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king one whole, or all things together as making one universe. In doing which they did not exclude the intelligent mind, but considered it as containr ing all things. Therefore, whatever was wrong in their way ot thinking, it doth not, nevertheless, imply or lead to Atheism.
301. The humane mind is so much clogged, and born downward, by the strong and early impressions of sense («), that it is wondersul, how the ancients should have made even such a progress, and seen so far into intellectual matters, without some glimmering of a divine tradition. Whoever considers a parcel of rude favages left to themselves, how they are sunk and swallowed up ia sense and prejudice, and how unqualified by their natural force to emerge from this state, will be apt to think that the first spark of philosophy was derived from heaven; and that it was (as a Heathen writer exprefieth it) dtaita^aM^' <p<Ao<re!j>('«.
302, The lapsed state of human kind is a thing to which the ancient philosophers were not strangers. The Av'irif, the $vyrjt the wa\i[$Jtfla. soew chat the Egyptians and Pythagoreans, the Platonists and Stoics, had all some notion of this doctrine, the outlines of which seem to have been sketched out in those tenets. Theology and philosophy gently unbind the ligaments, that chain the ioul down to the earth, and asiist her flight towards thp sovereign Good. There is an instinct or tendency of the mind upwards, which (heweth a natural endeavour to recover and raise ourselves, from our present sensual and low condition, into a state of light, order, and purity.
303.. The perceptions of sense are gross: but even in the senses there is a difference. Though harmony and proportion are not objects of sense,
T yet yet the eye and the ear are organs, which oster W the mind such materials, by means whereof flic may apprehend both the one and the other. By experiments of sense we become acquainted with the lower faculties of the foul; and from them, whether by a gradual (a) evolution or ascent, w* arrive at the highest. Sense supplies images to memory. These become subjects for fancy to work opon. Reason considers and judges of the imaginations. And these acts of reason become new objects to the understanding. In this seale, each lower faculty is a step that leads to one above it. And the uppermost naturally leads to the Deity, which is rather the object of intellectual knowledge than even of the discursive faculty, not to mention the sensitive. There runs a chain throughout the whole system of beings. In this chain one link . drags another. The meanest things are connected with the highest. The calamity therefore is neither strange nor much to be complained of, if a low sensual reader shall, from mere love of the animal lise, find himself drawn on, surprised, and betray'd into some curiosity concerning the intellectual. . 304. There is according to Plato properly no knowledge, but only opinion concerning things sensible and peristiing (b), not because they are naturally abstruse and involved in darkness, but because their nature and existence is uncertain, ever -fleeting and changing or rather, because they do not in strict truth exist at all, being always generating or in fieri, that is, in a perpetual flux, without any thing stable or permanent in them to constitute an object of real science. The Pythagoreans and Platonics distinguish between .» -fyof&tr and Ib c\, that which is ever generated and that which exists. Sensible things and corporeal forms M 27s. (i) 263, 264.
arc are perpetually producing and perishing, appeasing and difappearing, never resting in one state, but always in motion and change; and therefore in effect, not one being but a succession of beings: while To o» is understood to be somewhat of an abstract or spiritual nature, and the proper object of intellectual knowledge. Therefore as there can be no knowledge of things flowing and instable, the opinion of Protagoras and Theætetus, that sense was science, is absurd. And indeed nothing is more evident, than that the apparent sizes and shapes, for instance, of things are in a constant flux, ever differing as they are view*d at different distances, or with'glasses more or less accurate. As for those absolute magnitudes and figures, which certain Cartesians and other moderns suppose to be in things, that must seem a vain supposition, to whoever considers, it is supported by no argument of reason, and no experiment of sense.
305. As understanding perceiveth not, that is, doth not hear or see or seel, so sense knoweth not: And although the mind may use both sense and phancy, as means whereby to arrive at knowledge yet sense or soul, so far forth as sensitive, knoweth nothing. For, as it is rightly observed in the Theætetus of Plato, science consists not in the passive preceptions, but in the reasoning upon them, Tot <ofe« c/*elvm #v\h»yurfAW*.
306. In the ancient philosophy of Plato and Pythagoras, we find distinguished three sorts of objects: In the first place a form or species that is neither generated nor destroyed, unchangeable, invisible, and altogether imperceptible to sense, being only understood by the intellect. A second sort there is ever fluent and changing (g), generating and perishing, appearing and vanissiing. Thi*
(/) 263, 264. (g) 292, 293.
T 2 is is comprehended by sense and opinion. The third kind is matter which, as Plato teacheth, being neither an object of understanding nor of sense, is hardly to be made out by a certain spurious way of reasoning Xtyivuw Tiv« Vc9« f*lytt msoi. Sec bil Timæus. The fame doctrine is contained in the Pythagoric treatise De anima mundi, which distinguishing ideas, sensible things, and matter, maketh the first to be apprehended by intellect, the second by sense, and the last, to wit, matter, boyie-pf noSw- whereof Themistius the Perripatetic assigns the reason. For, faith he, that act is to be esteemed spurious, whose object hath nothing positive, being only a mere privation, as silence or darkness. And such he accounteth matter.
307. Aristotle maketh a threefold distinction of objects according to the three speculative sciences. Physics he suppoieth to be converfant about such' things as have a principle of motion in themselves 1 mathematics about things permanent but not abstracted; and theology about being abstracted and immoveable ; which distinction may be seen in the ninth book of his Metaphysics. Where by abstracted, yta&tov, he understands separable from corporeal beings and sensible qualities.
308. That philosopher held that the mind of man was a tabula rafa, and that there were no innate ideas. Plato, on the contrary, held original ideas in the mind, that is, notions which never were or can be in the sense, such as being, beauty, goodness, likeness, parity. Some perhaps may think the truth to be this: That there are properly no ideas or passive objects in the mind, but what were derived from sense: but that there are also besides these her own acts or operations; such are notions.
309. It is a maxim of the Platonic philosophy,
that the-soul of man was originally furnished with native inbred notions, and itands in need of sensible occasions, not absolutely for producing them, but only for. awakening, rousing, or exciting into act what was already pre-existent, dormant, and latent in the foul ; as things are slid to be laid up in the memory, though not actually perceived^ until they happen to be called forth and brought into view by other objects. This notion seemeth somewhat different from that of innate ideas, as understood by those moderns who have attempted to explode them. To understand and to be, are according to Parmenides the fame thing. And Plato in his seventh letter makes no difference between tS(and in-*?!)/*)?, mind and knowledge. Whence it follows, that mind, knowledge, and notions, either in habit or in act, always go together.
310. And albeit Aristotle considered the soul in it's original state as a blank paper, yet he held it to be the proper place of forms, tlw ^v^lj} titou Tovov ttfuv (a). Which doctrine first maintained by others he admits, under this restriction, that it is not to be understood of the whole foul, but only of the vwjhxii; as is to be seen in his third book De anima. Whence, according to Themiftius in his commentary on that treatise, it may be inserred that all beings are in the foul. For, faith he, the forms are the beings. By the form every thing is what it is. And he adds, it is the foul that imparteth forms to matter; ttw Cklu* l*o$u<rot TxoiKlhxis y.Q^(poii<. Therefore they are first in the foul. He surther adds, that the mind is all things, taking the forms of all things it becomes all things by intellect and sense. Alexander Aphrodisæus faith as much, affirming the mind tb be all things, nd* T» To Iom K, ri ai'i&ixwoEft. And (a) zCg.