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'motion the Peripatetics trace out a' firft iinmo

veable mover. The Platonics make God au. thor of all good, author of no evil, and unchangeable. According to Anaxagoras there was a confused mass of all things in one chaos, but mind fupervening, teadais, distinguished and divided them. Anaxagoras, it seems, ascribed the motive

faculty to mind, which mind some subsequent phi- losophers have accurately discriminated 'from Toul

and life,afcribing to it the sole faculty of 'intellection, * 321. But still God was supposed the first agent,

che source and original of all things, which he produceth, not occasionally or instrumentally · but with actual and real efficacy. Thus, the crea

tise, De fecretiore parte divinæ sapientiæ fecundum Ægyptios, in the tenth book, faith of God, that he is not only the first agent, but also that he

it is who truly acts or creates, qui verè efficit. ; . 322. Varro, Tully, and St. Augustin understand

the soul to be vis, the power, or force that acts, moves, enlivens. Now although, in our con

ception, vis, or spirit might be distinguished from - mind, it would not thence follow, that it acts

blindly or without mind, or that it is not closely - connected with intellect. If Plutarch is to be

trusted in his account of the opinions of philoso·phers, Thales held the mind of the world to be God : Democritus held the soul of the world to be an igniform deity (8): Pythagoras taught that God was the monad and the good, or s'agalov: Socrates also and Plato pronounced him to be the zo (b), the single, self originate one, essentially good. Each of which appellations and forms of speech directly tends to, and determines in mind, sis töv všv arreu de faith Plutarch. . 323.Whence that author concludes, that in the sense

(8) 106, 168, 277. (6) 287.

of thofe philosophers God is a mind, zwerson sido . not an abstract idea compounded of inconsistencies

and prescinded from all real things, as some moderns understand abstraction ; but a really existing spirit, distinct or separate from all sensible and cor. poreal beings. And although the Scoics are represented as holding a corporeal deity, or that the very system of the world is God, yet it is certain they did not, ac bottom, diffent from the forementioned doctrine; inasmuch as they fupposed the world to be an animal, (a) consisting of foul or mind as well as body. → 324. This notion was derived from the Pythagoreans, who held the world, as Timæus Locrus teacheth, to be one perfect animal, endued with

foul and reason ; but then they believed it to have · been generated : whereas the Scoics looked on

the world as the supreme God, including therein : mind or intellect. For the elementary fire, or, if one -may so speak, the animal spirit of the world, seemeth, according to them, to have been the vehicle of the foul (b), the vehicle of intellect or vis;

fince they styled the Divinity wūé ubegov (), or intel·lectual fire, i li

: 325. The Ægyptians, if we may credit the Hermaic writings, maintained God to be all things, not only actual but possible. He is styled by them, : that which is made and that which is unmade. And

therein it is said, fliall I praise thee for those things · thou hast made manifeft, or for the things thou · haft hidden ? therefore, in their sense, to manifeft, was to create ; the things created having been be

fore hidden in God. 326. Now whether the võis be abstracted from

the sensible world, and considered by it self, as diftince from, and presiding over the created fyra (a) 276.272. (6) 277. 284, (c) 272.


tem, or whether the whole universe, including mind together with the mundane body, is conceived ; to be God (d), and the creatures to be partial mani· festations of the divine essence, there is no atheism

in either case, whatever misconceptions there may be; so long as mind or intellect is understood to preside over, govern, and conduct the whole frame of things. And this was the general prevailing opinion among the philosophers.

327. Nor if any one, with Aristotle in his Metaphysics, should deny that God knows any thing without himself; seeing that God comprehends all things, could this be juftly pronounced an atheisti. cal-opinion. Nor even was the following notion of the fame author to be accounted atheism, to wit, that there are some things beneath the know. ledge of God, as too mean, base, and vile ; how. ever wrong this notion may be, and unworthy of the divine perfection.

328. Might we not conceive that God may be faid to be all in divers senses; as - he is the cause and origine of all beings; as the võs is the vonld's a doctrine both of Platonics and Peripatetics (e); as the vâs is the place of all forms, and as it is the * same which comprehends and orders (f) and suso

tains the whole mandane system. Ariftole declares, that the divine force or influence permeates the intire universe (8) and that what the pilot is in a ship, the driver in a chariot, the præcentor in 'a choir, the law in a city, the general in an army,

the fanie God is in the world. This he amply fets . forth in his book De mundo, a treatise which ha

ving been anciently ascribed to him, ought not to be set aside from the difference of style, which (as Patricius rightly observes) being in a letter to

(1) 300. (e) 309, 310. () 320. (8) 173.

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cohe mind on things

the sensitive pone obiects

king, might well be supposed to differ from the other dry and crabbed parts of his writings.

329. And although there are some expressions to be met with in the philosophers, even of the Platonic and Aristotelic fects, which speak of God as mix. ing with, or pervading all nature and all the ele. ments ; yet this must be explained by force and not by extension, which was never attributed to the mind (b) either by Aristotle or Plato. This they always affirmed to be incorporeal: and, as Plotinus remarks, incorporeal things are diftang each from other not by place, but (to use his expreffion) by alterity.

330. Thefe disquisitious will probably feem dry and useless, to such readers as are accustomed to consider only sensible objects. The employment of the mind on things purely intellectual is to most men irksome: whereas the sensitive powers, by constant use acquire ftrength. Hence, the objects of fense more forcibly affect us' (k), and are too often counted the chief good. For these things mén fight, cheat and fcramble. Therefore, in order to tame mankind and introduce a sense of virtue, the best humane means is to exercise their understand. ing, to give them a glympre of another world, -fuperior to the sensible, and while they take pains

to cherish and maintain the animal life, to teach cabenr not to neglect the intellectual. ri394. Prevailing studies are of no small confequence 80 alftare, the religion, manners and civil government of a country ever taking fome bias from id's philofophy, whichi affects not only the minds of its profeffors and students, but also the copinions of all the better sort and the practise of oche whole people, remotely and consequentially, indeed, though not inconsiderably. Have not the (6) 290, 293, 297, 319. (6) 264, 294.



polemic and scholastic philosophy been observed to produce controversies in law and religion? And have not Fatalism and Sadducism gained ground, during the general passion for the corpuscularian and mechanical philosophy, which hath prevailed for about a century ? This indeed might usefully enough have employed some share of the leisure and curiosity of inquisitive persons. But when it entered the seminaries of learning as a neceffary accomplishment, and most important part of education, by engrossing men's thoughts, and fixing their minds so much on corporeal objects, and the laws

of motion, it hath, however undesignedly, indi. rectly, and by accident, yet not a little indisposed

them for spiritual, moral, and intellectual matters. Certainly had the philosophy of Socrates and Pythagoras prevailed in this age, among those who think themselves too wise to receive the dictates of the gospel, we should not have seen interest take fo general and fast hold on the minds of men, nor public spirit reputed to be gevaiav fuýlhar, a generous folly, among those who are reckoned to be the most knowing as well as the most getting part of mankind, · 332. It might very well be thought serious trifling to tell my readers that the greatest men had ever an high efteem for Plato; whose writings are the touchftone of a hasty and shallow mind; whose philosophy has been the admiration of ages; which supplied patriots, magistrates, and lawgivers to the most flourishing states, as well as fathers to the church, and doctors to the fchools. Albeit in these days, the depths of thar old learning are rarely fathomed, and yet it were happy for these lands, if our young nobility and gentry instead of modern maxims would imbibe the notions of the great men of antiquity. Buc in these free thinking times many an empty head is


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