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Retrospective view of the affairs of Europe in the year 1779. State of the belligerant powers in Germany. Event of the late campaign, induces a difpofition favourable to the pacific views of the Empress-Queen; which are farther feconded by the mediation of Ruffia and France. A fufpenfion of arms published, and the Congrefs for negociating a peace affembles at Tefchen. Treaty of peace concluded. Differences between Ruffia and the Porte, threaten a new war. Negotiation conducted, and a new convention concluded, under the mediation of the French minifter. Naval preparations by Spain. Opens the war with the fiege of Gibraltar. France. Confequences of the appointment of M. Necker to the government of the French finances. Successful expedition to the coaft of Africa. Ineffectual attempt upon the Island of Jersey. Threat of an invafion, and great preparations apparently for that purpose. French fleet fails from Breft, and proceeds to the coafts of Spain. Combined fleets of France and Spain enter the British channel, and appear in great force before Plymouth. Enemy quit the channel, return again; at length finally quit the British coafts, and proceed to Breft.

T
HE little effect produced by
the contention of the great-
eft leaders, and of the greatest
armies in the world, during the
campaign of 1778, in Bohemia,
VOL. XXIII.

if not entirely fufficient to produce an actual defire of peace on both fides, could not, however, fail to induce a kind of languor and wearifomeness, and in fome [4] confiderable

confiderable degree to wear away that quick relish, and keen appetite for war, which great and untried force and talents, acting under the fanguine hopes of yet unfoiled ambition, are fo eminently calculated to excite.

We have heretofore fhewn, that this was not fo much a war of choice, as of prudence, forefight, and political neceffity, on the fide of the King of Pruffia. He made no claims; he had no immediate object of enlarging his dominions in view; nor if he had, was the prefent ftate of public affairs in any degree favourable to fuch a defign. Neither his time of life, his great experience in war, nor the full knowledge he had of the power and ability of his adverfary, were at all calculated to excite a fpirit of enterprize. On the contrary, the defire of fettling, improving, and confolidating with his antient people and dominions, the new fubjects and acquifitions he had .gained on the fide of Poland, together with that fill ftronger with, of tranfmitting a peaceable poffeffion, and undiminished force to his fucceffor, were objects which tended powerfully to difpofe him to the prefervation, fo far as it could be properly and wifely done, of the public tranquility.

But no motives, however cogent, could juftify to him, in a political view, the admitting of any confiderable addition of ftrength and dominion, to the power of the houfe of Auftria; more especially, when this addition was to establish a precedent of innovation and difmemberment, which might in time be equally

extended to all the other states that compofe the Germanic body. Upon the whole it would almost feem, as if fortune, who had fo often wonderfully befriended that hero, and whofe apparent defertions of him in cafes of great danger, (which were no lefs confpicuous than her favours) always tended ultimately to the increase of his fame, was now anxious to affix a new ftamp to the renown of her old favourite; and of clofing his great military actions by a war, in which he was to appear, rather as the generous pro▾ tector of the rights and liberties of the Germanic body at large, than as acting- at all under the influence of any partial policy.

he

On the other fide, the paft campaign had afforded a full conviction to the emperor, (a princé prepared for war beyond almost any other, by the fine ftate of his armies, and the refources of his own indefatigable and refolute fpirit) of the immenfe difficulty, of making any fuccefsful impreffion upon fuch an adverfary as the King of Pruffia. With fo vaft a force, and aflifted by fuch confummate commanders, could only act upon the defenfive; and could not prevent his own dominions from being rendered the theatre, and being confequently fubjected to all the calamities of war. It was true indeed, and no fmall matter of boast in fuch a conteft, that he had fuffered neither defeat nor difgrace; that the enemy had been obliged to abandon Bohemia, notwithftanding their utmost endeavours to establish a fecure footing there during the winter; and likewife, that the lofes on both fides were

pretty

pretty equally balanced. But then it was obvious, that the feafon was the immediate caufe which compelled the enemy to retreat from Bohemia; however, the good difpofitions made by the emperor, which equally baffled all the efforts made by the King of Pruffia, for gaining his favourite point of a general action, and defeated his views of obtaining any fure hold in the country, tended more remotely to that effest. Such a view of the circumftances of the campaign, could afford no great encouragement to an obitinate perfeverance in the conteft. A defenfive war, however ably conducted, or how ever abounding with negative fuccefs, could by no means, whether in point of honour or effect, anfwer the purposes for which it was undertaken; and the profpects of changing its nature were confined indeed.

However numerous or cogent the caufes and motives we have affigned, or others of a fimilar nature, might have been on either fide, for the difcontinuance of an unprofitable war, they would have been found unable to fubdue the ftrong paffions by which they were oppofed, if another, of greater power than the whole taken together, had not, happily for Germany, and perhaps for no fmall part of the reft of Europe, fupervened in reftoring the public tranquility.

The late illuftrious Maria Therefa, along with her other eminent virtues and great qualities, poffeffed at all times, however counteracted by the operation of a high and powerful ambition, a mind krongly impreffed with an aweful

fenfe of religion. This difpofi tion, which naturally increafed with years, was farther ftrengthened by the melancholy ariling from the early lofs of a husband whom the tenderly loved; and was latterly finally confirmed by the happy fettlement of her numerous offspring, which freeing the mind from care and folicitude, tended equally to wean it from the affairs of the world.

The event of the late ftruggle with the King of Pruffia, notwithstanding the immenfe afiftance the then received, and which he could not hope now to receive, muft have added great force to thefe motives. She could not wish to end her life in the midst of fuch a war. It was accordingly, much against the inclination of that great princess that the prefent war was undertaken; and he is faid to have fubmitted with the greateft réluctance to the opinion of her council, and the defire of the emperor on that point. For, although that prince could only derive his means of action through' the power of his mother; yet it would have been a matter of exceeding difficulty to her, directly to thwart the opinion and inclinations of a fon, who was in the highest degree defervedly dear to her, who was to be her fole and immediate fucceffor, and who fcarcely ftood higher in her affection than in her esteem. It was probably this reluctance to the war, on the fide of the EmprefsQueen, which produced thofe various appearances, of fluctuation in the councils, or of irrefolution and indecision in the conduct of the court of Vienna, of [4] 2

which

which we have formerly taken notice.

The ineffectiveness of the campaign, the equal fortune of the war, and the ceffation of action occafioned by the winter, ferved, all together, to produce a state of temper and difpofition, which was far more favourable to the pacific views and wishes of the emprefs, than that which had hitherto preShe perceived, and feized the opportunity; and imme. diately applying her powerful in. fluence to remove the obstacles which flood in the way of an ac commodation on the one fide, had foon the fatisfaction of discovering that her views were well feconded, by the temperate difpofition which prevailed on the other.

It is however to be obferved, that the mediation of the court of Verfailles, and the powerful interpofition of the court of Peterfburg, contributed effentially to further the work of peace. France was bound by the treaty of 1756, to affift the court of Vienna with a confiderable body of forces, in cafe of a war in Germany, and fhe had been called upon carly in the prefent conteft to fulfil that engagement. The court of Verfailles was likewife difpofed to with well to the houfe of Auftria from private motives; as well as to cultivate and cement the new friendship and alliance from public. But France being likewife a guarantee of the treaty of Weftphalia, her old engagements militated totally whith her new in the prefent inftance; fhe being thereby bound to refit all fuch infractions and invañons of the rights of the Germanic body, as thofe which he was now called 6

upon by the court of Vienna to fupport. She muft therefore, in any fituation, in which he was not difpefed to become an abso. lute party in the conteft, wish to be relieved from this dilemma. But her war with England, and her views with respect to America, operated more forcibly upon her conduct on this occafion, than any German treaties or connections. In the contemplation and purfuit of thefe grand and capital objects, the neceflity of keeping her force whole, her attention undivided, and of reftoring peace upon the continent, were all equally obvious, and were all mutually dependent. No wifdom could forefee, or venture to prescribe, what unexpected connections and alliances might fpring up, and what new collifions of interests. might take place, under a further progrefs of the war. France could not recollect the ruin brought upon her in the late war, without fhuddering at the thoughts of Germany. It is not then to be wondered, that fhe was equally fincere and zealous in her endeavours to restore tranquility on the. continent.

The court of Petersburg hadfrom the beginning flicwn and exprefied the ftrongest difapprobation of the conduct, and paid no. favourable attention to the claims, of that of Vienna; and had early avowed a full intention of effectually fupporting the rights of the Germanic body; at the fame time that preparations were actually made, for the march of a large body of Ruffian troops. Her powerful interpofition, through the medium of her minifter Prince Repnin, had no fmall effect in

facili

facilitating the negociations for peace.

Under fuch circumstances, and the offices of fuch mediators, little doubt was to be entertained of the event. Whether it proceeded from a view of giving weight to their claims in the expected treaty, or from any jéaloufy in point of arms or honour, which might have lain behind from the preceding campaign, however it was, the AuArians attacked with extraordinary vigour, and with no fmall degree of fuccefs, feveral of the Pruffian pofts on the fide of Silefia and the county of Glatz, foon after the commencement of the year. The liveliness of thefe infults did not induce the king to any eagernefs of retaliation.Points of honour of that nature weighed but little with him. He forefaw that an accommodation would take place; and he knew that no advantages which could now be gained would tell in the account upon that fetdement; whilft a number of brave men would be idly loft without March 10th. object or equivalent. An armistice on all 1779. fides was, however, publifhed, before the feafon could have admitted the doing of any thing effential, if fuch had even been the intention.

The Congrefs which was to preferve Germany, from the moft alarming and dangerous war to which it could have been expofed, was held at Tefchen in Auftrian Silefia; a town and district, which the emperor had generously confented to conftitute into a Duchy, under the title of Saxe-Tefchen, in favour of Prince Albert of Saxony, upon his marriage with an Arch-Duchefs in 1765. At that

place, the garrifon being previously withdrawn, the Imperial and Pruffian minifters, with thofe of all the princes engaged or interefted in the prefent conteft, as well as of the two mediating pow ers, were affembled, immediately after the publication of the armif, tice. And fo happy were the dif pofitions which now prevailed among the contending parties, and fo efficacious the endeavours of the

mediators, that the peace May 13th. was finally concluded in two months.

By this treaty, the late convention between the court of Vienna and the Elector Palatine was totally annulled; and the former restored all the places and diftricts which had been feized in Bavaria, excepting only the territory appertaining to the regency of Burghaufen, which was ceded to the houfe of Auftria, as an equivalent or indemnification for her claims and pretenfions. That court likewife gave up to the Elector Palatine, all the Fiefs which had been poffeffed by the late Elector of Bavaria; and agreed alfo to pay to the court of Saxony, as an indemnification for the allodial eftates, and other claims on that fide, the fum of fix millions of florins; (amounting to fome thing near 600,000 pounds fterling) to be paid in the course of twelve years, without intereft, by ftipulated half-yearly payments. Some ceffions were likewife made by the elector, in favour of the houfe of Saxony; and fome equivalent fatisfaction promifed by the emperor to the Duke of Deux Ponts, on his fucceffion to the double electorate. All former treaties between the court of [4] 3

Vienna

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