the latter, upon the consolidation of the Empire. One is mainly economic, the other, political in his aims. It might easily happen that the two measures would neutralize each other. For just as far as retaliatory duties may be successful in giving a basis for negotiation with foreign nations, they will involve concessions on the part of England which will undermine the advantage of preferential duties to the Colonies. And just as far as England is committed to these preferential duties in favor of the colonies, it will tie its hands in negotiating with foreign countries. The significant feature of the whole campaign is not so much that it involves the possibility of a departure from the policy of free trade, as that it shows a conviction on the part of the leading men of England that her commercial supremacy is in danger and that the government must do something to save it.

It will be surprising if the discussion which is being carried on so actively does not result in proving the importance of the fundamental conditions of production as compared with mere questions of tariff. Sir Robert Giffen estimates the total income of the United Kingdom at £1,750,000,000. The amount spent by the population on housing alone he puts at £223,000,000. The exports for the year 1901 were £234,000,000. If the above estimates are correct, it would appear that the amount spent on housing alone is nearly as great as the value of the goods exported. An addition of but I per cent. to the gross income of the Kingdom, which might easily take place through greater industry or intelligence or cutting down the drink bill, or diminishing strikes, would be equivalent to 7 per cent. added to the exports, and to a much larger fractional addition to the profits on exports.

To illustrate his criticisms of insular free trade, Mr. Balfour supposes three imaginary islands, one of which is very small in extent and in its productive capacity, another of which is very large and enjoys a great variety of climates and products, while the third, occupying a position between the two, is rich in mineral resources, but has no natural monopoly in respect to the things which it is best fitted to produce. This intermediate island is, of course, England, and he shows in this hypothetical case how

such a country may be injured by the high tariff countries surrounding it. The danger certainly exists if, as assumed in the hypothesis, that country possesses no advantages which make its products desired by other countries. But no arrangement of tariffs will give it such advantages. Those can be obtained only by applying more intelligent labor, both of direction and of execution, to industry. When we consider that every modern industrial country which depends upon mineral resources for its wealth is to that extent living upon its capital, and that in course of time these resources, hoarded by nature for its benefit, will be sure to be exhausted, we must see that the problem which confronts the modern Colbert is educational rather than commercial. He must not only aim to enable his countrymen to hold their own in utilizing and exporting its existing stores, but he must also prepare them through the applications of science to find substitutes in hitherto unused forces of nature for the resources upon which they now depend.

ADMINISTRATIVE CENTRALIZATION IN MEXICO.

MEXICAN political institutions have usually been described

as popular in form but despotic, or rather autocratic, in fact. Like most general descriptive formulae, this expresses but a half truth, for the history of the country abounds with attempts to give to the people of the towns some control over their affairs. Even the early Spanish viceroys recognized the corporate character of the towns and gave to them special powers and privileges which were administered by elective councils. One of the first acts of Cortez was to establish the Spanish "municipio" in Vera Cruz. His onward march towards Mexico City is marked by the establishment of local institutions similar to those existing in the mother country. When compared with the absolutism of the Spanish colonial government, the form of local government established was surprisingly liberal. The ayuntamientos or elective town councils were given a fair measure of control over the internal affairs of the municipality. Throughout the colonial period the form of local government remained practically unchanged. The turmoil of political life, which marked the period subsequent to the declaration of independence; the long series of revolutions and changes in form of government, were mirrored in the local institutions of the country. Each republican period was accompanied by attempts to introduce some form of popular government into the towns. In no case, however, did the zeal for democratic institutions go beyond the extension of the suffrage in the election of the town councils. The administrative control of the State authorities over local affairs remained practically the same under the Republic as during the colonial and imperial periods, comparatively little freedom of action being granted to the municipal councils.

The government of the capital city of the Republic was one of the most delicate problems with which the Constituent Assembly of 1856 had to deal. For some time it looked as if no agreement could be reached. The Federal District, in which the City of Mexico is situated, occupies somewhat the same relationship to

the Federal Government as the District of Columbia to our national government. It is a territory containing nearly fifteen hundred square kilometers, in which some twenty towns, exclusive of the capital city, are situated. The main question which the Constituent Assembly was called upon to decide was the degree of control of the Federal Government over the administration of the capital city and the other towns located in the District. The enthusiasm for democratic institutions which dominated the Assembly was such that every attempt to abandon the elective principle in the selection of the governing authorities of the towns was doomed to failure. After considerable discussion the constitutional provision as finally adopted required the Federal Government in organizing the District to provide for the election by popular vote of the governing authorities and the judicial officers of the towns. Although the Federal Government has adhered to the strict letter of this requirement, it has been able gradually to acquire control of the affairs of the towns and especially of the capital city through the introduction of two administrative principles, which, however distasteful to the radicals of 1856, do not violate any of the constitutional requirements. The Congress first provided for the appointment of certain officers by the President who should act as agents of the Federal Government and who were entrusted with functions which gave to them great power in local affairs. The second principle, which was intended to re-enforce the control established by the first, required the local authorities of all the towns to secure the approval of the Federal Government for the more important decisions affecting local policy. With the basis of organization thus fixed, the Congress proceeded to divide the Federal District into four prefectures, which included all the towns except the capital city. At the head of each of these divisions a prefect was placed whose main function was the maintenance of order in the district and who acted as agent of the central government in all matters involving administrative control over local officials. These prefects were directly responsible to the governor of the Federal District, who was appointed by the President of the Republic. In Mexico City the governor exercised the same functions as the prefects in the districts. The entire local police force was placed

under his charge. In fact he was made responsible for everything affecting the good order and safety of the city.

The local representative assemblies retained control of all the public works and public utilities, the capital city receiving the same treatment in this respect as the other towns of the Federal District. Owing to the division of authority between so many different organs, the system proved cumbersome and led to a movement to bring the capital city, and in fact the entire Federal District, under the direct control of the central government. The provision of article seventy-two of the Constitution-cited above proved an insuperable obstacle to any such change. The first step to be taken was, therefore, a constitutional amendment. In November, 1900, the President submitted to the Federal Congress an amendment to the Constitution which was designed to give the government a free hand in dealing with the Federal District. The amendment as finally approved by the Congress repealed the section requiring the election of municipal and judicial officers, substituting therefor the following clause:— "Congress shall have power to legislate in all matters concerning the Federal District and Territories."

A few days after the acceptance of this amendment (December 14, 1900), the Congress passed a resolution giving to the Executive the power so to change the form of government of the capital city as to reduce the municipal council to the status of a consulting body with no direct powers of administration. This delegation of legislative power to the Executive, which would be manifestly unconstitutional under our form of government, has taken such deep root in Mexican political practice, that some of the most important laws are now formulated and put into operation by the Executive. The only obligation imposed upon the President is that he shall render account to the Congress of the use he has made of this power. This is usually done after the law has been put into operation, and thus involves practical relinquishment by the legislative authority of its fundamental deliberative function. In this particular case the President fixed July as the date on which the new act should take effect. By the time the Congress meets in September the administrative reorganization will have been completely effected, so that even