JONES, THOMAS EDWARD, late Scunthorpe, farm labourer. Ct. Great Grimsby Nov. 2. KIHLSTEDT, Nov. 3. ELIZABETH BELINDA, Cardiff, licensed victualler. Ct. Cardiff. LEITH, HUGH CLARK, late Canterbury, carpenter. Ct. Canterbury. Nov. 3. LOWE, ALBERT ERNEST, late Montrell-rd, Streatham, domiciled Englishman. Ct. High Court. Nov. 4. MACKENZIE, RODERICK SANDFORD (described in Rec. Order as Roderick McKenzie), Knaresborough-pl, Earl's Court. Ct. High Court. Oct. 31. MCKENNA, JAMES, Stamford Brook-rd. Ct. Brentford. Oct. 31. MADDOCK, WILLIAM (trading as E. Harris and Son), Widnes, coal dealer. Ct. Liverpool. Nov. 4. MITCHELL, CECIL (late trading as C. Mitchell and Co.), Morecambe, builder. Ct. Preston. Nov. 3. MILLS, WILLIAM (trading as Architectural Specialities), Stalybridge, flooring SMITH, HENRY PERCY, Worcester, architect. Ct. Worcester. Nov. 4. TANSLEY, THOMAS, and TANSLEY, THOMAS WILLIAM (late trading as Tansley and Ct. High TEMPLETON, ARTHUR JOHN, late Belgrave-mansions, Belgrave-rd, St. John's Wood, artist. Ct. High Court. Nov. 3. WAGSTAFF, REGINALD HENRY, late Newport, hairdresser. Ct. Newport (Mon.). Nov. 4. WALTON, MARTHA SMITH (trading as 'Pam," and as June "), Bristol, ladies' outfitter. Ct. Bristol. Nov. 2. WATSON, EDWARD, Bedlington Station, chemist. Ct. Newcastle-upon-Tyne. Nov. 2. WHALLEY, HARRY BERTRAM, late Colwyn Bay, jam manufacturer. Ct Colchester. Oct. 28. WHITTINGHAM, WILLIAM, Kingston-upon-Hull, draper. Ct. Kingston-upon-Hull. Nov. 2. WILD, ALBERT CHARLES THOMAS (described in Rec. Order as A. C. T. Wild), WILLIAMS, WILLIAM, Carnarvon, fruiterer. Ct. Bangor. Nov. 3. ZACHARY, SAMUEL JOHN, Leeds, dental surgeon. Ct. Leeds. Nov. 2. DEATHS. COVENTRY.-On the 3rd inst., at 5, Queen's-ride, Barnes, Gwenllian Pascoe, wife of the Hon. Sir Reginald Coventry, K.C. FITZ-GERALD.-On the 30th ult., at 6, Fitz-William-square, Dublin, the Hon Gerald Fitz-Gerald, K.C., third son of the late Lord Fitz-Gerald, of Kilmarnock, late Land Commissioner and Judicial Commissioner in Ireland, aged 76. KEKEWICH.-On the 2nd inst., at Hatfield, Charles Granville Kekewich, of The Hill House, Hatfield, and 2, Suffolk-lane, E.C., aged 66. KIDSTON. On the 30th ult., at 7, Southpark-terrace, Glasgow, James Burns Kidston, solicitor, Glasgow, in his 64th year. MONTAGUE. On the 30th ult., Frederick Florence Montague, of 2, Hare-court, Temple, London, second son of the late Francis Montague, of St. Margaret's, Twickenham, aged 60. STAMMERS. On the 11th inst., at his residence, Sidney Joseph Richard Stammers, beloved husband of Margaret Amy Williams Stammers, of 40, Rutland-gate, Knightsbridge, and senior partner in the firm of Wansey, Stammers, and Co, of 52, Coleman-street, London, E.C. 2. 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At any rate this has the merit of consistency, for if grand juries are a necessity at assizes, they are of equal utility at quarter sessions. We do not believe that the general abolition of grand juries would in any sense lessen the efficiency of the administration of criminal justice, but the burden of grand jury service was rightly decided by an unfettered decision of the House. No doubt bills are ignored by grand juries, but, equally, true bills are returned by them after committals by magistrates in cases where the judges express surprise that the accused should have been placed on trial at all. We doubt whether grand juries at quarter sessions will fully appreciate one of Mr. Rawlinson's reasons for their attendance. The learned recorder of Cambridge said: "It does tend to bring them to try and take an interest in that most important branch of legal work, the administration of the criminal law, and the mere fact that they do come is an educative influence upon the grand jury in that case." writing by or on behalf of both the prosecutor and the accused and so long as the number of its members is not reduced below ten, be considered as remaining for all the purposes of that trial properly constituted, and the trial shall proceed and a verdict may be given accordingly. The alternatives put forward were, firstly, by Mr. Gates, that two additional jurors should be sworn to take the place, if necessary, of any member of the jury who was incapacitated, and, secondly, by Sir H. Curtis-Bennett and Mr. Grotian, that this should only be done where the judge thinks it necessary. It is well to bear in mind that the cases in which a re-hearing becomes necessary by reason of death or illness are not many, and that serious inconvenience is caused only in the case of trials that are protracted. The second alternative would meet the difficulties, for, as Mr. Grotian pointed out, both " judge and counsel always know pretty well whether a case is going to last five hours or five days." The clause as carriedquite apart from the question whether it will effect its purpose-requires further consideration owing to the possibility of the defence being prejudiced by reason of a refusal to accede to a trial with less than twelve jurors, and Sir W. Joynson-Hicks has undertaken to consider any amendment which would make for greater security for the accused. In serious cases it is inconceivable that the defence will consent to a verdict of less than the full number of jurors, and the new clause may remain a dead letter. The addition of two extra jurors from the jurors in waiting, if considered necessary by the judge, would bring about with more certainty the reform the new clause is designed to effect. Chairmen of Quarter Sessions WHATEVER may have been the case in the past, there is no doubt that since the passage of the Criminal Appeal Act 1907, quarter sessions have been careful to select careful and competent persons to act as chairmen and deputy chairmen. Many of them are members of the Profession, and those who have no legal qualification have carried out their duties without serious complaint. Therefore we think that Sir Henry Slesser's suggestion that their selection. should be subject to the approval of the Lord Chancellor is quite unnecessary for a veto, as in the case of the Recordership of London, is a distinctly invidious power-and the only alternative would be placing the appointment in the hands of the Lord Chancellor. That is not desired in any quarter, for the present system has worked well. Search Warrants AFTER the acceptance of several small but useful amendments which were made in committee, the House turned to the consideration of the clause which deals with the issue of search warrants. That clause as it stands was accurately described by Sir Patrick Hastings as giving the police the right to take power from magistrates for a universal search. The Home Secretary stated that the clause was put in at the request of the Director of Public Prosecutions, and that we can well believe, for no doubt he was responsible for the clause in the 1923 Bill, which was designed to enable him to obtain discovery of a bank account and a stop order merely on suspicion and before any charge was made. That clause was speedily dropped, but equally with the present clause it might be said that it was put in . . . in order to help what is the primary object of all criminal law, namely, that the criminal should be more easily brought to justice." A general right of arrest on suspicion might also have this effect. Most of the cases referred to by the Home Secretary related to statutes where an offence had been committed. As we have already stated, there are some fifty Acts of Parliament where there is specific power to issue search warrants, but only in two-the Official Secrets Act 1911 and the Firearms Act 1920-is the power given where there is suspicion that an offence is about to be committed. The original powers sought, which which included the right to search persons on the premises, were considerably whittled down in committee, but no explanation is forthcoming as to the offences against which this clause is directed. In our view, wide powers of this description should be specifically asked for and specifically granted, as in the case of the Acts of 1911 and 1920. The debate on this clause was not concluded on Monday and stood adjourned; and, unfortunately, a political element has been introduced into the discussion which should have been entirely absent when the administration of criminal justice is under consideration. "Scandalising the Court" IT is, happily, only on rare occasions that the court is called upon to intervene in cases of personal scurrilous abuse of a judge as a judge, but there is ample power to do so, and Rex v. Freeman, heard this week, was a particularly gross case. Lord Russell, in Reg. v. Gray, clearly defined the two classes of contempt. Any act done or writing published calculated to bring the court or the judge of the court into contempt, or to lessen his authority, is a contempt of court." This class was characterised by Lord Hardwicke as "scandalising the court itself." The other class with which one is more We have received a copy of the report made by the Naval Prize Tribunal, constituted under the Naval Prize Act 1918, which is a document of considerable legal and historical interest. Since 1708, with two exceptions, the whole benefit in prizes taken by the naval forces of the Crown has been granted to the actual captors, but in 1914 this ancient practice was departed from, and the proceeds of all captures that would have been available under the old rule was made available for distribution amongst the naval forces as a whole. By the Proclamation of the 15th Aug. 1918 the net produce of all such prizes as were declared by the tribunal droits of the Crown were so granted, together with other sums defined by the Act of 1918. A perusal of the report shows that the work of the tribunal was of great magnitude and complexity, for every seizure made throughout the War which had been followed by a decree of condemnation had to be reviewed, and whether or not the proceeds thereof came to the naval prize fund had to be decided. The application and elucidation of the schedules to the Act of 1918 were of considerably more difficulty than the determination of what should be treated as droits of the Crown once the guiding guiding principles had been established. Disagreement of Justices A NOVEL point concerning the duty of justices on the hearing of a charge, under the Indictable Offences Act 1848, when the Bench is equally divided, was raised last week before the Divisional Court in Rex v. Hertfordshire Justices (post, p. 387). Under sect. 25 of that statute, after hearing the evidence, "if the justice or justices of the peace then present shall be of opinion that it is not sufficient to put such accused party upon his trial for any indictable offence, such justice or justices shall forthwith order such accused party, if in custody, to be discharged." In the case in question, at the conclusion of the evidence the Bench was equally divided, and they decided to adjourn and rehear the case on a subsequent occasion. It was contended that unless the justices were "satisfied," they must discharge the accused, and there was no power to rehear the case before a reconstituted Bench, as in summary proceedings. But, as Lord Hewart pointed out, that argument would mean that the words "if the justices shall be of opinion that it is not sufficient," would have to be read, "if the justices shall not be of opinion that it is sufficient," an obvious straining of the Act and one that would be quite impossible. The question argued was perhaps an ingenious one, but when examined it is not surprising that it has remained unraised in its present form for more than seventyfive years. GIFTS OF CHEQUES THE question whether the donee of a cheque which has not been cashed in the lifetime of the donor, is entitled to payment of the amount thereof, generally arises where there has been a donatio mortis causâ. In a case which was recently before the Court of Appeal (Re Swinburne ; Sutton v. Featherley) (noted ante, p. 296), a similar point arose, but in this case the gift was a true gift and not a donatio mortis causâ. The principles, however, which were applied thus would appear equally to apply to a donatio mortis causâ, since delivery of the subject of the gift is one of the essential conditions for the validity of a donatio mortis causâ. In Re Swinburne (sup.), the facts were shortly as follows: On the 26th April 1923 the testatrix drew a cheque for £700 in favour of one G., and presented G. with the cheque as a gift. The cheque was not honoured upon presentation, because the signature had been badly written, and because the words "pounds had been omitted. Subsequently the testatrix drew another cheque for the same amount in favour of G., but the bank refused to honour this cheque as well on the ground that the signature on the cheque differed from the specimen signature of the drawer. Nothing more was done in the matter, and the testatrix died. At the date of the presentation of the cheque the testatrix had the sum of £131 9s. 5d. on current account, and £908 3s. 6d. on deposit amount, but it appeared that it was the practice of the bank to honour cheques of the testatrix to the extent of her deposit account. In these circumstances, the question arose whether the gift to G. was complete, and whether, therefore, she was entitled to the sum of £700 out of the deceased's estate. Now it is quite clear that a cheque drawn by the donor on his own bankers stands on quite a different footing from a cheque drawn in favour of the donor by a third person. In Clement v. Cheeseman (1884, 27 Ch. Div. 631), it was held that a cheque payable to the donor or his order, which had not been indorsed by the donor might, notwithstanding, constitute an effective donatio mortis causâ. As Mr. Justice Chitty pointed out (ibid., at pp. 631, 632); "The subjectmatter was not the testator's own cheque, but was his property, being the cheque of another man, which he had taken for value. In Byles on Bills it is stated that a cheque drawn by the donor upon his own banker cannot be the subject of a donatio mortis causâ, because the death of the drawer is a revocation of the banker's authority to pay. But when the donee is dealing with the cheque of another man, it stands entirely on the same footing as a bill of exchange or promissory note, which, according to Veal v. Veal (27 Beav. 303), may well be the subject of a donatio mortis causá. For this purpose there is no difference between the cheque of another man and a bill of exchange or promissory note." principle, it is submitted, would equally apply in the case of a pure gift. 66 The same Where, however, the subject-matter of the gift is a cheque drawn by the donor, the mere delivery of the cheque to the donee will not in itself entitle the donee to payment in the event of the prior death of the donor. A cheque is not money, but is merely an order by the customer to his bankers to pay to the drawee of the cheque the amount stated therein. According to sect. 73 of the Bills of Exchange Act 1882, a cheque is a bill of exchange drawn on a banker payable on demand," and according to sect. 3 of that Act a bill of exchange is defined as an unconditional order in writing, addressed by one person to another "-in the case of a cheque, by the customer to his banker-" requiring the person to whom it is addressed to pay on demand certain in money to or to the order of a specified person, or to bearer." In the case of a cheque, moreover, the duty and authority of the banker to pay the cheque drawn on him by his customer are determined, inter alia, by notice of the customer's death : (sect. 75 of the Bills of Exchange Act 1882). From the authorities, however, previous to Re Swinburne (sup.), it would appear that the donee of a cheque does not lose his right to payment merely by the fact that payment is not made in the lifetime of the donor, and it will be necessary to inquire how far, if at all, Re Swinburne alters the law in this respect. a sum Reference in the first place should be made to Hewitt v. Kaye (1868, L. Rep. 6 Eq. 198). There a testatrix gave a cheque to the trustees of a charity as a donatio mortis causâ, but died before it was possible to present the cheque. Lord Romilly, M.R. held that there was no effective donatio mortis causâ. In his judgment the learned judge said: "When a man on his deathbed gives to another an instrument, such as a bond, or promissory note, or an I.O.U., he gives a chose in action, and the delivery of the instrument confers upon the donee all the rights to the chose in action arising out of the instrument. But a cheque is nothing more than an order to obtain a certain sum of money, and it makes no difference whether the money is at a banker's or anywhere else. It is an order to deliver the money, and if the order is not acted upon in the lifetime of the person who gives it, it is worth nothing. The testatrix gave this cheque at night, and she died in the course of the same night before it could be presented. Suppose she had said: "I have got £600 in my desk; bring it to me and I will give you the money," and had died before it was brought to her, that would have been no gift and the gift of a cheque is the same thing; it is worth nothing until acted upon, and the authority to act upon it is withdrawn by the donor's death." It is evident from this case that the cheque must at least be presented, but then will presentment by itself entitle the donee to payment after the donor's death, since, according to the above judgment, the authority must be acted upon in the lifetime of the donor? The submission is here made that, although presenting the cheque in itself is not sufficient, the authority given by the donor may be sufficiently acted upon, without actual payment of the cheque being necessarily made in the lifetime of the donor. In Bromley v. Brunton (1868, 18 L. T. Rep. 628; L. Rep. 6 Eq. 275), the donor made a gift of a cheque drawn by him in favour of the donee, on her bankers, but on presentment of the cheque, the bank refused to honour it on the ground that the signature differed from the drawer's usual signature. The donor subsequently died, but the court nevertheless held that the gift was good. In his judgment, Sir John Stuart (V.-C.) said: "In order to make a gift of this description valid, it is necessary, according to the settled doctrine of the court, that it should be complete-that everything should be done on the part of the donor. The gift in this case being made in the form of a cheque drawn on the bankers of the donor, if there had been no funds in the hands of the bankers, then of course there would have been an incompleteness in the gift on the part of the donor. It is clear, however, that when the cheque was presented on the second occasion, the bankers had sufficient funds in their hands to pay it. The reason why they did not pay it was one proceeding from their minds they doubted the authenticity of the donor's signature, and the result is that the funds which the donor had dedicated to the purpose of this gift, through no act of the donor and through no default of the donee came into the hands of the executors of the donor. I conceive that under these circumstances no further act was necessary on the part of the donor to make the gift complete. The failure, so far as the gift has failed through non-payment to this time, occurred through the default of third parties whose duty it was to pay it. The effect of the cheque was to appropriate so much of the donor's money, and my opinion is that the funds, the subject of the gift, are, in the hands of the executors, just as much liable to the payment of the cheque as they were in the hands of the bankers." According to this decision the test would appear to be whether the donor and the donee had respectively done all in their power towards the perfection of the gift, in which event the gift would not fail merely by the default of third persons. When one refers, however, to Re Beaumont ; Beaumont v. Ewbank (86 L. T. Rep. 410) (1902) 1 Ch. 889) it appears that the decision in Bromley v. Brunton is placed on quite a different footing. In Re Beaumont (sup.) the donor drew a cheque in favour of one E., as a donatio mortis causâ. The cheque was eventually delivered to E., who endorsed it and presented it for payment at the donor's bank, where his account was overdrawn. The bank refused payment, not on this ground, since it was found as a fact that the manager was minded to lend the money to pay the cheque, but on the ground that the signature was not like the ordinary signature of the donor. The donor subsequently died without the cheque having been cashed. It was held by Mr. Justice Buckley that there was no valid donatio mortis causâ. The learned judge pointed out that a cheque, drawn by the donor, was not an equitable assignment of any part of the donor's balance at his bankers (Hopkinson v. Forster, L. Rep. 19 Eq. 74), it was merely a reasonable mandate which might be stopped in the donor's lifetime and would be revoked by his death. "In all these cases," said the learned judge, “ in order that the gift may be valid it must be shown that the donor handed over either property or the indicia of title to property which belonged to him. His own cheque is not property; it is only a revocable order, such that if the banker acts on it the donee will have the money to which it relates. Even without actual payment of the cheque there may be a good gift-for instance, if there is an undertaking by the bankers to the donee to hold the amount of the cheque for the latter, that may be enough." It is on this principle of a constructive payment of the money by the bankers that the learned judge was of opinion that the decision in Bromley v. Brunton (sup.) was to be based. As Mr. Justice Buckley put it, the court in that case must have decided that there was a complete gift inter vivos, either because the cheque was constructively paid, the bankers having substantially said that they would pay, so that the payment constructively related back to the date of presentation; or because the bankers had in effect said: "The account is in credit, and we will hold enough of the balance to satisfy the cheque subject to the signature being shown to be genuine," and therefore that there was a good equitable assignment. The ViceChancellor says: "The effect of the cheque was to appropriate so much of the donor's money, and my opinion is that the funds, the subject of the gift, are, in the hands of the executors, just as much liable to the payment of the cheque as they were in the hands of the bankers. I cannot suppose that he meant that the effect of the cheque by itself operated as an equitable assignment of money at the bank. Probably he meant that the effect of the cheque coupled with the bankers' action on it, was to appropriate enough of the money at the bank to meet the cheque that the bankers, so to speak, constructively honoured the cheque. All the authorities seem to be consistent with the view that where the cheque is not actually or constructively paid there is no valid donatio mortis causâ." It would appear that this principle, that there must be either an actual or constructive payment of the cheque the subject-matter of the gift, was accepted by the Court of Appeal in Re Swinburne (sup.), as the correct principle to be applied in such cases, and if Bromley v. Brunton (sup.) cannot be explained in this manner it cannot be considered as good law. The Court of Appeal, however, in Re Swinburne (sup.) were of opinion that on the facts there was no evidence of any such constructive payment by the bank, and that accordingly the gift was incomplete, and the donee was not entitled to recover the amount of the cheque. THE CONVEYANCER Settled Land Act 1925-Form of Vesting De d It is proposed to offer a few remarks about Form No. 1 in the First Schedule to the Settled Land Act 1925, namely, the vesting deed for giving effect to a settlement subsisting at the commencement of the Act. The form naturally follows the requirements of sect. 5 of the Act, sub-sect. (2) of which provides, that the statements or particulars required by that section may be incorporated by reference to an existing vesting instrument, and where there is a settlement subsisting at the commencement of the Act, by reference to that settlement, and to any instrument whereby land has been conveyed to the uses, or upon the trusts of that settlement, but not (save as last aforesaid) by reference to a trust instrument, nor by reference to a disentailing deed. The first point which will occur to the draftsman is what is meant by the direction to" recite the settlement under which T. L. is a tenant for life of full age in possession." A settlement may, and sometimes does, consist of more than one document; and even when it consists of only one instrument the limitations in tail may be very lengthy. It is apprehended, however, that it will be sufficient to show who is the tenant for life of full age in possession. Another question which arises is how the settled property should be described, that is, whether by reference to the description in the settlement, or by new schedule and plan. It is believed that the Profession has been somewhat exercised on this point. The parcels in a family settlement of a large estate are often very lengthy, and a new schedule and plan would take some time to prepare. If, however, the vesting declaration is to become a root of title it seems necessary that the parcels should be set out fully by schedule and plan, otherwise the prior deeds would remain part of the title. It is thought that in dealing with large estates, particularly if an early sale is contemplated, it will be found convenient to resort, either directly or indirectly, to a schedule and plan, brought up to date. In small estates, however, the referential method will probably be adopted. With regard to the additional or larger powers conferred by the settlement in relation to the settled land, the same principle will apply. Therefore, in the case of large estates, it seems advisable to set them out in the vesting deed at length, otherwise the prior deeds may have to be resorted to in order to ascertain the nature of such powers. The statutory form, like some other official forms, is only intended as a guide, and leaves certain questions, not always free from difficulty, to the draftsman. For instance, suppose that the settlement contains a paramount general power of appointment, or a paramount power to override some prior incumbrance, how should they be dealt with in the vesting deed? They will still remain as equitable powers, and presumably should be disclosed by the vesting deed. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS By Our Reporters in the Several Courts Workmen's compensation-Accident during transit to workMeans of transit provided by employers and on premises where work was-No right of workman to be on coach except by virtue of his contract of employment-Workmen's Compensation Act 1906 (6 Edw. 7, c. 58), s. 1 (1). Appeal by H., the applicant, from a decision given on the 30th May 1925 by His Honour Judge Rowland Rowlands, sitting as an arbitrator under the Workmen's Compensation Act 1906 in the County Court of Glamorganshire, holden at Aberdare and Mountain Ash. H. was a boy of fifteen living at Aberdare, and was employed by the respondents at one of their collieries situate on the Aberdare side of a mountain. Aberdare was about two miles from this colliery, and H. and others who lived at Aberdare would take the 'bus which took them to the foot of the incline leading up to the colliery, and there he entered a coach, the property of the respondents, which was hauled by a haulage rope up the incline to the colliery, a distance of 1035 yards. From the platform from which the coach started up to the colliery the land belonged to the respondents. An old parish road ran nearly parallel with the track on which the coach was drawn up, the gradient being one in seven and in places one in four. On the morning of the 26th Aug. 1924 H. caught the second coach starting at 6.30, but as it was full sat on the footboard at the side, as the men generally did when the coach was full, and on the way up his leg was caught in a roller, and was severely injured, he being thereby totally incapacitated until the 7th Jan. 1925. No point was made by the respondents because H. rode on the footboard, and the case was treated as though the accident had happened to him while in the coach. On the question whether the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment, the County Court judge found that the coach and the track on which it ran up to the colliery were the property of the respondents, and there was no contractual obligation on the men to use the coach, and held that he must decide against the applicant having regard to the recent decision in Newton v. Guest, Keen, and Nettlefolds Limited (133 L. T. Rep. 26) that where there was no duty or proved necessity for the workman to travel by the means of transit provided by the employers the accident did not arise out of and in the course of his employment. Held, that as H. at the time of the accident was in the coach only because of his employment by the respondents, and was on the employer's premises, his employment by them had begun, and therefore the accident arose out of and in the course of his employment in accordance with the principle laid down in John Stewart and Son (1912) Limited v. Longhurst (115 L. T. Rep. 399 ; (1916) 2 K. B. 803; affirmed 116 L. T. Rep. 763; (1917) A. C. 249), and the cases in which the applicant met with an accident while travelling to his work, but before he had come on to his employer's premises, such as Newton v. Guest, Keen, and Nettlefolds Limited (ubi sup.); Cremins v. Guest, Keen, |