The new constitution-makers have not always been content with taking away the power to pass special laws; they have in many cases tried to further curb the power of the legislature by putting a limit to the number of days of the session. A movement is also on foot to have sessions less often. This movement found expression in the new constitution of Alabama, which provides that the regular sessions of the legislature shall be held once in four years. This seems like a rather doubtful experiment. While it is perhaps desirable that the sessions be not held too often, yet grave evils may be caused by meeting only at long intervals. There are some subjects on which it is necessary to legislate oftener than once in four years. Some reforms must be fought through many sessions of the legislature and when this body meets only at long intervals the much needed reform may be greatly delayed. This was well illustrated in Alabama during the recent session. There is in that State a great need of some legislation on the subject of child labor, as the employment of young children in the cotton mills has recently awakened public sentiment on the question. The persons who are profiting by the exploitation of this labor made a determined effort to prevent any legislation on the subject, knowing full well that, if they could prevent it at that session, they would be secure for four more years. The subject of child labor is not one on which public sentiment can be aroused to such a pitch that a special session of the legislature will be called to enact a law forbidding it. In this way the infrequent sessions of the legislature may tend to defeat real progress.

VETO POWER OF THE GOVERNOR.

Like the federal government, the governments of the American States are suffering from a lack of the concentration of responsibility. It is difficult to find anybody who is responsible for any legislation. This diffusion of responsibility, combined with the ideas of the members that they must represent first of all the particular locality from which they are returned, has led to special and local legislation and laws that are detrimental to the public interest. This tendency was foreseen by the framers of the constitutions, and they endeavored to guard against it by

giving the governor the veto power. There are but three States in which this power is not put into the hands of the governor. These are Ohio, North Carolina and Rhode Island. Formerly the governor did not have the veto power in Delaware, but by the new constitution which went into operation in 1897 he is given the usual power to veto all bills. Of course, the influence of the governor in legislation is enormously increased by this power. It is rare that a bill may be passed over his veto. Consequently his power to kill unwise bills and impress upon his constituents the soundness of his judgment and strength of his individuality is provided by the exercise of this negative of legislation. It has been said that Grover Cleveland's rise to fame and the presidency is due in large measure to his fearless use of the veto power. It is true that he made a great record in the State of New York as a veto governor. If his fame was originally due to the use he made of this power, it is clear that, had he been the executive of a State where this power is denied the governor and where that officer is a sort of nonentity as far as law-making is concerned, it is very probable that he would never have been prominent in our national life. Governor Odell of New York first impressed his good judgment and strong individuality upon the people of that State by the use of the veto

power.

Now if there be added to the general veto power of the governor the power to veto separate items in any bill which appropriates money, it is easy to see that this additional power makes the governor one of the greatest forces in State legislation. It has been the custom for many years to place all the appropriations for the support of the government in one bill and, after having passed it through the two houses of the legislature, send it to the governor, who must under the ordinary State constitution either sign or veto the whole bill. In this way the governor was prevented from cutting out any steals which would frequently creep into the bill. In many States the general appropriation bill is loaded with items that will not bear the closest scrutiny. It is usually a bill of some thirty or more pages and carries several millions of dollars. Being of such a nature, it is not difficult for designing politicians to conceal in it certain

appropriations that never ought to be made. Accordingly it is of the highest importance that the governor should be given the power to go through the bill and prune out the items that have been improperly inserted there. Of the general appropriation bill for the State of New York for the year 1901, Governor Odell vetoed more than one hundred items and reduced the amount of the bill by more than $1,000,000. His action was generally praised by the press of the State. This shows that there was a popular feeling that the public money was being improperly spent.

There can be no question that such a provision in the federal constitution would be a great saving to the nation. The way the general appropriation bill is loaded with improper items has long been known to be a national disgrace. The President must either sign or veto the whole bill, and as it is usually not presented to him until in the closing days of the session of Congress or after the adjournment, it is next to impossible for him to stop the wheels of administration by vetoing the bill. Practically he has no choice in the matter and must sign it. This evil was recognized by the men who made the constitution of the Confederate States. In that constitution the president was empowered to veto any item or items of the appropriation bill.

This power to veto separate items is given to the governor in the constitutions of twenty-six States.1 It has recently been inserted in the new constitutions of Alabama and Virginia. In the constitution of Washington it is provided that the governor may veto separate sections or items of any bill. The effect of these provisions is to increase greatly the responsibility of the governor in all legislation. This fact will tend to attract to the office able and conscientious men who will furnish a counterpoise to the vagaries of the legislature.

The most advanced stage of this power to veto separate items has been reached in Pennsylvania. In the constitution of 1873, this provision was inserted:

1

Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wyoming.

"The governor shall have power to disapprove of any item or items of any bill making appropriations of money, embracing distinct items, and the part or parts of the bill approved shall be the law, and the item or items of appropriation disapproved shall be void, unless repassed according to the rules and limitations prescribed for the passage of other bills over the executive veto."

At different times the governors have construed this section as giving them the right to veto not only items but also parts of items, that is, to cut down the amount of money appropriated for any certain purpose. In 1899 Governor Stone vetoed in this way $1,000,000 of an item in the appropriation bill granting $11,000,000 for the public schools. The governor's construction of this clause of the constitution was sustained by the supreme court in a decision on April 22, 1901. This is an interesting decision, and whether or not it will be sustained in the other States having similar clauses in their constitutions will be watched with much interest. If it should become a part of the established constitutional law of the American States, it would place in the hands of the governor the sole authority to determine how much money should be spent and for what purposes. As the general appropriation bill seldom reaches him until after the legislature adjourns, there is no possibility of passing it over his veto. His power is therefore practically absolute. In 1901 Governor Stone of Pennsylvania vetoed fortyseven items and partly vetoed or cut down one hundred and thirty-two other items.2 A governor of Pennsylvania who is willing to assume the responsibility will have little trouble in making his influence felt in the expenditures of that State.

Like their statute law, the constitutions of the American States are developing along broad and healthy lines. Great improvements are manifest in all the newer instruments and there is no reason to fear that our constitution-makers of the future will not be able to meet and handle successfully any difficult problem that may confront them.

1

University of Colorado.

Commonwealth v. Barnett, 48 Atlantic, 976.

JOHN B. PHILLIPS.

'R. H. Whitten, New York State Library Bulletin, No. 72, p. 38.

RECENT TENDENCIES IN ECONOMIC LEGISLATION.

ONE has but to open a recent volume of the enactments of

any one of our State legislatures to realize how far removed is the policy which they represent from the laissez-faire principles of classic political economy. The constant extension of governmental action and regulation is partly due to growth in the conception of the rights and duties of the State, partly to the increasing complexity and difficulty of economic relations between individuals and classes. It was a recognition of the great importance of economic legislation that led to the establishment of the United States Industrial Commission, which closed its investigations early in 1902. The value of the Commission's work lay more in the information which it presented than in its direct recommendations. Nevertheless the Commission did make many wise suggestions for legislation, both in the way of urging the more backward States to follow the example of the more advanced, and in proposing untried measures. Even during the short time since the Commission expired a considerable amount of legislation along the lines recommended has been enacted. It is doubtful if these new laws can be attributed in very large measure to the Commission's influence. Our States have always been wont to copy one another's laws, and strong local interests are constantly pressing every legislature to take the progressive step which has been initiated elsewhere. The Commission's suggestions for wholly new enactments were largely such as were already in the air. Nevertheless it can scarcely be doubted that the formal recommendations of a Federal Commission such as this, as well as the information which it published, must have contributed somewhat to aid the influences already at work. It will be interesting, therefore, in summarizing recent legislative tendencies, to observe in what degree they conform, either to the direct recommendations of the Industrial Commission, or to the conclusions which readily followed from its investigations and discussions. This article has to do primarily with the legislation of 1902 and 1903 but has some reference to that of earlier years.