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lofopher, in his books of the foul, remarks upon an opinion fet forth in the Orphics, of the foul's entering from the universe into living creatures being born by winds, that this cannot be true of plants or of certain animals which do not breath. But air veffels are by later experiments allowed to be found in all plants and animals. And air may in fome fort not improperly be faid, to be the carrier or vehicle of the foul, inafmuch as it is the vehicle of fire, which is the fpirit immediately moved and animated by the foul (g).

281. The living fire, the living omniform feminary of the world, and other expreffions of the like nature occuring in the ancient and Platonic philofophy, how can they be understood exclufive of light or elemental fire, the particles of which are known to be heterogeneous, and, for ought we know, may fome of them be organized, and, notwithstanding their wonderful minutenefs, contain original feeds which, being formed and fown in a proper matrix, do gradually unfold and manifeft themselves, ftill growing to a juft proportion of the fpecies.

282. May not this æthereal feminary, confiftently with the notions of that philofophy, which afcribed much of generation to celeftial influence, be supposed to impregnate plants and animals with the first principles, the ftamina, or thofe animalcules which Piato, in his Timæus, faith are invifible for their smallmefs, but, being fown in a proper matrix, are therein gradually diftended and explicated by nourishment, and at length the animals brought forth to light. Which notion hath been revived and received of late years by many, who perhaps are not aware of it's antiquity, or that it was to be found in Plato. Timæus Locrenfis in

-¡(g) 163, 171

his book of the foul of the world, fuppofeth evenfouls to be derived from the cæleftial luminaries, excepting only the rational or intellectual part. But what influence or influx is there from the celeftial bodies, which hath not light for it's vehicle (a)?

283. What other nature there fhould be inter mediate between the foul of the world (b) and this grofs corporeal fyftem, which might be the vehicle of life, or, to use the language of philofophers, might receive or be impreffed with the forms of things, is difficult to comprehend. It is a vulgar remark, that the works of art do not bear a nice microscopical inspection, but the more helps are used, and the more nicely you pry into natural productions, the more do you difcover of the fine mechanifm of nature, which is endless or inexhaustible; new and other parts, more subtile and delicate than the precedent, ftill continu ing to offer themselves to view. And thefe microscopial obfervations have confirmed the ancient theory concerning generation, delivered in the Timæus of Plato. But that theory or hypothefis, how agreeable foever to modern difcoveries, is not alone fufficient to explain the phænomena, without the immediate action of a mind. And Ficinus, notwithstanding what himself and other Platonics fay of a plastic nature, is obliged to own, that with the mundane force or foul it is to be underftood, there is joined an intelligence, upon which the feminal nature conftantly depends, and by which it is governed.

284. Alcinous, in his tract of the doctrine of Plato, faith that God hath given the world both mind and foul: others include both in the word foul, and suppose the foul of the world to be God. (b) 171.

(a) 43.

Philo appears to be of this opinion in feveral parts of his writings. And Virgil, who was no ftranger to the Pythagoræan and Platonic tenets writes to the fame burpose.

Deum namque ire per omnes Terrafque tractufque maris coelumque profun. duin.

Hinc pecudes armenta, viros, genus omne fe

rarum,

Quemque fibi tenues nafcentem arceffere vitas. Thus much the fchools of Plato and Pythagoras feem agreed in, to wit, that the foul of the world (b) whether having a distinct mind of its own, or directed by a fuperior mind (c) doth embrace all it's parts, connect them by an invifible and indiffoluble chain, and preferve them ever well adjufted, and in good order.

285. Naturalifts, whofe proper province it is to confider phænomena, experiments, mechanical organs and motions, principally regard the vifible frame of things or corporeal world, fuppofing foul to be contained in body. And this hypothefis may be tolerated in phyfics, as it is not neceflary in the arts of dyalling or navigation to mention the true fyftem or earth's motion. But those who, not content with fenfible appearances, would penetrate into the real and true caufes (the object of theology, metaphyfics, or the philofophia prima) will rectify this error, and fpeak of the world as contained by the foul, and not the foul by the world.

286. Ariftotle hath obferved there were indeed fome who thought fo grofly, as to fuppofe the universe to be one only corporeal and extended nature but in the first book of his Metaphy

(6) 153, 172.

(c) 154, 279,

fics he justly remarks they were guilty of a great miftake; forafinuch as they took into their account the elements of corporeal beings alone; whereas there are incorporeal beings alfo in the univerfe; and while they attempted to affign the causes of neration and corruption, and account for the nature of all things, they did at the fame time destroy the very cause of motion.

ge

287. It is a doctrine among other fpeculations contained in the Hermaic writings, that all things are one. And it is not improbable that Orpheus, Parmenides, and others among the Greeks, might have derived their notion of To E, THE ONE, from Egypt. Tho' that fubtil metaphyfician Parmenides, in his doctrine of viss, feems to have added something of his own. If we fuppofe, that one and the fame mind is the univerfal principle of order and harmony throughout the world, containing and connecting all it's parts, and giving unity to the fyftem, there feems to be nothing atheistical or impious in this fuppofition.

288. Number is no object of fenfe: it is an act of the mind. The fame thing in a different conception is one or many. Comprehending God and the creatures in one general notion, we may say that all things together make one univerfe, or T wav. But if we fhould fay, that all things make one God; this would, indeed, be an erroneous nction of God, but would not amount to atheism, fo long as mind or intellect was admitted to be the Toysμovinov, the governing part. It is neverthelefs more refpectful, and confequently the truer notion of God, to fuppofe him neither made up of parts, nor to be himfelf a part of any whole what

foever.

289. All thofe, who conceived the univerfe to be an animal, muft in confequence of that notion,

fuppote

fuppofe all things to be one. But to conceive God to be the fentient foul of an animal, is altogether unworthy and abfurd. There is no fenfe, nor fenfory, nor any thing like a fenfe or fenfory in God. Senfe implies an impreffion from fome other being, and denotes a dependence in the foul which hath it. Senfe is a paffion; and paffions imply imperfection. God knoweth all things, as pure mind or intellect, but nothing by fenfe, nor in nor through a fenfory. Therefore to fuppofe a fenfory of any kind, whether space or any other, in God would be very wrong, and lead us into falfe conceptions of his nature. The prefuming there was fuch a thing as real abfolute uncreated space, feems to have occafioned that modern mistake. But this prefumption was without grounds.

290. Body is oppofite to fpirit or mind. We have a notion of fpirit from thought and action. We have a notion of body from refiftance. So far forth as there is real power, there is fpirit. So far forth as there is refiftance, there is inability or want of power. That is, there is a negation of fpirit. We are embodied, that is, we are clogged by weight, and hindered by refiftance. But in refpect of a perfect fpirit, there is nothing hard or impenetrable: there is no refiftance to the deity: Nor hath he any body: nor is the fupreme being united to the world, as the foul of an animal is to it's body, which neceffarily implieth defect, both as an inftrument, and as a conftant weight and impediment.

291. Thus much it confifts with piety to fay, that a divine agent doth by his virtue permeate and govern the elementary fire or light (d), which ferves as an animal spirit to enliven and actuate the

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