To Readers and Correspondents.

All communications must be authenticated by the name and address of the writer, not necessarily for publication, but as a guarantee of good faith. Anonymous communications are invariably rejected.

All communications intended for the Editorial Department should, in order to prevent delay, be addressed to the "EDITOR OF THE LAW TIMES." Advertisements, orders for papers, &c., should be kept distinct, and addressed to the Publisher, Mr. HOBAOE Cox, Law Times" Office, Windsor House, Bream's-buildings, E.O.

TO SUBSCRIBERS.

The volumes of the LAW TIMES, and of the LAW TIMES REPORTS, are strongly and uniformly bound at the office, as completed, for 58. 6d. for the Journal and 58. for the Reports.

Portfolios for preserving the current numbers of the LAW TIMES, price 58. 6d. ; LAW TIMES REPORTS, price 3s. 6d.

TO ADVERTISERS.

SCALE OF CHARGES FOR ADVERTISEMENTS.

Four lines of thirty words, or less than thirty words, in body type......... 3s. 6d. Each additional line, or ten words, or less than ten words ..................... Os. 6d. For three insertions a reduction of 10 per cent.; for six insertions a reduction of 10 per cent.

Advertisers whose reference is under initials to this office should remit 6d. additional to defray postage in transmitting replies to their Advertisements.

Advertisements must reach the Office not later than five o'clock on Thursday afternoon, and must be accompanied by a remittance Post-office Orders payable to Horace Cox.

HOLMES t. MILLAGE. -Practice Equitable execution ReceiverFuture earnings of judgment debtor Just and convenient "-Order XLIL, r. 3-Order L., r. 15a....... HIGH COURT OF JUSTICECHANCERY DIVISION. READ. WOTTON.-Practice-Action for recovery of possession of premises for breach of covenantClaim for injunction to restrain continuing breach

Be SNYDER DYNAMITE PROJECTILE COMPANY LIMITED; SKELTON'S CASE. Company - Winding-up- Prospectus-Misrepresentation-Repudiation of shares-Laches.. GOVERNORS OF BRIDEWELL HOSPITAL AND OTHERS . WARD, LOCK, BOWDEN, AND CO.-Ancient lights -User for more than nineteen and less than twenty years TAYLOR r. ROE.-Practice-Attach

205

209

210

212

ment-Motion-Irregularity-Name of wrong judge on notice-Amdavits -Service-Condoning irregularity-Serve with the notice of motion" 213 Re THE VARIETIES LIMITED-Company Winding-up- Shareholder's petition-Resolution for voluntary liquidation Preponderating influence of one shareholder

Re WELLS; Ex parte SHERIFF OF KENT.-Bankruptcy-Sheriff's costs -Fees for levy-Several writs of fi. fa.-Bankruptcy Act 1890 (53 & 54 Vict. c. 71), s. 11..... 231

214

Practice-Money

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION. WHITWORTH v. DARBISHIRE AND Practice OTHERS. Joinder of causes of action - Claim against executors as executors and for a personal wrong... POBINSON . CALDWELL AND ANOTHER. - Practice Pleadings-Notice of trial - Delivery of -- No reply delivered HENNELL r. DAVIES AND AUSTIN.paid into court generally-Items of bill-Extent of admission of liability MAYOR, ALDERMEN, AND BURGESSES OF SOUTHPORT t. MORRIS. Merchant Shipping Act 1854 (17 & 18 Vict. c. 104), s. 318-Ship-Navigation HARE . ELMS AND OTHERS.-Landlord and tenant-Breach of covenantNon-payment of rent-ForfeitureRelief- Claim by mortgagee lease-Necessary parties

of

PROMOTIONS AND APPOINTMENTS CORRESPONDENCE...

BRISTOL SAME r. JUSTICES

NOTES AND QUERIES

561 561 562 562

OF

r. LICENSING

229

BIRTHS, MARRIAGES, AND DEATHS...... 572

CONTENTS:-Abbreviations-Advising on Title-Conditions of Sale-ConveyancesDisentailing Deeds Leases Mortgages Releases -Partnership Articles Settlements: Personalty; Realty; Voluntary-Wills. HORACE COX, "Law Times" Office, Windsor House, Bream's-buildings, E.C.

The Law and the Lawyers.

THE Court of Appeal presents a list of the most attenuated description. From the Queen's Bench Division there are only thirteen final and four interlocutory appeals, and only one from the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division. The New Trial paper contains six cases. From the Chancery

Division there are twenty-five final appeals, and eight interlocutory, whilst only one comes from the County Palatine Court of Lancaster. All the appeals have been entered in the present year.

THE business of the Divisional Courts stood as follows at the beginning of the Sittings :-Special paper, 8; opposed motions, 84; Crown paper, 105; Revenue, 25; total, 222.

In calling attention to the interesting pamphlet issued by a special committee of the council of the Incorporated Law Society, we cannot help saying a word or two about the untiring zeal with which the Society watches over the fortunes of solicitors. Not a Bill affecting them is introduced or projected without being examined and, if necessary, condemned. Not a change likely to be detrimental to them passes unnoticed. Every existing privilege is protected, and not only the present fortunes of the Profession, but its future prospects are carefully watched. Those who have described the Incorporated Law Society as the best organised and most intelligent trade union in the country, will point to this pamphlet as a fresh proof of its zeal for the interest of its members. This is high praise; but not too high. This zeal is what we desire to see in both branches of the Profession.

A CORRESPONDENT calls our attention to some gossip in the Newcastle Daily Leader affecting the reputation of solicitors. The reference is to the payment of counsels' fees, and this is the assertion:

The more distinguished lights of the Bar get their money down, or if it is not paid down with the brief it is in their case always sure, but the young men are quite accustomed to find that the solicitor thinks he has done quite enough for them in providing them with an opportunity of appearing in court. Even busy and important men often find it impossible to obtain their fees. The friend to whom I was speaking to-day told me of a barrister who is thickly engaged in chamber work, but who is seldom heard of in court. He is one of the most prosperous and hard-worked juniors of the day, but he affirms that the solicitors are in debt to him to the extent of at least £10,000. There is in such a case no means of recovering unpaid fees. The law does not recognise the barrister's right to sue or even to claim payment. If it could be proved that a solicitor had charged his client for services rendered by a member of the Bar, and had not in such a case made payment, he could be brought before the Incorper ted Law Society; but, in fact, this is never done. The deceived barrister grins and bears it, hoping for better luck next time. Doubtless some solicitors do not pay their counsel, but it is, of course, the comparatively rare exception to the rule. The

gentleman in chamber practice must cultivate an inclination in his clients to owe him money, but the £10,000 must be a pure myth. We give prominence to the statements as it is just as well that the Profession should know to what misconceptions it is exposed.

AN American attorney has burnt his fingers by advertising for business; but, singularly enough, he selected divorce business, and guaranteed facility and privacy. This was the advertisement :-"Divorces legally obtained very quietly, good everywhere." The Supreme Court of Colorado held such an advertisement to be against good morals, a false representation, and a libel on courts of justice. Judge ELLIOTT said: "To say that divorces can be obtained very quietly is equivalent to saying they can be obtained without publicity"—that was the libel on the courts. It must follow, then, that to take steps to prevent publicity is to interfere with the proper and regular administration of justice. We think it is. The gentleman in question was suspended from practice for six months, and ordered to pay all the costs.

66

Ar the meeting of the East India Association, which last month met to hear a paper on the Jury System, by Mr. Justice JARDINE, Lord HOBHOUSE used arguments in favour of trial by jury which are of great force and novelty. This is what he said :- I think by far the most important effect of the jury system is the indirect effect which it has exercised upon the law of the country. It seems to me that juries have kept our laws sweet; they have kept it practical; they still do so; they are like the constant, unseen, unfelt, force of gravitation which enables us to walk on the face of the earth instead of flying off into space. Certainly nothing can be more important to the welfare and coherence, and the strength of a nation, than that its laws should be in general harmony with its convictions and its feelings. Now, lawgivers may be the wisest of men, sometimes they are; but they stand above their fellow-man, and the laws that they pass are apt to be rather hard, rather theoretical, rather above the heads of others, rather beyond the ideas of the day that they live in. If such laws are carried into force by a rigid machinery, there follow national convulsions; and if the ruling authority is strong enough to put down those convulsions, then there follows inevitably a national apathy and atrophy. Now, the juries are passing every day innumerable decisions, each of them very small, but constant, ubiquitous, and tending to carry superfine laws down into practical life, so as to make them fit for human nature's daily food."

THE House of Lords will not meet till the 18th inst. The legislative business of that House is in a very forward state. It has passed the Sale of Goods Bill, the Bills of Sale Bill, and the Public Authorities Protection Bill, and all but passed the Church Patronage Bill, while the House of Commons has as yet passed no Bill of any consequence. It seems rather regrettable that more Bills of importance are not originated in the House of Lords, and that the course adopted by Mr. GLADSTONE in 1872, when the Licensing Bill was introduced by Lord KIMBERLEY, has not been followed in the present session. Agricultural Bills, for instance, of which a large number are lying hopelessly stranded in the House of Commons, would be much better discussed and criticised in the Upper House, on the motion of Lord WINCHILSEA, as also would a Criminal Cases Appeal Bill, on the motion of the LORD CHANCELLOR.

Ir has been suggested as probable that the forthcoming Budget may contain a provision for increasing the stamp duties on stockbrokers' contract notes, which now stand at one penny if the contract note relate to the sale or purchase of any stock of the value of £5 and under the value of £100,

and at sixpence if it relate to the sale or purchase of stock of the value of £100 or upwards. The history of the duty is a little curious. Prior to 1888 there was a uniform duty of one penny whatever might be the value of the stock, and we believe we are correct in stating that this penny was always paid by the broker, who affixed the stamp, but did not charge his client with the penny. In 1888, Mr. GoSCHEN, by the Customs and Inland Revenue Act 1888, s. 16, raised the duty to sixpence in the case of amounts exceeding £100, and the 53rd section of the Stamp Act 1891, repeating the repealed sect. 16 of the Act of 1888, expressly provides that "the amount of duty upon a contract note may be added to the charge for brokerage or agency." The brokers, therefore, who uniformly charge the new sixpence on their clients, have saved an enormous number of pennies by Mr. GoSCHEN'S legislation, which, it must be borne in mind, is permissive only. Any further change will probably be in the direction of substituting an ad valorem duty for the present sixpence; but whether the stockbrokers will be able to throw the whole of the new duty on their clients may be doubted.

THE Sunday Observance Act of Charles II. is being vigorously put in force in Birmingham and other places, and it becomes a question of interest to inquire to what extent its provisions apply to the street sale of Sunday newspapers. The statute, after directing that all the laws concerning the observation of the Lord's day and repairing to the church thereon (see, e.g., 1 Eliz. c. 2, repealed by 9 & 10 Vict. c. 59) be carefully put in execution, enacts that no tradesman, artificer, workman, labourer, or other person whatsoever shall do any work of their ordinary callings on the Lord's day, works of necessity and charity only excepted, and that every person of the age of fourteen years or upwards offending in the premises shall forfeit five shillings; also that no person shall cry or expose to sale any wares, merchandise, fruit, herbs, goods, or chattels whatsoever on the Lord's day on pain of forfeiting the goods so cried, &c. It appears from these words that the penalty is not recoverable from children, or from any persons following on Sunday a trade which they do not follow on weekdays, but that there is a universal prohibition of crying goods on pain of forfeiture of the goods. cried. On an American statute similar to that of Charles II., it has been decided that newspapers are goods, and we think that decision was right. The Act of Charles II. can only be put in force with the consent in writing of the chief officer of police of the police district, or of two justices of the peace, or a stipendiary magistrate having jurisdiction in the place where the offence against it was committed. Thus much is provided by the temporary Sunday Observance Prosecution Act 1871, which is annually kept up by Expiring Laws Continuance Acts, but does not apply to two earlier Acts of Charles I. (1 Car. 1, c. 1, and 3 Car. 1, c. 2). By the first of these Acts, Sunday meetings of people out of their own parishes for sports and pastimes are prohibited on pain of a penalty of" three shillings, fourpence (sic) to be converted to the use of the poor of the parish" on each offender. By the second, carriers are forbidden to travel, and butchers to kill or sell any victual on Sunday, on pain of forfeiting twenty shillings or six shillings and eightpence respectively.

SOME books on conveyancing suggest putting an infant settlor to his or her election to confirm the settlement on attaining twenty-one or forfeit all other interests under the settlement derived from the wife or husband, as the case may be. When the infant is the intended wife, a simpler expedient is suggested by the recent case of Stevens v. Trevor Garrick (noted ante, p. 507; (1893) W. N. 49). There an infant, in April 1890, joined with her intended husband in settling a sum of £1000, to which she was entitled on her marriage, upon the usual trusts for herself, her husband, and her children. In Oct. 1891 she came of age, and claimed

to be able to repudiate the settlement, and to have the £1000 paid over to her. It is clear that, so far as she had personally assigned it when an infant, she was entitled to repudiate the settlement, seeing that no unreasonable delay had taken place. But her husband had also assigned it, and Mr. Justice CHITTY held that this sum was effectually included in his assignment, and therefore the wife could not deal with it. The ground of his Lordship's decision was that sect. 19 of the Married Women's Property Act 1882 prevented sect. 2 of that Act from applying, and consequently the property, which apart from the Act would have been treated as settled by the husband, must be treated as duly assigned by him. That section provides (inter alia) that "Nothing in this Act contained shall interfere with or affect any settlement, or agreement for a settlement, made or to be made, whether before or after marriage, respecting the property of any married woman." The expedient suggested is that the intended husband should in such cases always join in the assignment, and then the settlement will stand, though the wife may, on attaining twenty-one, wish to disaffirm it.

IN settlements of account arrived at between solicitor and client it is frequently the practice for a lump sum to be inserted for costs and for the client to sign the statement of account in terms expressing approval of the figures. In this connection, therefore, the decision of the Court of Appeal in Re Frape; Ex parte Perrett (noted ante, p. 507) is one of very general interest to the Profession. Notwithstanding such signature by the client (as above mentioned) the solicitor was ordered to deliver bills of costs relating to the work which he had charged for in a lump sum, and, notwithstanding an objection to taxation on the ground, mainly, that the account signed by the client was a binding agreement under sect. 8 of the Solicitors' Remuneration Act, Mr. Justice NORTH decided that, the solicitor's name merely being at the head of the account, there was no signed agreement within the section. On this point, however, the order has been reversed by the Court of Appeal, although, under the circumstances, the Lords Justices directed a taxation in order that the taxing master might consider whether the charge made was fair and reasonable.

CHARITIES have certain privileges which in the old days were to some extent sets-off against the laws of mortmain and charitable devises and bequests, and which continue though the rule against gifts hy will of land and impure personalty has been abrogated. One privilege is that a gift to a charity is not void on the ground of a perpetuity, and that a gift over from one charity to another is good though the gift over may take effect after the expiration of the period covered by lives in being and twenty-one years after. But a gift over to an individual after a gift to a charity is void if it does not necessarily fall within that period. For instance, in Re Bowen; Lloyd Philipps v. Davis (noted ante, p. 539), a testator in 1846 left £1700 to trustees upon trust to invest, and to establish three charity schools, and continue them for ever thereafter, provided that if the Government should. establish a general system of education, that trust should cease and the money should fall into his residue. The personal representatives of the residuary legatees took out this summons seeking payment thereof on the ground that a general system of education had been established by the Government under the Elementary Education Acts, and the gift over had consequently taken effect. As the event, on which the gift over was to take effect, was one which did not necessarily occur within perpetuity limits, Mr. Justice STIRLING held that it was void, and dismissed the summons.

WE referred last week to nearly a dozen cases relating to the rights and liabilities of persons who had entered into restrictive covenants in respect of one estate which had been, Second Sheet.

or was intended to be, sold in parcels. There is yet another position to be considered-that of the rights of a vendor who has parted with the whole of the estate. An instance of this position may be found in the case of Spencer v. Bailey (noted ante, p. 508). There S., the freeholder, demised some land for ninety-nine years to a lessee, who, with S.'s consent, assigned to a person who covenanted with S. his heirs and assigns as owners for the time being of land forming part of the E. estate, that he, his executors, administrators, and assigns would not for ten years use the premises for any trade or business except that of a poulterer and cheesemonger. This shop was subdemised for three years, which term became vested in B., who had notice of the restrictive covenant. The other shops, that formed with the one in question a row, had all belonged to S., and he had covenanted with the purchasers of some of the other shops that this one should not be used for the purpose for which B. was now using itnamely, a grocer's business with an off-licence for the sale of wines and spirits. S. had disposed of all his interest in the E. estate, and when he brought this action for an injunction to restrain B. from using the shop in a manner contrary to the covenant, he was met with the objection that, as all his interest in the E. estate was gone, he could not enforce the restriction. Mr. Justice ROMER held that this objection could not prevail, as S. was still liable to the purchasers of the other shops if he permitted the covenant to be broken, and granted the injunction which he sought.

THE ROYAL VETO.

IN all the discussions which have taken place upon the proposal to grant Home Rule to Ireland, we have seen no mention made of a very important point. It is generally supposed that the sole difficulty which the Ministerial majority will meet will be with the dominant party in the House of Lords. Could that resistance be overcome, it is argued, as if there were no doubt upon the subject, that the Home Rule Bill would necessarily and at once become law. As a matter of fact, there are two barriers between Home Rule and success, and not one merely.

Of course we have nothing to do with the political aspect of such a question as this. But it does seem strange that so few of our publicists should seem to be aware of the fact that the Crown in this country still possesses an absolute right of veto upon all legislation whatsoever. Although this right has sunk into desuetude and has become a shadow, yet it still exists. Not only has the House of Lords co-ordinate power with the Commons over all legislation (subject to restrictions as to money Bills), but behind both there stands the power of the Crown.

The second Parliament of Charles II. declared that there was no truth in the "opinion that both Houses of Parliament, or either of them, have a legislative power without the King." And by the same statute it was enacted that anyone holding or expressing an opinion to the contrary was liable to the now obsolete penalties of a pramunire. By way of enforcing this proposition, we desire to draw attention to the utterance of the latest publicist, who speaks with authority, and in presence of all the results of our political authorities. In his Law and Custom of the Constitution (published at Oxford in 1892), vol. 1, p. 32, Sir William Anson says as follows: "Legislation is effected by the Crown in Parliament; it is the Queen who makes laws with the assent of Lords and Commons, and by the authority of the same. But in fact the Commons have an exclusive initiative and control over one branch of legislation, the laws by which taxes are imposed; they have a preponderating influence over all other legislation; and the enacting power of the Crown has, since the reign of Henry VI., been reduced to a right to express assent or dissent when measures are submitted by Lords and Commons; even the veto, which is all that custom has left to the Crown, has not been exercised for nearly 200 years." But it exists all the same. The old formula, whereby the Royal assent was given to an Act, passed by both Houses of Parliament, and which may nowadays be heard in the House of Lords, was le Roy or la Reyne le veult; the Royal dissent was le Roy s'avisera. The latter phrase was used by William III. on several occasions,

notably in the cases of the Place Bill and the Triennial Parliaments Bill. It was last used by a British Sovereign in 1707, when Queen Anne exercised her right of veto on a Scotch Militia Bill.

But, so far as legality goes, that phrase may be heard this year. Of course modern practice is different. Now the Sovereign takes counsel with her Ministers. She may express distaste for a proposed measure; she can dismiss recalcitrant Ministers and find others more pliant; she may even dissolve Parliament and herself appeal to the country. If the country is against the Sovereign, it remains, as Lord Macaulay said, to yield, to abdicate, or to fight. But it is an oversight, which seems to us at least to be important. not to observe that the Royal veto in England is not yet dead. And what it might become, if circumstances altered, may be seen by anyone who cares to examine how the right exists and is exercised in modern Constitutions, as, for example, by the President of the United States of America.

THE STATUS OF AN AMBASSADOR.

THE recent change in the diplomatic relations of the United States has led to a great deal of confused writing. By the Diplcmatic Bill of 1892, the President was empowered to confer the status of Ambassador upon the American representative to any nation which had previously conferred similar rank upon its representative to the United States. Great Britain at once raised Sir Julian Pauncefote to the rank of Ambassador, and all the other first class Powers have either followed suit or are upon the point of doing so. As Ambassadors rank at the Court to which they are accredited in the order of seniority, Sir Julian thus becomes the doyen of the diplomatists at Washington, although when merely Minister he was lower in point of seniority than several of his fellows.

So far all is clear, but many journals in discussing the effect of this change have exhibited a quite remarkable ignorance as to the facts. The great distinction between an Ambassador and a mere Minister or Envoy is that the former represents his Sovereign both in his person and in his affairs. Consequently the rank of Ambassador is higher, and, as a rule, his salary is larger. At the Court to which he is accredited he enjoys a constant right of audience. But the journals have gone further in dealing with the matter. They have asserted that a further effect of the change is that the Ambassador to the United States will now enjoy the right of retaining his original domicil and immunity from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the United States, and this both for himself and for his family and retinuein a word, the whole range of privileges known to international law as 66 Exterritoriality." The inference is that as a mere Minister or Envoy he did not possess these. Now, this is wrong, and so far wrong that it may not be amiss to consider the exact state of the matter in law.

The Ambassador enjoys exterritoriality because he is the representative of his Sovereign. He is a full representative agent, and it is remarkable that, although in theory only a monarch can send an Ambassador, the example of the monarchical States has been followed by the Republics. And it is now well established that every nation which is so far sui juris as to be capable of negotiating in its own name may send an Embassy. Most of the old distinctions have ceased to be of importance, though still preserved. Thus a Plenipotentiary is an agent accredited by one Sovereign to another, whereas a Chargé d'Affaires is sent by one Foreign Minister to another. So, as we have seen, a Minister who represents his Sovereign both in his person and in his affairs is an Ambassador; one who represents him only in his affairs is a Resident or Envoy. But the point of importance is that the rank of the Ambassador depends solely on the State that sends him, and not upon the State that receives him. Provided it be a first class Power, a Republic is entitled by the Law of Nations both to send and receive Ambassadors. And, consequently, all Ministers enjoy the privileges of exterritoriality. As the great jurist Bynkershoek puts it: "To the accredited public Minister of every State (entitled to Royal honours), whatever be his designation, the rights of inviolability and the privilege of exterritoriality appertain with equal certainty and strength."

In the case of the United States, two points demand attention. In the first place, it may be asked why the United States has

taken so long to make this change, if it required to be made at all. It is over a century since that Power received full recognition of its rank as a nation. Yet, in deference possibly to an assumed simplicity, it has hitherto been contented with Ministers or Envoys. Secondly, it may be asked why, if the change was to be made, it had to be made by an Act of Congress. The Republic, as we have seen, had the right to send Ambassadors by the Law of Nations. And Professor Bryce, in his work on the American Commonwealth, enumerates the right to send Ambassadors eo nomine as one of the powers belonging to the President of the United States.

PETITIONS TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. THE great number of petitions which have within the last few weeks been presented to the House of Commons will direct attention to the constitutional method of endeavouring to influence Parliament itself on particular subjects by the exercise of pressure from without. The right of petitioning the Crown and Parliament for the redress of grievances is acknowledged as a fundamental principle of the Constitution, and has been uninterruptedly exercised from very early times: (May's Parliamentary Practice, p. 541.) This right was, however, for many centuries practically restricted to petitions for the redress of local and personal grievances. Numerous petitions of a political character, and signed by large bodies of people, were no doubt addressed to the Long Parliament; but Mr. Hallam regards petitions presented in that period, and likewise the petition in 1689 addressed to the Convention by the inhabitants of London and Westminster, pressing their declaration of William and Mary, to be the products of "times too critical to furnish regular precedents." An Act of Charles II. (13 Car. 2, c. 5) seems to give a statutory sanction to the established practice of confining petitions to local and personal grievances. It provides that no petition or address shall be presented to the King or either House of Parliament by more than ten persons, nor shall anyone procure above twenty persons to consent or set their hands to any petition for alteration of matters established by law in Church or State unless with the previous order of three justices of the county or the major part of the grand jury. The 5th Article of the Bill of Rights, declaring it to be the right of subjects to petition the King, was held not to repeal this statute of Charles II.: (R. v. Gordon, Doug. Rep. p. 592.)

The great precedent restricting the rights of petition in respect of general matters of public policy is to be found in the case of the Kentish Petition of 1701. The grand jury of Kent and other freeholders of the county presented a petition to the House of Commons on the 8th May 1701, imploring them to turn their loyal addresses into bills of supply. The House voted the petition scandalous, insolent, and seditious, tending to destroy the constitution of Parliament and to subvert the Government of the realm, and five of the petitioners were imprisoned till the end of the session. Commenting on these proceedings, Mr. Hallam says: "We may search whole columns of the Journals while the most animating topics were in discussion without finding a single instance of such an interposition of the constituent with the representative body. In this particular case of the Kentish Petition, the words in the resolution, that it tended to destroy the constitution of Parlia ment and subvert the established Government, could be founded on no pretence but its unusual interference with the counsels of the Legislature. With this exception, I am not aware (stating this, however, with some diffidence) of any merely political petition before the Septennial Bill in 1717, against which several petitions were presented by corporate towns, and, as to these, it may be observed that towns returning members to Parliament had a particular concern in the measure before the House. They relate, however, no doubt, to general policy, and seem to establish a popular principle which stood on little authority: (Hallam's Constitutional History, vol. 2, p. 273, note.)

As the popular principles of Government grew more esta blished, the right of petitioning on general grounds came to be recognised. Sir Erskine May assigns the period of 1779, when an extensive organisation was established to promote measures of economical and Parliamentary reform, as the origin of the modern system of petitioning: (May's Constitutional History,

vol. 2, p. 63.) Mr. Hallam thinks, however, that the great multiplication of petitions wholly unconnected with particular interests cannot be traced higher than those for the abolition of the Slave Trade in 1787: (Hallam's Constitutional History, vol. 2, p. 274, note.) That petitions affected the decision of the unreformed House of Commons is unquestionable. Mr. Fox, writing on the 28th April 1801, says: "With regard to the Slave Trade, I conceive the great numbers which voted with us, sometimes amounting to a majority, have been principally owing to petitions:" (Fox's Memoirs, vol. 4, p. 429.)

The influence of petitions was largely increased by the discussions to which their presentation gave rise. The arguments of the petitioners were enforced in debate, and the claims of petitioners to a prior hearing were paramount, whatever the business appointed for consideration. Lord Brougham has observed that all the great questions of liberal progress in his day, including the abolition of slavery, Catholic emancipation, and even the Reform Bill, had been really carried by the incidental discussions on the presentation of petitions. After the Reform Act of 1832, the debating of petitions threatened to become the sole business of the House of Commons. The practice of debating petitions was finally abandoned in 1842, after an effort, persevered in for a few years, to devote morning sittings to the special purposes of receiving and discussing "the petitions of the people." "The just influence of petitions has not," says Sir Erskine May, "been diminished by this change, for while the House restrained desultory and intrusive discussion, it devised other means for giving publicity and extended circulation to the opinions of petitioners. About a thousand petitions are annually printed in extenso, and all petitions are classified so as to exhibit the number of petitions with the signatures relating to every subject: (May's Constitutional History, vol. 2, pp. 69-70, note.) With the abandonment of the usage of debating the subjects of petitions, the right to petition the House of Commons on all matters relating to the general interest was conceded.

"It may

be remarked," says Mr. Hallam, writing in 1827, "that petitions against Bills imposing duties are not received, probably on the principle that they are intended for the general interest, though affecting the parties who thus complain of them :' (Constitutional History, vol. 2, p. 274, note.) A Standing Order adopted by the House of Commons in 1842, when the right of discussing petitions was restrained, permits the reception of petitions "against any resolution or Bill imposing a tax or duty for the current year," and declares "the usage under which the House has refused to entertain such petitions to be discontinued:" (May's Parliamentary Practice, p. 552.)

the settlement of which the plaintiffs alleged that he was trustee, though, as he stated in his answer, he did not know its contents when he so signed it. But, as the Lord Chancellor (Lord Cottenham) said in his judgment, "if such was the case, it was his own negligence to execute it whilst ignorant of its contents." That case is considerably stronger, for a person who executes the very deed which appoints him a trustee must, if his signature is to have any effect at all, be held to have accepted the trusts declared in it. Mr. Justice Wright held that merely signing the legacy receipt was not sufficient by itself to constitute B. a trustee, and therefore his disclaimer in 1881 was good. Persons who do not intend, or who have not fully made up their minds, to accept trusteeships or executorship, should be careful not to intermeddle with the trust estate or assets, or they may find that they have gone too far to turn back. In Lewin's Law of Trusts (9th edit. p. 266) it is affirmed that a trustee who has accepted the trust cannot afterwards renounce. 1. It is a rule without any exception that a person who has once undertaken the office, either by actual or constructive acceptance, cannot discharge himself from liability by a subsequent renunciation. The only mode by which he can obtain a release is either under the sanction of a court of equity, or by virtue of a special power in the instrument creating the trust, or of a statutory power, or with the consent of all the parties interested in the estate and being sui juris." The application to the court is expensive, the special power is unusual, and where any of the beneficiaries are non sui juris, their consent cannot be obtained. Hence the statutory power has frequently to be invoked, if the trustee is to escape from his office, but even that only applies in certain limited cases. The 32nd section of the Conveyancing Act 1881 provides that, "Where there are more than two trustees, if one of them by deed declares that he is desirous of being discharged from the trust, and if his co-trustees and such other person (if any) as is empowered to appoint trustees, by deed consent to the discharge of the trustee, and to the vesting in the co-trustees alone of the trust property, then the trustee desirous of being discharged shall be deemed to have retired from the trust, and shall, by the deed, be discharged therefrom under this Act, without any new trustee being appointed in his place." It will be observed that there have to be two continuing trustees, and the consent of the co-trustees and of the person having a power of appointment of new trustees has to be obtained, or this section does not apply, and the trustee may bitterly regret the day on which he accepted the trust of which he cannot get rid.

DISCLAIMER BY A TRUSTEE.

No one can be forced to take anything under a will, unless he has expressly or impliedly consented to do so. Sometimes a burden is so inextricably connected with a benefit, that the intended donee will not be permitted to take the latter without also taking the former. Sometimes by a chain of representation the executor of one person unwillingly becomes the executor of a prior testator. In these cases the person can refuse the benefit, or the executorship of the later testator; but, if he takes it, he impliedly consents to take the burdens which the testator, or the law, has attached to it. The same is true of a trust. No one can be compelled to undertake a trust imposed on him by will unless he has consented to do so, and though it may be prudent for a person named as such in a will to execute a disclaimer if he does not wish to be a trustee, his conduct may be sufficient to show that he has never intended to act, and therefore has never been a trustee. The case of Jago v. Jago (noted ante, p. 485) is on the dim borderland between acceptance and refusal. A testatrix, who died in 1866, directed her executors to pay to A. and B. a sum of money to be held in trust for the plaintiff, who was then an infant. A. and B. gave to the executors a receipt for the legacy on an Inland Revenue form. In 1876 A. died insolvent, and in 1881 B. executed a disclaimer of the trusts of the will. The plaintiff did not become aware of his legacy until 1892, when he called upon B. to account for it. On B.'s refusal to do so the plaintiff took these proceedings, and the main question was whether B. had accepted the trust by signing the legacy receipt. Buckeridge v. Glasse (10 L. J. 134, Ch.) the defendant executed

In

STATUTE-BARRED CLAIMS AGAINST SURĖTIES. Ir is a not unusual practice in drafting mortgages to make the mortgagor and the surety jointly and severally covenant to pay the mortgage debt and interest. So long as the mortgagor is solvent and continues to pay the interest, the surety naturally has not to pay anything, and it would be an unfortunate day for persons interested in mortgages, if it were ever decided that payment of interest by the mortgagor did not keep the debt alive against the surety.

In Re Frisby; Allison v. Frisby (61 L. T. Rep. N. S. 632; 43 Ch. Div. 106) E. and M., "as the surety of the said E.,' jointly and severally covenanted to pay on a particular day the sum lent to E. with interest, but there was no covenant for payment of subsequent interest. E. covenanted to surrender certain copyholds by way of mortgage to secure the debt. E. paid interest from the date of the deed (the 10th Dec. 1872) to the 10th Dec. 1880, but M. never paid any interest or gave any acknowledgment, and died in 1888. In April 1889 the surviving executrix of the mortgagee took these proceedings against J., the heir and administrator of M., asking for an order declaring that she was entitled to rank as a creditor against his estate for the £800 and interest. Under the Real Property Limitation Act 1874, s. 8, "No action or suit or other proceeding shall be brought to recover any sum of money secured by any mortgage, judgment, or lien, or otherwise charged upon or payable out of any land or rent, at law or in equity, or any legacy, but within twelve years next after a present right to receive the same shall have accrued to some person capable of giving a discharge for or release of the same, unless in the meantime some part of the principal money or some interest thereon shall have been paid, or some acknow