Q.B. DIV.

Where a public duty vested in a public body is not discretionary but merely ministerial the public body may delegate it to one of its officers. The duties of the London County Council as to dangerous structures under part ix. of the London Building Act 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. ccxiii.), are merely ministerial, and may, therefore, be delegated to the council's superintending architect.

CASE stated by a metropolitan magistrate.

The appellants were the County Council of London. The respondent was the owner of a structure known as No. 331, West Ferry-road, Poplar, as to which an order had been made under the provisions of the London Building Act 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. 113) relating to dangerous structures. The appellants had incurred certain expenses in obtaining and carrying out this order, and they summoned the respondent under sect. 109 for the recovery of these expenses.

At the hearing it was proved or admitted that a notice to the effect that No. 331, West Ferry. road, Poplar, had been reported to the district surveyor to be in a dangerous state, had been sent by the district surveyor to the London County Council, that in consequence thereof an order to survey the structure was sent by the superintending architect of the London County Council on their behalf to the district surveyor, that the district surveyor had reported as the result of his survey that the said structure was in a dangerous state, and that thereupon an order directing the respondent to carry out certain works was served on the respondent by the superintending architect, on behalf of the London County Council. It was admitted that the matter had never been actually before the London County Council, but that the different notices and orders had been issued by the officers of the council, under authority purported to be delegated to the superintending architect under an order made by the late Metropolitan Board of Works, and continuing in force under the London County Council (Local Government Act 1888, s. 123).

The said order ran as follows:

DANGEROUS STRUCTURES. Pursuant to the 81st section of the Metropolitan Building Act 1855 as amended by the Metropolitan Building Act 1869, the Metropolitan Board of Works doth hereby order and make the following regulations for carrying into execution the second part of the firstmentioned statute.

(1) The superintending architect of metropolitan buildings as a temporary measure until further order, is hereby authorised in the name of and on the part of the board, in the interval between any meetings of the board, and on receipt of any information of any dangerous structure, to name the surveyor of the district in which the structure may be situate to make the survey, and give the information and certificate to the board according to the said Acts. Also upon receipt thereof he do forthwith on the part of and in the name of the board take all necessary steps to give effect to such information and certificate by giving notices and authorising the contractor of the board to proceed in all proper works according to the said Acts.

No further order had been made, but in the regulations as to the London Building Act 1894 the London County Council had treated the matter of dangerous structures on the basis that their authority was still delegated to the superintending architect.

[Q.B. DIV.

The respondent had carried out the works required by the order served on him by the superintending architect, but had neglected or refused to pay the expenses incurred by the council in obtaining and carrying out the order. The magistrate held that such expenses could only be recovered where sects. 103, 105, and 106 of the London Building Act 1894, had been complied with; that those sections had not been complied with in this case, inasmuch as it had not been made known to the council that the structure in question was in a dangerous state, and the council had not required a survey of the structure to be made under sect. 103, nor had they caused the notice to be served on the respondent under sect. 106; and, finally, that the council had no authority to delegate their powers to the superintending architect, so that the routine followed in his department, as above described, was not a compliance with the section in question.

London Building Act 1894.

Sect. 103. (1) Where it is made known to the council that any structure is in a dangerous state the council shall require a survey of such structure to be made by the district surveyor or by some other competent surveyor. (3) The district surveyor

shall make known to the council any information which he may receive with respect to any structure being in a dangerous state.

Sect. 105. Upon the completion of his survey the district surveyor employed shall certify to the council his opinion as to the state of the structure.

Sect. 106. If the certificate is to the effect that the structure is not in a dangerous state no further proceedings shall be had in respect thereof, but if it is to the effect that the same is in a dangerous state, the council may cause the same to be shored up or otherwise secured and a proper hoard or fence to be put up for the protection of passengers, and shall cause notice to be served on the owner or occupier of the structure requiring him forthwith to take down, secure, or repair the same as the case requires.

Avory for the appellants.-I submit that the duty placed by the Act upon the council is purely ministerial, and as such can be delegated by them to their officers. If before any action can be taken the council must meet and consider the evidence as to the state of the structure in each particular case, the public safety might be greatly imperilled by the necessary delay. No injustice can arise through the delegation. If the powers of the Act are improperly put in force the person affected can appeal to a magistrate. It is the justices and not the council who are to exercise a discretion in the matter (see sects. 107 and 114.), or the person affected may go to arbitration (sect. 107). But before an application to the magistrate or a reference to arbitrators these preliminary and ministerial steps must be taken. The only case in any way against this argument is

Vestry of St. Leonards, Shoreditch v. Holmes, 50
J. P. 132.

There the question arose under sect. 81 of 18 & 19 of Vict. c. 120, which gave the vestry a discretion in the matter. Here the council have no discretion.

Defendant in person.-The Act expressly says that the County Council shall do these acts. I submit that to leave it to mere officials to do them is not in accordance with this provision.

WILLS, J.-I think this case must be remitted to the learned magistrate to deal with it on the merits. In my opinion the learned magistrate was wrong in the interpretation which he put upon the Act of Parliament. In sect. 103 the words are, 'Where it is made known to the council that any structure is in a dangerous state." We must hold that this is made known to the council when it is made known to one of the council's officers. The section then

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goes on "the council shall require a survey." This gives the council no option in the matter; the council has here no discretion to exercise, their function is purely ministerial. It is against every principle controlling these things to say, as the learned magistrate has said, that such a power cannot be delegated. The council have delegated it. Authority to act in the council's name has been given to the superintending architect by a resolution of the late Metropolitan Board of Works. It is true that that resolution is described as a temporary measure, but it was a measure to obtain until other arrangements were made. The functions of the Metropolitan Board of Works have been transferred to the London County Council, and this measure has been transferred with them. I may add that it seems to me to arise out of the nature of things that an act such as this which is compulsory on the council must be taken by their officer acting for them. It may be that in this case, as the defendant alleges, the law has been improperly put in force. We know nothing of that except this-that that is no reason why the authority to put it in force should not be exercised by an officer of the council.

An action was commenced by a manufacturer for a mandamus to compel the local authority, under sects. 15 and 21 of the Public Health Act 1875, to cause to be made such sewers as were necessary for effectually draining their district for the purposes of the Act; and, under sect. 7 of

the Rivers Pollution Prevention Act 1876, to give facilities for enabling the manufacturer to carry the liquids proceeding from his factory into the sewers under their control. Held, that a mandamus ought to be granted in so far as it related to the claim to compel the local authority to cause to be made such sewers as were necessary for effectually draining their

(a) Reported by W. W. ORR, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

district under the Public Health Act, and the manufacturer's premises in particular, upon the ground that, under sects. 15 and 21, the authority were bound to provide sufficient sewers to carry off the liquids from factories within their district, and that for any default by the authority in this obligation sect. 299 provided no exclusive or sufficient remedy, and had no application in such a case as the present where the question was one of law and not of fact; but that a mandamus ought not to be granted to compel the authority to give facilities under sect. 7 of the Act of 1876 for enabling the manufacturer to carry the liquids from his factory into existing sewers, upon the ground that for any default in that respect a sufficient and exclusive remedy was provided by sect. 10 of the Act, which constituted the County Court of the district the tribunal to deal with such default.

ARGUMENT before Charles, J. of points of law raised upon the pleadings in an action for a writ of mandamus.

For the purpose of the present argument the facts alleged in the pleadings were taken to be admitted, and were stated by the learned judge as follows:

This was an action for a mandamus argued on the 11th Nov. It raised several important questions of law upon the construction of the Public Health Act 1875, and the Rivers Pollution Prevention Act 1876, which the parties agreed should be argued before the hearing of the cause. The defendants are the local authority for the urban district of Oswaldtwistle, and as such have under their control the sewers of the district. The plaintiff in the action when originally brought in Oct. 1895, was Philip Cadell Peebles, a paper manufacturer, who was owner and occupier of a factory called the Whiteash Paper Mill, within the district for which the defendants are the local authority. On the 25th Nov. Mr. Peebles died, and the action, which was held by the Court of Appeal to survive (see Peebles v. The Oswaldtwistle Urban District Council, 74 L. T. Rep. 721; (1896) 2 Q. B. 159) was continued by his executors, who were duly added as plaintiffs. On the 27th July 1896 they sold to a company, who were added with their consent, by order of the learned judge at the hearing. The plaintiffs, as stated in the fifth paragraph of their statement of claim, desire to cause their drains to empty into the sewers of the defendants and to carry into such sewers the liquids proceeding from their but factory or manufacturing processes the sewers within the district are not such as are necessary for effectually draining the district for the purposes of the Public Health Act 1875, and in particular are not such as are necessary for effectually draining the plaintiffs' premises. whereby they are unable to cause their drains to empty into the defendants' sewers or to carry into them the liquids proceeding from their factory or manufacturing processes.' The plaintiffs then alleged that they had demanded of the defendants that they should cause to be made such sewers as might be necessary for effectually draining their district, and in particular for effectually draining the plaintiffs' premises, and, further, that the defendants should, according to the provisions of the Rivers Pollution Prevention Act 1876. give facilities for enabling the plaintiff's

66

to carry into the sewers the liquids proceeding from their factory or manufacturing processes. The defendants declined to comply with these demands, and the plaintiffs now claimed a mandamus to compel the defendants-first,

to cause

to be made such sewers as may be necessary for effectually draining their district for the purposes of the Public Health Act 1875; and, secondly, to give facilities for enabling the plaintiffs to carry the liquids proceeding from their factories or manufacturing processes into the sewers under their control."

In their statement of defence the defendants alleged (inter alia) that as to so much of the plaintiffs' claim as was for a writ of mandamus commanding the defendants to cause sewers to be made, the action did not lie in law, and that no such writ could be granted, on the ground that the plaintiffs' remedy (if any) was to make a complaint to the Local Government Board pur. suant to sect. 299 of the Public Health Act 1875, and that the only remedy for the defendants' alleged non-compliance with sect. 15 of the Act was the making of such complaint, and that the obligation imposed by the 15th section did not extend to obligations imposed by sect. 7 of the Rivers Pollution Prevention Act 1876, nor to provision for the receipt of the liquids from the plaintiffs factory, and on the ground that the plaintiffs have disclosed no case showing that the court ought to exercise its discretionary power (if any) of granting a writ in the plaintiffs' favour; and that as to so much of the plaintiffs' claim as was for a writ of mandamus commanding the defendants to give the plaintiffs facilities to carry their liquids into the sewers under the control of the defendants, the defendants objected that the action did not lie in law, and that no such writ could be granted, on the ground that the plaintiffs' remedy (if any) was to proceed under sect. 10 of the Rivers Pollution Prevention Act 1876, and that the court had no jurisdiction, as the remedy provided by law was in the County Court of the place where the alleged offence was committed, and that sect. 7 was not applicable to sewers not yet constructed.

-

Bigham, Q.C. (C. A. Russell with him) for the plaintiffs. The real question in the case is whether the defendants the urban district council-are bound to provide necessary sewage accommodation for this factory. We submit that they are so bound, and that there is imposed upon them the obligation-the statutory obligation to take away the sewage or the effluents from this factory, and we must take it as a fact that there are these effluents flowing from this factory, and that they must be removed if the district is to be properly drained. We say that the defendants' liability arises under the Public Health Act 1875, and that by sect. 15 the defendants are bound to remove these effluents. But that section does not stand alone; it is supplemented by sect. 21, and reading the two sections together there can be no doubt that the local authority are bound to provide the sewers that are necessary to take away these effluents. In answer to this the defendants rely on sect. 299, and say that, even if they are liable, we have mistaken our remedy, and that our proceeding in this court for a writ of mandamus is not the right remedy, but that we ought to have applied to the

Our

Local Government Board under sect. 299. answer to that is that sect. 299 has nothing to do with this case, in which the only question is a question of law, namely, whether the defendants are liable to provide this drainage. Sect. 299 contemplates a different case altogether. The Local Government Board will not decide questions of legal liability; but if there is a dispute, not as to the legal liability, but as to whether the thing done or omitted to be done is a thing that ought to be done-not having regard to the legal obligation-then, the duty being admitted. the Local Government Board will deal with the matter under sect. 299. For instance, if there is a dispute as to whether a sewer is sufficient or not, and there is no question as to the legal liability to make the sewer, that is the sort of dispute the board will deal with under sect. 299, but it will not decide whether the Act imposes a duty to make a sewer or not. So far, therefore, as the Act of 1875 is concerned, there is an unqualified obligation thrown on the defendants by sects. 15 and 21, and sect. 299 has no application, as the question is a disputed question of law. Then a point is raised under the Rivers Pollution Prevention Act 1876, and it is suggested that, as sect. 7 of the latter Act imposed upon the autho rity a qualified liability to deal with an effluent such as this, therefore the Act of 1875 does not apply, and also that if the defendants are guilty of any offence it is an offence under sect. 7, and that the remedy is by proceeding in the County Court under sect. 10, and not by mandamus. Our answer is that our rights arise under the Act of 1875, and would have existed before the Act of 1876 was passed, and that this Act of 1876, which was passed for wholly different purposes, was not meant to, and does not, qualify or alter the obligations imposed by the Act of

1875.

Joseph Walton, Q.C., and Danckwerts for the defendants.-The first part of the claim is under sect. 15 of the Act of 1875, and the second part is under, and in the language of sect. 7 of the Rivers Pollution Prevention Act 1876. It is, therefore, not accurate to say that we are setting up the Act of 1876 as a defence: the plaintiffs are setting it up as part of their claim. The question now is whether, looking at both statutes, the plaintiffs are right in the proceedings they have taken, proceedings to compel the defendants to make a sewer not only to drain the district, but to give the plaintiffs facilities (that is, under sect. 7 of the Act of 1876) for carrying away these liquids from this factory. As the right claimed is under both Acts and both sections, we are entitled to rely on any limitations in either Act. The first question is whether this court is the proper tribunal. We submit it is not, but that the proper tribunal is the Local Government Board under sect. 299. The real claim here is that the defendants should be ordered to make a sewer; and that is a claim under the Act of 1875 as there is no obligation imposed on the local authority under the Act of 1876 to make sewers. Sect. 7 of the Act of 1876 is in terms limited to cases of providing facilities where there are sewers already existing, and even that is further limited by the second proviso. Therefore, if an authority has got no sewers it cannot be compelled under that section to make them for this purpose; and even if it has sewers, if

..

such sewers are only sufficient for the "requirements" of the district, it cannot be compelled to allow the liquid refuse from a factory to be put into its sewers. The plaintiffs, therefore have to fall back on sect. 15 of the Act of 1875, and they rely especially on the words "such sewers as are necessary for effectually draining their district." But sect. 299 provides a remedy for that very thing, for it says: Where the local authority has "made default in providing their district with sufficient sewers;" so that the section deals in terms with the case of providing sufficient sewers. This Act of 1875, therefore, creates a new duty (in sect. 15) and gives a remedy in terms (in sect. 299) for the non-performance of that duty, and the authorities are perfectly clear that given a new duty created by statute and a new remedy in that statute, then that remedy, and that remedy only, can be followed. This general principle has been laid down in many cases both civil and criminal; by Lord Tenterden in Doe d. Bishop of Rochester v. Bridges (1 B. & Ad. 847); by Willes, J. in The Wolverhampton New Waterworks Company v. Hawkesford (6 C. B. N. S. at p. 356), where he says: "Where a liability not existing at common law is created by a statute which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy the remedy provided by the statute must be followed." The principle is the same in criminal cases:

Reg v. Hall, 64 L. T. Rep. 394; (1891) 1 Q. B. 747. As to the point that the Local Government Board does not deal with questions of disputed liability, the answer is that the questions here which are mixed questions of law and fact, such as the sufficiency of sewers, &c., are very proper questions for that board to deal with, and the board is competent to deal with them, and if they refused to deal with them a mandamus might then be applied for. There is no such limitation of their jurisdiction under the statute. If the plaintiffs had gone to the Local Government Board alleging a default under sect. 15, no court would have prohibited the Board from considering the matter. [CHARLES, J.-It is very doubtful if prohibition would lie against the Board: Reg. v. The Local Government Board (48 L. T. Rep. 173; 10 Q. B. Div. 309) ]. As to the part of the claim alleged to exist under the Act of 1876, sect. 10 of that Act in terms provides a remedy in the County Court in the district of which "any offence against the Act" is committed, and "where such offence consists in default to perform a duty under the Act." The only part of the Act to which that can be applicable is sect. 7, for that is the only section which creates any obligation to perform a duty: Lumley's Public Health, 5th edit. 1066. Therefore, in so far as the claim is based upon sect. 15 of the Act of 1875, it is met by sect. 299; and in so far as it is based on sect. 7 of the Act of 1876 it is met by sect. 10 of that Act, and those sections provide an exclusive remedy. But, even if the remedy is not an exclusive one, it is at all events an alternative and appropriate one, and the court will not grant a mandamus: Reg. v. The Registrar of Joint Stock Companies (59 L. T. Rep. at p. 69; 21 Q. B. Div. at p. 134); Reg. v. The Commissioners of Inland Revenue; Re Nathan (51 L. T. Rep. 53-4; 12 Q. B. Div. 473-5); and the same principle applies to an action for a mandamus and to a writ of mandamus:

Bush v. Beavan, 7 L. T. Rep. 106 32 L. J. 54, Ex.

Assuming that this is the proper tribunal there is no obligation upon the defendants to make these sewers. There is none under the Act of 1876, as the obligation there is merely to give facilities; and rone under the Act of 1875, as the obligation there is only to make sewers for the purposes of that Act. They referred to

Reg. v. Cockerell, L. Rep. 6 Q. B. 252;

Reg v. The Staines Local Board, 69 L. T. Rep.
714;

Reg. v. The Tottenham Local Board, 9 Times L.
Rep. 414:

Guardians of Hertford Union v. Kimpton 25 L. J.
41, M. C.

C. A. Russell, in reply, referred to

Atkinson v. The Newcastle and Gateshead Water-
works Company, 36 L. T. Rep. 761; 2 Ex. Div.
441:

Glossop v. The Heston and Isleworth Local Board,
40 L. T. Rep. 736; 12 Ch. Div. 102;
Attorney-General v. The Guardians of Dorking
Union, 46 L. T. Rep. 573; 20 Ch. Div. 595;
Kirkheaton District Local Board v. Ainley, 67 L. T.
Rep. 209; (1892) 2 Q B. 274;

Reg. v. The Tottenham Local Board, 9 Times L.
Rep. 414;

Lumley's Public Health (5th edit.), p. 36, note (a).
Cur. adv. vult.

Dec. 11.-CHARLES, J. read the following judgment:-I will deal first with the claim so lar as it depends on the Public Health Act 1875, and consider apart at present from the question of the form of remedy whether the local authority of a district are bound to provide sewers sufficient to carry off the effluents coming from manufactories within their district. If they are so bound, then, in the present case-taking the facts to be as stated in the pleadings for the purpose of this argument, but not otherwisethey have failed to perform their obligation. The plaintiff's contend that this duty is imposed by sect. 15, which enacts that "every local authority shall keep in repair all sewers belonging to them, and shall cause to be made such sewers as may be necessary for effectually draining their district for the purposes of this Act," and that by sect. 21 they as owners or occupiers of premises within the district are entitled under the regulations therein mentioned to cause their drains to empty into the sewers. The duty, it will be observed, is imposed "for the purposes of the Act," and those purposes must be taken to be sanitary purposes. Part 3 in particular is headed, Sanitary Provisions: Sewerage and Drainage." There is, however, no definition of sewage in the Act, but it was contended by the defendants that the duty imposed was confined to providing for sewage properly so-called, and reliance was placed upon sect. 27, which provides for the disposal of sewage and the terms of which seem to indicate that only ordinary sewage was included. The meaning given by the interpretation clause (sect. 4) to the word drain" may also be referred to as pointing in the same direction. But neither the language of sect. 27 nor the definition of "drain" appears to me to be decisive. On the other hand, the interpretation clause (section 4) clearly contemplates something beyond mere domestic drainage. Premises includes buildings, and "house" includes factories. Again, sect. 17. which directs the purification of sewage before its being discharged into

streams speaks of sewage or filthy water-terms wide enough to include the liquids coming from manufacturing processes. It is clear, I think. from these definitions of "premises" and "house" that the owner or occupier of a factory is entitled under sect. 21 to connect his premises by a drain with the sewer. But, having done so, what may be put into a drain? Is he to be limited to passing into it ordinary sewage only? I think not. In my opinion, he may use the drain to its utmost capacity and pass liquids of all kinds into it including those coming from his manufacturing processes-provided, indeed, that they are not liquids injurious to health. This would have been preventible by injunction under the nuisance clauses of the Act of 1875 (see especially sect. 91), and is now expressly forbidden by the Public Health Act of 1890, sect. 17. But the defendants contended that, even assuming they have made default in providing the sewers necessary for effectually draining their district under sect. 15 no mandamus should issue, because, by sect. 299 another remedy was provided for their breach of duty, if any. The duty imposed, they said, was a new one, and in the same statute the remedy for default of performance was given. Therefore, they argued, the principle applies which was laid down by Lord Tenterden. C.J., in Doe v. Bridges (1 B. & Ad. 847), and which has been approved of in many other cases, that when an Act creates an obligation and enforces the performance in a specified manner, it is a general rule that performance cannot be enforced in any other manner." This argument, if, in fact, well founded, would, no doubt, be a complete answer to an application for the prerogative writ, and it is not disputed that the same considerations apply to an action of mandamus (see Bush v. Beavan (7 L. T. Rep, 106; 32 L. J. 54, Ex.). Further, it was said that, if not an exclusive remedy, sect. 299 provided a sufficient and convenient remedy, and, if so, according to the well known practice, no mandamus would be granted. I felt, upon the hearing, much pressed by these arguments; but upon consideration I have come to the conclusion, so far as regards the Act of 1875, that they ought not to prevail. The provisions of sect. 299, so far as is material, are as follows: "Where complaint is made to the Local Government Board that a local authority has made default in providing their district with sufficient sewers, the Local Government Board, if satisfied, after due inquiry, that the authority has been guilty of the alleged default, shall make an order limiting the time for the performance of their duty, in the matter of such complaint. If such duty is not performed by the time limited in the order, such order may be enforced by writ of mandamus, or the Local Government Board may appoint some person to perform such duty." Now the question raised in the present case under the Act of 1875 is one of law and not of fact-namely, whether the defendants are bound to provide sewers for liquids coming from the plaintiffs' manufacturing premises at all; and to such a question I do not think that sect. 299 has any application. Unless excluded expressly, the plaintiff's have, in my opinion, a right to the judgment of a court of law upon the matter, but if the Local Government Board take the same view as the defendants they will never get it. The section, introduced by the words Where complaint is made," does

[Q.B. Div.

not seem to me to make it imperative on the plaintiffs to make a complaint of the sort now under consideration to the Local Government Board and to submit to their interpretation of the statute. It does not, therefore, provide an exclusive remedy within the meaning of Lord Tenterden's language in Doe v. Bridges (ubi sup.), or a sufficient and appropriate remedy in the sense in which those words are used, as constituting a bar to an application for a mandamus. Upon the latter point I may refer to the judgment of the Master of the Rolls in Re Nathan (51 L. T. Rep. 54; 12 Q. B. Div. 475), where he lays down the true principle upon which a mandamus may be granted or refused-"where there is no specific remedy by which justice can be done the court will grant a mandamus, but where there is a specific remedy by which the subject will get justice by a judicial decision of the courts. then it is within the reason of the rule that if there is such a remedy a mandamus ought not to issue." I should add that the Lords Justices in Glossop v. Heston and Isleworth Local Board (40 L. T. Rep. 736; 12 Ch. Div. 102) appear to have considered that a mandamus could properly issue to a local authority to enforce performance of their duty under sect. 15, though the case is not a decision upon the point. To the same effect is the language of Bowen, L.J. in Kirkheaton Local Board v. Ainley (67 L. T. Rep. 209; (1892) 2 Q. B. 274), when commenting (p. 278 of (1892) 2 Q. B.) on the case of Attorney-General v. Dorking Union (46 L. T. Rep. 573; 20 Ch. Div. 595), and again in his judgment at p. 284. I now proceed to consider the claim of the plaintiffs under the Rivers Pollution Prevention Act 1876 for a mandamus to compel the defendants to give facilities for enabling them to carry the liquids proceeding from their factories into the sewers under their control. A very few words will suffice to dispose of it. I may observe in passing that the powers of this Act are cumulative (see sect. 16), and do not in any way abridge powers given to persons under other Acts, such as the Public Health Act 1875. The section relied on by the plaintiffs is sect. 7, which enacts that "every sanitary or other local authority having sewers under their control shall give facilities for enabling manufacturers within their district to carry the liquids proceeding from their factories or manufacturing processes into such sewers." The section, it will be noted, applies only to existing sewers, and it contains two provisoes which, I have to assume for the purposes of argument, are inapplicable, and to which, therefore, I need not further refer. Now, if this section stood alone, I have no doubt that a mandamus would be granted to compel the authority to give the requisite facilities so far as regards existing sewers. But by sect. 10 another sufficient and appropriate remedy for default is provided. The County Court is thereby constituted the proper tribunal to enforce the performance of the duty, and by sect. 11 an appeal to the High Court is provided, or the plaint may by leave of a judge be removed into the High Court. This is, in my opinion, a complete answer to the claim of the plaintiffs for a mandamus under sect. 7. Here there is "a specific remedy provided by which the subject will get justice by a judicial decision of the courts." It is needless to inquire, under these circumstances,