claimed the heritable bonds as heir) was also entitled to a share of the movable property as legatee under the will: It was held by Lord Chancellor Brougham, in delivering the judgment of the House of Lords affirming that of the court below, that the construction of the will, and the legal consequences of that construction, must be determined by the law of the land where it was made, and where the testator had his domicile, that is to say, by the law of England prevailing in that country; and this, although the will was made the subject of judicial inquiry in the tribunals of Scotland; for these courts also are bound to decide according to the law of the place where the will was made.1

The sovereign power of municipal legislation also § 6. Perextends to the regulation of the personal rights of the sonal status. citizens of the State, and to every thing affecting their civil state and condition.

It extends (with certain exceptions) to the supreme police over all persons within the territory, whether citizens or not, and to all criminal offences committed by them within the same.2

Some of these exceptions arise from the positive law of nations, others are the effect of special compact.

There are also certain cases where the municipal laws of the State, civil and criminal, operate beyond its territorial jurisdiction. These are,

state and

I. Laws relating to the state and capacity of persons. Laws reIn general, the laws of the State, applicable to the lating to the civil condition and personal capacity of its citizens, capacity of operate upon them even when resident in a foreign operate excountry.

persons may

tra-territori

ally.

Such are those universal personal qualities which take effect either from birth, such as citizenship, legitimacy, and illegitimacy; at a fixed time after birth, as minority and majority; or at an indeterminate time after birth, as idiocy and lunacy, bank

1 Trotter v. Trotter, Wilson and Shaw's Rep. vol. iii, pp. 407-414. 2 "Leges cujusque imperii vim habent intra terminos ejusdem reipublicæ, omnesque ei subjectos obligant, nec ultra. Pro subjectis imperio habendi sunt omnes, qui intra terminos ejusdem reperiuntur, sive in perpetuum, sive ad tempus ibi commorentur." (Huberus, tom. ii. liv. i. tit. 3, de Conflict. Leg. § 2.)

ruptcy, marriage, and divorce, ascertained by the judgment of a competent tribunal. The laws of the State affecting all these personal qualities of its subjects travel with them wherever they go, and attach to them in whatever country they are resident.1 This general rule is, however, subject to the following excep

tions:

Natural

1. To the right of every independent sovereign State ization. to naturalize foreigners and to confer upon them the privileges of their acquired domicile. (a)

! Pardessus, Droit Commercial, Pt. VI. tit. 7, ch. 2, § 1. Fœlix, Droit International Privé, liv. i. tit. 1, § 31. "Qualitates personales certo loco alicui jure impressas, ubique circumferri et personam comitari, cum hoc effectu, ut ubivis locorum eo jure, quo tales personæ alibi gaudent vel subjecti sunt, fruantur et subjiciantur." Huberus, tom. ii. 1. i. tit. 3, de Conflict, Leg. § 12.

(a) [Distinct from the implied national character, arising from domicile, and which may exist for commercial purposes without a person ceasing to be bound by his allegiance to the country of his birth or adoption, all the countries of Christendom, with more or less restrictions, accord the rights of naturalization to foreigners. England was the only country where an act of the legislature was necessary in each particular case. There, even in acts of Parliament, the Stat 1 Geo. 1, c. 4, required the insertion of a clause, excluding the party from being a privy counsellor, sitting in either house of Parliament, or holding any civil or military office; but since 1844, (7 and 8 Vict. c. 66,) that provision is repealed, and aliens may now be naturalized, by presenting a petition to one of the principal Secretaries of State; and it is not necessary to go to Parliament, except for the purpose of obtaining the political privileges still inhibited to naturalized aliens by the general law, but to the granting of which, by a special act, there is no longer any impediment. British Statutes at Large, 7 and 8 Vict. p. 392. With regard to expatriation, however, there is not the same accordance of views in the laws of different countries. The doctrine of the publicists is, that whenever a child attains his majority, according to the law of his domicile of origin, he becomes free to change his nationality, and to choose another domicile; and even in the case of the subject of a country, England for example, which refuses the liberty of expatriation, the original tie is preserved only in the interest of the nation to which the individual belonged, and without affecting, with reference to his adopted country, the validity of the naturalization acquired there. Fœlix, Droit International Privé, § 22.

These principles have been recently elucidated in two cases, which commanded the serious consideration of the American government. In one of them it felt bound to recognize the obligations of foreign nationality, voluntarily assumed by one who had been a native born citizen, and not to interpose, on his behalf, the claims of American citizenship, to protect him against the consequences of acts committed against the country of his adoption. In the other, it protected, under

Even supposing a natural-born subject of one country cannot throw off his primitive allegiance, so as to cease to be responsible

the American flag, when arrested in a country (which was not his domicile of origin) by the functionaries of the sovereign that had expatriated him, a foreigner who, by circumstances, had ceased to owe allegiance to any other country, who had obtained a domicile in the United States, and who had done every thing which our laws permitted to acquire the rights of American citizenship.

The case of John S. Thrasher is thus presented in a report prepared in December, 1851, by Mr. Webster, Secretary of State, in answer to a resolution of the House of Representatives:

"There is no doubt that John S. Thrasher is a citizen of the United States by birth, nor is there any doubt that he has resided in the island of Cuba for a considerable number of years, engaged in business transactions, sometimes as a merchant, and sometimes as the conductor of a newspaper press; although the precise period and duration of such residence are not known.

"In the letter from the Governor of Cuba to her Catholic Majesty's Minister in the United States, it is stated that he has been not only a resident in Havana for a considerable time, but domiciled there by regular proceedings, and that he has in solemn form sworn allegiance to the Spanish crown.

"There is no evidence in the possession of the government to show what was his purpose with regard to his returning to his native country, at any fixed or definite time. Other members of his family are understood to be, like himself, residents in Cuba - his father having gone to that island some years ago.

"It appears that soon after the failure and breaking up of the late expedition of Narciso Lopez, in the invasion of Cuba by him and the troops under his command, Mr. Thrasher was arrested and tried for high treason or conspiracy against the crown of Spain; condemned to eight years imprisonment to hard labor, and sent to Spain in execution of that sentence.

"The first general question then, is, as to his right to exemption from Spanish law and Spanish authority, on the ground of his being a native-born citizen of the United States.

"The general rule of the public law is, that every person of full age has a right to change his domicile; and it follows, that when he removes to another place, with the intention to make that place his permanent residence, or his residence for an indefinite period, it becomes instantly his place of domicile; and this is so, notwithstanding he may entertain a floating intention of returning to his original residence or citizenship at some future period.

"The Supreme Court of the United States has decided, 'that a person who removes to a foreign country, settles himself there, and engages in the trade of the country, furnishes, by these acts, such evidences of an intention permanently to reside in that country, as to stamp him with its national character;' and this, undoubtedly, is in full accordance with the sentiments of the most eminent writers, as well as with those of other high judicial tribunals on the subject. No government has carried this general presumption farther than that of the United

for criminal acts against his native country, it has been determined, both in Great Britain and the United States, that he

States, since it is well known that hundreds of thousands of persons are now living in this country who have not been naturalized according to the provisions of law, nor sworn any allegiance to this government, nor been domiciled among us by any regular course of proceedings. What degree of alarm would it not give to this vastly numerous class of men, actually living among us as inhabitants of the United States, to learn that, by removing to this country, they had not transferred their allegiance from the governments of which they were originally subjects, to this government? And, on the other hand, what would be the condition of this country and its government, if the sovereigns of Europe, from whose dominions they have emigrated, were supposed to have still a right to interpose to protect such inhabitants against the penalties which might be justly incurred by them, in consequence of their violation of the laws of the United States? In questions on this subject, the chief point to be considered is the animus manendi, or intention of continued residence; and this must be decided by reasonable rules and the general principles of evidence.

"If it sufficiently appear, that the intention of removing was to make a permanent settlement, or a settlement for an indefinite time, the right of domicile is acquired by a residence even of a few days.

"It is undoubtedly true, that an American citizen who goes into a foreign country, although he owes local and temporary allegiance to that country, is yet, if he performs no other act changing his condition, entitled to the protection of his own government; and if, without the violation of any municipal law, he should be treated unjustly, he would have a right to claim that protection, and the interposition of the American government in his favor would be considered as a justifiable interposition. But his position is completely changed, when, by his own act he has made himself the subject of a foreign power. And a person found residing in a foreign country is presumed to be there animo manendi, or with the purpose of remaining; and to relieve himself of the character which this presumption fixes upon him, he must show that his residence was only temporary, and accompanied all the while with a fixed and definite intention of returning. If in that country, he engages in trade and business, he is considered, by the law of nations, as a merchant of that country; nor is the presumption rebutted by the residence of his wife and family in the country from which he came. This is the doctrine as laid down by the United States courts. And it has been decided that ‘a Spanish merchant who came to the United States, and continued to reside here and carry on trade, after the breaking out of war between Spain and Great Britain, is to be considered an American merchant, although the trade could be lawfully carried on by a Spanish subject only. But the necessity of any presumption in Mr. Thrasher's case is entirely removed, if, in fact, he actually took out letters of domiciliation, in order to enable him to transact business such as a Spanish subject or a domiciliated foreigner can alone transact, and actually swore allegiance to the Spanish crown.

"But, independently of a residence with intention to continue such residence;

may become by residence and naturalization in a foreign State entitled to all the commercial privileges of his acquired domicile

independently of any domiciliation; independently of the taking of any oath of allegiance or of renouncing any former allegiance, it is well known that, by the public law, an alien, or a stranger born, for so long a time as he continues within the dominions of a foreign government, owes obedience to the laws of that government, and may be punished for treason, or other crimes, as a native-born subject might be, unless his case is varied by some treaty stipulations; but this duty of obedience to the laws, arising from local and temporary allegiance, ceases, of course, the moment he transfers himself back to his original country.

"An American citizen, by birth, owing, of course, a native allegiance to the United States, going abroad and obtaining no residence under a foreign government, and professing to such government no allegiance, and who should yet commit acts of hostility or war against this country, would seem to bring himself within the act of Congress which declares, that if any person or persons, owing allegiance to the United States of America, shall levy war against them, or shall adhere to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the United States or elsewhere, he or they shall be adjudged guilty of treason. And the reason is plain, since his allegiance in such a case is original and native, and has not been transferred nor lost in any other local allegiance arising from a residence elsewhere, but continues to be the primitive tie which binds him to his country.

"But, as has been already said, every foreigner-born, residing in a country, owes to that country allegiance, and obedience to its laws so long as he remains in it, as a duty imposed upon him by the mere fact of his residence and the temporary protection which he enjoys, and is as much bound to obey its laws as native subjects or citizens. This is the universal understanding in all civilized States, and nowhere a more established doctrine than in this country.

"Our citizens who resort to countries where the trial by jury is not known, and who may there be charged with crime, frequently imagine, when the laws of those countries are administered in the forms customary therein, that they are deprived of rights to which they are entitled, and therefore may expect the interference of their own government. But it must be remembered, in all such cases, that they have of their own free will elected a residence out of their native land, and preferred to live elsewhere and under another government, and in a country in which different laws prevail.

"They have chosen to settle themselves in a country where jury trials are not known, where representative government does not exist, where the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is unheard of, and where judicial proceedings in criminal cases are brief and summary. Having made this election, they must necessarily abide its consequences. No man can carry the ægis of his national American liberty into a foreign country, and expect to hold it up for his exemption from the dominion and authority of the laws and the sovereign power of that country, unless he be authorized so to do by the virtue of treaty stipulations.

"The definition of crimes the denouncement of penalties for their commission, and the forms of proceeding by which guilt is to be ascertained, are high pre