corporators. They have not the same affinity for science as at first; their patriotism goes off in a gaseous state, and they adhere to the solids of their system! They will let your Franklins and your Davys achieve the honors of discovery, while they, as stockholders and directors of a "Chemical Bank," confine all their scientific transactions to the precious metals, whose nature and value every body knows and fully appreciates !

A great city demands pure and wholesome water for the use and comfort of its inhabitants; and there stand in the lobby of the legislature benevolent gentlemen, whose philanthropy knows no bounds, and who are willing to devote their entire wealth to this most beneficent purpose. The halls of legislation resound with their praises-the enterprize meets with nothing but favor, and a perpetual charter is granted to the individuals seeking it. But that so great philanthropy should not be left to its own reward, they also receive from the legislature, as a poor equivalent, the privilege of banking. Forthwith the business commences, and the crystal stream of pure and unadulterated water, which glistens at yonder fountain, is to be carried to every man's door. The genius of Health smiles upon the endeavor, and the budding rose of beauty shall bathe and expand into full and sweet bloom under these purifying influences!

Alas! it is not so! The maid at the fountain starts back from her pail, for the water flows like mud! And we are told that the "pure and wholesome water" of the Manhattan Company of the city of New-York has been repeatedly offered to intelligent horses, by whom it was "most respectfully declined."

In these and like cases of special privilege conferred upon the applicants for legislative favor, with what motive are the charters obtained? Is it for the public advantage or private gain? It does not require much sagacity to perceive that, under cover of pretended public benefit, there is cloaked the clearest selfishness. Private advantage is the primary aim of the corporators; and if the community can be made to believe itself benefited, whether the fact be so or not, it

is enough for their purpose. I do not deny that they are willing that the public should be benefited incidentally: but the chief benefit the corporators design to retain to themselves. It is nothing to them, if they can make large profits, whether the public partake at all of the benefit; but if they cannot make gains unless the community require some benefit from their transactions, then they are willing to confer a public benefit in order the better to promote their own selfish interests. I would speak reverently enough of such public benefactors. Perhaps the community are sometimes benefited by their operations. But the division of benefits between these corporators and the people is about as equitable as that court of justice which, in distributing the oyster between contending claimants, takes the animal to itself, and liberally bestows upon the litigants-the shells.

We have before seen that the Legislature had no favors to bestow upon any individual; that government could not collect a fountain of privileges without an abridgement of the rights of all; that the true function of government is the protection of rights; and that this office, properly performed, defeats any grant of special privileges.

What position, then, ought a just government to take in reference to the grant of charters, conferring special privileges? I answer-the ground of general legislation, and consequently the denial of every special application.

The evils of partial legislation-of the grant of monopolies of chartered and exclusive privileges-cannot be enumerated within our present space; nor shall I attempt to set them all down here. But I invite the reader to examine the statute-books of any of the States of the Union, and to note what passes at every legislative session. In the State of New-York the laws of each session fill a large octavo volume; and this volume is chiefly composed of partial lawslaws not made for all, but for a few recipients of legislative justice or favor.

By some of these laws the claims of private individuals against the State are allowed. Now why should each claim of this character require a special law for its adjustment?

Because we brought from England with us a law maxim, denying to the subject the right of suing the sovereign. The King is presumed to be incapable of denying a just claim of the subject; and if he will only just mention it to him by an humble petition, and present it to him on bended knee, why, he will get his money from the royal purse. In other words, the King is willing to be dunned, but will not be sued. We have adopted this delicate sentiment, and driven all claimants against the State to become legislative duns. Because a sovereign King cannot be called to answer in a tribunal, presumed to be his subservient creature, and which has no power to coerce him, therefore a citizen of a Republic cannot resort to a court of justice and establish his claim against the State. A citizen, therefore, having a just claim, must petition the Legislature for redress, and must retain some agent to wait upon legislative justice. This latter personage enlightens the representatives of the people by his private conversations, regales them with his wit, and conciliates them with dinners and wine, and other "creature comforts."* He succeeds.

One claim is disposed of, but many remain, some of which are allowed, some are looked into and forgotten, and others are not examined at all. The persevering and bold claimant, having many friends and acquaintances, may get more than he deserves; while the modest and friendless claimant may get much less than he deserves, or nothing at all. This whole procedure is wrong, and arises from the stupid aping of institutions which have no analogy to our own. If the

* An action was tried some years ago in the Court of Common Pleas of the City of New-York, founded upon the claim of an individual for services and expenses devoted to the procurement of a law from the Legislature of the State of New-Jersey, incorporating a private company for some purpose, which I do not now recollect. The plaintiff's claim consisted of various items of wine, suppers, dinners, and other comforts, provided by him in the course of lobbying the bill through that Legislature, together with a round sum for his services in the premises. He alleged that the defendant, a leading member of the corporation thus created, had agreed, upon the procurement of the charter, to pay him for his services a large sum, and also these expenses. The suit was defended on the ground that these services were contrary to public policy and sound morality, and this defence was successful. And yet scarcely a special law passes a legislative body in this country, especially if it confer any valuable special privilege, but what owes its passage to means which this Court justly pronounced to be against public morality. So great is the evil necessarily incident to special legislation.

State owe a citizen, it ought to pay him. If it does not owe him, it ought not to give him any thing. If it owes and will not pay, the citizen ought to be enabled to sue the State, and, upon a recovery, ought to be paid out of the public treasury. The State condescends to sue the citizen in our courts-why not condescend a little further, and be sued in them?

This change of our system of disposing of private claims against the State would be a hard blow at the "lobby," and might diminish the annual harvest of its honorable members; but then it would also prevent the evils, delay, expense, and injustice arising from this branch of special legislation. All these private claims would be determined in our courts, upon the same legal principles as prevail between private persons, and with a great avoidance of expense and delay. This would prevent another great evil in regard to contracts for making the public works. These contracts are given to the lowest bidder, who oftentimes agrees to do the work for a far less sum than he can afford, and relies upon adjusting his loss, and upon getting profits also, by importuning the Legislature with his claims. He drives the fair contractor from the work; busies himself upon his job in vacation, and works at "lobbying" during the legislative term. The public pays for the State works at most disastrous rates under this system of management. The State first pays the price agreed, next the price which the "lobby" have sanctioned, and then must be added to these the expense of legislating upon the claim, which, together, may amount to three times more than some fair contractor would have exacted for the same work.

The remedy consists in the enactment of a general law, which shall afford to every citizen the same measure of redress against the State, which the State ordains between its citizens; and the denial to the legislature of the power of allowing any claim to a private citizen. Let justice be done in these cases by the courts.

Another large class of special laws arises from the incorporating of cities and villages, the laying out of highways, incorporating academies, &c. All that is proper to effect in

these cases, can be done by general laws. Let, for instance, a general law declare that a village containing a certain number of inhabitants may become a body politic and corporate, by the consent of a certain majority of its inhabitants who are legal voters, to be given in a prescribed manner, with public notice, &c., and filed in some proper office of recordand that when so incorporated, certain powers, well defined by the general law, shall pertain to this municipal corporation. But there is one branch of special legislation to which I wish more particularly to invite attention; and I would inquire why such legislation is necessary in reference to the business of banking? If the legislature can grant a special charter for banking upon safe principles to any particular class of men, why can it not make a general law prescribing the mode in which anybody can enter into this business? If ten or twenty good citizens, under certain restrictions and limitations, can be safely intrusted by a special charter to carry on this business, why cannot all good citizens be intrusted with the same power? If the public are safe in one case, would they not be in the other? If the business were thrown open to all men on the same terms, and under the same restrictions, would any more eventually embark in it than the public wants required? Would not individual sagacity, in this as in all other cases, be found to respond to the demands of the community far better than legislative wisdom? Would not capital be aggregated at such places as the public wants required? If so, what is the objection to general legislation on this subject? I do not now speak of the merits of banking or paper money, but the evils of special legislation.

If banking be a legitimate mode of making gain, then all men who can do so have an equal right to embark in it. If it be an improper mode of acquiring gain, then it ought to be prohibited to all alike. If it can be allowed with safety to any class of men who are able to take stock under a special charter, then it can be safely allowed to all men who are able to take stock under a general law. If banking, as generally exercised in this country, is to be continued, the evil to be