country. Much polemical literature has been called into life, but little of it seriously concerns itself with the evolution of particular industries and of the present industrial organization. This field of inquiry promises rich results, similar to those obtained by foreign writers in their study of the industrial evolution of Europe. Topics quite as concrete and attractive as those in the monetary and banking history of the country await the trained investigator. They appeal to the student of history and economics. Judging from the intense public interest in the subject of industrial combinations, the results of such investigations should fall on good ground. It is to be hoped that American scholarship will hereafter contribute as much to a general knowledge of the country's industrial development as it has in the past done to that of its financial history.

The notable address delivered by Dr. Andrew D. White before his Yale classmates upon the celebration of their fiftieth anniversary in June suggests more lines of thought than the author could fully develop in an afternoon. Taking as his theme the much-debated question, how a man of large wealth could use it to the best public advantage, he proposes a number of special foundations in some twenty-five universities, all bearing directly upon public affairs. Among them are professorships and fellowships in comparative legislation, in comparative administration, in international law, in the history of civilization and in the history of the United States. The first of these suggestions has attracted the most attention, as it is perhaps the most original and far-reaching, and the question has been raised whether such professorships and fellowships would really have any effect upon public affairs, the faults of our public life being moral rather than intellectual. The success of the plan would depend upon the possibility of creating a science which, by its very authority, would overcome the moral defects so often criticized in our public life. Those who devote themselves to the profession of the law in our country may be said at the present time to have three distinct kinds of activity before them. In the ordinary practice of the law, whether the jurist appears as an advo

cate or as a judge, the point to be attained is always the correct interpretation of the law. The question is, what does a particular law mean, and how should it be applied. A second kind of activity is open to the more limited number who have to do with the codification of laws. This is a work mainly of compilation. Here, again, the main question is, what do the laws mean, though the codifier must also take up the task of deciding how the meaning can be most tersely expressed. The third activity concerns itself with the making of laws. Here the object aimed at is not to find out what laws are in the public interest, or what laws can be most successfully put into operation. The main question for the lawyer is, how can the legislature be most successfully influenced to pass the law that his client desires? This statement does not imply that the public interest never enters into legislation. But it does imply that to consider that public interest and to study the actual workings of legislation is not a recognized part of a profession, but is left to the citizens who are engaged in practical political activity. Dr. White's first suggestion, if carried out, would lead ultimately to the creation of a new department of the science of jurisprudence. It would lead to the study of laws with reference to their social effects, and it is thus quite in line with the suggestions thrown out in 1895 by Professor Menger in the inaugural address which he gave on assuming the rectorship of the University of Vienna. If, in the course of years, such a science could be created and attain such a degree of accuracy as to command confidence, it would have the same effect upon the practice of law that the development of the science of medicine has had upon medical practice. When Mephistopheles gave his famous advice to Faust's pupil with regard to the practice of medicine, he called forth an enthusiastic response in the practical mind of the youth, who exclaimed, "Man sieht doch wo und wie!" Such a response the young lawyer might make who becomes initiated into the best methods of obtaining big fees by influencing legislatures. But if the science of legislation could be put on a basis approaching the accuracy of medical science, few people would be willing to risk their reputations by advocating obviously faulty or clumsily worded laws. There would be still room for corruption, as there is still a field for

quackery in medicine. But its area would be greatly restricted. The mere fact that a certain kind of measure was commonly recognized to be faulty would shame the average legislator into voting against it. There are already indications of a desire to entrust the framing of laws to experts in fields where science has even to a small degree prepared the way. Significant in this respect is the recent action of Massachusetts in establishing a commission of experts, with the Hon. Carroll D. Wright at their head, to revise the labor laws of the State. If the universities could lay the foundations of a science of legislation, the making of laws would be entrusted more and more to experts in all fields, and we should have fewer laws passed at each session of the legislature, only to be repealed at the next.

FOR

MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT IN OHIO.

OR years Ohio municipal government has been a subject attracting the attention and wonder of students of political science and municipal problems; and during the past year this interest has reached a climax, the now famous decisions of Judge Shauc constituting what Prof. John A. Fairlie calls a "situation unparalleled even in American history."

Those interested in the development, of what may for want of a better designation be called the "Ohio idea" of municipal government, are referred to the admirable essay of Dr. Delos F. Wilcox, entitled "Municipal Government in Michigan and Ohio,” one of the Columbia University studies in History, Economics and Public Law. After reviewing the history of special legislation under the State's first constitution, Dr. Wilcox recites the efforts to remedy the evils that had grown up under the old system by the enactment of Section I of Article XIII of the present constitution (adopted in 1851) to the effect that "the legislature shall pass no special act conferring corporate powers.'

This section, taken in conjunction with Section 26 of Article II, which provides that "all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation throughout the State"; and Section 6 of Article XIII, which provides that the General Assembly shall provide for the "organization of cities and incorporated villages by general laws, and restrict their power of taxation, assessment, borrowing money, contracting debts and loaning their credit, so as to prevent the abuse of such power," was regarded as sufficient to provide for a uniform scheme of government for Ohio cities. How well or rather how poorly founded was this belief Dr. Wilcox and other writers on the subject have abundantly proved.

To be sure, the first legislation under the Constitution of 1851 was in general harmony with the intent and purposes of the framers of that instrument. The Act of May 3, 1852, was a general municipal corporations act, "the first of its kind in the

1 Michigan Law Review, vol. i, No. 5, p. 353.

United States" according to Dr. Wilcox. This Act repealed all existing special charters and all cities were brought under its operation. This Act, however, introduced the idea of classification, providing for two classes of cities, those of more than 20,000 constituting the first class and those of between 5,000 and 20,000 the second class; all other municipal corporations were designated as villages. The next year an amendatory Act was passed providing that the consent of the council should be required before any city or village was advanced to the next higher grade or class.

These two acts, however much in general outline, spirit, and purpose intended to be in harmony with the new constitutional provisions, contained the germs out of which developed all the later, heterogeneous mass of legislation dealing with municipal government in Ohio. The principle of classification once recognized, took root and developed like a green bay tree, and the power of the municipal council to determine the question of the status of a municipal corporation aided this development. The first manifestation of the tendency toward special legislation was the Act of April 5, 1856, which applied to cities of the first class having less than 80,000 population. In other words, it was an act providing for the government of Cleveland, which was the only city of the first class having less than 80,000. Cincinnati was the other city of the first class. In 1859 a law was passed relating to cities of the first class "then having less than 80,000 and more than 35,000 population." This, too, was intended to provide a law that should apply only to Cleveland. Without going further into the details, all of which are available in the authority already mentioned, suffice it to say that a beginning having once been made in the direction of special legislation under general forms, the practice grew rapidly.

In 1869 another municipal code was enacted, with 61 chapters and 732 sections. It repealed 185 acts and was intended to simplify an already complicated situation. This it did to a measurable extent; but the pernicious idea of classification

1 For a fuller description of the Act, see Wilcox, Municipal Government in Michigan and Ohio, pp. 63-77.