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losopher, in his books of the soul, remarks upon an opinion set forth in the Orphics, of the soul's entering from the universe into living creatures being born by winds, that this cannot be true of plants or of certain animals which do not breath. But air vessels are by later experiments allowed to be found in all plants and animals. And air may in some sort not improperly be faid, to be the carrier or vehicle of the soul, inasmuch as it is the vehicle of fire, which is the spirit immediately moved and animated by the soul (g).
281. The living fire, the living omniform seminary of the world, and other expressions of the like nature occuring in the ancient and Platonic philosophy, how can they be understood exclusive of light or elemental fire, the particles of which are known to be heterogeneous, and, for ought we know, may some of them be organized, and, notwithstanding their wondersul minuteness, contain original seeds which, being formed and sown in a proper matrix, do gradually unfold and manisest themselves, still growing to a just proportion of the species.
282. May not this æthereal seminary, consistently with the notions of that philosophy, which ascribed much of generation to celestial influence, be supposed to impregnate plants and animals with the first principles, the stamina, or those animalcules which Piato, in his Timæus, faith are invisible for their smallmess, but, being sown in a proper matrix, are therein gradually distended and explicated by nourishment, and at length the animals brought forth to light. Which notion hath been revived and received of late years by many, who perhaps are not aware of it's antiquity, or that it was to be found in Plato. Timæus Locrensis in
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his book of the soul of the world, supposetb evetisouls to be derived from the cælestial luminaries, excepting only the rational or intellectual part. But what influence or influx is there from the" celestial bodies, which hath not light for it's vehicle fa)?
283. What other nature there should be inters mediate between the soul of the world (b) and this gross corporeal system, which might be the vehicle of lise, or, to use the language of philosophers, might receive or be impressed with the forms of things, is disficult to comprehend. It is a vulgar remark, that the works of art do not bear a nice microscopical inspection, but the more helps are used, and the more nicely you pry into natural productions, the more do you discover of the fine mechanism of nature, which is endless or inexhaustible; new and other parts, more subtile and delicate than the precedent, still continuing to ofser themselves to view. And these microscopial observations have confirmed the ancient theory concerning generation, delivered in the Tiniæus of Plato. But that theory or hypothesis, how agreeable soever to modern discoveries, is not alone sufficient to explain the phænomena, without the immediate action of a mind. And Ficinus, notwithstanding what himself and other Platonics fay of a plastic nature, is obliged to own, that with the mundane force or foul it is to he understood, there is joined an intelligence, upon which the seminal nature constantly depends, and by which it is governed.
284. Alcinous, in his tract of the doctrine of Plato, faith that God hath given the world both mind and soul: others include both in the word foul, and suppose the soul of the world to be God*
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Philo appears to be of this opinion in several parts of his writings. And Virgil, who wds no stranger to the Pythagoræan and Platonic tenets writes to the lame burposc.
Deum namque ire per omnes Terrasque tractusque maris coelumque prosundum.
Hinc pecudes armenta, viros, genus omne serarum,
Quemque fibi tenues nascentem arceslere vitas. Thus much the schools of Plato and Pythagoras seem agreed in, to wit, that the soul of the world (b) whether having a distinct mind of its own, or directed by a superior mind (c) doth embrace all it's parts, connect them by an invisible and indissoluble chain, and preserve them ever well adjusted, and in good order.
285. Naturalists, whose proper province it is to consider phænomena, experiments, mechanical organs and motions, principally regard the visible frame of things or corporeal world, supposing soul to be contained in body. And this hypothesis may be tolerated in physics, as it is not neceslary in the arts of dyalling or navigation to mention the true system or earth's motion. But those who, not content with sensible appearances, would penetrate into the real and true causes (the object of theology, metaphysics, or the philosophia prima) will rectify this error, and speak of the world as contained by the foul, and not the foul by the world.
286. Aristotle hath observed there were indeed some who thought so grosly, as to suppose the universe to be one only corporeal and extended nature : but in the first book of his Metaphy
sics he justly remarks they were guilty of a great mistake i forasmuch as they took into their account the elements of corporeal beings alone; whereas there are incorporeal beings also in the universe; and while they attempted to assign the causes of generation and corruption, and account tor the native of all things, they did at the fame time destroy the very cause of motion.
287. It is a doctrine among other speculations contained in the Hermaic writings, that all things are one. And it is not improbable that Orpheus, Parmenides, and others among the Greeks, might have derived their notion of To iv, The One, from Ægypt. Tho' that subtil metaphysician Parmenides, in his doctrine of wismt, seems to have added something of his own. If we suppose, that one and the fame mind is die universal principle of ordtr and harmony throughout the world, containing and connecting all it's parts, and giving unity to the system, there seems to be nothing atheistical or impious in this supposition.
288. Number is no object of sense: it is an ast of the mind. The fame thing in a different conception is one or many. Comprehending God and the creatures in one general notion, we may siy that all things together make one universe, or T» sr*v. But if we should fay, that all things make one God; this would, indeed, be an erroneous notion ot God, but wpulcl not amount to atheism, so long as mind or intellect was admitted to be the -to Myi^wnov, the governing part. It is nevertheless more respectsul, and consequently the truer notion of God, to suppose him neither made up of parts, nor to be himself a part of any whole whatsoever.
289. All those, who conceived the universe to be an animal, must in consequence of that notion,
suppose Oppose all things to be one.' But to conceive God lo be the sentient soul of an animal, is altogether unworthy and absurd. There is no sense, nor *ensory, nor any thing like a sense or sensory in God. Sense implies an impression from some other being, and denotes a dependence in the soul which hath it. Sense is a passion; and passions imply impersection. God knoweth all things, as pure mind or intellect, but nothing by sense, nor in nor through a sensory. Therefore to suppose a sensory of any kind, whether space or any other, in God would be very wrong, and lead us into false conceptions of his nature. The presuming there was such a thing as real absolute uncreated space, seems to have occasioned that modern mistake. But this presumption was without grounds.
290. Body is opposite to spirit or mind. We v have a .notion of spirit from thought and action. We have a notion of body from resistance. So far forth as there is real power, there is spirit. So far forth as there is resistance, there is inability or want of power. That is, there is a negation of spirit. We are embodied, that is, we are clogged by weight, and hindered by resistance. But in respect of a persect spirit, there is nothing hard or impenetrable: there is no resistance to the deity: Nor hath he any body: nor is the supreme being united to the world, as the soul of an animal is to it's body, which necessarily implieth desect, both as an instrument, and as a constant weight and impediment.
291. Thus much it consists with piety to fay, that a divine agent doth by his virtue permeate and govern the'elementary fire or light (</), which serves as an animal spirit to enliven and actuate the