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Therefore the good or one is not the light that enlightens, but the source of that light.

344. Every moment produceth some change in the parts of this visible creation. Something is added or diminished, or altered in essence, quantity, quality, or habitude. Wherefore all generated beings were faid by the ancients to be in a perpetual flux (V). And that which, on a consused and general view, seems one single constant being, (hall upon a nearer inspection appear a continued series of different beings. But God remains for ever one and the fame. Therefore God alone exists. This was the doctrine of Heraclitus, Plato, and other ancients.

345. It is the opinion of Plato and his followers, that in the foul of man,prior and superior to intellect, there is somewhat of an higher nature, by virtue of which we are one ; and that by means of our one or unit, we are most closely joined to the deity. And, as by our intellect we touch the divine intellect, even so by our To t» or unit the very flower of our essence, as Proclus expresseth it, we touch the first one.

346. According to the Platonic philosophy, ens and unum are the fame. And consequently our minds participate so far of existence as they do of unity. But it should seem that personality is the indivisible center of the foul or mind, which isa monad so far forth as she is a person. Therefore person is really that which exists, inasmuch as it participiates the divine unity. In man the monad or indivisible is the avrS To aW the self same self or very self, a thing, in the opinion of Socrates, much and narrowly to be inquired into and discussed, to the end that, knowing ourselves, we may know what belongs to us and our happiness.

347. Upon mature reflexion thi mind of all created beings seemeth alone indivisible, and to partake most of unity. But sensible things are rather considered as one than truly so, they being in a perpe.

(0 m> 356.

tual tual flux or succession, ever differing and various. Nevertheless, all things together may be considered as one universe (d), one by the connection, relation and order of it's parts, which is the work of mind whose unit is by Platonic, supposed a participation of the first ra tv.

348. Socrates, in the Theaetetus of Plato, speaketh of two parties of philosophers, the fiotttt and cl TM Oaou ?«wi«T«M, the flowing philosophers who hel<3 all things to be in a perpetual flux, always generating and never existing; and those others who maintained the universe to be fixed and immoveable. The difference seems to have been this, that Heraclitus, Protagoras, Empedocles, and in general those of the former sect, considered things sensible and natural i whereas Parmenides and his party considered To *a*t not as the sensible but as the intelligible world (e), abflracted from all sensible things.

349. In effect if we mean by things the sensible objects; these, it is evident, are always flowing; but if we mean things purely intelligible, then we may fay on the other hand, with equal truth, that they are immoveable and unchangeable. So that those, who thought the whole or To vZv to be. e» *',-«{ a fixed or permanent one, seem to have understood the whole of real beings, which, in their sense, was only the intellectual world, not allowing reality of being to things not permanent.

350. The displeasure of some readers may perhaps be incurred, by surprising them into certain reflexions and inquiries for which they have 110 curiosity. But perhaps some others may be pleased, to find a dry subject varied by digressions, traced through remote inferences, and carried intoancient times, whose hoary maxims (f) scattered in this essay are not proposed as principles, but barely as hints to awaken and exercise the inquisitive reader, on points not beneath the ac

\<t) 287, 288. (f) 293, z9+, 29$. s/J 298, 501.

» tention

tention of the ablest men. Those great men, Pythagoras, Plato, and Aristotle, the most consummate. in politics, who sounded states, or instructed princes, or wrote most accurately on publick government, were1 at the fame time most acute at all abstracted and fiibJime speculations; the clearest light being ever necessary to guide the most important actions. - And whatever the world thinks, he who hath not much meditated upon God, the humane mind, and the Summum bonum, may possibly make a thriving} earthworm, but will most indubitably make&'sorrV patriot and a sorry statesman. -'' -'

351. According to the nice metaphysics of thoffc ancient philosophers To tv, being considered as What? was first and simplest in the deity, was prescindedeveni from entity to which it was thought prior and superiors and is therefore by the Platonics styled super-eflenriaK1 And in the Parmenides it is faid, To t* doth not exist; which might seem to imply a negation of the divine being. The truth is, Zeno and Parmenides argued, that a thing existing in time was older and younger than it self; therefore the constant immutable To VdidF not exist in time; and if not in time, then in none of the differences of time past, present, or to come ;| therefore we cannot fay that it was, is, or will be; But nevertheless it is admitted in the fame Parmenides,1 that To voc is every where present to To tv: that is, instead of a temporary succession of moments, there is one eternal now, or, punctum stans, as it is termed by the schoolmen. "'*

352. The simplicity of <ri « (the father in- the Pythagoric and Platonic trinity) is conceived-such as to exclude intellect or mind, to which it is supposed prior. And that hath created ri suspicion of atheism' in this opinion. For, faith the Jearned doctor Cudworth, shall we fay that the first hypostafis or person is «W and »\6yoc, senseless and irrational, and altogether devoid of mind and understanding? or would

-' (f) 298, 30s. T .;

not not this be to introduce a kind of mysterious atheism? To which it may be answered, that whoever acknowledged the universe so be made and governed by an eternal mind, cannot be justly deemed an atheist (g). And this was the tenet of those ancient philosophers. In the Platonic dectrine, the generation of the vise or Aoyoj was not contingent but necessary, not temporary but from everlasting There never was a time sup* posed wherein -» h subsisted without intellect, the priority having been understood only as a priority of order or conception, but not a priority of age* Therefore, the maintaining a distinction of priority between '» h and you? doth not inser, that the one ever existed without the other. It follows, therefore, that the father or 4 %* may, in a certain sense, be faid to be «»« without atheism, or without destroying the notion of a deity; any more than it would destroy the notion of a humane soul, if we should conceive a distinction between self and intellect, or intellect and lise. To which we may farther add, that it is a doc-, trine of Platonics, and agrees with theirxnaster's te■etSi to fay that ti tv,or the first hypostasis,contains all excellence and persection, whereof it is the original source, and iseminenter, as the schools speak, intellect and lise, as well as goodness; while the second liypostasis is essentially intellect, and by participation goodness and lise; and the third, lise essentially, and by participation goodness and intellect.

353. Therefore, the whole being considered, it will not seem just, to six the imputation of atheism upon those philosophers, who held the doctrine of to it; whether it be taken in an abstracted or collective, a metaphysical or merely vulgar meaning (b); that is, whether we prescind unity from essence and intellect, since metaphysical distinctions of the divine attributes dp not in reality divide them: or whether we consider the univerfal system of beings, as one* $ACC;*he union, connexion, and order of it's mern(z) i54> 279, «8;. {*) 300.


bers, do manisestly inser a mind or intellect to be he cause thereof.

354. To e» may be conceived either by composition or division. For as, on the one hand, we may fay the world or universe is one whole or one animal j so we may, on the other hand, consider The One To e» by division or abstraction, as somewhat in the order of things prior to mind. In either sense there is no atheism, so long as mind is admitted to preside and direct the animal; and so long as the unum or To %> is supposed not to exist without mind (a). So that neither Fieraclitus nor Parmenides, nor Pythagoras nor Plato, neither she Ægyptians nor Scoics, with their doctrine of a divine whole or animal, nor Xenophanes with his o ««) T«v, are justly to be accounted atheists. Therefore modern atheism, be ic of Hobbes, Spinofa, Cpllins, or whom you will, is not to be countenanced by the learning and great names of antiquity.

355. Plato teacheth, that the doctrine concerning the one or unite is a means to lead and raise the mind (b) to the knowledge of him who truly is. And it is a tenet both of Aristotle and Plato, that identity is a certain unity. The Pythagoræansalfo,.as. well as the Platonic philosophers, held unum and ens. to be the fame. Consistently with which that only can be faid to exist, which is one and the fame. In things sensible and imaginable, as such, there seems to be no unity, nothing that can be called one prior to all act of the mind; since they being in themlelveS aggregates, consisting of parts or compounded of elements, are in effect many. Accordingly it is remarked by Themisiius, the learned interpreter of, Aristotle, that to collect many notions into one, and to consider them as one, is the work of intellect, and not of sense or fancy.

356. Aristotle himself, in his third book of the

(*}z%7, 288. CA) *9i> *9S

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