[Reg. v. Kennedy. Q. B. Div.: Lord Coleridge, C.J. and Cave, J. Jan. 18, Feb. 8.-Counsel: for the prosecutors, E. Boyle and G. Elliott; for Colonel North, L. Walton, Q.C. and Forman. Solicitors: Dollman and Pritchard; George Whale.] Elementary Education-Board School-School Hours-Corporal Punishment inflicted for an Offence committed from School and out of School Hours Elementary Education Act 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 75), s. 97— Code of Regulations 1892. - An appeal from a conviction of the magistrates upon a case stated by them, as to whether they were right in convicting the appellant, a schoolmaster, of assault for flogging one of the boys of the school for an offence committed by one of the boys out of school hours and off the school premises. The offence committed was hitting another boy and injuring him, while on their way to the school, but outside, and at a considerable distance from the school premises. The appellant was the head-master of a board school, who, when he heard of the boy's offence, flogged him. By the 99th section of the Elementary Education Act 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 75) a code of regulations is issued by the Education Department, of which the following is a regulation issued in the code of 1892, for obtaining a grant for the discipline and organisation of the school. It says as follows: "To meet the requirements respecting discipline, the managers and teachers will be expected to satisfy the inspector that all reasonable care is taken, in the ordinary management of the school, to bring up the children in habits of punctuality, of good manners and language, and also to impress upon the children the importance of cheerful obedience to duty, of consideration and respect for others, &c." It was contended that this clause in the code, and also by the decisions of several cases cited, that the appellant was justified in inflicting the punishment he did, and that he was not liable to be convicted of a common assault. Held, that the conviction was wrong and must be quashed; a schoolmaster has delegated to him the reasonable authority of a parent, and, for the proper discipline of a school, such punishment, if reasonable, was not illegal. [Clery v. Booth. Q. B. Div.: Lawrance and Collins, JJ. Feb. 7.Counsel for the appellant, Poland, Q.C., and P. H. White; the respondent not represented. Solicitors; for the appellant, Baker and Nairne; the respondent not represented.] Ecclesiastical Law-Resignation of Incumbent-Pension assigned to him— New Incumbent appointed-Sequestration of Benefice-Liability of new Incumbent after Sequestration-Personal Judgment--Incumbents Resignation Act 1871 (34 & 35 Vict. c. 44), s. 10.-Appeal by the defendant from the Southend County Court, where the learned judge gave judgment for the plaintiff for a sum of £43 13s. The plaintiff, Mr. Montagu, had for thirty years been the rector of the parish of Hawkwell in the county of Essex. He resigned the living in March 1891, under the provisions of the Incumbents Resignation Act 1871, and he received from the bishop the declaration of vacancy, dated the 11th March 1891, giving him a pension under that Act. He has already received two half-yearly pensions under that resignation, and he now claims from the defendant the sum of £43 13s. in respect of one halfyear's pension due on the 11th Oct. 1892. These two half-yearly payments were received by the plaintiff from the defendant, Mr. Twyne, who had been appointed as rector of the parish on the plaintiff's resignation. On the 11th Sept. 1892 the living was sequestrated, and a sequestrator appointed by the bishop, and this sequestrator has to provide for the services of the church. The bishop permitted Mr. Twyne to perform the duties of the parish at a stipend of £100 a year, but Mr. Twyne has not (as he stated in his examination in the County Court) been in receipt of the revenues since the sequestration, nor the stipend, also that he had not resigned the benefice, but was still incumbent. Before the learned County Court judge it was contended for the defendant that, as the benefice was sequestrated on the 11th Sept. 1892, and that as the defendant had not been in receipt of the revenues of the benefice since then, he is not liable personally for this pension. The learned judge treated as a question of fact, (1) whether the statutory liability still continued, as to which he thought that the evidence showed that it did; and (2) whether sequestration not being a vacation of the incumbency, the defendant still remained liable. The judge held that the defendant was liable, and gave judgment for the plaintiff. Sect. 8 of the Incumbents Resignation Act 1871 provides that the commissioners may" specify the amount of pension which, in their opinion, ought to be allowed out of the revenues of the benefice to the retiring incumbent;" and sect. 10 provides: "The pension so allowed shall be a charge upon the revenues of the benefice, and shall be recoverable as a debt at law or in equity from the incumbent of the said benefice by the retired clerk," &c. Held (upon the 10th section and the authority of Gathercole v. Smith, 44 L. T. Rep. N. S. 439; 17 Ch. Div. 1), that the learned judge was right, and the plaintiff was entitled to a personal judgment for the amount, and that the fact of the sequestration made no difference. [Montagu v. Twyne. Q. B. Div.: Lawrance and Collins, JJ. Feb. 11. Counsel: for the defendant, C. E. Jones; for the plaintiff, Gregson Ellis. Solicitors: Jelf and Sons, London and Chelmsford: J. Fawcett, for Wood, Son, and Langton, Southend.] Fishery District-Certificates of Secretary of State-Tributary-Waterworks Reservoir-Rivers Severn and Vyrnwy-Salmon Fisheries Acts 1861-1876 (24 & 25 Vict. c. 109; 28 & 29 Vict. c. 121; 36 & 37 Vict. c. 71; 39 & 40 Vict. c. 19)-Freshwater Fisheries Act 1878 (41 & 42 Vict. c. 30)-Liverpool Corporation Waterworks Act 1880 (43 & 44 Vict. c. cxliii.), ss. 8, 36, and 49.-A case was stated by magistrates, after hearing an information laid by the appellant, a water bailiff of the Severn Fishery Board, against the respondent for fishing for trout, within, as the information alleged, the Severn Fishery District. The said fishery district was defined by certain certificates dating from 1866 to 1882, and given under the hand of one of Her Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, to include so much of the river Severn and of the rivers Vyrnwy and Teme and the tributaries of the same, and of all the other tributaries of the river Severn situated within the county of Montgomery. By the Salmon Fisheries Acts 1861-1876 control of these fisheries was vested in the Board of Conservators of the Severn Fishery District, who resolved, by virtue of the powers vested in them by sect. 7 of the Freshwater Fisheries Act 1878, to issue licences to all persons fishing for trout or char within the Severn Fishery District, and such licences were approved of by the Principal Secretaries of State, and are now in force throughout the said district. In 1880 the Corporation of Liverpool were prosecuting a Bill in Parliament known as the Liverpool Corporation Waterworks Bill, when the Board of Conservators entered into an agreement not to oppose the Bill, providing that an amount of compensation water be supplied to them. By the Liverpool Corporation Waterworks Act 1880 (43 & 44 Vict. c. cxliii.), s. 8, "A reservoir (to be formed by means of an embankment across the valley of the river Vyrnwy (or Llanwddyn River), in the parish of Llanwddyn," was to be constructed, and it was so constructed: and by sect. 36 of the Act the corporation might from time to time take, collect, divert, impound, and use all the waters of the river Vyrnwy at and above the point at which the embankment of the Vyrnwy Reservoir crosses the same and of all the tributary streams and springs of the said river above the said point." By sect. 49 of the said Act it is provided that, "except only as is by this Act expressly provided, nothing herein contained shall take away, lessen, prejudice, or alter any of the rights, powers, authorities, or privileges of the Board of Conservators of the Severn Fisheries, and except as aforesaid all such powers, rights, privileges, and authorities may be exercised and enjoyed by the Board of Conservators in as full and ample a manner as if this Act had not been passed." The magistrates refused to convict the respondent, holding that the agreement between the Fishery Board and the Corporation of Liverpool, and also the Liverpool Corporation Waterworks Act took away the rights of the Fishery Board, and that the Fishery Board had no jurisdiction over the tributaries of the river Vyrnwy inside the Vyrnwy reservoir. It was, on appeal, contended by the appellant that the Fishery Board still had jurisdiction over the Severn fishery district, which included the rights of fishing and of granting licences for fishing within that district, and that, notwithstanding the embankment, the river Vyrnwy was still a tributary of the river Severn, and that the reservoir formed by the embankment across the river Vyrnwy was nevertheless a tributary of the river Vyrnwy. The respondent contended that the magistrates were right in their construction of the agreement and the Waterworks Act, and in dismissing the information. Held, that the said reservoir into which the river Vyrnwy flowed is not now a tributary of the river Vyrnwy, the same principle having been laid down in a somewhat similar decision given in the case of Harbottle (app.) v. Terry (resp.) (48 L. T. Rep. N. S. 219; 10 Q. B. Div. 219), and that the respondent's right to issue licences to fish had been extinguished by the agreement and by the Liverpool Corporation Waterworks Act 1880, and dismissed the appeal. [George (app.) v. Carpenter (resp.). Q. B. Div.: Lawrence and Collins, JJ. Feb. 7.-Counsel: for the appellant, Willis Bund; for the respondent, Joseph Walton, Q.C. and W. F. Taylor. Solicitors: for the appellant, Stallard and Turner, for John Stallard and Son, Worcester; for the respondent, John Rayner, Town Clerk, Liverpool.] on Licensing Acts-Licensing Justices-Court of Summary Jurisdiction— Application for Transfer Objection by Police Superintendent Refusal Appeal Notice of Appeal Service "the other Party"- Licensing Act 1828 (9 Geo. 4, c. 61), s. 27-Summary Jurisdiction Act 1879 (42 & 43 Vict. C. 49), s. 31. The Summary Jurisdiction Act 1879 provides by sect. 31, that, where any person is authorised to appeal from the conviction or order of a court of summary jurisdiction to a court of general or quarter sessions, he may appeal to such court, subject to the conditions and regulations following: The appellant shall, within the prescribed time, or, if no time is prescribed, within seven days after the day on which the said decision of the court was given, give notice of appeal by serving on the other party, and on the clerk of the said court of summary jurisdiction, notice in writing of his intention to appeal, and of the general grounds of such appeal. An application having been made to the licensing justices for the city of Bristol at the annual general licensing meeting, for the renewal of the licence of an old beerhouse, the superintendent of police for the district opposed the application, and the renewal was refused. From this refusal the applicants appealed to the Court of Quarter Sessions, and served the notice of appeal upon the justices in the court below, but not upon the superintendent of police. The Court of Quarter Sessions refused to hear the appeal on the ground that the superintendent was "the other party," within the meaning of the above section, and that he should therefore have been served with the notice of appeal. Held, that the decision of the Court of Quarter Sessions was right; and further, that as the applicants had availed themselves of their right to appeal to quarter sessions, they could not now ask that the licensing justices should be compelled to rehear the original application for a renewal of the licence. [Reg. v. The Licensing Justices of Bristol; Reg. v. The Justices of Gloucestershire. Q. B. Div.: Lord Coleridge, C.J. and Cave, J. Feb. 8 and 9.-Counsel: for the justices, Poland, Q.C., and A. T. Lawrence: for the applicants, Gwynne James. Solicitors for the justices, H. M. Phillips, for T. Holmes Gore, Bristol; for the applicants, Meredith and Co., for G. Pearson, Bristol.] Metropolis-Obstructions in Streets. · Costermongers' Stalls Michael Angelo Taylor's Act (57 Geo. 3, c. xxix.), s. 65-Metropolitan Streets Acts 1867 and 1868 (30 & 31 Vict. c. 134, s. 6, and 31 Vict. c. 5, s. 1)- Repeal of earlier Act by implication.—Michael Angelo Taylor's Act (57 Geo. 3, c. xxix.) provides by sect. 65 that the persons having control of the streets may order the removal of any stall, wares, merchandise, &c., placed upon any carriage way, and if the stall, &c., is not removed, the owner or person in charge thereof may be summoned and fined. The Metropolitan Streets Act 1867 enacts, by sect. 6, that no goods or articles shall be allowed to rest on any part of a street so as to cause obstruction to the passage of the public, and that any person doing any act in contravention of this section shall be liable to the penalty of a fine; and, by sect. 27, that all the powers conferred by this Act shall be deemed to be in addition to and not in derogation of any other powers conferred by any other Act, and any such powers may be exercised as if this Act had not been passed. 31 Vict. c. 5 enacts that sect. 6 of the Metropolitan Streets Act 1867 shall not apply to costermongers so long as they comply with the regulations made by the Commissioner of Police. A costermonger having been summoned for non-compliance with an order by a district board of works for the removal of a stall and the merchandise thereon, which obstructed the passage of the public along a street within the district, it was contended on his behalf that the Metropolitan Streets Act 1867, as amended by the Act of 1868, by implication repealed the provisions of 57 Geo. 3, c. xxix., and that, as he had complied with the regulations of the police, the district board of works had no authority to order him to remove his stall. Held, that this contention was well founded, and that 57 Geo. 3, c. xxix., s. 65, was by implication repealed by the later statutes. [Summers v. Holborn District Board of Works. Q. B. Div.: Lord Coleridge, C.J. and Cave, J. Feb. 9.-Counsel: for the appellant, Lowe; for the respondent, Peile. Solicitors for the appellant, A. Newton; for the respondent, Matthew H. Hale.] Parliamentary Election-Borough Vote-Inhabitant Occupier-30 & 31 Vict. c. 102, s. 3, sub-sect. 2, and s. 27.-This was an appeal from the decision of the revising barrister at Bangor retaining two names on the list of voters. The names appealed against were those of two canons attached to the cathedral of Bangor, and the qualifying premises were a house occupied by them and by two other canons, each having by voluntary agreement exclusive occupation for three months in the year. But in case of need each might by arrangement himself occupy the premises for a whole year. The furniture in the house was the joint property of the canons, and during the interval between the occupation of each of the canons a servant came in and occupied the premises during the daytime for all the canons. The claimants, when not in occupation of the premises, resided within seven miles of them. Held, that by their agreement to occupy in rotation the claimants had denuded themselves of such occupation as would entitle them to vote. [Rowland v. Pritchard. Q. B. Div.: Lord Coleridge, C.J., Wright and Collins, JJ. Feb. 13.-Counsel: for the appellant, Bryn Roberts; for the respondent, Germaine. Solicitors: for the appellant, Indermaur and Brown; for the respondent, George Owen, Carnarvon.] Pharmacy-Sale of Poison-Mixture containing Poison-Patent Medicine -"Chlorodyne"-Sale by Unregistered Person-Penalty-Pharmacy Act 1868 (31 & 32 Vict. c. 121), ss. 1, 2. 15, 16, 17.-The Pharmacy Act 1868, by sect. 15, imposes a penalty on "any person who shall sell or keep open shop for the retailing, dispensing, or compounding poisons, not being a duly registered pharmaceutical chemist." Schedule A. to the Act contains the names of all articles which are to be deemed poisons within the Act. By sect. 16, "Nothing hereinbefore contained shall extend to or interfere with the making or dealing in patent medicines." Various regulations are to be observed in the sale of poisons under sect. 17, which provides, however (as amended by sect. 3 of 32 & 33 Vict. c. 117), that such regulations shall not "apply to any medicine supplied by a legally qualified medical practitioner to his patient or dispensed by any person registered under the Act, provided such medicine be distinctly labelled with the name and address of the seller and the ingredients thereof be entered, with the name of the person to whom it is sold or delivered, in a book to be kept by the seller for that purpose." The appellant, who is a grocer, was sued in the County Court of Bloomsbury, under sect. 15, for keeping open shop for retailing, dispensing, or compounding an article called chlorodyne which contained poisons, to wit, opium or a preparation of opium and chloro-. form, or one of the said poisons, contrary to the provisions of the Pharmacy Act 1868. It was proved that one half-ounce bottle of chlorodyne contained one grain of morphia, which is the active principle of opium, and that eight-tenths of a grain of this poison might kill an adult, while one-hundredth of a grain might be fatal to an infant. The County Court judge held that chlorodyne was a poison within the meaning of the Act, and gave judgment for the society. The defendant appealed, and contended, first, that a mixture containing poison is not itself a poison within the Act, the Act only applying to those poisons specifically mentioned in the schedule, and that therefore chlorodyne is not a poison within the Act; secondly, that it is a "patent medicine" within the meaning of sect. 16, and therefore exempt from the Act. Held, that the exempting words of sect. 17 show that the Act is not confined to the poisons mentioned in the schedule unmixed with other ingredients, and that therefore chlorodyne is a poison; and, secondly, that chlorodyne is not a patent medicine within sect. 16. Appeal dismissed. [Pharmaceutical Society v. Piper. Q. B. Div.: Lawrance and Collins, JJ. Feb. 8 and 10.-Counsel: for the appellant, Bonsey; for the Society, Poland, Q.C. and T. R. Grey. Solicitors: for the appellant, Neve and Beck; for the Society, Flux, Son, and Co.] Poor Rate-Rateability of Premises used for the Purposes of a Volunteer Corps The Volunteer Act 1863 (26 & 27 Vict. c. 67).-A case stated by an arbitrator, by the order of a judge, under 32 & 33 Vict. c. 67, s. 40; the question for the opinion of the High Court being whether certain premises, in whole or part, used as a store-house under sect. 26 of the Volunteer Act 1863 (26 & 27 Vict. c. 67) was rateable. One contention of the appellant that the store in question was not rateable being that the case came within the exception in sect. 16 of the Volunteer Act 1863, and the other contention being that the premises were occupied for Crown purposes. Sect. 16 of the Volunteer Act 1863 provides that, "The commanding officer of a volunteer corps or administrative regiment receiving any arms, ammunition, or other stores supplied at the public expense, or by subscription, shall, subject to the approval of the lieutenant of the county, appoint a proper storehouse for the depositing and safe keeping of such arms, ammunition, or stores. Every such storehouse shall be free from all county, parochial, or other local rates, or assessments." Cases were cited for the appellant showing that county buildings were exempt from assessment as well as storehouses belonging to the militia and being used for Crown purposes. The following cases were cited on behalf of the respondent's contention that the premises were rateable: Gambier v. Lydford (3 E. & B. 346; 23 L. J. 69, M. C.; 2 C. L. Rep. 95); Rex v. Bradford (4 M. & S. 317). Held, that the arbitrator having found that the whole premises were necessary for a storehouse, except certain rooms (the officers' ante-room, the canteen, the sergeants' room, the men's messroom on the first floor and two rooms on the third floor) which were suitable for the purposes of the corps, these findings therefore are that the whole of the premises are used solely for the purpose of the volunteer corps, and is therefore exclusively in occupation for military purposes, and therefore used for the purposes of the Crown; and that such occupation is exempt from ratability. : [Pearson (app.) v. Holborn Union Assessment Committee (resps.). Q. B. Div.: Lawrance and Collins, JJ. Feb. 9.-Counsel: for the appellant, Poland, Q.C. and Edward Boyle; for the respondent, Bosanquet, Q.C. and R. Cunningham Glen. Solicitors for the appellant, Church, Rendell, Todd, and Cox; for the respondent, John Rexworthy.] Practice-Taxation of Bill of Costs-Omission to place Change of Solicitors on the Record-Order VII., r. 3.-This was an appeal from Kennedy, J. in chambers refusing to review the taxation by a learned master of the defendant's bill of costs. During the course of the action in which the costs were incurred the defendant had changed his solicitor. Notice of this change had been given to the plaintiff's solicitor; but the defendant's new solicitor had omitted to have his name placed on the record as the defendant's solicitor in lieu of the former solicitor. The defendant was successful in the action. Objection was taken for the plaintiff to the allowance by the master of certain "party and party" costs to the defendant, on the ground that no costs could be recovered by the defendant from the plaintiff which had been incurred between the time that the retainer of the former solicitor was revoked and the granting of a certificate after judgment to the new solictors, and it was contended that, as regards costs incurred during that time, the defendant was in the position of a successful litigant in person who would be entitled to no other costs than court fees. Held, that, though a breach of the rules had been committed, it was not such as to deprive the defendant of his right to costs. [Norris v. Bailey. Q. B. Div.: Lord Coleridge, C.J. and Collins, J. Feb. 15.-Counsel: for the appellant, Gollan; for the respondent, Hume-Williams. Solicitors: for the appellants, Morris and Richards; for the respondent, Raphael.] LAW LIBRARY. The Law of Merchandise Marks. By FRANK SAFFORD, Barristerat-Law. Waterlow and Sons Limited. 66 "A WORK useful to the trader, the consumer, and the lawyer, on Merchandise Marks, is at the present time required." So says Mr. Safford, and we agree. Our author has evidently devoted much care and attention to gathering information outside cases and Acts of Parliament, and his 130 pages of text is a lucid exposition of the law and practice affecting Merchandise Marks. The remainder of the volume, quite one half, comprises Acts and Orders with which it is necessary to be familiar. The form which the text takes is this-the Merchandise Marks Act is given in extenso in large type, and each section has its commentary and cases, not as notes, but framed as ordinary text-writing. There are convenient crossheadings, and the whole is completed by an excellent index. This work will be found thorough and practical. Messrs. Butterworths have issued The Principal Judgments delivered in the Consistory Courts of London, Hereford, Ripon, and Wakefield, and in the Commissary Court of Canterbury. By Chancellor Tristram, Q.C., D.C.L. The supplement contains the General Rules and Regulations to be observed in suits and proceedings in the Consistory Court of London. We share Dr. THE Magistrates Qualification Bill, prepared and brought into the House of Commons by some ten members, amongst whom are no less than three Queen's Counsel, proposes to alter and amend the mode of appointment of and the qualification required for county justices. It will be observed, therefore, that it is confined to county justices. It proposes to do away with the necessity of a recommendation by the Lord-Lieutenant of the county, and says that such appointments shall be made by the Lord Chancellor upon a consideration of any names of persons who may occur to him, or be suggested to him," and the public bodies to submit or suggest the names of persons eligible to be appointed are the County Council of the county, or any public local authority. But the really important clause of the Bill is that which proposes to alter the qualification required by persons to be appointed as county justices. Sect. 1 of the 38 & 39 Vict. c. 54, provides that a person who has for two years immediately preceding his appointment been the occupier of a dwelling-house assessed at the value of not less than one hundred pounds, should be deemed to be qualified to be appointed a justice of the peace for such county. The present Bill proposes to abolish this property qualification by omitting the words assessed at not less than one hundred pounds a year," and also to insert the word "efficient" instead of "sufficient" in the Act 2 Hen. 5, st. 2, which required that justices should be of the Imost sufficient persons" in the counties. 66 the board had acquiesced in the paving.-After a long hearing, Mr. Kennedy held that the road was a new street, and that the board had not estopped themselves by acquiescence. He however consented to state a case for the High Court. Plymouth Borough Council (says the Western Morning News) having, by an arbitrary and hasty resolution, shut out from candidature for the assistant town clerkship all the solicitors of Plymouth, yesterday had before them only three selected candidates. The resolution had been arrived at without due appreciation of its importance, and has been derided as an unnecessary slight to local men by most persons competent to judge of the facts. Any ordinarily efficient young solicitor could in a very few weeks have fairly mastered the Acts relating to municipal government, and, under the guidance of the town clerk, would be able to do the detail work which unquestionably will, for a long time to come, be the chief occupation of the town clerk's assistant. The possession of local knowledge by an otherwise efficient man ought to have been deemed a strong recommendation instead of the reverse. But having made this renewed protest, in the name of fair play to west countrymen, we are constrained to admit that the council has made a judicious and satisfactory choice from the candidates before them. Mr. William Collingwood, who has been for two years legal assistant in the Town Clerk's office at Cardiff, is a gentleman whose credentials entitled him to full confidence and support, and his personal presence, and evident intelligence and interest in his work, impressed the council most favourably. We have no doubt that his services will prove of great advantage to Plymouth, and help to expedite the work of the Town Clerk's office. It will somewhat soothe the disturbed feelings of other members of the Profession to know that Mr. Collingwood has agreed not to practise in Plymouth for a lengthened term after he may cease to be an official of the corporation. It was The case of Zampa-road, in which the apportionment was £127, was first dealt with.-Crump said that Zampa-road was nine years ago formed and paved by the defendant, and then ceased to be a new street. paved with tar paving, and the board could not now come forward and say they objected to the tar paving, and charge his client with the expense of repairing it. If they could the board would be able, after a road had been made for 100 years, to say they were dissatisfied with it. There must be a limit when a street ceased to be a new street. He referred to sect. 105 of the Metropolis Local Management Act of 1855, and sects. 77 and 112 of the Act of 1862, and cited Hunt v. Vestry of Camberwell; Reg. v. Marsham (65 L. T. Rep. N. S. 778). He pointed out that the surveyor, whose duty it was to make the estimate, had not been called, and submitted that his signature to an estimate was no evidence that he had made it. The inhabitants of the district were satisfied with the paving.-Spencer said that the board were carrying out statutory powers, and had never taken over the roads in question. The defendant said the paving was completed in 1885, and, with a little attention, would last 100 years. Since 1890 the board had cleansed and watered the roads, and the public had used them.-Evidence was called to show that tar paving was a suitable material for this road.-Spencer said that the board could at any time say they were not satisfied with the paving. It was not for the magistrate to say whether the road was properly paved or not, or whether Cleobury,* Friday, at 10 Pwllheli, Tuesday, at 10 Rochester, Tuesday, at 9.30 Rothbury, Saturday, at 10 Saffron Walden. Tuesday, at 10 Saxmundham, Tuesday, at 10 Clerkenwell, Monday, Tuesday, Wednes- Royston, Thursday, at 10 day, Thursday, and Friday Colchester, Monday, at 11 Corwen, Saturday, at 10 Derby, Wednesday, at 10 Durham, Monday and Tuesday, at 10 Frome, Tuesday, at 10 Gloucester, Tuesday Godalming, Thursday Greenwich, Friday, at 10.15 Halesworth, Wednesday, at 12.50 Halifax, Tuesday (Reg., Bky), at Wednesday, at 10 Harwich, Tuesday, at 10 Haslingden, Thursday, at 9.30 Huddersfield, Monday (Reg., Bky), at 11; Lambeth, Tuesday and Thursday, at 10 Leeds, Monday, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday (Bky), at 10 Other sittings are specially fixed if necessary. FORD'S SHERIFFS' OFFICERS AND THEIR FEES.-The Sheriffs Act 1887, and Notes of Use to Under-Sheriffs and their London Agents, and also to Sheriffs' Officers. Price 18.-HORACE Cox, "Law Times" Office, Bream's-buildings E.C.- [ADVT.] PROCEEDINGS NUISANCE-BARBED WIRE FENCE-PUBLIC FOOTPATH. On the 10th inst., at the Birkenhead County Court, his Honour Judge Wynne Ffoulkes gave judgment in the case of Stewart v. Wright. The case, which was heard before his Honour on the 10th Jan., was one in which Thomas Charles Stewart, metal broker, living in Manor-road, Liscard, claimed £2 4s. from Albert T. Wright, solicitor, Wallasey, being the cost of a macintosh coat which had been damaged by a barbed wire fence belonging to the defendant. W. L. Danger appeared for the plaintiff, and the defendant appeared in person. The facts of the case were that on the 29th Sept. last the plaintiff, in company with a friend named Connor, was walking along a footpath leading from Wallasey-road to Mill-lane, Liscard, one side of which was bounded by a stone wall, and the other side was bounded by a barbed wire fence dividing the road from the defendant's field. As the plaintiff was turning the corner, the macintosh coat which he was wearing at the time was caught by a gust of wind and thrown against the barbed wire, the result being that it was considerably damaged. Evidence was also given of damage having occurred to plaintiff's clothing on another occasion on the same path, and his wife had also torn her glove by the fence on another occasion. For the defence it was contended that the fence was at the present day an ordinary one; that it was not dangerous in the sense of any decision of the courts; that the plaintiff had ample notice of the nature of the fence; that the plaintiff having such notice, had not used ordinary care in passing round the corner. The defendant also contended that the footpath was not a public path, but on that point his Honour at once ruled against the contention, as it was admitted that it had been used by the public for twenty years. His HONOUR, on delivering judgment, said this was the first action of its kind that had been brought on this circuit. The law did not prescribe the material to be used for the purpose of a fence, but there was the general law that a man must not do that on his land which created or became a nuisance to the public lawfully using the road on which his land abuts. There was no express decision of the High Court applying that maxim to barbed wire fencing, but there were three decisions in the County Courts condemnatory of barbed wire fencing. His Honour then referred to the decisions given in the County Courts of Crediton, Birmingham, and Manchester, and also to the case of Elgin Company's Road Trustees v. Innes, tried before the Scotch Court of Session, in the latter of which the court dismissed the action, but gave plaintiffs their costs. He thought it was to be inferred from the Scotch decision that the use of barbed wire in a fence alongside of a public way was not in itself illegal, but that it was a dangerous kind of fencing, and that the person using it used it at his peril. Then there was abundance of English authority for saying that if anyone lawfully using a highway sustained injury from a public nuisance made or maintained on or near a highway he had a right of action for such injury against the person making or maintaining such nuisance. He had but little to add in applying these principles to the facts proved in evidence The fence was on a level with the footpath, a position which was condemned as very dangerous by the case in the Court of Session. It was true that the wire was attached to the posts on the field side of the posts, and that the posts were closer together than they were in the Scotch case. But the very accident itself which occurred to the plaintiff to the injury of his macintosh, as well as the two previous accidents-one to his wife and the other to himself-showed that those arrangements were not sufficient to secure the public using the footpath from the dangers arising from the barbed wire used. He must therefore hold that this fence, so constructed and placed, was dangerous to the public using the path and a nuisance, and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover in this action, unless he had been guilty of contributory negligence in not taking-and that too after notice of the existence and nature of the fence-due care. He did not think the evidence supported that defence. A sudden gust of wind-a very ordinary occurrence-blew the plaintiff's coat against the fence as he turned the corner, and he was then, his Honour thought, taking due and reasonable care in turning the corner. His judgment must therefore be for the plaintiff, and for the amount claimed. He would give leave of appeal, if the defendant wished to do so. A. T. Wright said the case was of great importance to so many owners that he was bound to express dissatisfaction with the effect of the judgment, but he had to thank his Honour for the care he had taken in the matter. His HONOUR said he had looked at every authority he could find bearing on the case, and he had acted on the principles laid down in the Scotch If the defendant wished to appeal he could do so. case. COMMERCIAL FAILURES AND BILLS OF SALE. According to Stubbs' Weekly Gazette, the number of failures in England and Wales gazetted during the week ending the 11th Feb. was 168. The number in the corresponding week of last year was 171, showing a decrease of 3. The number of bills of sale in England and Wales, registered at the Queen's Bench for the week ending the 11th Feb. was 203. The number in the corresponding week of last year was 218, and the corresponding weeks for the three previous years 191, 152, and 181. THE TYPE-WRITER AND INSURANCE.-The Yost Type-writer Company, of 40, Holborn Viaduct, London, have introduced a new pattern typewriter, specially adapted for writing out insurance policies. It prints the same length of line as the brief machine recently put on the market for legal work, but the paper carriage has been elongated so as to accommodate paper 16in. wide. AFFECTING PROFESSION. THE On the 8th inst., in Bankruptcy, before Mr. Registrar Linklater, an adjourned sitting for public examination was held under the bankruptcy of Edwin T. Tadman, a solicitor, carrying on business for some years in Gray's-inn, but who was recently struck off the rolls for professional misconduct. At a former meeting the debtor failed to appear, and the Court intimated that unless he filed an affidavit explaining his reasons for not attending, a warrant would be issued for his arrest. C. A. Pope attended as Assistant Official Receiver; Morton Daniel and Rake for creditors; and W. A. Colyer for the debtor. Colyer stated that he had written to the debtor informing him of the intimation of the court, but he received no reply until yesterday, when a letter reached him in the following terms: "Pier Hotel, Worthing, Feb. 7. Dear Sir,-I received your two letters addressed to the Marine Hotel together, but not till Thursday last, too late to get the affidavit you refer to. I assume, therefore, the Registrar has made the order, and, that being so, that the public examination will again be adjourned. I suppose when I am prepared I shall be able to apply for a day to be appointed with a view to closing the bankruptcy or otherwise. -Yours faithfully, EDWIN T. TADMAN." Mr. Registrar LINKLATER asked whether the last order had been served on the debtor, but it appearing that it had not, he intimated that he should adjourn the case until Tuesday next, and directed the orders to be served by the Official Receiver at the debtor's last known address. If he did not then attend, the Official Receiver would be at liberty to make such application as he thought fit. On Tuesday the debtor failed to appear, and an adjournment was ordered sine die. On the 8th inst., at Clerkenwell, William Fowler, of 91, Cornwall-road, Bayswater, was summoned, at the instance of the Incorporated Law Society, before Mr. Horace Smith, for having unlawfully represented himself to be a solicitor. It appeared that, in consequence of an advertisement which had appeared in the Exchange and Mart, the defendant had sent some violins to a Mr. M'Cugh, of Ilfracombe, on approval. These violins Mr. M'Cugh returned without paying the carriage. Some correspondence ensued between the parties, and the defendant threatened to put the matter into the hands of his solicitor if the amount of the carriage, 1s. 9d., was not sent. Eventually M'Cugh received a letter purporting to come from a solicitor of the name of Herbert Holloway, of 21, Cowcrossstreet, Smithfield, demanding the 1s. 9d., and a further sum of 6s. 8d., the solicitor's fee for writing the letter. A female witness, residing at the address in Cowcross-street, said she kept a news shop, and took in letters at a penny a time. She knew the defendant as Herbert Holloway, and received letters for him, which she duly handed to him. Once or twice she had seen him open letters addressed to Herbert Holloway. She had personally received from defendant a postcard signed Herbert Holloway, bearing the Paddington postmark. A solicitor's clerk stated that the defendant had admitted to him that his name was Fowler, and that he wrote the letters signed in that name. For the defence it was stated that Holloway was a friend of the defendant's, and took upon himself to write as he did. Mr. Horace Smith fined the defendant £10, with £2 2s. costs. On the 10th inst., before Lord Coleridge and Cave, J. sitting as a Divisiona Court, the Attorney-General (with him Sutton) showed cause against a rule calling upon the County Court judge of Brompton to show cause why he should not proceed to hear an application by the Incorporated Law Society to commit one Vague, who it was alleged had infringed the Solicitors Acts of 1843 and 1860 by practising as a soliciter, being unqualified. The rule was supported, upon behalf of the Incorporated Law Society, by Sir R. Webster, Crump, Q.C., and Hollams. It was contended on behalf of the County Court judge that he had no power to commit except for a contempt committed in the face of the court within sect. 113 of 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95 (Reg. v. Lefroy, 28 L. T. Rep. N. S. 132; L. Rep. 8 Q. B. 134). Reference was made to sect. 2 of the Solicitors Act of 1843 and sect. 26 of the Solicitors Act of 1860, also to sects. 5 and 162 of the County Courts Act 1888. Sir Richard Webster pointed out that acting as an unqualified person was always a contempt of court, and he referred to sects. 35 and 36 of the Act of 1843, subsequently repealed. There was parallel legislation affecting solicitors and County Courts, and it was manifestly intended to give the County Court power to commit. Crump, Q.C. followed, and said that, when applied to, the judge had entrenched himself behind Reg. v. Lefroy. It was not at all clear that an unqualified person using the process of the County Court was not all through acting in the face of the court. He was using a process which he was prohibited from using, and which was declared a contempt of the court whose process was used. The legislation was intended for the protection of courts who had not the jurisdiction over unqualified persons which they had over solicitors, and also for the protection of solicitors. Commitment was the only punishmeut which could be effectual with unqualified practitioners, who were almost always impecunious. The Court reserved judgment. IN the Court of Appeal on Wednesday, before Lord Esher, M.R. and Lindley and Lopes, L.JJ., an appeal by a solicitor was heard against an order of the Divisional Court that he should be struck off the rolls for professional misconduct. UNCLAIMED STOCK AND DIVIDENDS IN THE BANK OF ENGLAND. [Transferred to the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt, and which will be paid to the persons respectively whose names are prefixed to each in three months from the date given, unless other claimants sooner appear.] AIREY (Julius Talbot, Frognall-hall, Hampstead, gentleman, and AIREY (Violet HEIRS-AT-LAW AND NEXT OF KIN. COGHLAN (Henry Thomas), 14, Hyde-pk-grdns, who died on Nov. 24, 1892. His next of kin living at the time of his death, or the legal personal representatives of such of the said next of kin as are now dead, to come in, by March 11, and prove their claims at the chambers of Mr. Justice Kekewich. March 20, at the said chambers, at two o'clock, is the time appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon such claim. COBLEY (James), 9, Balaclava-rd, Bermondsey, Surrey, who died there on Nov. 8, 1880. His next of kin to apply to the Solicitor for the Treasury, Treasury-chmbrs, Whitehall. MAYNARD (Bridget), 59, Princes-st, St. Marylebone, widow, who died on Nov. 12, 1892. Her next of kin to apply to the Solicitor for the Treasury, Treasury-chmbrs, Whitehall. MACRO (Florence Sophia), a daughter of Alfred Macro, late of Poplar, nautical instrument maker, and who it is believed left England with her father for New York, America, about the year 1872, then said to be about fifteen months old. If living, or, if dead, her legal personal representatives, or any person claiming to have any assignment, mortgage, charge, or incumbrance on her share in certain funds, subject to the trusts of the will of Ann Gage, late of Boxford, Suffolk, to come in, by March 20, and prove such claims at the chambers of Mr. Justice Stirling. March 28, at the said chambers, at twelve o'clock, is the time appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon such claims. SEMARK (Charlotte), Home Farm, Ash, Kent, widow. Her next of kin to send in, by March 11, the particulars of their claims to Messrs. J. and J. C. Hayward, solicitors, Dartford. UPTON (William), formerly of Handsworth, Staffordshire (son of the late Joseph and Harriet Upton, of the same place), who left England for Chicago, U.S. of America, about the year 1860. If living, or, if dead, any persons claiming to be his children or issue, or any other person claiming to have any interest under the will of William Hutchinson, late of Wednesbury, Staffordshire, victualler, to come in, by April 24, and prove his or their claims (if any), at the chambers of Mr. Justice Chitty. May 1, at the said chambers. at eleven o'clock, is the time appointed for hearing and adjudicating upon such claims. WRIGHT (Charles), Mattishall Burgh, Norfolk, gentleman, who died on Nov. 18, 1842. His heir-at-law to communicate with Messrs. Cooper and Norgate, solicitors, East Dereham, Norfolk. APPOINTMENTS UNDER THE JOINT-STOCK WINDING-UP ACTS. BIDASOA RAILWAY AND MINES LIMITED.-Petition for winding-up to be heard Feb. 20, before the Court sitting at the Royal Courts of Justice, Strand. Lowless and Co., 26, Martin's-la, Cannon-st, solicitors for the petitioners. Notices of intention to appear on the hearing of the petition must be signed by the person or firm, or his or their solicitor (if any), and must reach the above-named not later than six o'clock on Feb. 19. CLARENDON LAND INVESTMENT AND AGENCY COMPANY LIMITED.-Petition for windingup to be heard Feb. 20, before the Court sitting at the Royal Courts of Justice, Strand. Munns and Longden, 8, Old Jewry, solicitors for the petitioners. Notices of intention to appear on the hearing of the petition must be signed by the person or firm, or his or their solicitor (if any), and must reach the above-named not later than two o'clock on Feb. 18. CIVIL SERVICE BREWERY COMPANY LIMITED.-Order for continuation of voluntary winding-up made by Mr. Justice Williams on Jan. 11. Saunders, Hawksford, Bennett, and Co., 68, Coleman-st, solicitors for the petitioner. CAMBORNE CONSOLS LIMITED.-Petition for winding-up to be heard Feb. 18, before the Court of the Vice-Warden of the Stannaries of Cornwall, sitting at the Princes Hall, Truro, at ten o'clock. Chilcott and Son, Truro, solicitors for the petitioner. DRACHENFELS BANKET GOLD MINING SYNDICATE LIMITED.-Petition for winding-up to be heard Feb. 20, before the Court sitting at the Royal Courts of Justice, Strand. Hadden, Woodward, McLeod, and Blyth, 6, New-sq, Ltncoln's-inn, petitioners' solicitors. Notices of intention to appear on the hearing of the petition must be signed by the person or firm, or his or their solicitor (if any), and must reach the above-named not later than six o'clock on Feb. 18. FEDERAL BANK OF AUSTRALIA LIMITED.-Petition for winding-up to be heard Feb. 20, before the Court sitting at the Royal Courts of Justice, Strand. Powell and Burt, 28 and 29, St. Swithin's-la, solicitors for the petitioner. Notices of intention to appear on the hearing of the petition must be signed by the person or firm, or his or their solicitor (if any), and must reach the above-named not later than two o'clock on Feb. 18. GOLDFIELDS OF MANICA LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by Feb. 24, their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Mr. H. S. Banks, 66, Cannon-st, the liquidator of the company, HYDE PARK CAB COMPANY LIMITED.-Petition for winding-up to be heard Feb. 20, before Mr. Justice Williams. Shaen, Roscoe, Massey, and Co., 8, Bedfordrow, solicitors for the petitioner. Notices of intention to appear on the hearing of the petition must be signed by the person or firm, or his or their solicitor (if any), and must reach the above-named not later than six o'clock on Feb. 19. HAMPSHIRE LAND COMPANY LIMITED.-Petition for winding-up to be heard Feb. 20, before the Court sitting at the Royal Courts of Justice. Strand. Munns and Longden, 8, Old Jewry, agents for King and Lapthorns, Gladstone-bldgs. Landport, solicitors for the petitioners. Notices of intention to appear on the hearing of the petition must be signed by the person or firm, or his or their solicitor (if any), and must reach the above-named Messrs. Munns and Longden not later than two o'clock on Feb. 18. JOHNSONS LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by March 13, their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Messrs. Eldred and Bignold, 11, Queen Victoria-st, solicitors for A. Johnson, of Raleigh House, West Hampstead, the liquidator of the company. J. E. H. GORDON AND CO. LIMITED.-Petition for winding-up to be heard Feb. 20, before the Court sitting at the Royal Courts of Justice, Strand. R. Raphael, 59, Moorgate-st, solicitor for the petitioners. Notices of intention to appear on the hearing of the petition must be signed by the person or firm, or his or their solicitor (if any), and must reach the above-named not later than six o'clock on Feb. 18. NATIONAL LITHOGRAPHIC AND PRINTING COMPANY LIMITED.-Petition for winding-up to be heard Feb. 20, before the Court sitting at the Royal Courts of Justice, Strand. Paterson, Sons, and Candler, 26, Bouverie-st, Fleet-st. Petition for windingup to be heard Feb. 20, before the Court sitting at the Royal Courts of Justice, Strand. Ranger, Burton, and Co., 17, Fenchurch-st, solicitors for the petitioner. Notices of intention to appear on the hearing of the petitions must be signed by the person or firm, or his or their solicitors (if any), and must reach the abovenamed respectively not later than six o'clock on Feb. 19. NORWOOD CHEMICAL WORKS LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by March 15, their names and addresses, and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Mr. T. C. Parkin, 36, Bank-st, Sheffield, Yorkshire, the liquidator of the company. E. Swift, Wharncliffe-chmbrs, Bank-st, Sheffield, solicitor for the liquidator. NEW CLYDACH COLLIERY COMPANY LIMITED.-Creditors to send in, by March 31, their names and addresses and the particulars of their claims, and the names and addresses of their solicitors (if any), to Messrs. T. Morgan, W. M. Lewis, and D. H. Francis, 128, Bute-st, Cardiff, the liquidators of the company. Ingledew and Sons, 57, Mount Stuart-sq, Cardiff, solicitors for the liquidators. PORTSMOUTH AND SOUTHSEA ARMY AND NAVY STORES LIMITED.-Petition for windingup to be heard Feb. 20, before the Court, sitting at the Royal Courts of Justice, Strand. E. S. Parker, 12, Bishopsgate-st Within, solicitor for the petitioners. Notices of intention to appear on the hearing of the petition must be signed by the person or firm, or his or their solicitor (if any), and must reach the above-named not later than two o'clock on Feb. 18. ST. ETIENNE BREWERY COMPANY LIMITED.-Petition for winding-up to heard Feb. 20, before the Court sitting at the Royal Courts of Justice, Strand. Ingram, Harrison, and Ingram, 67, Lincoln's-inn-flds, solicitors for the petitioner. Notices of intention to appear on the hearing of the petition must be signed by the person or firm, or his or their solicitor (if any), and must reach the abovenamed not later than six o'clock on Feb. 19. WHEAL UNY MINE.-Petition for winding-up to be heard Feb. 21, before the Court of the Vice-Warden of the Stannaries of Cornwall, sitting at the Prince's-hall, Truro, at ten o'clock. Chilcott and Son, Truro, agents for Daniell and Thomas, Camborne, solicitors for the petitioners. Notices of intention to appear on the hearing of the petition must be signed by the person or firm, or his or their solicitor (if any), and must reach the above-named solicitors not later than six o'clock on Feb. 20. WOODROW, HOOPER, AND CO. LIMITED.-Petition for winding-up to be heard Feb. 20, before the Court_sitting at the Royal Courts of Justice, Strand. Layton, Sons, and Leadon, 29, Budge-row, Cannon-st, solicitors for the petitioner. Notices of intention to appear on the hearing of the petition must be signed by the person or firm, or his or their solicitor (if any), and must reach the above-named not later than six o'clock on Feb. 18. CREDITORS UNDER ESTATES IN CHANCERY. BUDD (David), Warnham, near Horsham, Sussex, builder. March 14; J. F. A. LAWS (William), Little Clacton Lodge, Essex, farmer and landowner. C. J. Grimwade, solicitor, Hadleigh, Suffolk. April 12; Mr. Justice Chitty, at two o'clock. REES (Benjamin Evans), Eglwyswrw, Pembrokeshire, merchant. March 10; I. Evans, solicitor, Cardigan. March 17; Mr. Justice Stirling, at twelve o'clock. WRATISLAW (Rev. Albert Henry), formerly of 90, Manor-rd, Stoke Newington, since of Clairville, Merton-rd, Southsea, and late of Graythwaite, Alhambra-rd, Southsea, Southampion, M.A., clerk in holy orders. March 6 R. B. S. Roberts, solicitor, 8, New-sq, Lincoln's-inn. March 13; Mr. Justice Kekewich, at twelve ANTHONY (Joshua), 2, St. John's-ter, Pendre, Brecon, retired lessee of tolls. March 13; BIRD (John Edward), formerly of the Taff Vale Railway Company's General Offices, BARBER (Joseph), 6, Pembroke-sq, Kensington, gentleman. March 25; Hinde, Milne, BRADY (Mary Ann), the Workhouse, Anlaby-rd, Kingston-upon-Hull, widow. BLAKE (Elizabeth), 49, Carter-st, Greenheys, Manchester, Lancashire, widow. BARNES, otherwise BARNES-PARSONS (James), 137, Hurdsfield-rd, Macclesfield, CROSSING (Samuel Jenkin), 35, Woburn-sq, and of 4, Eastcheap, produce broker. COOK (Mary Ann), Dover, Kent, spinster. March 24; Lewis and Pain, solicitors, CARLYM (John), 3, Strangways-ter, Truro, solicitor. March 9; Smith, Paul, and Archer, solicitors, Truro. |