destroys the right of appeal, and the court has consequently no jurisdiction to entertain it. Considering, then, that the taking of the recognizance is a matter over which the appellant has no control, but that the whole proceeding is regulated by the justice who has done the act appealed against, it is clear that the loss of the right of appeal in such a case operates with the most unjustifiable hardship upon an innocent party, by making him suffer for the negligence of one over whom he has no control whatever. The 8th section remedies this, by enabling the court under such circumstances to permit the substitution of a fresh recognizance for the original, provided the latter has been entered into within the proper time. The statute then, by a clause similar to the 7th section of 11 & 12 Vict. c. 31, goes on to provide that the decision of the court of quarter sessions as to the sufficiency of the statement of grounds of appeal, and as to the amending of orders or judgments, or statements of grounds of appeal, and as to the substitution of new recognizances, shall be final, and shall not be liable to be reviewed by certiorari, mandamus, or otherwise. By the 10th section it gives them the same power of amending indictments in respect of variances between matters in writing or in print, and their recital, as is given to courts of oyer and terminer and general gaol delivery, by the 6th section of 11 & 12 Vict. c. 46. The 11th section introduces a very important inno vation, by enabling the parties after notice of appeal (except in cases of bastardy or proceedings under any of the statutes relating to the revenue), to state the facts in the form of a special case for the opinion of one of the superior courts. It thus assimilates the mode of proceeding in such cases to that which already exists in the superior courts, and carries the similarity still further by giving jurisdiction in such cases to all the superior courts of common law, instead of, as hitherto, limiting to the court of Queen's Bench only. To complete the analogy the following section makes the provisions of 9 & 10 Will. 3, c. 15, with respect to references to arbitration in civil suits, applicable to the same cases as those wherein a special case is authorized to be stated under the 11th section. These two sections, it will be seen, relate to the power of the parties themselves to substitute some other tribunal for that of the court of Quarter Sessions. But the next section extends to that court the same power of ordering such matters to be referred to arbitration as is now possessed by the judges of the superior courts at nisi prius. And to complete the analogy, the 15th section renders the provisions of 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 32, applicable to all arbitrations under this Act, as well as giving to such arbitrators the same powers of amendment which the court of Quarter Sessions itself would have had on the trial of the appeal. Then, in order to provide for the contingency of the reference going off either by the death of the arbitrator or from any other cause, the 14th section provides, that when the reference proves abortive, the court of Queen's Bench may order the Quarter Sessions to enter continuances, and hear the appeal. In all of these cases, however, a doubt might exist whether, after entering into a recognizance conditioned for the trial of the appeal before the court of Quarter Sessions, such a statement of a special case or agreement of reference would not be a forfeiture of the recognizance, inasmuch as the appeal in such cases would not be tried by the court to which the condition relates. To prevent the chance of such injustice, the 16th section provides that the recognizance shall not be forfeited by such agreement or submission, and thus disposes of any question which might otherwise arise regarding to the effect of such a proceeding in this respect. The value of these provisions when applied to matters before the superior courts is so well known, that little doubt can be entertained of their proving equally useful with regard to those which come before courts of Quarter Sessions. In the many complicated cases which so frequently arise with respect to the rating of railways and other public undertakings they can scarcely fail to be of the greatest advantage, whilst even in the more ordinary cases which come before those courts for their decision on appeal, not a few of them could be settled with far more satisfaction to the parties themselves, and with an infinite saving of the public time, by a reference to arbitration. The Act then goes on to assimilate the proceedings for the levying and recovering of fines, issues, and amerciaments with those upon a forfeited recognizance, and concludes by providing for the enforcement of the orders of Courts of Quarter Sessions by attachment issuing out of the court of Queen's Bench, instead of the present unsatisfactory remedy by indictment. Such is an outline of the provisions of this important statute, the tendency of which must be to diminish litigation and expense, to further substantial justice, and to increase the utility and efficiency of the tribunal to which it applies. J. A. F. 5, Brick Court, Temple. 5th Oct. 1849. CONTENTS. SECT. 1. Uniformity of time for notice of appeal Notice of appeal to be in writing and signed - 2. Act not to affect notices of appeal against orders of removal, orders of bastardy, &c. 3. Defects in statement of grounds of appeal 78 11. Power to state a special case without going to the 12. References to arbitration, (9 & 10 Will. 3, c. 15) 13. References by order of court of sessions 14. Where reference abortive, Queen's Bench may order 15. 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, to be applicable to references Arbitrators to have power of amendment 16. Recognizances for prosecution and trial of appeal 17. Levying and recovery of fines, issues, and amercia- 18. Enforcing orders of sessions |