...page 394

employment as servant of the inhabitants of the parish; and that the money which he was alleged to have embezzled was properly described as the property of the inhabitants of the parish. (Reg. v. Smalman.) False pretences-Evidence-Opinion of witnessPermissible question-Larceny and misdemeanour -Practice-Indictment-Multiplying counts inEffect of new sentence on person released on licence. On the trial of an indictment for obtaining goods and credit by false pretences, if the alleged false representation is in writing, it is permissible to ask the person who is alleged to have been defrauded, what opinion he formed on seeing the writing. A person convicted of obtaining certain goods by false pretences cannot subsequently on the same facts be convicted of larceny. The counts in an indictment should be restricted to those only which are necessary to formulate the charge against the defendant; to multiply them is to embarrass the defendant in his defence. Per Hawkins, J.: If the counts in an indictment are numerous it is reasonable to ask the court to try each count separately. And also per Hawkins, J.: A court in passing a sentence on a person who has been released on licence has no jurisdiction to order that the new sentence shall be concurrent with the unexpired portion of the old sentence, which the convict becomes liable to complete. (Reg. v. John King.) Indictment - Necessary averment - Offence not originally indictable-Claim to be tried by a jury. -Where an indictment is preferred, in accordance with the provisions of sect. 17 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act 1879 against a person who, when charged before a court of summary jurisdiction with the commission of an offence punishable summarily, claimed to be tried by a jury, the court has jurisdiction to deal with the indictment as if the offence had been originally indictable, and the fact that the indictment is preferred in consequence of the defendant's claim to be tried by a jury is not a necessary averment. (Reg. v. Chambers.) ...

DIVORCE. Practice-Husband's petition for dissolution - Ex parte statements as to name of alleged adulterer -No legal evidence-20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, s. 28Rule 4, Divorce Court Rules 1865 Alleged adulterer to be made a co-respondent.-A husband who petitions for dissolution of his marriage on the ground of his wife's adultery must join the alleged adulterer as a co-respondent, though he possess no legal evidence against the alleged adulterer, and though his only knowledge as to the man's name be derived from confessions made by the wife or from other ex parte statements. (Jones v. Jones.)

...

Sequestrators-Matrimonial Causes Act 1857 (20 & 21 Vict. c. 85), s. 52-Property in hands of trustees, not parties.-A writ of sequestration was issued against the property of a co-respondent, who had not paid damages assessed against him in a divorce suit, and which by order of the court he was directed to pay, and the sequestrators applied, upon motion, for an order directing the trustees of the co-respondent's marriage settlement to pay into court any money then in their hands and due by them to the co-respondent. Upon the hearing of the motion, the trustees contested the jurisdiction of the court to make any order against them, and they further denied liability to the corespondent. Held, that these were not matters which could be heard and determined by the court upon motion in the divorce suit. (Craig v. Craig and Hamp.)

392

76

190

280

Borough vote-Disqualification-Persons living in almshouses-Legal interest vested in almspeople -Receipt of disqualifying alms.-A charity was founded by a grant of lands whereby the founder established a hospital, known as the Charterhouse, Hull, "for thirteen poor men and thirteen poor women, feeble or old, so long as they are necessitous," and it is still the necessary qualification for election that the persons should be feeble, old, and necessitous. The lands are vested in the masters, brothers, and sisters, and form the source of the revenue of the charity and the brothers, so long as they are such, reside in houses or rooms of which they are the legal owners. The brothers have to clean their rooms, and must be within when the gates are closed at 10 p.m. They are elected and are removable by the town council, and receive a weekly allowance of 78., with coals and medical attendance, and the brothers have hitherto always voted at Parlia mentary elections. Held, that, as the legal interest in the lands forming the charity was vested in the brothers themselves, they were not disqualified from voting under sect. 36 of the Reform Act 1832, by the receipt of "alms which by the law of Parliament now disqualify from voting." (Cowen and another, apps., v. The Town Clerk of Kingston-upon-Hull, resp.) Registration

...

Old lodger claim Omission of declaration-Mistake-Jurisdiction of revising barrister to amend.-A person on the old lodger list of electors sent in a lodger claim in respect of the same lodgings within the time within which old lodgers are required to send in their claims, but by mistake the form omitted the declaration in Form H., No. 2, of the Registration Order 1895 that the claimant was on the old lodger list in respect of the same lodgings. Held, that the omission of this declaration was a mistake in the claim which the revising barrister had jurisdiction to correct by inserting the declaration. (Francis, app., v. Metcalfe), returning officer, resp.)

ESTATE DUTY.

Voluntary settlement - Appropriated funds - Incumbrance. By a revocable post nuptial settlement personal property was settled upon trust for the settlor for life, and after his death upon trusts that the trustees should appropriate a part of the trust funds of a specified value to be held upon certain trusts and should stand possessed of the residue in trust for the settlor, his executors, administrators, and assigns. Held, that the appropriated funds did not constitute an "incumbrance" within sect. 7 (1) of the Finance Act 1894, and that the executor of the settlor who had paid the estate duty on the whole of the funds comprised in the settlement was entitled to receive from the persons entitled to the appropriated funds a rateable proportion of the estate duty. (Re Meyrick; Meyrick v. Hargreaves.)

EXCISE LICENCE. Secretary to "watch club "-Soliciting orders for watches-Liability to penalty-" Bonâ fide traveller."-The respondents formed and were secretaries of two "watch clubs," the proprietors of which were in one case a watchmaker in London, and in the other case a licensed dealer in plate in London. The respondents induced persons te join these clubs, and the members paid a weekly subscription to the respondents, and at certain intervals a ballot was held, and the successful member became entitled to a silver watch. The respondents did not keep watches in stock, but they communicated the order to the principals in

593

380

621

London, and the watch was sent to the member entitled to it. The respondents received a commission on each transaction, and all the transactions were carried on in the places where the respondents resided. Held, that the respondents came within the prohibition of sect. 17 of the Revenue Act 1867 as persons soliciting, taking, or receiving orders" for excisable articles without having a proper licence, and that they did not come within the exemption in that section as "bona fide travellers." (Killick, app., v. Graham, resp.; Lintern, app., v. Burchell, resp.)... ...page 29

Annuitant society-Objects of society exhaustedUndisposed-of funds-Charity Cy-près-Bonâ vacantia-Resulting trust-Friendly Societies Act 1829 (10 Geo. 4, c. 56).-In 1810 a society was established for the sole purpose, as expressed by its rules, of providing out of its members' subscriptions, fines, and forfeitures, a fund for the widows of deceased members. In 1839 the rules were revised, and the society conformed to the provisions of the Friendly Societies Act 1829, but the objects of the society remained unaltered. The society consisted of ordinary and honorary members. In 1878 the last surviving ordinary member died. In 1879 the only known honorary member died. The last annuitant of the society died in 1892. The rules made no provision for dissolution, nor had any dissolution! been attempted under the Friendly Societies Acts, or otherwise. An action was brought by the trustees of the society for distribution of the fund remaining in their hands, they and the representatives of the deceased honorary member disclaiming all beneficial interest therein. Held, Rigby, L.J. dubitante, that the society was not a charitable institution to which the doctrine of cy-près could be applied. But held that there was no resulting trust in favour of the personal representatives of those who contributed to the fund; and that therefore it passed to the Crown as bona vacantia. (Cunnack v. Edwards.) .. Failure of objects - Charity - Poverty Cy-près. A friendly society was formed in 1800 for the relief of sick and distressed members, their widows and children. In 1893 a legacy of £500 was bequeathed to the society by a testator, at whose death there was only one member of the society alive, and three annuitants, two of whom since died. The annuity of the remaining annuitant was amply covered by funds of the society in court. Held, that the society, not being a perfectly business-like arrangement or a mutual insurance society, and poverty being a necessary qualification to obtain relief from it, was a charity; that it was in existence at the testator's death, and that, therefore, the legacy had not lapsed and was applicable cy-près. (Re Buck; Bruty v. Mackay.)

...

...

Lapse

...

FUND IN COURT. Fraudulent petition-Order for payment out-Payment to wrong person-Solicitor-Improper use of name-Officer of the court-Ratification

628

205

122

312

Partnership-Liability to replace fund.-Where negligence or other breach of duty is committed by a solicitor (an officer of the court) in a matter in which the court has seisin, the court may, and if it can do full justice will, summarily order its officer to make good the loss occasioned by his neglect or breach of duty. But the limit of liability is the measure of the loss flowing from the negligence or breach of duty. The court cannot, merely because the officer has been guilty of misconduct, mulet him in damages. The damages must flow from the act of negligence or misconduct. To constitute a binding ratification of acts a priori unauthorised, the acts must have been done for and in the name of the supposed principal, and full knowledge of what those acts were, and unqualified adoption after such knowledge, must be proved; or, in the alternative, the circumstances of the alleged ratification must be such as to warrant the clear inference that the principal intended to adopt and take upon himself the responsibility of the supposed agent's acts, whatever they were, or however culpable they were. It is not within the scope of the agency authority created by the partnership for one partner in a firm of solicitors to allow the use of the name of the firm by another solicitor, and therefore to bind his copartner. (Marsh v. Joseph.)...

...

Reservation of right to make watercourse-Right to take water.-A grant of land by la Colonial Government contained a reservation that "the said land shall be liable without compensation to have any watercourses made over any part of it for the public use and benefit, by order of the Colonial Government," with certain exceptions as to buildings. Held, that the right to make a watercourse included a right to divert water from a natural stream on the land to fill it, and to use the water so diverted. (Remfry v. Surveyor-General of Natal.)...

66

HACKNEY CARRIAGE. Railway station-Refusal by cab-driver to drive into "Place" within limits of Act.-A railway station is a place" within the meaning of sect. 17 of the London Hackney Carriage Act 1853, which imposes a penalty upon the driver of any hackney carriage who refuses to drive any person hiring or intending to hire such carriage to any place within the limits of the Act," and the driver who refuses to drive such person into a railway station within the limits of the Act, incurs the penalty imposed by the section. (Ex parte Kippins.)

Extraordinary traffic-Person ordering materials for works-" Person by whose order the traffic has been conducted."-The respondent, who was the owner of a mansion-house and park, undertook building operations at his mansion-house on a large scale. Part of the work was done by contractors and part by the repondent himself. The materials for the work done by the respondent were supplied in this way: samples were submitted to the respondent, and when a sample was approved of the price was fixed, which in every case included delivery at the works, and orders were given on behalf of the respondent for the delivery of the materials as required. In no case was anycontract entered into for the supply of any material, and the respondent was not bound to take any such materials, nor had he any control over the carriage of the materials, but he knew that they would be delivered by traction engines, and in fact they were so delivered. Extraordinary expenses for the repair of the road having been incurred in consequence of such traffic: Held, that the respondent was the " son by whose order such traffic was conducted " over the road, and that he was liable for such

...

...

...page 247

expenses. (The Kent County Council, apps., v. Lord Gerard, resp.) Public nuisance - Breach of statutory duty Special damage-Right of action.-A gas company, in laying down a main along the side of a public road, filled up the trench so carelessly and defectively that the wheel of the vehicle in which the plaintiff was driving sank into the trench, whereby the vehicle was upset and the plaintiff injured. A jury having found not only that the company were guilty of negligence in the filling up of the road, but also that they left the road in such a state as to constitute a nuisance and a danger to those using the road; Held, that, as the company had left the road in a condition which amounted to a public nuisance, they were liable to the plaintiff, notwithstanding the provisions of sect. 11 of the Gasworks Clauses Act 1847 (Goodson v. The Sunbury Gas Consumers' Company Limited.)

HOUSE OF LORDS. Jurisdiction-Costs-Poor law-Limitation of time for payment of debt.-The House of Lords, as the ultimate Court of Appeal, has an inherent authority to order the payment of costs in any case, even though the court from which the appeal comes may not have such power. Where & judgment of the House of Lords directed the respondents to pay the costs of the appeal. Held, that the order for the payment of costs was not complete, and that no liability which could be enforced by legal process existed in respect of it, until the amount had been certified by the Clerk of the Parliaments, in accordance with the practice of the House. (Guardians of West Ham Union v. Churchwardens of Bethnal Green. Second Appeal.)

CO

HUSBAND AND WIFE. Intermittent cohabitation - Desertion.-The habitation which must necessarily be broken in order to give a good ground for a plea of desertion, need not necessarily be, and is not intended by the decisions in Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald (19 L. T. Rep. 575; L. Rep. 1 P. & D. 697) and Reg. v. Lereche (65 L. T. Rep. 602; (1891) 2 Q. B. 418) to imply that the husband and wife have been living together day and night under the same roof. The true meaning of those two decisions is that where, as in both those cases, the parties have been living separate and apart by mutual consent, there can be no desertion of the one party by the other, without a prior resumption of cohabition: there must, in fact, be an active withdrawal from an existing cohabitation. (Bradshaw v. Bradshaw.) Nullity of marriage-Cohabitation and non-consummation-Refusal of woman to allow consummation -Inference of latent incapacity-Decree.-From the fact of non-consummation of a de facto marriage after a period of cohabitation, during which one party made repeated attempts and was always willing and anxious to bring about the consummation of the marriage, the Court, notwithstanding the apparent competence of both parties, may draw the inference that something more than seemingly mere wilful refusal must have animated the party who has, in fact, persistently refused to allow consummation. In a case where the petitioner, a widower with children, went through the form of marriage in May 1893 with the respondent, a widow without children, and lived and cohabited with her at divers places until the latter part of Oct. 1893, during which time he, being admittedly able and anxious to consummate the marriage, made repeated attempts to do so, but was always repelled by the respondent, who refused to allow any attempt at connection: The Court, notwithstanding the fact that, upon medical inspection, the respondent exhibited no structural impediment nor signs of virginity, pronounced a decree nisi annulling the marriage, upon the

251

286

391

ground that it was open to the court to draw from the facts the inference of some latent incapacity on the part of the respondent. (F. v. P., falsely called F.)...

... page 192

Persistent cruelty Wilful neglect to provide reasonable maintenance, causing wife to leave husband and live separate and apart from him -Limit of time for proceeding-Summary Jarisdiction Act 1848-Continuing offence-Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women) Act 1895.-The limit of time imposed in the Summary Jurisdiction Act 1848, applies to "persistent cruelty" by a husband to a wife, and also to "wilful neglect to provide reasonable maintenance for her or her infant children whom he is legally liable to maintain," if by such cruelty or neglect the husband has caused the wife to leave him and live separate and apart from him," within the meaning of the Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women) Act 1895, s. 4. These offences as distinguished from desertion, are not continuing offences, and any complaint in regard to such persistent cruelty and neglect must be made within six calendar months of the commission of the offence, in accordance with sect. 8 of the Act of 1895. (Ellis v. Ellis.) Restitution of conjugal rights-Bond fides and conduct of petitioner-Matrimonial Causes Act 1884. -Conduct of a petitioner, though falling short of a matrimonial offence for which relief could be obtained, may yet be a good and sufficient ground for refusing a decree for restitution of conjugal rights. (Oldroyd v. Oldroyd.) ...

...

INCOME TAX. Deductions-Payment to retiring manager-Capital expenditure. The appellant company acquired under the provisions of an Act of Parliament the entire business of the Q. Insurance Company. One of the articles of agreement between the companies, which was embodied in the Act of Parlia ment, provided that the appellant company should take the manager of the Q Company into their service at an agreed salary, and, if they afterwards dispensed with his services, should commute his salary for a lump sum upon a basis agreed upon. In pursuance of this agreement the appellant company took the manager into their service, and after a short time dismissed him, and paid him a lump sum in commutation of his salary. Held, that, under the circumstances, this payment was part of the consideration for the purchase of the business of the Q. Company, and was a capital expenditure which the appellant company were not entitled to deduct in making their returns of profits and gains for income tax purposes. (Royal Insurance Company . Watson)

390

281

334 Public library.-A public library vested in a municipal corporation as library authority, under the Public Libraries Act 1892, is a "building the property of a literary institution within the meaning of the Income Tax Act 1842, s. 61, No. VI., and therefore the corporation is entitled to exemption from income tax in respect of such library under the section. (Mayor, &c., of Manchester v. McAdam.)

INNKEEPER. Liability to keep guest-Traveller.-The liability of an innkeeper at common law to receive and keep a guest applies only to guests who are travellers. Therefore, where a guest, who had remained at a hotel for ten months and refused to leave, was ejected by the proprietor: Held, that no action would lie against the proprietor of the hotel. (Lamond v. Richard.)

INSURANCE. BURGLARY.

Policy against burglary-Execution by insurersNonpayment of premium-Waiver of pre-payment -Recital.-On the 14th Dec. a proposal for an insurance against loss by burglary, containing a

229

693

clause that no insurance should be considered in force until the premium had been paid, was signed by the plaintiff and sent in to the defendants, an insurance company. A policy of insurance from the 14th Dec. 1895 to the 1st Jan. 1897 was duly executed by the defendant company a few days later, which contained recitals of the proposal, and that the first premium had been paid. It also contained a proviso that no insurance should be held to be effected until the premium due thereon should have been paid. This policy after its execution remained in the possession of the company, and the plaintiff did not pay anything by way of premium. On the night previous to the execution of the policy the plaintiff's premises were broken into, and he suffered loss thereby. Held, that the policy was a complete contract, and that the defendant company had waived the prepayment of the premium, and were liable under the policy. (Roberts v. The Security Company Limited.) page 531

FIRE.

Subrogation-Right of insurers to benefit of contracts of assured-Landlord and tenant.-The defendant, being the lessee of premises, covenanted to repair; the lessor covenanted to insure and to expend any insurance money received in making good damage by fire. The defendant insured the premises with the plaintiffs. A fire occurred and the defendant received from the plaintiffs £100, the full amount of the loss. The damage by fire was not made good, and the lease expired. The lessor sued the defendant for breach of covenant to repair, and that action was compromised by the defendant paying £140 and undertaking not to sue upon the lessor's covenant in the lease. The lessor subsequently received £100 from the insurance company with which he had insured the premises. Held, that the plaintiff's were entitled to the defendant's rights under the covenant in the lease, and were, therefore, entitled to recover from him the sum of £100, being the value of those rights which he had given up. (West of England Fire Insurance Company v. Isaacs.)

MARINE.

564

549

Arrival in "final port."-A policy of insurance on a vessel was stated to be at and from Newcastle (N.S.W.), "to any port or ports, place or places, in any order, on the west coast of South America, and for thirty days after arrival in final port however employed.' Held, that the words "final port" in this clause meant the final port of loading for the homeward voyage, and that the vessel was covered under the policy not only up to her final port of discharge, but up to and including her final port of loading for the homeward voyage, and for thirty days after her arrival in such final port of loading. (Crocker and others v. Sturge and another.) Freight Exception of claims consequent on loss of time Delay by perils of the seaFrustration of adventure-Total loss of freight. -A time policy of insurance, by which freight in respect of a steamer was insured against total loss or general average, contained the exception" warranted free from any claim consequent on lost time, whether arising from perils of the sea or otherwise." The vessel was chartered to convey a cargo to South Africa, and sailed on the voyage; her main shaft was broken by perils of the sea, and she was towed back to the port of loading. The delay necessary for repairing the damage so as to enable the vessel to proceed on the voyage was such as to frustrate the object of the adventure; the charter was properly cancelled; and the freight was totally lost. Held, that a claim for the loss of freight was a claim consequent on loss of time" arising from perils of the sea, within the meaning of the exception in the policy, and that the assured could not recover. (Bensaude and others v. The Thames and Mersey Marine Insurance Company.) 155, 405

Loss by perils of the sea-Loss caused by unseaworthiness Judgment against shipowner in

salvage suit-Estoppel against underwriter.-A judgment against a shipowner in a suit in the Admiralty Division for salvage reward is not, in an action by the shipowner against underwriters to recover the amount which he has paid under the judgment, conclusive or admissible evidence that there has been a loss by perils of the sea. A steamship sailed from port with insufficient coal for the voyage. Having burnt nearly all her fuel, she was proceeding under reduced steam and sail at about three knots an hour, and was about forty-one miles from port, the weather being fine and the sea moderate. She was not damaged, and could have proceeded under sail. Her master, by rocket, hailed a steam trawler and was towed into port. In a salvage suit the owner of the trawler recovered 3501., for salvage services, from the owner of the steamship. Held, that there had been a loss by perils of the sea within the meaning of a time policy of insurance. (Ballantyne and Co. v. Mackinnon.)

...page 95

INTESTATES' ESTATES ACT 1881. Escheat-Beneficial interest in real estate-Legal or equitable interest.-A testatrix devised a house of which she was seised in fee simple to her executors, who were to sell the same, and the testatrix directed that the purchase money should form part of her general personal estate. The testatrix further directed that her debts, funeral and testamentary expenses, and the legacies given by her will should be paid out of her general personal estate, but she did not dispose of the residue of the estate after such payment had been made. Though an inquiry had been directed, no heir-at-law of the testatrix had come in to claim the undisposed-of net proceeds of sale of the devised house, and in an action for the administration of the testatrix's estate the Crown claimed such proceeds by virtue of sects. 4 and 7 of the Intestates' Estate Act 1894. The executors claimed them for their own benefit. Held, that the net proceeds of sale were a beneficial interest in the testatrix's real estate not effectually disposed of, and that, as the interest was an equitable one, sect. 4 applied, and the Crown was entitled by escheat. (Re Wood; Attorney-General v. Anderson.)

JURISDICTION.

Power of County Court and High Court to order service out of the jurisdiction - Transfer of action-Administration. An action was commenced in the County Court against a defendant resident out of the jurisdiction, who was an executrix of an executor and trustee, claiming a declaration that the investment of a legacy bequeathed to the plaintiff at twenty-one was a breach of trust, and that the defendant was liable to make good the loss, and for administration of the testator's personal estate. The registrar gave leave to serve out of the jurisdietion, and subsequently it was ordered that the plaintiff be at liberty to administer interrogatories, and these were answered. But before this the defendant gave notice that she objected to the jurisdiction ou the grounds (1) that the estate was beyond the County Court limit; and (2) that the process had been served out of the jurisdiction. Notice of motion was given that at the trial a further and better answer to interrogatories would be asked for. At the trial (the earliest time by the County Court practice) the above objections were taken by the defendant, and on the ground of the first of them the action was transferred to the High Court. On a summons for further and better answer in the High Court, it was Held, (1) that there was jurisdiction under Order LI, r. 23, of the County Court Rules 1889, to order service out of the jurisdiction, although no order in such a case existed in the case of the High Court; and (2) that there having been no waiver while the action was pending, either in the County Court

28

d

LANDLORD AND TENANT. Determination of tenancy-Tenant's fixtures left by consent on land-Rights of mortgagees.Tenant's fixtures not removed during the continuance of the tenancy become on its expiration part of the freehold even though they are on the premises by the parol consent of the lessor; and though such consent might give the tenant a right of action for the value of the fixtures against the lessor if he subsequently refused to permit their removal, it will give no such right as against the lessor's mortgagees who were no parties to it, should they refuse. (Thomas v. Jennings and others.)

LEASE.

274

Construction-Water-Stream-Water percolating through marsh.-The respondents by lease demised to the appellant certain land and buildings with two ponds," together with right to the water in the said ponds and in the streams leading thereto." Held (Lord Halsbury, L.C. dissenting), not to include water from an adjacent spring, which percolated through a piece of marshy ground in no defined channel, and eventually reached one of the ponds. Semble, that there was an implied covenant on the part of the lessors not to diminish in any way the supply of water to the ponds, but held that there was no evidence that they had done so. Judgment of the court below affirmed. (M'Nab v. Robertson and others.) 666 Covenant to keep in repair-Damages.-In an action against an under-lessee on a covenant in a lease to keep the demised property in repair, where the under-lessee has notice of the original lease and of the covenants contained in it, the immediate lessor's liability over to the superior landlord must be taken into account in assessing the damages, and such damages are properly assessed on the basis of awarding a sum representing the diminution in value of the reversion on the termination of the underlease in consequence of the breach of covenant. (Conquest and another v. Ebbetts and another.)

...

LESSOR AND LESSEE. Licence to assign-Fine or sum of money in the nature of a fine-Conveyancing and Law of Property Act 1892 (55 & 56 Vict. c. 13), s. 3.-Where a building lease contains a covenant by the lessee not to assign without the licence of the lessors, the lessors are entitled to demand as a condition of granting such licence that the lessee shall deposit a sum of money as security for the due performance of the covenants in the lease, as the language of sect. 3 of the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act 1892, providing "that no fine or sum of money in the nature of a fine shall be payable for or in respect of such licence" points to an absolute payment of money to the person demanding it as a condition of granting such licence, and not to a sum of money deposited which the lessee will receive back if the covenants are performed. (Re Cosh's Contract.)

36

365

LIBEL.

Fact of libel-Question for judge-Privileged occasion-Excess of privilege.-In cases of libel it is a question for the judge whether the words complained of are capable of being construed by a reasonable man in a libellous sense, apart from any question of malice. Where an alleged libel has been published on a privileged occasion a finding by the jury that there was an excess of privilege, there being no evidence of malice, is no ground for entering judgment for the plaintiff. (Nevill v. Fine Arts and General Insurance Company.)

...page 606

LIBELLOUS PUBLICATION. Communication of contents-Liability-Damages.No claim can be maintained by the publishers of a libellous work against a person informing the individuals libelled of the publication and who bring actions against the publishers resulting in the recovery of damages. (Saunders v. The Seyd and Kelly's Credit Index Company Limited; The Seyd and Kelly's Credit Index Company Limited v. Saunders and Chapman.)...

LICENSING.

Refusal to renew-Appeal to quarter sessionsNotice of appeal-Objector-Respondent to the appeal-Costs.-A person who at a general annual licensing meeting has successfully objected to the renewal of a licence, and has afterwards been duly served with a notice of appeal by the licenceholder, is a party to the appeal to quarter sessions within sect. 31 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act 1879, and the Court of Quarter Sessions has therefore jurisdiction to order him to pay the costs of the appeal, notwithstanding that he has not appeared at the hearing of the appeal. (Reg. v. The Justices of Kent and others.)

LOCAL GOVERNMENT. County council-Bye-law-Use of obscene language in dwelling-house abutting on public streetValidity. A county council, under the powers conferred by sect. 16 of the Local Government Act 1888 to make bye-laws for the good rule and government of the county, made a bye-law prohibiting, under a penalty, any person from using in any house, building, garden, or other place abutting on or near to a street or public place, any violent, profane, or obscene language to the annoyance of any person in such street or public place. Held, that the bye-law was one which could properly be made for the "good rule and government" of the county, and was valid; and that therefore a man who had used obscene language in his dwelling-house, in a room abutting upon, and the door of which opened into the public street, to the annoyance of various persons in such street, ought to have been convicted under the bye-law. (Mantle, app., v. Jordan, resp.)...

District council-Plans for new buildings-Intended mode of drainage-Refusal to approve plans -The owner of land submitted to the district council plans for the erection of a large number of houses in proposed new streets. The plans showed that each house was to be drained by a separate drain ending in the soil of the proposed new street, and contained a note that it was proposed that the street and outfall sewers should be made by the council at their own expense. The council refused to approve of the plans unless it was shown into what sewer or other means of drainage the house drains were to communicate and empty, and for want of a proper and sufficient means of drainage and sewerage, and required that the street and outfall sewers should be made by or at the expense of the owner. The council's bye-laws provided that the plans of new buildings should show the "intended mode of drainage." Held, that the council were not entitled to disapprove the plans

193

11

552