loses all authority upon her marriage, although this does not give her husband the right to act for her or to be appointed administrator de bonis non.65 In other states, however, marriage of a feme sole does not of itself terminate her authority as executrix or administratrix, but merely renders her liable to removal upon the application of interested parties, and until she is suspended. her acts are valid.67

In determining whether under the law of today a married woman may be appointed or continue to act as executrix or administratrix, the controlling point is the answer to the question, Is it forbidden?s

§ 1203. Corporations as Executors.

The right of a corporation sole to act as executor seems not to be questioned. The early rule was that a corporation aggregate, consisting of various persons, could not act as executor, since it could not take the oath of office nor perform personal duties, such a body

65 Pistole v. Street, 5 Port. (Ala.) 64; Smith v. McIntire, 83 Fed. 456; Whittaker v. Wright, 35 Ark. 511; Tribble's Exrs. V. Broadus, 15 Ky. L. 324, 23 S. W. 349; State v. Rucker, 59 Mo. 17; Roberts v. Place, 18 N. H. 183; Oakes v. Buckley, 49 Wis. 592, 6 N. W. 321.

Compare: Fields v. Carlton, 84 Ga. 597, 11 S, E. 124, where it was held the husband might act for his wife in her right pending the appointment of an administrator with the will annexed.

66 McMillan v. Hayward, 94 Cal. 357, 29 Pac. 774; Cosgrove v. Pitt

man, 103 Cal. 268, 37 Pac. 232; Newhouse v. Gale, 1 Redf. (N. Y.)

217.

67 Schroeder v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. 343, 11 Pac. 651; Buckley v. Buckley, 16 Nev. 180.

68 Stewart, Appellant, 56 Me. 300; Hamilton v. Levy, 41 S. C. 374, 19 S. E. 610.

Mr. Redfield says: "But where no statutory provision exists upon the subject, the marriage of a feme sole will not probably have the effect to terminate the office." -2 Redf. Wills 60.

69 Godolph, pt. 2, § 6; Williams Exrs. (3d Am. ed.) *187.

70

being formed for special purposes only. But it later became settled that a corporation aggregate if nominated as executor, may appoint a person styled a syndic who undertakes administration with the will annexed, taking the oath to perform the duties of the trust as other administrators.71 But it has been held that a syndic of a corporation aggregate will not be granted letters testamentary where the will appoints individuals to act as co-executors with the corporation, and such individuals accept the trust.72

74

The practice of appointing a syndic to represent a corporation as administrator has been accepted in some jurisdictions in the United States,73 in others it has been rejected. Some American authorities held that in the absence of a statute conferring authority on a corporation to act as executor or administrator, such corporation can not so act.75 But the legislatures of many states have provided for the creation of corporations for the purpose of and with the power to act as executors or administrators,76 and such acts are constitutional." A statute con

70 1 Bl. Com. *477; Bacon's Abr., tit. Exrs. & Admrs. A., 1; Wms. Exrs. (3d Am. ed.) *186.

According to the Year-book, 12 Ed. IV, 9b, the Mayor and Commonalty sued as executors without objection.

71 Bacon's Abr., tit. Exrs. & Admrs. A., 2; Williams Exrs. (3d Am. ed.) *187; Goods of Darke, 1 Sw. & Tr. 516.

72 Goods of Martin, 90 L. T. N. S. 264.

73 Matter of Kirkpatrick, 22 N. J. Eq. 463.

74 Georgetown College v. Browne, 34 Md. 450.

75 Fidelity Ins. Trust & Safe Dep. Co. v. Niven, 5 Houst. (Del.) 163; Georgetown College V. Browne, 34 Md. 450.

If the law does not allow a corporation to act as administrator, the appointment of a corporation to such office is void and subject to collateral attack.-Continental Trust Co. v. Peterson, 76 Neb. 411, 107 N. W. 786, 110 N. W. 316.

76 Attorney General Fellows v. First National Bank, 192 Mich. 640, 159 N. W. 335; Estate of Goddard, 94 N. Y. 554.

77 Reed v. Baltimore Trust &

ferring on a corporation the power to act as guardian, executor, trustee, or the committee of one non compos mentis, includes a power to act as administrator.78

Under some statutes it has been held that a foreign corporation is incompetent to receive letters of administration, and that the courts of one jurisdiction have no authority to issue such letters to a foreign corporation."

§ 1204. Conviction of an Infamous Crime as a Disqualification. Under the civil and canon law, traitors, felons, heretics, apostates, incestuous bastards, and many others, were precluded from acting as executors.80 At common law, however, because of the fact that an executor acted in autre droit, even those attainted or outlawed might act as such.81 Today, by statute in most states, no one who has been convicted of an infamous crime is qualified to act either as executor or administrator. Such conviction is an absolute disqualification. But in order to bring the case within the statutory prohibition, the crime in question must be infamous within the definition of the statute, and the conviction must have been had in a court within the state for an offense against the laws thereof.82

Guarantee Co., 72 Md. 531, 535, 20 Atl. 194.

78 Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Wright, (Tenn.) 58 S. W. 755.

79 Grunow V. Simonitsch, 21 N. D. 277, 130 S. W. 835.

No corporation can in any event act as executor or administrator except by appointment, and a foreign corporation is governed by the laws of the state and the orders of state courts.-Attorney General Fellows v. First National Bank, 192 Mich. 640, 159 N. W. 335.

80 Swinb., Wills, pt. 5, §§ 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 10; Godolph, pt. 2, ch. 6.

81 Coke, Litt., 128a; Caroon's Case, Cro. Jac. 8; Killigrew v. Killigrew, 1 Vern. 184.

As to civil death generally, see § 312.

As to legal disabilities because of outlawry, see §§ 313, 314.

As to attainder and corruption of blood, see §§ 315-317.

As to civil death because of conviction of a felony, see § 318.

82 O'Brien v. Neubert, 3 Dem.

The fact that one has been convicted of a misdemeanor does not make him incompetent to act.83 Conviction is necessary in order to work a disqualification; the mere accusation of having committed an infamous crime is not sufficient.

And no degree of legal or moral guilt or delinquency is sufficient to exclude one from the administration of an estate as the next of kin of the decedent, in a case where preference is given by statute to the applicant.85

§ 1205. Want of Integrity as a Disqualification.

Want of integrity is a statutory disqualification to act either as executor or administrator. The word "integrity," as used in the statute, means soundness of moral principle and character as shown by the manner in which a person deals with others.86 A person who deliberately and knowingly violates the sanctity of his oath by swearing falsely is wanting in integrity.87

Where want of integrity is a disqualification, the question of the integrity of an applicant for letters testamen

SUET. (N. Y.) 156, in which case it was held that the conviction in the court of another state of the crime of larceny was not evidence of improvidence on the part of the convict which would justify an adjudication of incompetence to execute the duties of administrator.

83 "It would seem that the statute (section 2661) contemplates conviction of some crime of a serious nature. Were it not so, it would have left out the word 'infamous' and would have provided that a person who had been convicted of a crime should be dis

qualified from being appointed administrator."-In re O'Hare, 60 Misc. Rep. 269, 113 N. Y. Supp. 281. 84 Estate of Agoure, 165 Cal. 427, 132 Pac. 587.

85 Coope v. Lowerre, 1 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 45, where administration was granted to a person proved to be dishonest, and against whom a large judgment had been recovered in a case of crim. con.

86 In re Bauquier, 88 Cal. 302, 26 Pac. 178, 532.

87 Root v. Davis, 10 Mont, 228, 25 Pac. 105,

tary or of administration may always be raised, and be made the subject of judicial investigation, and if the applicant be adjudged incompetent to execute the duties of the trust because of want of integrity, letters shall not issue to him. In order to sustain a judgment of want of integrity, the accusation should be certain and grave in its nature, and must be established by proof which would at least approach the certainty required for conviction in a criminal prosecution.88 Under the statutes, proof may be made of such depraved conduct as would impeach the applicant's integrity and justify the court in adjudging him incompetent. 89 But the fact that a surviving husband claimed the whole of his wife's estate as his own does not of itself show such want of integrity as to render him incompetent to act as administrator;90 and the mere fact that a person claims property as her own which other legatees insist belongs to the estate, does not, without some reference to the honesty of the claim, show a want of integrity.91

88 Root v. Davis, 10 Mont. 228, 25 Pac. 105.

Compare: Under the Connecticut statute, In re Smith's Appeal, 61 Conn. 420, 426, 16 L. R. A. 538, 24 Atl. 273.

89 "An abandoned person may be guilty of many dishonest transactions not punishable by our Criminal Code as an 'infamous crime,' which nevertheless would indicate such moral turpitude, such baseness of character, such want of integrity and conscientious hon

esty of purpose, as to render him unworthy of the trust involved in the administration of an estate."Root v. Davis, 10 Mont. 228, 25 Pac. 105.

Proof of unfaithfulness to mar riage vows does not establish want of integrity.-Estate of Newman, 124 Cal. 688, 693, 45 L. R. A. 780, 67 Pac. 686.

90 In re Carmody, 88 Cal. 616, 26 Pac. 373.

91 In re Bauquier, 88 Cal. 302, 26 Pac. 178, 532.