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pendence. Domestic and general society results mainly from the moral wants of mankind.

Now, pride, or a feeling of self-dependence, is one attribute of the human mind. It cannot be lost without a sense of degradation. Pride gives tone to human character. A dependent and servile human being hath lost a portion of his proper humanity—and the laws ought to do nothing to create an artificial and unnecessary state of depression and dependence in any human being. Look at the wife in this point of view, and behold her after the surrender of her estate to her husband-a mere pensioner upon his bounty-entitled, it may be, to her reasonable support and maintenance, but having to ask for it, to make known her wants; ay, and to satisfy her lord of their reasonableness before he can be moved to her relief. 'In the general course of human nature," says Mr. Hamilton, "a power over a man's subsistence is a power over his will." So a power over a woman's subsistence may enslave her will and degrade her pride. Moreover, the chances for the just exercise of this power are not as numerous as could be desired, since he who decides upon the wife's requests is interested against her wishes-for so much as he withholds from her he retains to himself. Her sense of justice, therefore, receives the next wound and love vanishes. For no woman's affection, however strong, can remain long unimpaired after her pride has been mortified and her sense of justice outraged by her husband.*

* During a debate in the New-York Legislature of 1840, upon "a bill to incorpo rate the New-York Female Benevolent Society," several members seemed to have imbibed the spirit of reform in regard to laws effecting the rights and social position of woman, and spoke as follows:

"Mr. Loomis advocated the bill as one step toward recognizing the separate existence of females.

"Mr. Culver said there was one feature in this bill of which he heartily approved. It was that which exempted the husband from any liability for the wife's subscriptions. I long,' said Mr. C. to see the day when legislation shall give to women some right of possession in their own property.'

"Mr. Simmons agreed with the gentleman from Washington, in expressing his hopes that the law would be modified in relation to the rights of married women, but he doubted the propriety of commencing this reform by an act of incorporation.

"Mr. Stoddard stated that he would be glad to see the day when the female sex should have their own control over their own property-when they should be no longer subjected to the caprice and oppression and the ill treatment of the idle and the vicious men to whom it may be their lot to be united.

Moreover, if the husband really fears that the wife is unfit to appreciate the value of property, he has but to allow her the same means he himself enjoys for the gratification of her innate love of it, by allowing her to acquire and possess it; and all analogy shows that she will be very soon well enough improved in the very point he would attain. She will come by degrees to appreciate property as well as himself, and the more she shall exercise the faculty of acquisitiveness, the stronger it will become. She now is sometimes inclined to regard the property of her husband as a stranger's-it is not her own-and all she spends of it is clear gain to herself. She is not allowed to indulge the desire of possession. Its activity would be a salutary check upon needless expenditure.

She would soon look upon him with great respect for his love of money. She would think him, on the whole, as rather a sensible man than otherwise, and she might be inclined to imitate her lord's example. Husbands had better try the experiment at any rate. They now keep their wives from the exercise of acquisitiveness, and still complain that they are deficient in that respect; and this with the same justice that a parent could complain of a child for being deficient in music, after having strictly prohibited it from all instruction and exercise. But I wish to treat of the justice, not the expediency, of this matter. Woman has the right of property, and the husband has no right to demand its surrender by the act of marriage, and the law ought not to sanction it. If a woman of proper age and discretion chooses voluntarily to surrender a part of her property to her husband by an ante-nuptial agreement, there seems not to be any objection to this, provided the law shall properly guard the mode of her doing it; but an implied surrender by force of

"Mr. M'Murray hoped the period would soon arrive when very great and serious alterations would be made in our statutes relative to the rights of married women. These laws have been handed down to us from dark feudal times, and are not consistent with the better, wiser, purer spirit of the age. The poor female, subjected by laws, in the making of. which she has had no voice, to the grasp of the merciless creditor of the dissolute husband, finds her property, earned by her own hard labor, swept away.

"The adversities of the last few years had shown thousands of instances where the laws visited upon the wife the misfortune or imprudence of the husband."

law is entirely destitute of foundation in reason and justice. It seems to me that the law should leave the woman's fortune in her own hands, and under her perfect and free control to the same extent after marriage as before. Then as regards the acquisitions of property after marriage, it seems to me that the parties ought to be treated as holding it jointly between them, and the whole to go to the survivor.

A bill was lately pending before the Legislature of the State of Missouri, which if passed, would greatly improve the condition of married women in respect to the right of property. It provides that

"All the property owned by the wife, at the time of the marriage, and all she may acquire during the marriage, by descent or gift, shall be called the wife's separate property.'

"All the property which shall be acquired during the marriage, either by the husband or by the wife, except that which is acquired by descent or gift, shall be called 'common property.'

"The husband's separate property shall be liable for his debts contracted before and after the marriage, but shall not be liable for the debts of the wife.

"The wife's separate property shall be liable for her debts contracted before the marriage, but shall not be liable for the husband's debts, contracted before or after the marriage.

"The husband shall have unrestricted power to alienate and dispose of his own separate property, and to alienate and dispose of the common property during the marriage; except that the common property which is real estate shall not be alienated or disposed of, unless the wife join the husband in the conveyance.

"The husband may, during the marriage, alienate and dispose of the wife's separate property, if the wife give her consent thereto in writing."

This latter clause, it seems to me, confers too much authority upon the husband. He ought not to be empowered to alienate her separate estate, without the order of a court of competent jurisdiction, which should ascertain that it was the true interest of the wife to consent to the transfer of her estate, and require an equivalent in value to be settled upon by the husband.

Let us carry the principle of equality into the married state, and allow the wife to know and feel that she is truly the partner and equal of her husband. If she has not been a "silent partner" hitherto, she has at least been a very “dormant" one. My proposition is not new. The common law is altogether at variance with the laws of France, Spain, Hol

land, and with the laws of one of the States of this Union, (Louisiana,) in regard to the marital rights-and especially as to the wife's right of property. Community of property between husband and wife exists to a certain extent in most civilized countries where the common law of England does not prevail. The civil law is the friend of woman, and as respects her moral freedom and her right of property tends to exalt her condition and to render her conscious of her equality with man. I leave this subject to the reader's consideration and I fear that the same objection may prevail against me, as against the laws of which I have complained --that of having done injustice to the rights of woman.

CHAPTER IX.

OF THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY AND ITS MORAL RELATIONS.

If a quantity of corn be thrown upon the ground within reach of a flock of fowls, each one will greedily devour all that is required to satisfy its appetite, but will go away without caring as to what remains, and without gathering up or secreting any thing for future use.

If there shall be exposed to the reach of many of the tribes of squirrels certain nuts which they take as food, you will observe that they will take not only for immediate consumption, but will carry to their nests a very considerable supply and hoard it up.

In the former case the animal has not an instinct to hoard, while in the latter this instinct exists. It is an innate propensity, and has no dependence whatever upon the sagacity ot the animal. That sagacity may aid the animal in carrying this native desire into execution, but it does not call the desire into being. The propensity results from the animal's organization. It exists also in man as a native instinct, not

dependent upon his intellectual perceptions for its origin, but only for its means of direction and gratification. "Man," says Lord Kaimes, "is a hoarding animal, having an appetite for storing up things of use."

The phrenologists regard this appetite as an innate propensity, having its seat in a particular and well-defined portion of the brain, whose exclusive function it is to manifest this desire, by them denominated Acquisitiveness. It is the desire of acquisition, the love of possession. It may exist without the power of reason; nay, it may defy that power.It may exist without the human sentiments; nay, it may rage in opposition to them. It is, in the abstract, a blind passion, without moral or intellectual aim-happy in possession, without knowing why-relishing gratification, and pained upon denial. Of itself it has neither reason, conscience nor pride. It asks not why or wherefore it should be gratified. It cares not who is pained, so that it be pleased. It is happy, but not proud of its possessions.

In the abstract, then, this instinct in man enjoys no greater dignity than in animals; and, regarded of itself alone, would claim no higher consideration. But the moment you consider man as endowed with reasoning faculties, to discover the end to which the fruits of his acquisition may be devoted, this blind instinct assumes a new importance and dignity. It is relieved in a great measure from its animal estate, and takes a more elevated position. It becomes an enlightened passion. Utility springs up where blind possession reigned, and order bears sway where all before was confusion. The innate desire is still as strong as ever, but it spends its force in a new direction. It ceases to control the will of the animal, and is tutored to obey the will of man. Thus, under the guidance of human reason, this desire prompts man to guard against want, and becomes essential to his life and safety.It is now a desire, whose enlightened gratification is of primary necessity to his bodily welfare, and, therefore, lays the foundation of a right, but not a right of the most sacred character. It is a right pertaining to his animal existence as one means of its preservation. That existence itself is, as yet, of

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