Copyright-International Copyright Act 1886 (49 & 50 Vict. c. 33), s. 6 -Saving of Rights and Interests previously acquired-Interest in Advertising Trade Mark-Trade Mark first produced in GermanyInjunction. The plaintiff claimed to be entitled in Germany to copyright in photographs of a painting produced in Germany before Dec. 1885 called "Lisette," representing the half-length figure of a girl holding a lighted candle in her left hand, which she screened with her right, thus throwing the light on her face and bust. In Jan. 1887 the predecessors of the defendant company, a firm of candle manufacturers, registered as their trade mark for candles a picture of "Lisette" on a small scale, with the words "trade mark" at the bottom, and the defendants reproduced this picture in various sizes and colours by means of chromo-lithography without the words "trade mark," on show cards and trade lists, for the purpose of advertising their goods. In Jan. 1892, shortly before the commencement of the action, the plaintiff, under the International Copyright Act 1886 and the Order in Council made thereunder on the 28th Nov. 1887, registered himself as the owner of the copyright in England, and now sought to restrain the defendants from infringing his copyright by using the show cards and trade lists, it being admitted that the defendants were entitled to use their trade mark, as, at the time it was registered, the plaintiff had no copyright in England. Held, that, as the show cards were intended to be used for the purpose of putting the defendants' goods on the market, and attracting attention to them with a view to their sale, and were not intended to be works of art, the proviso in sect. 6 of the International Copyright Act 1886 applied, as the defendants had before the date of the Order in Council an interest to advertise their trade mark by means of those cards and trade lists, which interest was subsisting at the date of such crder; and action dismissed. [Schauer v. J. C. and J. Field Limited. Ch. Div.: Chitty, J. Nov. 2.-Counsel: Byrne, Q.C. and Scrutton; Farwell, Q.C. and John Cutler. Solicitors: Herbert Bentwich; Chester.] Costs-Taxation—Attendances-Drawing Cases for Counsel-Solicitors' Remuneration Act 1881 (44 & 45 Vict. c. 44)-General Order, Schedule II., Part 2.-A firm of solicitors, who had acted for a client in respect of certain trust matters extending over several years in which he was interested, the preparation of his will, and the preparation and passing of succession accounts, delivered their bill, in which they charged for eighty-three attendances at 10s., and charged for drawing cases for counsel at the rate of 2s. per folio, 10s. being the fee fixed for attendances in ordinary cases by Schedule II., part 2, of the General Order made in pursuance of the Solicitors' Remuneration Act 1881, with a provision that in extraordinary cases the taxing master may increase or diminish the above charge if for any special reason he thinks fit," and 2s. per folio being the fee fixed for drawing "deeds, wills, and other documents" by the same schedule. The taxing master allowed thirty of the attendances only at 10s. each, reduced forty-three attendances to 6s. 8d., and disallowed the remainder. The taxing master also allowed only 1s. per folio for drawing cases for counsel. In his answers to the objections to the taxation, the taxing master claimed a discretionary power to reduce the fee fixed for attendances in ordinary cases, and with respect to the fee of 2s. per folio stated to the effect that cases for counsel did not come within the words "other documents," that it was the general rule of the Taxing Office to allow only 18. per folio for drawing cases for counsel, and that he considered that sufficient in that case. Held, on a summons for a review of the taxation, that the taxing master had a discretionary power to reduce the fee for attendances to 6s. 8d., but that he was wrong in allowing only 1s. per folio for drawing cases for counsel, instead of 28. per folio as fixed by Schedule II., part 2, of the General Order, made in pursuance of the Solicitors' Remuneration Act 1881, in which the words "other documents" included cases for counsel, on the ground that it was the practice of the Taxing Office only to allow 1s. per folio in such case. [Re Mahon and Sayer. Ch. Div.: North, J. Oct. 27, Nov. 1.Counsel: Sir Horace Davey, Q.C. and R. F. Norton; Butcher. Solicitors: Hyde, Tandy, Mahon, and Sayer; Hucks, Arnold, and Mozley.] 'Tunnel under Highway-Ownership of Soil-Easement—Exclusive User for upwards of Twelve Years-Prescription Act-Real Property Limitation Act (37 & 38 Vict. c 57).-The plaintiff was the owner in fee simple of certain lands to the east of a highway, and (as he alleged) of the soil to the centre of the highway, where it abutted on the said lands. He was also owner of a messuage and land to the west of the same highway opposite to part of his land on the east, and claimed the entire soil under the highway at this point. The defendants claimed the right to the exclusive possession and user of a tunnel which ran for some distance under the highway, and which had been constructed in 1872 by their predecessor in title under a licence from certain road trustees. This licence empowered the grantee thereof, his heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, to excavate, construct, and use the tunnel. One of the points argued in the action was as to whom the soil under the highway belonged. That turned upon the construction of the Act 41 Geo. 3, c. 60, by which it was enacted that the property of certain roads (including the highway in question) "and the ground and soil thereof" should be absolutely vested in the road trustees. The evidence showed that the tunnel had been exclusively used by the defer dants, or their predecessors in title, and had not been substantially altered within twelve years from the commencement of the action in Aug. 1891. For the plaintiff it was urged that only so much of the soil of the road as was necessary for the support and maintenance of the road vested in the road trustees originally, and that at most the defendants had an easement and a right of way to which they had not yet acquired a title under the Prescription Act. For the defendants it was mainly argued that what had been done was rightly done under the licence from the absolute owners of the soil; and that the Statute of Limitations was a bar to the action. Held, that, even assuming that the plaintiff had a sufficient title to the soil under the highway (apart from the Statute of Limitations), there had been no mere easement of a right of way enjoyed by the defendants or their predecessors, but an exclusive possession and occupation of the tunnel for more than twelve years after any right of action accrued; and therefore the Statute of Limitatations applied and the defendants had a good title. [Bevan v. The London Portland Cement Company Limited. Ch. Div.: Romer, J. Oct. 27.-Counsel: for the plaintiff, Sir Horace Davey, Q.C., Haldane, Q.C., Elgood, and Ingpen; for the defendants, Rigby, Q.C. (S.-G.), Chadwyck-Healey, Q.C., and F. Thompson. Solicitors for the plaintiff, Sismey and Sismey, for Tolhurst, Lovell, and Clinch, Gravesend; for the defendants, Renshaw, Kekewich, and Co. Will-Construction-Gift to a Class-Child en ventre sa mère.-A testator bequeathed his residuary estate between his nephews and nieces during their respective lives, and declared that, if any of his nephews and nieces should die, leaving child or children living at their death, the proportionate share of such nephew or niece in his said residuary estate should go and be divided equally between such child or children, as to sons on their attaining twenty-one, and as to daughters at that age or marriage, and as to any of his nephews or nieces dying without leaving any child or children surviving them, he directed that the proportionate share of each such nephew or niece so dying without issue in the said residuary estate should be divided equally between the child or children of his other said nephews and nieces. One of the testator's nephews entitled to a share in his residuary estate died without issue. Held, that a child en ventre sa mère at the time of such nephew's death was included in the words "children of my other said nephews and nieces," and was entitled to share, as one of the class of such children, in the gift over. Decision of Bacon, V.C., in Re Gardiner's Estate; Garratt v. Weeks (L. Rep. 20 Eq. 647), not followed, as being inconsistent with the current of authorities. and if [Re Hallett; Hallett v. Hallett. Ch. Div. Chitty, J. Nov. 2.Counsel: Byrne, Q.C.; Farwell, Q.C.; Levett, Q.C.; B. B. Rogers; Lemon; Carson; Heath; R. F. Norton; F. Pownall; P.Wheeler ; and Ellis. Solicitors: Paine, Son, and Pollock; Hepburn, Son, and Cutcliffe; Hawks, Stokes, and McKewan; Walker, Son, and Field, agents for Wm. Gee and Son, Bishop's Stortford; Godden, Son, and Holme.] Will-Construction-Substitutional Gift.-A testator by his will, after giving and devising his real and personal estate to trustees, and declaring trusts as to the rents, interest, dividends, and profits thereof in favour of his wife for life, and after her decease in favour of his two daughters for their lives, directed that, "after the decease of the survivor of my said daughters," his trustees should convert his estate, invest the proceeds, and " pay, apply, and divide the principal and interest moneys unto and equally amongst my grandchildren, namely, the children of my said daughters respectively, as and when they shall attain the age or respective ages of twenty-one years either or any of my said grandchildren shall be then dead leaving lawful issue, I do hereby direct that the part or share of such of them so dying shall go unto and be equally divided amongst such issue, if more than one, such issue taking their parents' share only; but in case there shall not be any such issue, then the whole shall go and accrue to the survivor." E. R., one of the testator's grandchildren, died on the 10th Oct. 1877, leaving three children, viz., C. T. R., H. W. R., and V. D. C. T. R. died on the 7th March 1879, H. W. R. died on the 2nd March 1878. E. B., the surviving daughter of the testator, died on the 6th May 1889. This was an adjourned summons raising the question who was entitled to E. R.'s share in the testator's estate. Held, that the gift to the issue of grandchildren was substitutional; that it was not necessary in order to entitle issue of E. R. to participate in E. R.'s share that they should survive E. B., but that it was necessary that they should survive E. R.; and that, as C. T. R., H. W. R., and V. D. had survived E. R., the personal representatives of C. T. R., the personal representatives of H. W. R. and V. D. were entitled to E. R.'s share in equal parts. Lanphier v. Buck (34 L. J. 650, Ch.) and Re Turner (Ib. 660) followed. [Re Northrop; Taylor v. Baldwin. Ch. Div.: Stirling, J. Oct. 29. -Counsel: Greenwood, Wright Taylor, and Wood. Solicitors: W. and J. Flower and Nussey, for Killick, Hutton, and Vint, Bradford; S. S. Seal, for Wade, Bilborough, Booth, and Co., Bradford.] Will-Leasehold House-Rent-Repairs-Fine on Renewal-Tenant for Life Remainderman Trustees-Liability.-By his will, made the 17th Dec. 1889, J. C. B. appointed executors and trustees, and gave, devised, and bequeathed to the trustees or trustee the houses in Grafton-street and at High Beach, in which he resided, upon trust to permit his wife to occupy the said houses during her life, and after her death upon the trusts thereinafter declared concerning the same. Testator bequeathed his leasehold house, No. 1, Grafton-street, aforesaid, subject to the trust in favour of his wife thereinbefore declared, to the trustees or trustee, upon trust for his son Godfrey for his life. Testator bequeathed all his personal estate, not otherwise disposed of by his will or any codicil, to the trustees or trustee, upon trust for sale, and out of the net proceeds to pay his funeral and testamentary expenses and debts, and pecuniary legacies and the legacy duty thereon; and to hold the residue upon trust for investment as therein mentioned, and testator declared that the trustees or trustee should hold his residuary personal estate upon trust out of the income thereof to pay all the costs, charges, and expenses of carrying into execution the trusts of his will. Then followed directions, as to the disposal of the income and capital of testator's residuary personal estate, and testator directed that the trustees or trustee, other than his wife, should, in addition to the legacies thereinbefore given to them, be allowed, and should be entitled to retain for their own use and benefit in each year, a commission at the rate of one per cent. per annum, calculated on the net amount of his residuary personal estate received by them in each year after deducting all rates, taxes, insurances, and other outgoings and expenses payable by them under any of the trusts therein contained, such commission to be divided between the trustees or trustee other than his wife, in equal shares. The lease of the house in Grafton-street was granted for sixtyone years at a ground rent of £84, renewable every fourteen years on payment of a fine of £450. In 1883 a renewed lease of certain houses in Oxford was obtained from the Corporation of Oxford by the Principal and Fellows of Hertford College upon the faith of a letter written by testator that he would assume the responsibility of the lease. Testator died in 1891. This was an originating summons taken out by the trustees and executors of the will for the determination of the following questions: (1) Whether the rents payable in respect of the testator's leasehold house, No. 1, Grafton-street, and the rates, taxes, and expenses of repairing and keeping in repair the said house, and the freehold house at High Beach in which the testator resided, ought to be paid by the defendant, the widow, or by the trustees, and if by the trustees, out of what part of the testator's estate? (2) Whether the trustees of the will, onght to renew the lease under which the said leasehold house in Grafton-street was holden, and if so, how and out of which portion of the testator's estate ought the fines and other expenses of renewal to be paid or provided for? (3) Whether the executors and trustees of the will ought, out of the testator's estate, to pay the rent and undertake the burden of the covenants contained in the lease of 1883, made between the Corporation of Oxford, and the Principal and Fellows of Hertford College. Held, that the widow was under no obligation to do any of the things which the trustees as lessees were liable to do to retain the property; Held, that neither the widow nor the next tenant for life were liable to pay the fine for renewal; Held, that the rent and other outgoings must be paid out of income; Held, that the fine and expenses of renewal of the lease must be distributed among the beneficiaries, according to their enjoyment of the lease, such enjoy. ment to be settled by actuarial calculation; Held, that the testator's estate was liable to pay the rent and bear the burden of the covenants contained in the lease to Hertford College. [Re Baring; Jeune v. Baring. Ch. Div. Kekewich, J. Oct 26.— Counsel Sir Horace Davey, Q.C. and Ingle Joyce; Hornell; Swinfen Eady; Marten, Q.C. and J. W. Clark. Solicitors: R. T. Wragg; Markby, Stewart, and Co.] Will-Specific Bequest-Residuary_Bequest-Stamps-Account Stamp Duty-Estate Duty-Customs and Inland Revenue Act 1881 (44 & 45 Vict. c. 12), s. 27-Customs and Inland Revenue Act 1889 (52 & 53 Vict. c. 7), s. 5.-A testatrix, who died on the 9th Dec. 1891, by her will dated the 18th March 1890 devised her real estate and bequeathed certain specific sums of stock to trustees upon trust to sell and convert and to divide the proceeds between all the children of G. M. and W. M. as therein mentioned, and she bequeathed the residue of her personal estate to G. E. M. absolutely. On her death an originating summons was taken out asking for a decision by the court whether the stamp duty payable under sect. 27 of the Customs and Inland Revenue Act 1881, and the estate duty payable under sect. 5 of the Customs and Inland Revenue Act 1889 in respect of the estate of the testatrix ought to be paid by G. E. M. alone as the residuary legatee under the will, or whether such duties ought to be paid rateably by the defendant G. E. M. and such of the children of G. M. and W. M. respectively as took a share under the trusts of the will. Held, that both duties must be paid by the residuary legatee. Re Croft; Deane v. Croft (66 L. T. Rep. N. S. 157; (1892) 1 Ch. 652) distinguished. [Re Sturges Bourne; Martin v. Martin. Ch. Div.: Stirling, J. Oct. 25 and 29.-Counsel: Badcock; Gurdon. Solicitors for all parties Frere, Foster, and Co.] QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION. Adulteration of Milk-38 & 39 Vict. c. 63 (Sale of Food and Drugs Act 1875), 8. 6-Summons must state Particulars of Offence-42 & 43 Vict. c. 30 (Sale of Food and Drugs (Amendment) Act 1879), s. 10.-Case stated under 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, by the stipendiary magistrate for the county borough of Salford. The appellant was on the 16th July 1892 served with a summons under 38 & 39 Vict. c. 63 (the Sale of Food and Drugs Act 1875), for an offence against sect. 6 of that Act, at the instance of the respondent. The summons described the offence in the following terms: "For that you on the 30th June 1892, at Salford, in the borough aforesaid, did then and there sell to Henry Rider, and to the prejudice of Henry Rider, one pint of milk, which was not of the nature, substance, and quality of the article demanded by such purchaser, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided." The appellant appeared to the summons, and took the objection that the summons was bad, and that he could not be convicted under it, because it did not state, as required by sect. 10 of 42 & 43 Vict. c. 30 (Sale of Food and Drugs (Amendment) Act 1879), particulars of the alleged defect in the milk, or in what manner it was alleged to have been adulterated. The magistrate reserved the point, and proceeded to hear the case, when it was proved that the cause of complaint, namely, that the milk had been adulterated by the addition of water, was communicated by the appellant to the respondent before the summons was issued, and he therefore held that the summons was good, and sufficiently complied with the said section, and he fined the appellant 20s. and costs. Held (allowing the appeal), that the conviction was bad, because the summons did not sufficiently state the particulars of the offence within the meaning of 42 & 43 Vict. c. 30, s. 10. Case remitted to magistrate with opinion of court that summons should be dismissed. [Barnes (app.) v. Rider, (resp.). Q.B. Div.: Pollock, B. and Hawkins, J. Oct. 27.-Counsel: for the appellant, Toller; for the respondent, Smyly, Q.C. Solicitors: for the appellant, Indermaur and Brown, for Gardner and Son, Manchester; for the respondent, Firth and Co., for the Town Clerk, Salford.] Charging Order-Shares in Railway Company-Director not Beneficial Owner-Private Act-44 & 45 Vict. c. clxxx.-1 & 2 Vict. c 110.-The appellant was a judgment creditor who obtained a charging order on certain shares standing in the name of the judgment debtor in the books. of the Oldbury Railway Company, the judgment debtor being at the time a director of that railway. Originally, the shares in question were owned by the judgment debtor, but by sect. 19 of the private Act of 1881 of the Oldbury Railway Company, the Great Western Railway Company had power to appoint three directors to the board of the Oldbury Railway Company, and the section of that Act further provided that "no other qualification than being so appointed shall be requisite for such directors." In the year 1889 the Great Western Railway Company purchased the shares of the judgment debtor, but the shares were allowed to remain in the defendant's name on the books of the company, in order to maintain his qualification as a director of the Oldbury Railway Company. The learned judge in chambers having set aside the charging order nisi, the judgment creditor now appealed in support of making it absolute, contending that they had been injured by the action of the Great Western Railway Company; that, so long as the judgment creditor remained a director of the Oldbury Railway Company no one had any means of knowing that his position had altered with regard to the shares. From all appearances, the judgment debtor was the beneficial owner of them so long as he remained a director of the company. Against making the charging order nisi absolute, the following cases were cited: Pulbrooke v. The Richmond Consolidated Mining Company (9 Ch. Div. 610); Cooper v. Griffin (66 L. T. Rep. N. S., ca, 661; (1892) 1 Q. B. 740). Held, that the appeal must be dismissed; that to alter the decision of Pulbrook v. The Richmond Consolidated Mining Company would. after all these years, cause so much confusion that, although the decision in tthat case was very much to be regretted, that case must nevertheless be followed. [Howard and Mason v. Sadler. Q. B. Div.: Coleridge, C.J. and Wills, J. Oct. 28.-Counsel: for the judgment creditor, C. GregsonEllis; for the judgment debtor, Atherley Jones; for the Great Western Railway Company, J. V. Austin. Solicitors: for the judgment creditors, A. F. V. Wild; for the judgment debtor, Philip J. Rutland, for J. Mead, Birmingham; for the Great Western Railway Company, Nelson.] Costs -Taxation of Solicitor's Costs-Instructions for Brief-Counsel's Fees-Refresher Fees-Order LXV., r. 27, sub-rules 29 and 38.-This was an application to the Divisional Court to review the taxation of costs. The plaintiff appealed from the taxing master to the learned judge (Pollock, B.) in chambers, who dismissed the appeal on the ground that the matter was one for the discretion of the taxing master. In taxing the costs of the action the taxing master had taxed off £36 15s. and £5 10s. for documents on the item "instructions for brief," and counsel's refresher fees, amounting to £28, were taxed off altogether. On these two items the plaintiff appealed. On the latter item the taxing master had alleged in his reasons that, as the learned leader, a Queen's Counsel, did not attend the court on the days in question, his refresher fees were not entitled to be paid. It was contended that the taxing master was wrong in disallowing these items. in dispute. The action lasted three days, and although the learned leader in question was not there throughout the whole trial of the action, he nevertheless was there for a short time on each of the three days. Held, that the taxing master had exercised a proper discretion as to the refresher fees, but as to the amount allowed by the taxing master on the "instructions for brief," the same was insufficient. [Macleod v. Thrupp. Q. B. Div.: Coleridge, C.J. and Wills, J. Oct. 28.-Counsel; for the plaintiff, G. A. Scott; for the defendant, Clode. Solicitors: for the plaintiff, A. M. Bridley; for the defendant, Frank Richards and Sadler.] Ecclesiastical Law-Churchwarden— Qualification― Residence within Parish or District-Mandamus-1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 38, s. 16.-It is provided by 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 38, that, where the population of a parish exceeds a certain number, and a new church is built within such parish, the Ecclesiastical Commissioners or the bishop of the diocese may assign a district to such new church; and it is enacted by sect. 16 that two fit and proper persons shall be appointed to act as churchwardens for every church built under the provisions of this Act at the usual period of appointing parish officers in every year, and shall be chosen, one by the incumbent of the church for the time being, and the other by the renters of the pews in such church. A new church having been built in the parish of Windsor, a district called Sunningdale, in which it was situated, was assigned to it under the above-mentioned Act. The respondent had been churchwarden for four years, but at the last vestry meeting, at which he was elected, he was objected to by the applicant, one of the parishioners, on the ground that he did not live within the district of Sunningdale. The respondent's house was in the parish of Windsor, but about 500 yards from the boundary of the district of Sunningdale. It was admitted that in all other respects the respondent was a fit and proper person to be elected churchwarden. Held, that the above statutory provision did not overrule the general law, and that a person, in order to be eligible for the post of churchwarden, must reside within the parish or district assigned to the church of which he sought to be churchwarden. [Reg. v. Rev. J. A. Crce and others. Q. B. Div.: Mathew and Bruce, JJ. Oct. 26 and 27.-Counsel: for the applicant, Wills; for the respondents, Hansell. Solicitors: for the applicant, Burton, Yeates, and Hart; for the respondents, Brooks, Jenkins, and Co. Game-Sale of Game killed Abroad-Necessity for Excise Licence-Game Act 1831 (1 & 2 Will. IV., c. 32), ss. 2, 19, 20, and 23-The Game Licences Act 1860 (23 & 24 Vict. c. 90), ss. 15 and 16.-Case stated by Mr. Fenwick, one of the Metropolitan Police magistrates. The respondent exposed for sale in a shop in the Old Kent-road, and sold to the appellant, who was an officer of the Inland Revenue, a hare and a brace of black game, without having obtained an excise license. It was proved that both the hare and the black game had been killed in Russia, and imported into this country for sale, and it was found, as a fact, that the black game were of the same species as, and undistinguishable from, the black game found in the United Kingdom, and named in sect. 2 of 1 & 2 Will. IV., c. 32, and that the hare was of the same species as, and undistinguishable from, the hares found in Scotland (commonly called "Blue Hares "), also named in sect. 2 of 1 & 2 Will. IV. c. 32. The respondent was summoned to answer an information, exhibited by order of the Commissioners of Inland Revenue, charging him with dealing in game without having in force such a licence as by the statute in that behalf was, and is, required. The magistrate, being of opinion that on the facts proved no excise licence was required by the respondent, dismissed the summons. Held, that his decision was right. Reading the series of statutes together, the later ones by the light of the earlier, it is clear that they are intended to apply only, and do apply only to English game. Guyer v. Reg. (on the prosecution of the Field Sports Protection Society), 60 L. T. Rep. N. S. 824; 23 Q. B. Div. 100, approved. [Pudney (app.) v. Eccles (resp.). Q. B. Div.: Mathew and Bruce, JJ. Oct. 31.-Counsel: for the appellant, Dankwertz; for the magistrate, Sutton. Solicitors: for the appellant, Solicitor of Inland Revenue; for the magistrate, Solicitor to the Treasury. The respondent was not represented.] Gaming-Gaming Act 1892 (55 Vict. c. 9), s. 1-Promise made before Act came into operation-Action brought after Act in operation-Applica tion of Act.-Appeal from decision of the County Court judge of Salisbury. Section 1 of the Gaming Act 1892 (55 Vict. c. 9) enacts that "any promise express or implied, to pay any person any sum of money paid by him under or in respect of any contract or agreement rendered null and void by the Act of 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, or to pay any sum of money by way of commission fee reward or otherwise, in respect of any such contract, or of any services in relation thereto, or in connection therewith, shall be null and void, and no action shall be brought or maintained to recover any such sum of money." This Act came into operation on May 20th 1892, but prior to that date, the transaction on which the present action was brought had taken place. A betting agent had been employed and had paid money on account of his principal. The action was not commenced till June 1892, and the County Court judge, being of opinion that the Act did not apply to promises made before it came into operation, gave judgment for the plaintiff. Subsequently, however, he entertained misgivings as to the correctness of his decision, and gave leave to appeal to the Divisional Court. Held, that his original decision was right, and that the prohibition from bringing an action on a promise of this kind had no application in the case of a promise made before May 20th 1892. : [Knight v. Lee. Q. B. Div.: Mathew and Bruce, JJ. Oct. 31. Counsel for the plaintiff, D'Eyncourt; for the defendant, Morten. Solicitors for the plaintiff, H. J. King; for the defendant, Clarke, Rawlins, and Co.] Metalliferous Mines Regulation Act 1872 (35 & 36 Vict. c. 77), s. 13 -Side Entrance of abandoned Mine-Fencing for the Prevention of Accidents-Sufficiency of.-Special case cited by justices. By sect. 13 of the Metalliferous Mines Regulation Act 1872 it is provided that, when a mine under the Act is abandoned, or the working of it discontinued, the owner, or other person interested in the minerals, "shall cause the top of the shaft and any side entrance from the surface to be, and to be kept, securely fenced for the prevention of accidents." The respondent was the owner of a copper mine in Merionethshire, the workings of which were discontinued in 1872, and the side entrance to which was situated in an inclosure of rough pasture or woodland, some nine or ten acres in extent, surrounded by a wall. There was no fencing round the side entrance itself, but the magistrates found that the wall constituted a secure fence sufficient for the prevention of accidents, and they therefore dismissed the summons which one of the inspectors appointed under the Act had taken out against the respondent. Held, that a wall inclosing a considerable area of ground within which a side entrance to a mine exists is not such a fencing of the side entrance as is required by the section. [Foster (app.) v. Owen (resp.). Q. B. Div.: Mathew and Bruce, JJ. Oct. 31. - Counsel for the appellant, Sutton; for the respondent, Griffith Jones. Solicitors: for the appellant, Solicitors for the Treasury; for the respondent, Charles Hughes, Dolgelly.] Parliament Registration Amendment of Declaration by Revising Barrister-Parliamentary and Municipal Registration Act 1878 (41 & 42 Vict. c. 26), s. 28, sub-sects. (2) (13).—In this case a rule nisi had been obtained, calling upon the revising barrister at Exeter to show cause why a writ of mandamus should not issue directing him to state a case for the opinion of the court, in order to determine the question whether or not the barrister was right in allowing certain amendments to be made in the claims sent in by certain persons for the lodger franchise. In the case of one Mitchell, which was identical with that of six others, the claim was made in respect of the sole occupation of a bedroom and the joint occupation of a sitting-room in the same house, and the declaration stated that he occupied partly as joint and partly as sole tenant, and the annual value of the said premises was declared to be £10 or upwards. This sum would be sufficient if the occupation were as sole tenant, but not as joint tenant, in which case the annual value must be declared to be £20. The revising barrister found as a fact that the room, in respect of which a sole occupancy was declared, was of the required value of £10, and he accordingly amended the declaration by striking out all mention of a joint tenancy, and added the vote to the list. It was now argued on behalf of the complainant that the amendment was not one which the revising barrister had power to make under sub-sect. 2 of sect. 28 of the Parliamentary and Municipal Registration Act 1878 (41 & 42 Vict. c. 26), which only gives power to correct any "mistake" which may be proved to have been made in the claim; and that this was not the correction of a mistake, but a change in the description of the qualification, and therefore contrary to sub-sect. 13 of the same section, which provides that the revising barrister shall not be at liberty to change the description of the qualification as it appears in the list, except for the purpose of more clearly and accurately defining the same. In support of this view Foskett v. Kaufman (16 Q. B. Div. 279) was cited. Held (discharging the rule), that this was a "mistake which the revising barrister had power under sub-sect. (2) to amend, and not a change in the description of the qualification under sub-sect. (13). Reg. v. McKellar and others. Q. B. Div.: Pollock, B. and Hawkins, J. Nov. 1.-Counsel: for the complainant, J. V. Austin; for the respondent, J. A. Foote. Solicitors for the complainant, Farman and Dumas, for Dunn, Exeter; for the respondent, Robinson, Preston, and Stow, for Friend and Beal, Exeter.] : Poor Law-Pauper Settlement-Contract of Apprenticeship-Settlement acquired by Contract not under Seal-3 Will. & M. c. 11, s. 8-31 Geo. 2, c. 11.-Case stated by the chairman of quarter sessions for the county of Worcester on the hearing of an appeal from an order of justices of the 12th Dec. 1891, that Frank William Penson, a lunatic pauper, be charged on the Woodstock Union. The pauper was born, in 1867, at Draycot, in the Shipston-on-Stour Union, in the county of Worcester. By a written contract duly stamped, but not under seal, dated the 14th Dec. 1881, he was apprenticed to Alfred Adams, a grocer, in the parish of Kidlington, in the Woodstock Union, in the county of Oxford, and resided there for two years and ten months, i.e., from Aug. 1881 to the 31st May 1884. He subsequently enlisted in the army, and, becoming of unsound mind, was, by order of the Secretary of State, on the 16th July 1891 removed to the Worcester County and City Lunatic Asylum. The quarter sessions dismissed the appeal. It was contended on behalf of the appellants that, under 3 Will. & M. c. 11, s. 8, a person bound an apprentice by indenture can only acquire a settlement by virtue thereof, if the said indenture is under seal. Held (dismissing the appeal), that the effect of 31 Geo. 2, c. 11, was to place a person serving under a contract of apprenticeship duly stamped but not under seal in the same position as he would have been if serving under an indenture under the earlier Act, and therefore the pauper by his contract of apprenticeship acquired a settlement in the Woodstock Union, and the order of the justices was right. [The Guardians of the Woodstock Union (apps.) v. The Guardians of The Shipston-on-Stour Union (resps.). Q. B. Div.: Mathew and Bruce, JJ. Nov. 1. Counsel: for the appellants, Gwynne James; for the respondents, Bosanquet, Q.C. and R. Harrington. Solicitors: for the appellants, Robinson, Preston, and Stow; for the respondents, Berkeley Calcott, for Eden Hiron, Shipston-on-Stour.] Practice Dismissal of Action-Frivolous and Vexatious-Restraint against any further Proceedings-Order XXV., r. 4; Order XXVII., r. 1.— An application was made to the Divisional Court to restrain the proceedings in a certain action brought by the plaintiff against several defendants, as being frivolous and vexatious," and it was contended that it ought to be dismissed for that reason, under Order XXV., r. 4, and under Order XXVII., r. 1. The court was also asked to restrain the plaintiff from taking any further proceedings on the same cause of action against any of the defendants without the leave of the court. Order XXV., r. 4, provides that the court or a judge may order any pleading to be struck out, on the ground that it discloses no reasonable cause of action, and in case of the action or defence being shown by the pleadings to be frivolous or vexatious, the court or judge may order the action to be stayed or dismissed, or judgment to be entered accordingly. Order XXVII., r. 1, provides that, if the plaintiff being bound to deliver a statement of claim, does not do so within the time allowed for that purpose, the defendant may, at the expiration of that time, apply to the court or a judge to dismiss the action, with costs, for want of prosecution, and on the hearing of such application the court or judge may, if no statement of claim shall have been delivered, order the action to be dismissed accordingly, or may make such order as the court or judge shall think just: (Garbutt v. Fawcus, 35 L. T. Rep. N. S. 617; L. Rep. 1 Ch. 155; 45 L. J. 130, 133 Ch.; Besant v. Wood, 40 L. T. Rep. N. S. 445; 12 Ch. Div. 605, cited.) Held, that, this being an application to the inherent authority of the court to prevent the abuse of its process for the purpose of vexation and oppression, the exercise of its jurisdiction in such cases having become more frequent of late years, the present application to stay this action as frivolous and vexatious must be granted, but that, as to the second part of this application, viz., to prevent any further proceedings on the same cause of action against the defendants or any of them without the leave of the court, cannot be acceded to. The action is merely dismisssed against all the defendants as frivolous and vexatious. [Henderson v. Baird and others. Q. B. Div.: Coleridge, C.J. and Wills, J. Oct. 26.-Counsel: for the defendant Baird, Witt; for the defendants, Aldridge and Co., Gwynne James; for the defendant Apps, Morton Daniel. Solicitors: for the defendant Baird, Lumleys; for the other defendants, Aldridge and Co. and Apps. The plaintiff was not represented. Practice-Pleadings-Action for Slander-Allegations struck out.-An appeal by the plaintiff from the master and the learned judge (Pollock, B.) in chambers, striking out certain allegations in a statement of claim in an action for slander. The plaintiff, while setting out in the statement of claim the alleged slander, further alleged in the pleadings that the reason defendant uttered the alleged slander was "with the object of persuading (a certain third person) to form an intimacy with the defendant." This allegation the learned judge in chambers struck On behalf of the plaintiff it was contended that the allegation was necessary, as showing the malicious intention on the part of the defendant in uttering the alleged slander. Held, that the allegation was scandalous and unnecessary, and was quite rightly struck out both by the learned master and the judge in chambers. out. [McGuckin v. Ralli. Q. B. Div.: Coleridge, C.J. and Wills, J. Oct. 18.-Counsel: for the plaintiff, McCall, Q.C. and Rosenthal; for the defendant, Temple Francke. Solicitors: for the defendant, Lewis and Lewis.] Public Health (Buildings in Streets) Act 1888 (51 & 52 Vict. c. 52), 8. 3— Photographer's Showcases erected beyond the front main Wall of the Houses on either Side-"House or Building."-Sect. 3 of the Public Health (Buildings in Streets) Act 1888 makes it unlawful in any urban district, without the written consent of the urban authority, to erect or bring forward any house or building in any street, or to build any addition to any house or building beyond the front main wall of the house or building on either side of the same. The appellant, a photographer, without the written consent of the urban sanitary authority, erected in London-road, Leicester, some 30ft. in front of the building line a structure of wood and glass to serve as a showcase, or in lieu of a shop window. It was 9ft. long by 3ft. wide, and 7ft. high, and was fastened to the ground by four posts at the corners, forming part of the structure, and let into the ground to the depth of 9in. or 12in.; it was roofed over, and had a door at one end. The appellant was convicted, by the justices for the borough of Leicester, of an offence against sect. 3 of the above-mentioned Act, on the ground that he had erected a building within the meaning of the section. Held, that the question, whether or not such a structure is a building, must depend upon the particular circumstances of the case, having regard to the object of the enactment; and that there were materials here on which the magistrates could find, as a fact, that this was a building, and that having so decided they could not now be overruled. [Brown (app.) v. Corporation of Leicester (resps.). Q. B. Div.: Pollock, B. and Hawkins, J. Oct. 26.-Counsel: for the appellant, Rawlinson; for the respondents, Toller. Solicitors for the appellant, Parsons, Wykes, and Davis, Leicester; for the respondents, Field, Roscoe, and Co., for John Storey, Leicester.] Solicitors' Remuneration-Sale of Land by Auction-Charges for conducting Sale-Taxation of Bill of Costs-Solicitors' Remuneration Act 1881 (44 & 45 Vict. c. 44), General Order 1882. Sched. I., pt. 1.-This was an appeal from an order of the judge of the Durham County Court refusing to vary the registrar's taxation of a bill of costs of the solicitor to the official liquidator of the Onward Building Society, incurred in conducting the sale by public auction of certain properties of the society at Langley Moor and Browney Colliery. The property sold was put up in three different lots, each having a different title, and each being sold to a different purchaser. Lot 1 sold for £102 10s., Lot 2 for £270 5s., and Lot 3 for £262 10s. It was contended that, according to the scale of charges and the rules of the General Order 1882 under the Solicitors' Remuneration Act 1881, the solicitor was entitled to be paid £5 for conducting the sale of each lot, making a total of £15, whereas upon taxation the registrar had calculated the fee on the aggregate of the purchase moneys of the three lots taken together, i.e., £635 5s., and only allowed a charge of £6 10s. for the three lots sold, and the County Court judge had upheld his decision. Held (dismissing the appeal), that the fee allowed on taxation was correct, for it was not chargeable on the purchase moneys of each lot, but as one percentage on the aggregate amount of the purchase moneys of the lots sold. [Re The Onward Building Society, Q. B. Div.: Pollock, B. and Hawkins, J. Oct. 25.-Counsel: for the solicitor, the appellant, Scott Fox; for the liquidator of the Onward Building Society, Dibdin. Solicitors for the appellant, Iliffe, Henley, and Sweet; for the liquidator, Bridges, Sawtell, Heywood, and Co.] : IN BANKRUPTCY. Bankruptcy-Estoppel-Assignment of Debts--Interpleader Issue as to One-Motion to set aside Assignment.-B., on the 12th Dec. 1891, two days before filing his petition, assigned to A. his book-debts. A. sued one of the debtors for £27, and the trustee in the bankruptcy of B. gave notice to the debtor that he claimed the debt. An issue was ordered to be tried as to the ownership of this debt of £27, and such issue contained no limitation of the title the trustee might set up. At the hearing the sole defence set up by the trustee was, that A. (the assignee) had notice at the time of the assignment of an act of bankruptcy committed by B., his assignor. The issue was decided in favour of A., the assignee. The trustee now moved to set aside the whole assignment on several grounds not raised before, amongst which were that the assignment was a fraudulent preference. The assignee insisted that the whole question had been decided on the interpleader issue, and could not be again raised; that the trustee might have raised these further objections at the trial, and not having done so was estopped, as the precise legal point had then been determined between the same parties. Held, that, as there was nothing in the pleadings to prevent these defences being raised at the trial of the interpleader issue, the trustee could not be allowed to raise the question again on the present motion. [Re Hilton; Ex parte March. Q. B. Div. in Bank. Williams, J. Oct. 21.-Counsel: for the applicant, Muir Mackenzie; for the respondent, T. Chitty. Solicitors: for the applicant, Plunkett and Leader; for the respondent, Morton, Cutler, and Co.] Bankruptcy-Stoppage in Transitu-Final Destination of Goods.-In May 1891 the following order was given to R. and Co. by B. and G.: "Please invoice in duplicate by June 2. J., H., A., and Co., Trinidad, 500 boxes, &c.' With the order were instructions to be handed with the goods to the superintendent of the London Docks: "Superintendent London Docks. Please receive the undermentioned packages to be shipped on board the Macgarel. Mark. J. H. A. and Co., Trinidad. 500 boxes." The goods were invoiced to B. and G., marked as above, for Macgarel s.s., London Docks, and delivered to the Dock Company, with the instructions, and a receipt drawn up by the vendors was signed by the dock superintendent, as follows, London Dock Company. "Bought of R. and Co. J., H., A., and Co., Trinidad. 500 boxes, &c. On account B. and G., Lime-street." A receiving order was made against B. and G., and the goods being on their way to Trinidad a notice was given to the managing owners of the Macgarel to hold the goods to the order of R. and Co., as B. and G. had stopped payment. On the arrival of the Macgarel, the Trinidad courts ordered the delivery of the goods to Messrs. Archer, the holders of the bill of lading, who paid £75 for them to the trustee of B. and G. This was a motion by R. and Co. claiming the £75. The applicants contended that the instructions to the vendors were to ship to Trinidad, and no intervention of the buyer being necessary the vendors' stop prevailed, as the goods had not reached their destination. The respondents maintained that the destination was the London Docks, and that the transit ended there, and that it required the buyer's intervention to send them further. Held, that the transit was determined when the receipt was given by the Dock Company, that there was no stoppage in transitu, and that the trustee of B. and G. was entitled to the £75. [Re Gurney; Ex parte Hughes. Q. B. Div., in Bank: Williams, J. Oct. 27.-Counsel: for applicant, D. Jones; for respondent, Hansell. Solicitors for applicant, Murray, Hutchins, and Stirling; for respondent, Davidson and Morris.] Bankruptcy-Voluntary Settlements-Gift of Diamonds to Wife-" Settlement"-Bankruptcy Act 1883 (46 & 47 Vict. c. 52), s. 47.-By sect. 47 of the Bankruptcy Act 1883, (1) "any settlement of property not being a settlement made before or in consideration of marriage, or made in favour of a purchaser or incumbrancer in good faith and for valuable consideration, or a settlement made on or for the wife or children of the settlor of property which has accrued to the settlor after marriage in right of his wife, shall, if the settlor becomes bankrupt within two years after the date of the settlement, be void against the trustee in the bankruptcy, and shall, if the settlor becomes bankrupt at any subsequent time within ten years after the date of the settlement, be void against the trustee in the bankruptcy, unless the parties claiming under the settlement can prove that the settlor was at the time of making the settlement able to pay all his debts without the aid of the property comprised in the settlement, and that the interest of the settlor in such property had passed to the trustee of such settlement on the execution thereof. (3) Settlement' shall, for the purposes of this section, include any conveyance or transfer of property." Between Dec. 1889 and 1891 a husband made presents to his wife of valuable diamonds which he had bought; the occasions selected were Christmas-day, the anniversary of their wedding-day and when a horse called Romance, belonging to the husband, had won a certain race. The jewels were afterwards pawned, the husband became bankrupt, and his trustees claimed the pawn-tickets, alleging that, even if there was a gift of these diamonds to the wife, the transaction amounted to a settlement within sect. 47, and was void. Held, that, as the husband contemplated the retention by his wife of the presents of diamonds, the transaction was a settlement within the meaning of sect. 47, and was therefore void as against the trustee in bankruptcy of the husband. [Re Vansittart; Ex parte Brown. Q. B. Div., in Bank. Williams, J. Oct. 26 and27.-Counsel: for the trustee, Witt, Q.C. and Germaine; for the respondent, Yate Lee. Solicitors: for the trustee, R. and E. Bastard; for the respondent, Sanderson, Holland, and Adkin.] PROBATE, DIVORCE, AND ADMIRALTY DIVISION. PROBATE BUSINESS. Will-Revocation Clause-Principal and Agent--Testatrix misinformed by Agent as to Revocation Clause- Absence of Fraud. The testatrix, a maiden lady, resided for many years before her death with the plaintiff, Miss Collins, and in 1875 they made mutual wills, leaving each other everything. The testatrix, in 1885, made a codicil, leaving several small articles to various friends, but giving Miss Collins a first life interest in the said articles. In 1889, the testatrix, with a view to provide a small sum of ready money to enable Miss Collins to pay for her funeral expenses, insured her life for £50, and was advised to make a will or codicil dealing exclusively with the said £50. For this purpose the insurance agent, who was a personal friend of the testatrix, purchased a form of will which he filled up in accordance with her instructions. He then proceeded to read over the document to the testatrix, who stopped him when he came to the revocation clause, saying she did not want that, as she wished her former will and codicil to stand. The agent thereupon told her that to strike out the words and make any erasure upon the will would vitiate the whole document, and, further, that, as the document only dealt with the £50 insurance money, nothing it contained could have any effect upon any other property. Upon these assurances the testatrix, after some further discussion, consented to sign, and did sign, the will with the revocation clause still in it. The facts were practically admitted. The defendant was the next of kin, and she pleaded undue execution. The plaintiffs, the executors named in the last will, claimed probate of all three documents, and asked that the words of revocation should be struck out of the document of 1889 upon the ground that the testatrix did not know and approve thereof. The Court (following the law as laid down by Lord Hannen in the case of Morrell v. Morrell, 7 P. Div. 68), decided, with regret, that, in the absence of the slightest suggestion of fraud, the words of revocation must stand, and, consequently, that probate of the will of 1889 alone could be granted. [Collins and another v. Elstone. P. & D. Div.: The President (Sir F. H. Jeune). Oct. 27.-Counsel: for the plaintiffs, Bargrave Deane ; for the defendant, Bray. Solicitors: for the plaintiffs, West, King, and Adams; for the defendant, Freshfields and Williams.] Will-Execution-Full Attestation Clause and apparent due ExecutionEvidence of Attesting Witnesses-Presumption-" Omnia præsumuntur rite esse acta" rebutted-Probate refused. The testator, a retired farmer, died on the 9th April 1891, leaving a holograph will of the 28th March 1890, which contained a full attestation clause also in the handwriting of the testator. Owing, it was said, to the crumpled state of the will the registrar required an affidavit of the attesting witnesses. In the affidavits the latter stated that the testator came to their joiner's shop to pay a small account on the 28th March 1890, and he then produced a paper which he said was his will, and asked Mr. John Hudson to witness it. He said he had already signed it, and he pointed to the place where Mr. John Hudson was to write his name at the foot of the attestation clause. Mr. John Hudson having signed his name, the testator asked, "Where is Charles ?" Mr. John Hudson then went, at the testator's request, to fetch his son Charles Hudson, who was working in the shop below, and when Charles Hudson came up the testator told him that he wanted him to witness his will, and that he and Mr. Hudson, sen., had already signed it. Charles Hudson then signed the will in the presence of his father and of the testator. The Court regretted that the evidence of the two attesting witnesses was too clear for the presumption of law to prevail in face of their affidavits and oral evidence; and accordingly found against the will, but allowed the costs of both parties out of the estate. [Wyatt and another v. Berry and others. P. & D. Div.: Barnes, J. Oct. 31 and Nov. 2.-Counsel: for the plaintiffs, Searle; for the defendants, Bargrave Deane. Solicitors for the plaintiffs, Gibson and Weldon, agents for Charles Jowett, Stockport; for the defendants, Arthur Toovey, agent for Bennett, Boycott, and Orme, Chapel-en-leFrith, Stockport.] PROMOTIONS AND APPOINTMENTS. Information intended for publication under the above heading should reach us not later than Thursday morning in each week, as publication is otherwise delayed. Mr. FRANCIS NOLAN, Q.C., of the Connaught Circuit, has been coopted a Bencher of the Honourable Society of King's Inns, Dublin. Mr. HENRY PORCHER, deputy magistrate's clerk at Pontypridd, has been appointed Clerk to the Magistrates in succession to the late Mr. John Stockwood. Mr. EDWARD WILKINS, of the firm of Parker and Wilkins, of High Wycombe and Aylesbury, has been appointed Registrar of the Aylesbury County Court in succession to the late Mr. C. H. Watson. Mr. Wilkins was admitted in January 1879. Mr. DAVID ELIAS DAVIES has been appointed a Commissioner for Oaths. Mr. Davies was admitted in August 1886. Mr. GEO. JEREMY LYNSKEY, of 16, Lord-street, Liverpool, has been appointed a Commissioner for Oaths. Mr. Lynskey was admitted in Jan. 1886. Mr. JOHN PEGGE, of 15, Cooper-street, Manchester, has been appointed a Commissioner for Oaths. Mr. Pegge was admitted in June 1886. Mr. ROBERT STEPHEN WALKER, of 14, Queen-st, Cheapside, has been appointed a Commissioner for Oaths. Mr. Walker was admitted in June 1886. Mr. FREDERICK KINCH, of the firm of Warriner and Kinch, of 188, Fleet-street, E.C., has been appointed a Commissioner for Oaths. Mr. Kinch was admitted in Jan. 1883. WARNING TO INTENDING HOUSE FURNISHERS AND LESSEES.-Before purchasing or renting a house have the sanitary arrangements thoroughly examined by an expert from the Sanitary Engineering and Ventilation Company, 65, Victoria-street, Westminster, next the Meteorological Office [Estbd. 1875], who also undertake the Ventilation of Offices, &c.-[ADVT.] DODD'S AGRICULTURAL HOLDINGS (ENGLAND) ACT 1883.- With Explanations, Notes, Forms, and Precedents, including Precedents of Agreements for Specific" and "Fair and Reasonable" Compensation, and the Farmer's Agreement," and an Appendix containing the Act of 1875 (where it differs from the new Act). Price 5s.-HORACE COX, "Law Times" Office, Windsor House, Bream's-buildings, E.C.—[Advт.] Canterbury, Monday, at 11; Tuesday, at 10 Rochester, Tuesday, at 9.30 Carmarthen, Friday Chesham, Monday Chesterfield, Thursday and Friday, at 10 Denbigh, Tuesday Derby, Tuesday and Wednesday, at 10 Doncaster, Thursday, at 10 Exeter, Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday Grantham, Tuesday, at 10 Rugby, Thursday, at 10 Shaftesbury, Monday, at 10 Sheffield, Wednesday and Thursday, at 10.30 Shrewsbury, Monday and Tuesday, at 10 Skipton,* Thursday, at 9.45 Southam, Saturday, at 10 Southampton, Tuesday, at 10 Southport, Tuesday, at 10 South Shields, Thursday, at 10 Southwark, Thursday and Friday, at 11 Spilsby, Wednesday, at 12 Stamford, Wednesday, at 11 Stoke, Monday, at 9.30 Stone,* Saturday, at 9.30 Stourbridge, Wednesday and Thursday, at 10 Stratford-on-Avon,* Monday, at 10 Sunderland, Thursday (Reg., Bky) Great Grimsby, Thursday, and Friday Swindon, Wednesday, at 10.30 (Bky and Adm.), at 10 Tadcaster, Wednesday, at 10 Truro, Friday and Saturday, at 10 Huddersfield, Monday (Reg., Bky), at 11; Wakefield, Tuesday, at 10 Friday, at 10 Kendal, Monday, at 10 Lambeth, Tuesday and Thursday, at 10 Leeds, Monday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday, at 10 Lincoln, Monday, at 10 Wandsworth, Tuesday, at 11 Wednesday, Yarmouth, Friday and Saturday Yeovil, Thursday, at 10 York, Tuesday, at 9.30 * Other sittings are specially fixed if necessary. GENERAL INTELLIGENCE. PROCEEDINGS AFFECTING THE PROFESSION. AT the Norwich Bankruptcy Court on Wednesday, the 26th ult., before Mr. Registrar Cooke, William Wortley Pratt, solicitor, late of Victoria Chambers, Norwich, came up for his public examination, he having been adjudicated bankrupt. His liabilities amounted to £5977 14s. 6d., and his deficiency to £5133 10s. 5d. The debtor stated, in answer to the official receiver, that he commenced practice in March 1891. At that time he was heavily in debt and without means, so that he began thoroughly insolvent. His liabilities were very nearly £1000, and they had been created mainly by Stock Exchange speculations. At that time he owed Gurneys about £800, and he owed his sisters about £1000. At that time, however, he had considerable assets. When he came of age he received £550 under his grandfather's will, and he was then solvent. He had come into no moneys since. This was in 1887, and between that time and 1891 he lost the £550 and £1000 as well. He left Norwich in July last. While in practice he kept books of account which contained particulars of his business and moneys received and paid. There was no regular cash-book. He intended to keep one, but with the load of debt hanging over him he did not care to start one. His speculations on the |