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king one whole, or all things together as making one universe. In doing which they did not exclude the intelligent mind, but confidered ic as contain ing all things. Therefore, whatever was wrong in their way of thinking, it doth not, nevertheless, imply or lead to Atheism.; - 301. The humane mind is so much clogged, and born downward, by the ftrong and early impreffions of sense (a), that it is wonderful, how the ancients should have made even such a progress, and seen so far into intellectual matters, without fome glimmering of a divine tradition. Whoever confiders a parcel of rude savages left to themfelves, how they are sunk and fwallowed up in sense and prejudice, and how unqualified by their natural force to emerge from this state, will be app to think that the first spark of philofophy was defived from heaven ; and that it was (as a Heathen writer expreffeth it) θεοπαράδολG- φιλοσοφία,
302. The lapsed state of human kind is a thing to which the ancient philosophers were not strang. ers. The λύσις, εhe φυγή, the σαλιγμεσία Thew that the Egyptians and Pythagoreans, the Platonists and Stoics, had all fome notion of this doctrine, the outlines of which seem to have been sketched out in those tenets. Theology and philosophy gently unbind the ligaments, that chain the soul down to the earth, and assist her flight towards the sovereign Good. There is an inftinct or tendency of the mind upwards, which sheweth a natural endeavour to recover and raise ourselves, from our present fenfual and low condition, into a state of light, order, and purity.
303. The perceptions of fenfe are grofs.: but even in the fenfes there is a difference. Though harmony and proportion are not objects of fente,
yet the eye and the ear are organs, which offer to the mind such materials, by means whereof the may apprehend both the one and the other. By experiments of sense we become acquainted with the lower faculties of the soul ; and from them, whether by a gradual (a) evolution or ascent, we arrive at the highest. Sense supplies images to memory. These become subjects for fancy to work apon. Reafon confiders, and judges of the imaginations. And thefe acts of reason become new objects to the understanding. In this scale, each lower faculty is a ftep that leads to one above it. And the uppermoft naturally leads to the Deity, which is rather the object of intellectual knowledge than even of the discursive faculty, not to mention the fensitive. There runs a chain throughout the whole system of beings. In this chain one link drags another. The meanest things are connected with the highest. The calamity therefore is neither ftrange nor much to be complained of, if a low fenfual reader shall, from mere love of the animal life, find himfelf drawn on, surprised, and betray'd into some curiosity concerning the intellectual. .
304. There is according to Plato properly no knowledge, but only opinion concerning things fensible and perifhing (b), not because they are naturally abstruse and involved in darkness, but becaufe their nature and existence is uncertain, ever feeting and changing ; or rather, because they do not in strict truth exist at all, being always generating or in fieri, that is, in a perpetual flux, with out any thing stable or permanent in them to constitute an object of real science. The Pythagore:ans and Platonics distinguish between to fuéseker and to ov, that which is ever generated and that which exists. Sensible things and corporeal formas
(a) 275.. (6), 263, 264.
ating of ning stabie real scienn betwee
are perpetually producing and perishing, appearing and disappearing, never resting in one stace, but always in motion and change; and therefore in effect, not one being but a succession of beings : while ró og is understood to be somewhat of an abstract or spiritual nature, and the proper object of intellectual knowledge. Therefore as there can be no knowledge of things flowing and instable, the opinion of Protagoras and Theatetus, that sense was science, is absurd. And indeed nothing is more evident, than that the apparent sizes and shapes, for instance, of things are in a constant Aux, ever differing as they are viewd at different distances, or with glasses more or less accurate. As for those absolute magnitudes and figures, which certain Cartesians and other moderns suppose to be in things, that must seem a vain supposition, to whoever confiders, it is supported by no argument of reason, and no experiment of sense.
305. As understanding perceiveth not, that is, doch noc hear or fee or feel, fo sense knoweth not: And although the mind may use both sense and phancy, as means whereby to arrive at knowledge yet sense or soul, so far forth as sensitive, knoweth nothing. For, as it is rightly observed in the Theatetus of Plato, science consists not in the passive preceptions, but in the reasoning upon them, tã wei enerwv ovidogioução
306. In the ancient philosophy of Plato and Pythagoras, we find distinguished three sorts of objects : In the first place a form or species that is neither generated nor destroyed, unchangeable, invisible, and altogether imperceptible to sense, being only understood by the intellect. A second fort there is ever Auent and changing (8), generą. ting and perishing, appearing and vanilhing. This W 263, 264. (g) 292, 293,
is comprehended by sense and opinion. The third kind is matter which, as Plato teacheth, being neither an object of understanding nor of sente, is hardly to be made out by a certain fpurious way of reasoning noglou cu tine vóc ubyis misóv. See bis Timæus. The same doctrine is contained in the Pythagoric treatise De anima mundi, which dif tinguishing ideas, sensible things, and matter, ma. keth the first to be apprehended by intellect, the second by sense, and the last, to wit, matter, doglouco vólcw' whereof Themiftius the Perripatetic asigns the reafon. For, faith he, that act is to be esteemed fpurious, whose object hath nothing poli. tive, being only a mere privation, as silence or darkness. And such he accounteth matter.
307. Aristocle maketh a threefold distinction of objects according to the three speculative sciences, Physics he supposeth to be conversant about such . things as have a principle of motion in themselves; mathematics about things permanent but not abstracted; and theology about being abftracted and immoveable ; which distinction may be seen in the ninth book of his Metaphysics, Where by ab. stracted, gwersòv, he understands feparable from corporeal beings and sensible qualities.
308. That philosopher held that the mind of man was a tabula rafa, and that there were no innate ideas. Plato, on the contrary, held original ideas in the niind, that is, notions which never were or can be in the fense, such as being, beauty, goodness, likeness, parity. Some perhaps may think the truth to be this: That there are proper. ly no ideas or passive objects in the mind, but what were derived from senfe : but that there are also besides these her own acts or operacions ; such are notions. 309. It is a maxim of the Platonic philosophy,
that the soul of man was originally furnished with native inbred notions, and stands in need of sen(ible occasions, not absolutely for producing them, but only for awakening, rousing, or exciting into act what was already pre-existent, dormant, and latent in the soul; as things are said to be laid up in the memory, though not actually perceived, until they happen to be called forth and brought into view by other objects. This notion seemetli somewhat different from that of innate ideas, as understood by those moderns who have attempted to explode them. To understand and to be, are according to Parmenides the same thing. And Plato in his seventh letter makes no difference between vgs and ésýun, inind and knowledge. Whence it follows, that mind, knowledge, and notions, either in habit or in act, always go together. · 310. And albeit Aristotle considered the soul in it's original state as a blank paper, yet he held it to be the proper place of forms, tie füglu Eirou tótor eid wv (@). Which doctrine first maintained by others he admits, under this restriction, that it is not to be understood of the whole soul, but only of the voloxen'; as is to be seen in his third book De anima. Whence, according to Themiftius in his commentary on that treatise, it may be inferred that all beings are in the soul. For, faith he, the forms are the beings. By the form every thing is what it is. And he adds, it is the soul that imparteth forms to matter; tlul Ialwe pop owoce moixinais ubepolis. Therefore they are first in the soul. He further adds, that the mind is all things, taking the forms of all things it becomes all things by intellect and sense. Alexander Aphrodilæus faith as much, affirming the mind to be all things, καλά τε το νοείν και το αιθάνεστ. And (a) 269.