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one another, as well as on the particles of light, for producing moft of the phænomena in nature? But in reality, thofe minute particles are only agited according to certain laws of nature, by fome other agent, wherein the force exifts and not in them, which have only the motion; which motion in the body moved, the Peripatetics rightly judge to be a mere paffion, but in the mover to be ivigyti

or act.

251. It paffeth with many, I know not how," that mechanical principles give a clear folution of the phænomena. The Democritic hypothefis, faith doctor Cudworth, doth much more handfomely and intelligibly folve the phænomena, than that of Aristotle and Plato. But things rightly confidered, perhaps it will be found not to folve any phænomenon at all. For all phænomena are, to fpeak truly, appearances in the foul or mind; and it hath never been explained, nor can it be explained, how external bodies, figures and motions fhould produce an appearance in the mind. Those principles, therefore, do not folve, if by folving is meant affigning the real, either efficient or final caufe of appearances, but only reduce them to general rules.

252. There is a certain analogy, conftancy, and uniformity in the phænomena or appearances of nature, which are a foundation for general rules: and thefe are a grammar for the understanding of nature, or that feries of effects in the visible world, whereby we are enabled to foresee what will come to pafs, in the natural_courfe of things. Plotinus obferves, in his third Ennead, that the art of prefaging is in fome fort the reading of natural letters denoting order, and that fo far forth as analogy obtains in the univerfe, there may be vaticination. And in reality, he that foretells the motions of the

pla

I

A

planets, or the effects of medicines, or the refult, of chemical or mechanical experiments, may be faid to do it by natural vaticination.

253. We know a thing when we understand it: and we understand it, when we can interpret or tell what it fignifies. Strictly the fenfe knows nothing. We perceive indeed founds by hearing, and characters by fight but we are not therefore faid to understand them. After the fame manner, the phæ nomena of nature are alike vifible to all: but all have not alike learned the connexion of natural things, or understand what they fignify, or know how to vaticinate by them. There is no question, faith Socrates, in Theateto, concerning that which is agreeable to each perfon; but concerning what will in time to come be agreeable, of which all men are not equally judges. He who foreknoweth what will be in every kind, is the wifeft. According to Socrates, you and the cook may judge of a difh on the table equally well; but while the difh is making, the cook can better foretell what will enfue from this or that manner of compofing it. Nor is this manner of reasoning confined only to morals or politics; but extends alfo to natural science.

254. As the natural connexion of figns with the things fignified is regular and conftant, it forms a fort of rational difcourfe (a), and is therefore the immediate effect of an intelligent caufe. This is agreeable to the philofophy of Plato and other ancients. Plotinus indeed faith, that which acts naturally is not intellection, but a certain power of moving matter, which doth not know, but only do. And it must be owned, that, as faculties are multiplied by philofophers according to their operations, the will may be diftinguifhed from the intellect,

(a) 152.

But

But it will not therefore follow, that the will, which operates in the course of nature, is not conducted and applied by intellect, although it be granted that neither will underftands, nor intellect wills. Therefore, the phænomena of nature, which ftrike on the fenfes and are understood by the mind, do form not only a magnificent fpectacle, but also a moft coherent, entertaining, and inftructive difcourfe; and to effect this, they are conducted, adjusted, and ranged by the greatest wisdom. This language or difcourfe is ftudied with different attention, and interpreted with different degrees of fkill. But fo far as men have studied and remarked it's rules, and can interpret right, fo far they may be faid to be knowing in nature. A beaft is like a man who hears a ftrange tongue, but understands nothing.

255. Nature, faith the learned Doctor Cudworth, is not mafter of art or wifdom: Nature is ratio merfa & confufa, reafon immerfed and plunged into matter, and as it were fuddled in it and confounded with it. But the formation of plants and animals, the motions of natural bodies, their various properties, appearances and viciffitudes, in a word, the whole series of things in this visible world, which we call the courfe of nature, is fo wifely managed and carried on, that the most improved human reafon cannot thoroughly comprehend even the least particle thereof; fo far is it from feeming to be produced by fuddled or confounded reason.

256. Natural productions, it is true, are not all equally perfect. But neither doth it fuit with the order of things, the ftructure of the universe, or the ends of providence that they fhould be fo. General rules, we have feen (a), are neceffary to

(a) 249, 252.

make

make the world intelligible: and from the conftant obfervation of fuch rules, natural evils will fome times unavoidably enfue: things will be produced in a flow length of time, and arrive at different degrees of perfection.

257. It must be owned, we are not confcious of the fyftole and diastole of the heart, or the motion of the diaphragm. It may not nevertheless be thence inferred, that unknowing nature can act regularly, as well as ourselves. The true inference is, that the self-thinking individual, or humane perfon, is not the real author of those natural motions. And in fact no man blames himself if they are wrong, or values himself if they are right. The fame may be faid of the fingers of a musician, which fome object to be moved by habit which understands not; it being evident, that what is done by rule must proceed from fomething that understands the rule; therefore, if not from the musician himself, from fome other active intelligence, the fame perhaps which governs bees and fpiders, and moves the limbs of thofe who walk in their fleep.

258. Inftruments, occafions, and figns (b) occur in, or rather make up, the whole vifible course of nature. Thefe, being no agents themfelves, are under the direction of one agent concerting all for one end, the fupreme good. All those motions, whether in animal bodies or in other parts of the system of nature, which are not effects of particular wills, feem to fpring from the fame general caufe with the vegetation of plants, an ætherial spirit actuated by a mind.

259. The first poets and theologers of Greece and the eaft confidered the generation of things, as afcribed rather to a divine caufe, but the Phyfici

(b) 160.

to natural caufes fubordinate to, and directed still by a divine; except fome corporealists and mechanics, who vainly pretended to make a world without a God. The hidden force that unites, adjufts, and caufeth all things to hang together, and move in harmony, which Orpheus and Epedocles ftyled love; this principle of union is no blind principle, but acts with intellect. This divine love and intellect are not themfelves obvious to our view, or otherwise difcerned than in their effects. Intellect enlightens, Love connects, and the fovereign Good attracts all things.

260. All things are made for the fupreme good, all things tend to that end: and we may be faid to account for a thing, when we fhew that it is fo beft. In the Phædon, Socrates declares it to be his opinion, that he, who fuppofed all things to have been difpofed and ordered by a mind (c), fhould not pretend to affign any other caufe of them. He blames phyfiologers for attempting to account for phænomena, particularly for gravity and cohesion, by vortexes and æther, overlooking the τὸ ἀγαθὸν and τὸ δέον, the frongert bond and cement which holds together all the parts of the universe, and not difcerning the cause it self from thofe things which only attend it.

261. As in the microcofm, the conftant regular tenor of the motions of the vifcera and contained juices doth not hinder particular voluntary motions to be impreffed by the mind on the animal fpirit; even fo in the mundane fyftem, the fteddy obfervance of certain laws of nature, in the groffer maffes and more confpicuous motions, doth not hinder, but a voluntary agent may fometimes communicate particular impreffions to the fine ætherial medium,

(c) 154, 160.

which

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