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which in the world anfwers the animal fpirit in man. Which two (if they are two) although invifible and inconceivably small, yet feem the real latent fprings, whereby all the parts of this vifible world are moved; albeit they are not to be regarded as a true caufe, but only an instrument of motion; and the inftrument not as a help to the creator, but only as a fign to the creature.

262. Plotinus fuppofeth that the foul of the universe is not the original caufe or author of the fpecies, but receives them from intellect, the true principle of order and diftinction, the fource and giver of forms. Others confider the vegetative foul only as fome lower faculty of a higher foul, which animates the fiery ætherial spirit (d). As for the blots and defects which appear in the course of this world, which fome have thought to proceed from a fatality or neceffity in nature, and others from an evil principle, that fame philofopher obferves, that it may be the governing reafon produceth and ordaineth all those things; and, not intending that all parts fhould be equally good, maketh fome worfe than others by defign, as all parts in an animal are not eyes: And in a city, comedy, or picture, all ranks, characters, and colours are not equal or like; even so exceffes, defects, and contrary qualities, confpire to the beauty and harmony of the world.

263. It cannot be denied, that with respect to the universe of things, we in this mortal ftate are like men educated in Plato's cave, looking on fhadows with our backs turned to the light. But though our light be dim, and our fituation bad, yet if the best use be made of both, perhaps fomething may be feen. Proclus, in his commentary on the theology of Plato, obferves there are two (d) 178.

forts

forts of philofophers. The one placed body firft in the order of beings, and made the faculty of thinking depend thereupon, fuppofing that the principles of all things are corporeal: that body moft really or principally exifts, and all other things in a fecondary fenfe, and by virtue of that. Others, making all corporeal things to be dependent upon foul or mind, think this to exift in the first place and primary fenfe, and the being of bodies to be altogether derived from, and prefuppofe that of the mind.

264. Senfe and experience acquaint us, with the course and analogy of appearances or natural effects. Thought, reafon, intellect, introduce us into the knowledge of their caufes. Senfible appearances, though of a flowing, unstable, and uncertain nature, yet having first occupied the mind, they do by an early prevention, render the after task of thought more difficult: and as they amufe the eyes and ears, and are more fuited to vulgar ufes and the mechanic arts of life, they eafily obtain a preference, in the opinion of moft men, to thofe fuperior principles, which are the later growth of the humane mind arrived to maturity and perfection, but, not affecting the corporeal fenfe, are thought to be fo far deficient in point of folidity and reality, fenfible and real to common apprehenfions being the fame thing. Although it be certain, that the principles of science are neither objects of fenfe nor imagination; and that intellect and reafon are alone the fure guides to truth.

265. The fuccefsful curiofity of the prefent age, in arts and experiments and new fyftems, is apt to elate men, and make them overlook the ancients. But notwithstanding that the encouragement and purfe of princes, and the united endeavours of great focieties in thefe later ages, have extended experimental

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mental and mechanical knowledge very far, yet it must be owned, that the ancients too were not ignorant of many things (e), as well in phyfics as metaphyfics, which perhaps are more generally, though not first known in these modern times.

266. The Pythagoreans and Platonifts had a notion of the true fyftem of the world. They allowed of mechanical principles, but actuated by foul or mind: they diftinguished the primary qualities in bodies from the fecondary, making the former to be phyfical caufes, and they understood phyfical causes in a right fenfe: they faw that a mind infinite in power, unextended, invifible, immortal, governed, connected and contained all things: they faw there was no fuch thing as real abfolute space: that mind, foul or fpirit, truly and really exifts: that bodies exift only in a fecondary and dependant fense: that the foul is the place of forms: that the fenfible qualities are to be regarded as acts only in the caufe, and as paffions in us: they accurately confidered the differences of intellect, rational foul, and fenfitive foul, with their diftinct acts of intellection, reasoning, and fenfation, points wherein the Cartefians and their followers, who confider sensation as a mode of thinking, feem to have failed. They knew there was a fubtil æther pervading the whole mafs of corporeal beings, and which was itself actually moved and directed by a mind: and that phyfical caufes were only inftruments, or rather marks and figns.

267. Those ancient philofophers understood the generation of animals to confift, in the unfolding and diftending of the minute imperceptible parts of pre-exifting animalcules, which paffeth for a modern discovery: this they took for the work of nature, but

(e) 166, 167, 168, 241, 242, &c.

nature

nature animate and intelligent (f): they understood that all things were alive and in motion: they fup. posed a concord and difcord, union and difunion in particles, fome attracting, others repelling each other; and that those attractions and repulfions, fo various, regular, and useful, could not be accounted for, but by an intelligence prefiding and direct ing all particular motions, for the confervation and benefit of the whole.

268. The Egyptians, who imperfonated nature, had made her a diftinct principle, and even deified her under the name of Ifis. But Ofiris was underftood to be mind or reafon, chief and fovereign of all. Ofiris, if we may believe Plutarch, was the firft, pure, unmixed and holy principle, not discernible by the lower faculties; a glympfe whereof like lightening darting forth, irradiates the underftanding; with regard to which Plutarch adds, that Plato and Arift le termed one part of philofophy imonlixov; to wit, when having foared above common mixed objects, and got beyond the precincts of fenfe and opinion, they arrive to contemplate the first and moft fimple being, free from all matter and compofition. This is that gola iræs F of Plato, which employeth mind alone; which alone governs the world, and the foul is that which immediately informs and animates nature.

269. Although the Egyptians did fymbolically reprefent the fupreme divinity fitting on a lotus, and that gefture has been interpreted to fignify the most holy and venerable being to be utterly at reft repofing within himfelf; yet, for any thing that appears, this gefture might denote dignity as well as repofe. And it cannot be denied, that Jamblicus, fo knowing in the Ægyptian notions,

(A) 1724

taught

taught there was an intellect that proceeded to generation, drawing forth the latent powers into light in the formation of things. Nor was this to be understood of an external world, fubfifting in real abfolute space: For it was a doctrine of those antient fages, that foul was the place of forms, as may be feen in the twelfth book of the arcane part of divine wisdom, according to the Egyptians. This notion was embraced by divers philofophers of Greece, who may be fuppofed to have derived it from the fame fource from whence many of their other opinions were drawn.

270. The doctrine of real abfolute external fpace, induced fome modern philofophers to conclude it was a part or attribute of God, or that God himself was fpace; inafmuch as incommunicable attributes of the deity appeared to agree thereto, fuch as infinity, immutability, indivifibility, incorporeity, being uncreated, impaffive, without beginning or ending; not confidering that all thefe negative properties may belong to nothing. For nothing hath no limits, cannot be moved or changed, or divided, is neither created nor destroyed. A different way of thinking ap pears in the Hermaic as well as other writings of the ancients. With regard to abfolute space, it is obferved in the Afclepian dialogue; that the word Space or Place hath by it felf no meaning; and again, that it is impoffible to understand what fpace alone or pure fpace is. And Plotinus acknowledgeth no place but foul or mind, exprefly affirming that the foul is not in the world, but the world in the foul. And farther, the place of the foul, faith he, is not body, but foul is in mind, and body in foul. See the third chapter of the fifth book of the fifth Enead.

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