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this in Fact is Aristotle's own doctrine in his third book Di anima, where he also asserts, with Plato, that actual knowledge and the thing known are all one: ra Cujto Sk isn i? X«t' i»£f yttav ivisi,pn w&ypetli. Whence it follows that the things are where the knowledge is, that is to fay, in the mind. Or, as it is otherwise expressed, that the soul is all things. More might be faid to explain Aristotle's notion, but it would lead too far.

311. As to an absolute actual existence (b) of sensible or corporeal things, it doth not seem to have been admitted either by Plato or Aristotle. In the Theætetus we are told, that if any one faith a thing is or is made, he must withal fay, for what, or of what, or in respect of what, it h or is made; for, that any thing should exist in it self or absolutely, is absurd. Agreeably to which doctrine it is also farther affirmed by Plato, that it is impossible a thing should be sweet, and sweet to no body. It must nevertheless be owned with regard to Aristotle, that, even in his Metaphysics there are some expressions which seem to favour the absolute existence of corporeal things. For instance, in the eleventh book speaking of corporeal sensible things, What wonder, faith he, if they never appear to us the fame, no more than to sick men, since we are always changing, and never remain the fame our selves? And again, he faith, Sensible things, although they receive r.o change in themselves, do nevertheless in sick persons produce different senfations and not the fame. These pasiages would seem to imply a distinct and absolute existence of the objects of sense.

312. But it must be observed, that Aristotle distinguisheth a twofold existence, potential and actual, it will nor, therefore, follow that, acs'*; 264, jp:, 294.

cording Cording to Aristotle, because a thing is* it must actually exist. This is evident from the eighth book of his Metaphysics, where he animadverts on the Megaric philosophers, as not admitting a possible existence distinct from the actual: from whence, faith he, it must follow, that there is nothing cold or hot or sweet or any sensible thing at all, where there is no perception. He adds, that in consequence of that Megaric doctrine, we can have no sense but while we actually exert it: we are blind when we do not see, and therefore both blind and deaf several times in a day.

313. The i»7fA££«<*i ufurou of the Peripatetics, that is, the sciences, arts, and habits, were by them distinguished from the arts or ivl&ixeu* J&rtgxi, and supposed to exist in the mind, though not exerted or put into act. This seems to illustrate the manner in which Socrates, Plato, and their followers conceived innate (c) notions to be in the foul of man. In was the Platonic doctrine, that humane fouls or minds descended from above, and were sowed in generation, that they were stunned, stupified, and intoxicated by this descent and immersion into animal nature. And that the soul, in this M>m{«£ic pr slumber, forgets her original notions, which are smothered and oppressed by many false tenets and prejudices of sense. Insomuch that Proclus compares the soul, in her descent invested with growing prejudices, to Glaucus diving to the bottom of the sea, and there contracting divers coats of sea-weed, coral, and shells, which stick close to him and conceal his true shape.

314. Hence, according to this philosophy, the mind of man is so restless to shake off that slumber, to disengage and emancipate herself from those prejudices and false opinions, that so straitly beset and cling to her, to rub off those covers, that disguise her original form, and to regain her primæval state and first notions: Hence, that perpetual struggle to recover the lost region of light, that ardent thirst and endeavour after truth and intellectual ideas, which lhe would neither seek to attain, nor rejoice in, nor know when attained, except flie had some prænotion or anticipation of them, and they had lain innate and dormant like habits and sciences in the mind, or things laid up, which are called out and reused by recollection or reminiscence. So that learning seemeth in effect reminiscence.

315. The Peripatetics themselves distinguish between reminiscence and mere memory. Themistius observes that commonly the best memories go with the worst parts; but that reminiscence is most persect in the most ingenious minds. And notwithstanding the tabula rasa (d) of Aristotle, yet some of his followers have undertaken to make him speak Plato's sense. Thus Plutarch the Peripatetic teacheth as agreeable to'his master's doctrine, that learning is reminiscence, and that the »?t itad' S|i» is in children. Simplicius also, in his commentary on the third book of Aristotle «&< ^v^, fpeaketh of a certain interiour reason in the foul, acting of it self, and originally full of it's own proper notions, Sj-aijj*;? <*V ixJ!2

316. And as the Platonic philosophy supposed intellectual notions to be originally inexittent or innate in the soul (<'), so likewise it supposed sensible qualities to exist (though not originally) in the soul, and there only. Socrates faith to Theætetus, You must not think the white colour that you sec is in any thing without your eyes, or in your eyes,

W 308- («) 309, 3(4.

or er in any place at al). And in the Timæus Plato teacheth, that the figure and motion of the particles of fire dividing the parts of our bodies produce thac painsul senfation wecall heat. And Plotinus, in the sixth book of his second Ennead, observes that heat and other qualities are not qualities in the things themselves, but acts: that heat is not a quality, but act, in the fire: that fire is not really what we perceive in the qualities light, heat, and colour. From all which it is plain, that whatever real things they supposed to exist independent of the soul, those were neither sensible things, nor cloathed with sensible qualities.

317. Neither Plato nor Aristotle by matter, uA>), understood corporeal substance, whatever the moderns may understand by that wordk To them certainly it signified no positive actual being. Aristotle describes it as made up of negatives, having neither quantity nor quality nor essence. And not only the Platonists and Pythagoreans, but also the Peripatetics themselves declare it to be known, neither by sense, nor by any direct and just reasoning, but only by some spurious or adulterine method, as hath been observed before. Simon Portius, a famous Peripatetic of the sixteenth century, denies it to beany substance at all, for, faith he, nequit per se subsistere, quia sequeretur, id quod non est in actu esie in actu. If Jamblichus may be credited, the ./Egyptians supposed matter so far from including ought of substance or esience, that, according to r.hem, God produced it by a separation from all substance, essence or being,

xV<**ifl0' &TT££io&«fcri!s U'aoti!?^. That matter is actually nothing, but potentially all things, is the doctrine of Aristotle, Theophrastus, and all the antient Peripatetics.

318. According to those philosophers, matter is

U only only a pura potentta, a mere possibility. But Anaximander, successor to Thales, is represented as having thought the supreme deity to be infinite matter. Nevertheless though Plutarch calleth it matter, yet it was simply -n <?jr«gov, which means no more than infinite or indefinite. And although che moderns teach that space is real and infinitely. extended; yet if we consider that it is no intellectiual notion, nor yet perceived by any of our senses, we shall perhaps be inclined to think with Plato in his Timaeus, that this also is the result of Uyia-[*of v«0©- or spurious reasoning, and a kind of waking dream. Plato observes that we dream, as it were, when we think of place, and believe it necessary, that whatever exists should exist in feme place. Which place or space (f) he also observes is ^it* di*<&*i<r:xt *V7o\, that is to be selt as darkness is seen, or silence heard, being a mere privation.

< .319. If any one should think to inser the reality or actual being of matter from the modern tenet, that gravity is always proportionable to the quantity of matter, let him but narrowly scan the modern demonstration of that tenet, and he will find it to be a vain circle, concluding in truth no more than this, that gravity is proportionable to weight, that is to it lelf. Since matter is conceived only as desect and mere possibility ; and since God is absolute persection and act; it follows there a the greatest distance and opposition imaginable between God and matter. Insomuch that a material God would be altogether inconsistent. i 320. The force that produces, the intellect that orders, the goodness that persects all things is the supreme being. Evil, desect, negation, is not the object of God's creative power. From {s) «so, 279.

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