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this in fact is Ariftotle's own doctrine in his third book De anima, where he alfo afferts, with Plato, that actual knowledge and the thing known are all one: τὸ αὐτὸ δέ ἐσιν ἡ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἐπιςήμη το weyual. Whence it follows that the things are where the knowledge is, that is to fay, in the mind. Or, as it is otherwife expreffed, that the foul is all things. More might be faid to explain Ariftotle's notion, but it would lead too far.

311. As to an abfolute actual existence (b) of fenfible or corporeal things, it doth not seem to have been admitted either by Plato or Ariftotle. In the Theatetus we are told, that if any one faith a thing is or is made, he muft withal fay, for what, or of what, or in respect of what, it is or is made; for, that any thing fhould exift in it felf or abfolutely, is abfurd. Agreeably to which doctrine it is also farther affirmed by Plato, that it is impoffible a thing should be fweet, and fweet to no body. It must neverthelefs be owned with regard to Ariftotle, that, even in his Metaphyfics there are fome expreffions which feem to favour the abfolute exiftence of corporeal things. For inftance, in the eleventh book speaking of corporeal fenfible things, What wonder, faith he, if they never appear to us the fame, no more than to fick men, fince we are always changing, and never remain the fame our felves? And again, he faith, Senfible things, although they receive no change in themselves, do neverthelefs in fick perfons produce different fenfations and not the fame. Thefe paffages would feem to imply a distinct and abfolute existence of the objects of fenfe.

312. But it must be obferved, that Ariftotle diftinguifheth a twofold existence, potential and actual. It will not, therefore, follow that, ac(b) 264, 292, 294.

cording

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Cording to Ariftotle, because a thing is, it muft actually exift. This is evident from the eighth book of his Metaphyfics, where he animadverts on the Megaric philofophers, as not admitting a poffible existence diftinct from the actual from whence, faith he, it must follow, that there is nothing cold or hot or fweet or any fenfible thing at all, where there is no perception. He adds, that in confequence of that Megaric doctrine, we can have no sense but while we actually exert it: we are blind when we do not fee, and therefore both blind and deaf feveral times in a day.

313. The ἐντελέχεια πρῶται of the Peripatetics, that is, the fciences, arts, and habits, were by them diftinguished from the arts or ex ἐνδελέχεια

Tegal, and fuppofed to exift in the mind, though not exerted or put into act. This feems to illuftrate the manner in which Socrates, Plato, and their followers conceived innate (c) notions to be in the foul of man. In was the Platonic doctrine, that humane fouls or minds defcended from above, and were fowed in generation, that they were ftunned, ftupified, and intoxicated by this defcent and immerfion into animal nature. And that the foul, in this végwis or flumber, forgets her original notions, which are fmothered and oppreffed by many falfe tenets and prejudices of fenfe. Infomuch that Proclus compares the foul, in her defcent invested with growing prejudices, to Glaucus diving to the bottom of the fea, and there contracting divers coats of fea-weed, coral, and fhells, which stick close to him and conceal his true shape.

314. Hence, according to this philofophy, the mind of man is fo reftlefs to fhake off that flumber, to difengage and emancipate herself from thofe prejudices and falfe opinions, that fo ftraitly

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befet and cling to her, to rub off thofe covers, thit disguise her original form, and to regain her primæ val ftate and firft notions: Hence, that perpetu al ftruggle to recover the loft region of light, that ardent thirft and endeavour after truth and intellectual ideas, which he would neither seek to attain, nor rejoice in, nor know when attained, except he had fome prænotion or anticipation of them, and they had lain innate and dormant like habits and fciences in the mind, or things laid up, which are called out and roused by recollection or reminiscence. So that learning feemeth in effect reminiscence.

315. The Peripatetics themselves diftinguifh between reminifcence and mere memory. The miftius obferves that commonly the beft memories go with the worst parts; but that reminifcence is moft perfect in the most ingenious minds. And notwithstanding the tabula rafa (d) of Aristotle, yet fome of his followers have undertaken to make him fpeak Plato's fenfe. Thus Plutarch the Peripatetic teacheth as agreeable to his master's doctrine, that learning is reminifcence, and that the

xat is in children. Simplicius alfo, in his commentary on the third book of Ariftotle wei Juxus, fpeaketh of a certain interiour reafon in the foul, acting of it felf, and originally full of it's own proper notions, wangrs do cauls T πλήρης των οἰκείων γνωςῶν.

316. And as the Platonic philofophy fuppofed intellectual notions to be originally inexiftent or innate in the foul (e), fo likewife it fuppofed fenfible qualities to exift (though not originally) in the foul, and there only. Socrates faith to Theætetus, You must not think the white colour that you fee is in any thing without your eyes, or in your eyes, (d) 308. (*) 309, 314.

or

er in any place at all. And in the Timæus Plato teacheth, that the figure and motion of the particles of fire dividing the parts of our bodies produce that painful fenfation we call heat. And Plotinus, in the fixth book of his fecond Ennead, obferves that heat and other qualities are not qualities in the things themselves, but acts: that heat is not a quality, but act, in the fire: that fire is not really what we perceive in the qualities light, heat, and colour. From all which it is plain, that whatever real things they fuppofed to exift independent of the foul, thofe were neither fenfible things, nor cloathed with fenfible qualities.

317. Neither Plato nor Ariftotle by matter, An, understood corporeal fubftance, whatever the moderns may understand by that word. To them certainly it fignified no pofitive actual being. Ariftotle describes it as made up of negatives, having neither quantity nor quality nor effence. And not only the Platonifts and Pythagoreans, but also the Peripatetics themselves declare it to be known, neither by fense, nor by any direct and just reafoning, but only by fome fpurious or adulterine method, as hath been obferved before. Simon Portius, a famous Peripatetic of the fixteenth cen tury, denies it to be any fubftance at all, for, faith he, nequit per fe fubfiftere, quia fequeretur, id quod non eft in actu effe in actu. If Jamblichus may be credited, the Egyptians fuppofed matter fo far from including ought of fubftance or effence, that, according to them, God produced it by a feparation from all fubftance, effence or being, ἀπὸ ἐσιότης αποιχειοθεισης υλότης. That matter is actually nothing, but potentially all things, is the doctrine of Ariftotle, Theophrastus, and all the antient Peripatetics.

318. According to those philofophers, matter is U

only

only a pura potentia, a mere poffibility. But Anaximander, fucceffor to Thales, is reprefented as having thought the fupreme deity to be infinite matter. Nevertheless though Plutarch calleth it matter, yet it was fimply aregov, which means no more than infinite or indefinite. And although the moderns teach that space is real and infinitely. extended; yet if we confider that it is no intellectual notion, nor yet perceived by any of our fenfes, wé fhall perhaps be inclined to think with Plato in his Timæus, that this also is the refult of Raylouds vol or fpurious reafoning, and a kind of waking dream. Plato obferves that we dream, as it were, when we think of place, and believe it neceffary, that whatever exifts fhould exift in fome place. Which place or space (f) he alfo obferves is μετ' ἀναπησίας ἁπλὸν, that is to be felt as darkness is seen, or filence heard, being a mere privation.

319. If any one should think to infer the reality or actual being of matter from the modern tenet, that gravity is always proportionable to the quantity of matter, let him but narrowly fcan the modern demonftration of that tenet, and he will find it to be a vain circle, concluding in truth no more than this, that gravity is proportionable to weight, that is to it felf. Since matter is conceived only as defect and mere poffibility; and fince God is abfolute perfection and act; it follows there is the greatest distance and oppofition imaginable between God and matter. Infomuch that a material God would be altogether inconfiftent.

320. The force that produces, the intellect that orders, the goodnefs that perfects all things is the fupreme being. Evil, defect, negation, is not the object of God's creative power.

(P) 250, 279.

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