Minister for Foreign Affairs, willing to lay before Bismarck a proposition for an armistice, which the French Provisional Government agreed to concur in, if initiated by a third party. Five interviews took place between the veteran French statesman and Count Bismarck, at the quarters of the latter at Versailles. Thiers paid his last visit to the German Chancellor at two o'clock on Sunday, Nov. 6th. On his return, the forts were silent, and for a short interval hopes were entertained within the city that an armistice had been agreed upon. But at six o'clock next morning he set out for Tours, and it was then known that the negotiations had failed.

In a report drawn up by M. Thiers on the 9th October, he thus explains the course which the discussion took. The object of his journey, he told Bismarck, was to obtain an armistice. Count Bismarck admitted the expediency of his mission, though, at the same time, he made certain reserves upon the intervention of the neutral powers in these negotiations. These had for their object the conclusion of an armistice in order to prevent further bloodshed, and to permit France to establish by means of elections, freely held, a regular Government, by which a treaty might be signed in a valid manner. The Chancellor having alluded to the members of the late régime who were endeavouring to reconstitute themselves into a Government at Cassel, M. Thiers replied at once that that Government had for ever ceased to exist, and had no future chance of success. M. de Bismarck then protested against any ideas of German interference in the internal affairs of France. The questions which were mooted during the first conference were, first, the principle of the armistice; secondly, its duration, the freedom of election in the occupied provinces; thirdly, the positions to be retained and relations to be observed by the belligerent armies; and, lastly, the revictualling of all besieged places, and especially of Paris, during the armistice. Count Bismarck did not appear to entertain any insurmountable objections on these questions, and M. Thiers thought that an understanding would probably be arrived at on all the other points. The conferences followed one another, two being generally held each day.

The first two points having been agreed upon, and the duration of the armistice having been fixed at twenty-five days, it was also agreed that nothing would be prejudged by the conclusion of an armistice. With regard to the questions raised relative to Alsace and Lorraine, Count Bismarck said he could not permit any electoral agitation in those provinces, but added that he would not object to their being represented by influential persons without any interference of Germany in the elections; and this point was agreed to by both parties.

On the fourth point several discussions took place between M. Thiers, Count Bismarck, and the Prussian generals, but the question of the revictualling did not at first give rise to any fundamental objection on the part of the Chancellor, who referred it to the mili

tary authorities. On the 3rd, M. Thiers said that the revictualling of the besieged places had become not a mere question of details, but a sine quá non. Count Bismarck, on behalf of the Prussian generals, declared that the armistice was absolutely against the interests of the Prussians, and that he could only consent to the revictualling of Paris if the Government of the National Defence was prepared to concede some military equivalent, as, for example, a military position round Paris. M. Thiers having insisted, Count Bismarck added that by a military position he meant "a fort, and perhaps more than one." Thereupon M. Thiers stopped him immediately, and declared that to refuse Paris to be revictualled was equal to depriving her of her resources for resisting during a month, and that to demand a fort was nothing less than to demand a surrender of the ramparts.

M. Thiers then relates his interview with M. Jules Favre, the rupture of the negotiations, the refusal to proceed with the elections without an armistice, and concludes his report as follows:

"The time has now come for the neutral Powers to judge if sufficient attention has been paid to their advice, but it is not us they can reproach with having disregarded it, and we make them judges of the conduct of both belligerent Powers. I have used all my efforts to recover for my country the blessings of peace, which it had lost by the errors of a Government whose existence alone was a mistake. France having accepted such a Government, and having abandoned to it, without retaining any control, all her destinies, has committed a great and irreparable fault."

Again we confront the account of the French negotiator with that of Bismarck himself:

"The fact that a statesman of position and experience like M. Thiers had been accepted by the Paris Government led us to hope that proposals would be made to which it would be possible for us to accede. M. Thiers stated that at the desire of the neutral Powers France would be ready to agree to an armistice. Notwithstanding the objections which stood in the way of a conclusion of an armistice, the King allowed his wish to prevail that steps favourable to the conclusion of peace might be taken. Count Bismarck therefore offered a suspension of hostilities for twenty-five or twenty-eight days on the basis of the military status quo. He proposed to fix by a line of demarcation the positions of the two armies in accordance with those respectively occupied by them on the day of the signing of the truce. He also proposed that hostilities should be suspended for four weeks, and that during that time the elections for a National Assembly and its installation should be held. On the French side, the only consequences of the armistice would have been the abandonment by them of the little and inexplicable course they pursue of wasting their artillery munitions by firing from the guns of their forts. As regards Alsace, Count Bismarck declared that he insisted upon no stipulation which could be considered calling in question the possession of this German department by

France before the conclusion of peace, and that we should make no charge against any inhabitant of Alsace for appearing as a Deputy in the French National Assembly. M. Thiers declined these

proposals, and declared that he could only agree to an armistice on condition that it should embrace an extensive revictualling of Paris. In reply to the question as to what equivalent he could make for such a concession, M. Thiers said he could offer none other than the readiness of the Paris Government to allow the French nation to choose representatives. The King was justly surprised at such extravagant military pretensions, and deceived in the expectations which he had associated with the prospect of negotiating with M. Thiers. The incredible demand that we should sacrifice the fruits of all the efforts we had made during two months, and the advantages which we had achieved, and restore the conditions of the struggle to the point at which we found them in the beginning of our investment of Paris, once more proved that pretexts are sought in the French capital to deny to the nation the power of recording its votes. At Count Bismarck's expressed wish that an attempt should be made to bring about an understanding upon other bases, M. Thiers, on the 5th inst., had an interview with the members of the Paris Government to propose a short truce, or that elections should be ordered without a regular Convention being signed for the suspension of hostilities, in which case Count Bismarck promised free intercourse, and the granting of all facilities consistent with the security of the German armies. In return M. Thiers communicated merely the instruction he had received to break off the negotiations. The course these negotiations had taken left Count Bismarck convinced that those now holding the reins of power in France were not in earnest from the commencement in the wish to allow the voice of the French nation to be expressed by a Representative Assembly, elected by free votes, and that it was just as little their intention to bring about an armistice. They must have been convinced of the impossibility of their conditions being accepted, and only brought them forward in order not to give a negative reply to the neutral Powers whose assistance they hope to obtain."

The news of the rupture of the negotiations for the armistice did not take the Tours Government by surprise. M. Gambetta never

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ceased to act upon the assumption that the war would go on. did not so far put himself in opposition to General Trochu and his colleagues as to refuse to listen to the friendly representations of the neutral Powers, and to proclaim his dissent to an armistice which would really have assured France the benefit of the status quo. But a pigeon despatch was sent by him to Paris tendering his resignation, unless substantial guarantees were given that the armistice would not be a snare. His pigeon was crossed by another, bringing the news that the Prussian terms were altogether illusory, and had been rejected at Paris. M. Jules Favre then issued a circular to the French Ministers abroad. Prussia, he said, by rejecting the armistice, had once more proved that she was con

tinuing the war with a personal object only, and without regard to the real interests of her subjects. "She pretends," he said, "to be forced to prosecute the war by our refusal to cede two provinces which we neither can nor will abandon. In reality she seeks to destroy us, to satisfy the ambition of the men by whom she is governed. The sacrifice of the French nation is useful to them for the preservation of their power, and they coldly profess to be astonished that we should refuse to become their accomplices by falling into the weakness which their diplomacy advises.

"It is not only the French army, but the French nation, that she seeks to annihilate when she proposes to reduce Paris to the horrors of a famine. To ask of us for a month of our provisions is to ask of us our arms-arms which we resolutely hold in our hands, and will not lay down without fighting." In conclusion, he said, that the pause being now denied them, which they required for the convocation of a National Assembly, being unable to consult the wishes of France at large, the Government of the National Defence had interrogated Paris. "All Paris in reply rises to arms, to show the country and the world what a great people can do when it defends its honour, its homes, and the independence of its country.

And now the measures for the defence of Paris were pushed on with increased activity. Fresh earthworks, redoubts, and rifle-pits were constructed. Trees were cut down for construction and for fuel. The space between the ramparts and the forts became a zone of desolation. Destruction was a work congenial to the spirit of the young mobiles, some of them mischief-loving Parisians, some hardy striplings from the provinces, and they were not slack in performing this part of their duty. The ordinary life inside the capital has been described by various inhabitants who went through that dreary period of durance. A mournful calmness had settled over the spirits of all classes not actively engaged in the work of defence. At first public amusements were interdicted, but after a while it was thought advisable to give some change to thought, and sober tragedies were represented at some of the theatres by actors clothed in the dresses of ordinary wear. Communication with the outer world was only carried on by balloon and carrier pigeons. A regular balloon post was established, "ballon monté,' by which letters, if they escaped the look-out of the Prussians, might perchance drop down to some town out of danger, and be transmitted to their destination. Inside the city strict precautions were taken to make the food supply hold out as long as possible. Beef and mutton were doled out to the inhabitants in small fixed rations. Horses, dogs, cats, rats, were sold in the butchers' shops, and gastronomic ingenuity was exercised in making these strange viands palatable. The animals in the Jardin d'Acclimatation were here and there sacrificed, both as being expensive to keep, and as being available for food. Those who had not prudently laid in a stock of salt meat in their private larders were forced to content themselves with very meagre fare. About the middle of November the worst kind of butter was costing 12 francs per pound, a cabbage 1 or 2

francs. Of veal there was none. Beef and mutton, at the end of two or three hours' waiting in a queue, might be received to the amount of 240 grammes per head for two days. Donkey ranged from 4 to 6 francs per pound. Eggs were sixpence each; milk was scarcely to be had. On the other hand horses for food were numerous; large quantities of salt meat were stored at the Opera; bread was plentiful, though not of the best quality; and wine and spirits believed to be practically unlimited in quantity. Undoubtedly the provisions proved to be really more abundant than was anticipated by those who only formed their conclusions outside the walls of the blockaded city.

But in anticipation of the surrender, stores of food were already being collected by the investing forces to allay the agonies of hunger which it was believed the inhabitants would be reduced to feel before that crowning humiliation should take place.

The aspect of the defences at this time may be conceived from the following description of the Neuilly side, given by a correspondent of the Times:·

"Adjoining the railway station a stone barricade, some five feet high, with apertures left for musketry, has been constructed across the road, and a similar barricade has been erected in the adjoining Avenue de Malakoff. Some little distance behind the above barricade, in the Avenue de la Grande Armée, is a second barricade of earth, while about twenty yards in advance of it one perceives that the gilt-tipped iron railings, which indicate the limit of the octroi, have been lined on the inside with stout timber, pierced with loopholes for musketry, in front of which is raised a wooden stage for the marksmen to stand on, forming altogether no less than three lines of defence behind the ramparts. In advance are the drawbridges, clamped with iron rods and bars, and raised with heavy chains, and flanked with massive masonry, loopholed in thirty-eight places. The side towards the Avenue de Neuilly, together with the massive posts of drawbridges, are tinted green to resemble the turf of the ramparts, and render them undistinguishable from it at night-time. A couple of 24-pounders peep through the embrasures of the flanks of the adjacent bastions, in lieu of the 6-pounder field-pieces formerly mounted there. In advance of the drawbridge an extensive angular-shaped earthwork has been thrown out, stretching some distance into the Avenue de Neuilly, and diverting the narrow roadway leading thereto circuitously to the left. The earthwork is strengthened behind with tall stockades, and has a second row of stockades in the rear, converting it as it were into a veritable redoubt. Other stockades are, moreover, carried across the fossé on both sides of the drawbridge, and one noticed that the large iron gas and water pipes laid bare where the moat has been continued across the road were cased with timber covered over with long iron spikes. On emerging from the narrow circuitous covered way, a scene of utter desolation presents itself. For rather more than 800 feet in advance, which is the distance the Zone des Ser

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