwards, the Court of Appeal held that it was not revoked.] As to the point of the admissibility of the evidence to prove the declarations of the testatrix, see 66 Doe d. Shallcross v. Palmer, 16 Q. B. 747, 756. Upon that authority there has followed a string of cases. It was interpreted and extended in Staines v. Stewart and Jones, 2 Sw. & Tr. 320, 329. [SMITH, L.J.-In the Goods of Ripley (1 Sw. & Tr. 68) is also an important case to be looked at.] A later case was Quick v. Quick, 3 Sw. & Tr. 442. [Lord RUSSELL, C.J.-That, I think, has been overruled.] If you can get hearsay evidence of a declaration admitted on any point, you can use it on another: Sugden v. Lord St. Leonards, 34 L. T. Rep. 372; 1 Prob. Div. 154, 224. [LINDLEY, L.J. referred to Keen v. Keen (29 L. T. Rep. 247; L. Rep. 3 P. & D. 105). Lord RUSSELL, C.J.-None of those cases seems to help you in regard to the proposition that have to you establish.] We cannot say that they are actually in point, but they show what the court has done. Evidence of declarations has been admitted in other cases: Keen v. Keen (ubi sup.); Johnson v. Lyford, 18 L. T. Rep. 769; L. Rep. Gould v. Lakes, 43 L. T. Rep. 382; 6 Prob. Div. 1. A duplicate is part of a will, and is considered as a testamentary paper; and all testamentary papers have to be brought in for probate : Killican v. Parker, 1 Lee, 662. Where a will is executed in duplicate one only is admitted to probate, and the other is produced to show that there has been no revocation. The duplicate has also to be produced before probate [CT. OF APP. is granted, because, if the two documents in any way varied, they would both have to be proved. The question always is, whether there are two wills or two expressions of the same will. [SMITH, L.J.-Would you call a lease and a counterpart the same document ?] We should say yes. If a bill of lading is executed in duplicate or triplicate it would be regarded as one document. [Lord RUSSELL, C.J.-So also, I suppose, would bills of exchange drawn in sets.] Lord St. Leonards' case (ubi sup.) went a great deal farther than any previous case, because in all the other cases there was evidence of intention only. [Lord Russell, C.J. referred to Hubbard v. Alexander (35 L. T. Rep. 52; 3 Ch. Div. 738), where the court allowed evidence to be admitted to show that two codicils of different dates, but containing the same dispositions, were executed only as duplicates.] We say that this case is within Gould v. Lakes (ubi sup.)-where it was held that statements of a testatrix, whether made before or after the execution of the will, are admissible to show what papers constitute the will-and that this was one will though written in duplicate. There is a passage to that effect in Colvin v. Fraser, Hagg. Eccl. 266, at p. 329. The same statement appears in Williams on Executors, 9th edit. p. 132. If evidence is admitted it is admissible for all purposes: The Aylesford Peerage, 11 App. Cas. 1, 9. Even to prove the execution of a will evidence of a declaration is admissible. [Lord RUSSELL, C.J. -Is there any case which establishes the proposition that evidence of an ex post facto statement of a testator is admissible to prove the execution of his will?] Evidence of declarations were admitted to prove the fact that a will had a legal existence in Sly v. Sly and Dredge, 2 Prob. Div. 91. [Lord RUSSELL, C. J.-That is a different case altogether. It is somewhat on the lines of Lord St. Leonards' case (ubi sup.).] We admit that there is no case precisely on all-fours with the present. The case that is mostly against our proposition is In the Goods of Ripley (ubi sup.), which was decided on the authority of Doe d. Shallcross v. Palmer (ubi sup.), both of which cases were cited with approval by the Court of Appeal in Sugden v. Lord St. Leonards (ubi sup.). We do not think that in Woodward v. Goulstone (55 L. T. Rep. 790; 11 App. Cas. 469) the House of Lords meant to lay down that posttestamentary declarations of a testator as to the contents of his will were not admissible in evidence. If a declaration of a testator is admissible in evidence for the purpose of proving the contents of a will, there is no distinction between that and evidence of a declaration for the purpose of proving the execution of the will. [Lord RusSELL, C.J.-I think that there is a considerable distinction. The question is so far completely open.] They referred also to the Wills Act 1837, sect. 20. Inderwick, Q.C. and L. D. Powles for the respondents.-There is a marked distinction between the case of Gould v. Lakes (ubi sup.), upon which the appellant mainly relies, and this case. In Gould v. Lakes the question was as to the admissibility of evidence of a declaration to prove the contents of a will. You cannot have evidence of a declaration of a testator to prove the execution of a particular paper. In the present case the two documents together are one will; that is to say, one only is to be given effect to. The case of Doe d. Shallcross v. Palmer (ubi sup.) is in our favour. There is also one case in the House of Lords, viz., Woodward v. Goulstone (ubi sup.) and one in the Court of Appeal, viz., Sugden v. Lord St. Leonards (ubi sup.) which establish the proposition that evidence of a declaration is not admissible for the purpose of proving the execution of a will, although perhaps to prove the contents of a will; but even that is not absolutely certain. We cannot find any case where the present point has actually arisen. But with regard to attesting witnesses see Stobart v. Dryden, 1 M. & W. 615. Bayford, Q.C. replied. He Lord RUSSELL, C.J.-In this case we have to deal with a motion on the part of the defendant J. C. Morris for a new trial based upon two grounds: first, that the learned judge in the court below misdirected the jury in particulars which I shall have to mention presently; secondly, that he improperly rejected evidence which he ought to have admitted. The case is a peculiar one. So far as it is necessary to narrate them the facts are these: A will was executed on the 8th Aug. 1878 by Ann Keble Atkinson. At that date she was a widow and had been for some time carrying on the business of her late husband, who was a builder. The story of the making of the will is this: Admittedly the will is in the handwriting of the nephew of the testatrix, Charles Thomas Atkinson, and he is the principal beneficiary under it, being interested to the extent of about 14,0007. practically takes all the property except some small legacies. Upon the occasion of the execution of the will the testatrix, from some document described as a parchment, which was open before her, dictated to her nephew the terms of the will. He took down those terms in pencil, and went home and copied them in ink on foolscap. He then went back, and the testatrix executed the will in the presence of two witnesses. The surviving attesting witness was called. The nephew says that, after the execution of the will, and after the attesting witnesses had left, he asked the testatrix if he might take a copy of the will for himself. Having made a copy, instead of taking it away with him, he left it with the testatrix. The evidence further shows that later, when the testatrix was ill, she sent the will and the copy to the mother of Charles Thomas Atkinson. The will and the copy remained with her for about a year and a half. Then they were returned to the testatrix, and remained in her custody till her death in Nov. 1895. Upon her death in that year no will, nor anything purporting to be a will, was forthcoming. Accordingly, on the 4th Jan. 1896, letters of administration were granted to the defendant, John Chandler Morris, as one of the next of kin of the deceased. An inquiry was thereupon made, at the instance of those claiming under the will, with the result that ultimately the present plaintiffs, Emma Atkinson and Charles Thomas Atkinson, propounded a document as the true and properly executed will of the testatrix. When the document was produced it bore upon its face in the [CT. OF APP. clearest manner signs that the testatrix did intend to nullify and revoke the will she had made, for she had erased her own signature, and also the Christian name and occupation of one of the attesting witnesses. She wrote in her own handwritingNull and void," and she initialled those words, and added her reasons thus: "Through injustice on the part of Mrs. Emma Atkinson and family from time to time." Nothing could be clearer than the intention that the testatrix gave of revoking the will, and certainly it would be most anomalous if the court did not so far as it could give effect to that intention. The question is, can it do so? Before I come to that I will deal with the points taken by counsel. First, as to the misdirection. It is said to be this, that the learned judge in the court below did not explain to the jury as he ought to have doue, the circumstances of the case and the peculiar facts which called on the judge to warn the jury to be critical in regard to the evidence adduced in support of the will, because the will was prepared by a person who was the principal bene. ficiary thereunder, and he had been called to give evidence in support of it. It is clear that, whenever a person who is himself a beneficiary comes forward in support of a will which he has himself procured to be executed, it is the duty of the judge to explain to the jury that they ought to be excessively critical before accepting his evidence. That has again and again been laid down and acted on. But it does not follow that the evidence of such a person is to be altogether disregarded. The question, therefore, on the plea of misdirection is, has the learned judge discharged his duty? I think that he has; and, although I should myself have preferred to have pointed out more clearly to the jury that Charles Thomas Atkinson was a person whose evidence was to be received with great caution, yet I cannot come to the conclusion, because the learned judge has not expressed himself more strongly, that there has been any misdirection. I say that for this reason: He deals with the alleged circumstance that the testatrix did not know the contents of the will. He says this in his summing-up to the jury: "Then the next defence raised by the defendants is that the deceased at the time of the execution of the will did not know and approve of the contents of the will. Now, with regard to that particular plea, it is desirable that you should appreciate exactly how the matter stands. order to make a good will you must of course prove that the person not only signed it, but that he knew what he was doing, and knew and approved of the contents of the document. It is perfectly true to say that, where you find a person who is benefiting to a large extent by the will, and who himself prepares that will and gets the deceased to sign it, you look with some suspicion on it, and it requires strong proof that the will has been executed to the satisfaction of the person who made it. It is a rule of common sense, and it was thus expressed in the Court of Appeal only a short time ago very much as I have put it to you." The learned judge then read a passage from the judgment of Lindley, L.J. in Tyrrell v. Painton (70 L. T. Rep. 453, at p. 455 ; (1894) P. 151, at p. 157). The learned judge then continues thus: "That is to say, if you think a will is made in circumstances that attract suspicion, do not let it go to probate unless the court is satisfied that In |