twelfths of which he was entitled in fee under the marriage settlement of his father and mother,) was worth to be let 1401. per annum, and that his father was above sixty-nine years of age, and very infirm, and unlikely to live, and his own interest in the premises was of the value of 2,2001. at least. And he was at that time in very indigent circumstances, and greatly distressed for money, and owing to long-continued ill health, in a very infirm state of body and mind; and finding it necessary to procure a loan of money, he applied to a son of Ryle for that purpose, whereupon he was sent for by Ryle, and promised a loan of 30%., and directed to go to the office of his (Ryle's) solicitor in Stockport in order to give a security. He further represented that on going to that place, he found Ryle there, and the agreement drawn up, and that he signed it at Ryle's request, without reading it, or hearing it read or explained, believing it only intended to secure the re-payment of the 30%., and being wholly ignorant of its effect, and of the value of the estate, and his interest therein; that on discovering the nature of the transaction he offered to return the 301., and requested Ryle to deliver up the agreement, which was refused. He denied that Ryle had been at all times ready to perform his part of the agreement, and expressed his belief that he had purposely abstained from a performance during the life-time of his (Swindell's) father, in which period alone he (S.) could have derived any advantage from it; and submitted, that the agreement ought not to be carried into execution. Ryle, by the amendments, denied all fraud; charged that the proposal to sell came from Swindells; that the agreement had been prepared from instructions given by Swindells to a solicitor who had previously acted in that capacity for both parties, and that it was read over, and the nature and contents of it fully explained to him by the solicitor; that he was acquainted with the value of his shares in the estate; that the whole premises never let for 1824. RYLE v. SWINDELLS. 1824. RYLE V. SWINDELLS. more than a rack-rent of 991. 15s., and were subject to a chief-rent of 157., and a legal claim of one J. A. in respect of the mines that on the 5th of August, 1809, he lodged 5707., the remainder of the purchase-money payable, in the hands of Messrs. Jones and Co. of Manchester, bankers, for the defendant, on the completion of the purchase, where it still remained and that he had given a fair consideration, &c. Swindells, by his answer to the amendments, averred, that at the time the instructions (which, according to his recollection, proceeded from Ryle) had been given, he was in a state of intoxication through drinking in the company of Ryle, and that he did not suspect or understand their object, although he admitted his consent, and that the agreement had been read over to him. The testimony of the solicitor went fully to corroborate the allegations of Ryle as to the fairness of the transaction the lodgment of the 5701.: the circumstances under which the agreement had been prepared and signed, and to shew that Swindells had been aware of what he was doing and capable of taking care of his interest, and of making a bargain: and that in the year 1812, he had made two conditional offers to execute the agreement. The plaintiffs examined eight or nine other witnesses, who spoke to Swindells having been in a good state of health, and competent to the management of his affairs, and aware of the value of his interest in the estate in 1809, and to his having resolved, and previously endeavoured to dispose of it. One person swore that he had heard him say he had sold his shares. Several of the witnesses, who were farmers, or in a similar situation of life, estimated the value of the reversion of the whole of the estate, expectant on the death of the father, who was stated to be of the age of 70 or 72, in July 1809, at 1,2007., 1,300, 1,400l., or 1,430l., calculating the father's life-interest to be worth from nine or ten to fifteen years' purchase, at 891. or 901. a year. and making a further deduction in computing the value of the defendant's portion, on ac count of the manner in which it was circumstanced. The general effect of a great mass of evidence given on the other side was, that Swindells was extremely poor, uneducated, illiterate, and of a very weak understanding, subject, throughout the year 1809, to habitual, and almost continual intoxication; and, independently of that habit, incapable of comprehending any agreement for, or managing the sale of any real estate, without advice and assistance: that at the time of the agreement his father was a very bad life, in consequence of great indigence and wretchedness of living, being obliged to sleep on straw in a low hovel, and frequently destitute of the common necessaries of life: that in 1809 the annual value of the entire premises to be let was 1417., or at the lowest 1204., the father's life interest worth only four or five years' purchase, and the son's reversionary interest worth at the highest valuation 2,3517., and at the lowest 1,500l. A witness who had been a clerk to the solicitor, gave evidence with respect to the state of inebriety of Swindells at the time of entering into the agreement, in some degree contradictory to that of his employer. Martin, H. and Spence for the plaintiffs. The performance of the agreement is resisted upon two grounds. 1st. That the vendor was not in that state, at the time he entered into it, which would enable him to understand what he was doing, and that he was imposed upon, and entrapped into an act which he did not intend : all that part of the defence is completely answered, and disposed of by the evidence of the highly respectable solicitor who drew the instrument, and to whom no cross interrogatory was put, and that of another person who heard Swindells say he had actually sold his interest. The other ground is, that the price was inadequate. Now, mere in 1824. RYLE v. SWINDELLS. 1824. RYLE v. SWINDELLS. adequacy of price is not a reason for exempting from the obligation of executing the contract, unless it be so grossly inadequate as to evidence fraud, (Gwynne v. Heaton (a)) and that is disproved here, as well by the testimony of the solicitor, as that of a number of individuals perfectly acquainted with all the circumstances of the property. Jervis and Koe for the defendants. The plaintiffs must go into a Court of Law for a remedy, if they have any. The performance of this bargain ought not to be enforced in equity, for a more catching one cannot well be imagined. It was concluded with a man, unassisted by any advice, who was incapacitated by mental imbecility, and habitual inebriety, from conducting a sale, or taking care of his own interests in any way, and who was ignorant of what he was doing at the time from actual intoxication, as is proved by the clerk. Cooke v. Clayworth (b). Butler v. Mulvihill (c). With respect to the consideration, it is not pretended that any proper valuation of the property was made by a person competent to it. The nominal price 8007. was under the full value of the vendor's interest; but the real consideration did not amount to that, for it was a matter of absolute uncertainty whether he should ever receive 2001. of it. The whole of the purchase-money has to this day been kept back except 301. This vendor was incompetent to enter into a contract to bind him, being in the situation of an expectant heir dealing for his expectancy during his father's life, and not on an equal footing with the other contracting party Peacock v. Evans (d). It is incumbent on the purchaser of such property from an expectant heir, to make out that he has given the full value for it. Coles v. Trecothick (e). In Gowland v. De Faria (ƒ) the Master of the Rolls said "That case" of an expectant heir dealing for his ex (a) 1 B. C. C. 1. vide pp. 5 & 8. (c) 1 Bligh. 137. (d) 16 Ves. 512. vide 514 & 515. (e) 9 Ves. 234. vide p. 246. (f) 17 Ves. 20. pectancy "is an exception to the general rule, that for mere inadequacy of value a contract is not to be set aside." In all these cases, the issue is upon the adequacy of the price. The present is a much stronger case for relief than either of those. LORD CHIEF BARON. I have just the same impression respecting this case which I had originally. I think it falls within the principle of Peacock v. Evans, and I have no hesitation in making the same decree. Two grounds have been stated against enforcing a performance of this contract; that the vendor was incapacitated by intoxication at the time he entered into the contract from understanding what he was doing, and that the consideration was inadequate. The former is contradicted by the soli citor, a gentleman of great respectability, I believe, who drew the instrument; and according to his testimony, Swindells did that which is inconsistent with such a supposition, in objecting to the provisions of the deed, by which the interest on the 2007. to be retained by the purchaser was secured to him. There is nothing to shew that he was in a state of inebriety, except the testimony of one witness, who says that he appeared to be in that condition. But with respect to inadequacy, there seems to be that degree of it, which according to the authority of the case to which I alluded, and the subsequent ones, should prevent a specific performance. In that case I was of counsel for the defendant in the original cause; in the argument on it all the prior cases were examined, and the result was that the bill to establish the purchase was dismissed. On that occasion, Sir W. Grant commenced giving his opinion in these terms. "No difficulty could have arisen upon this case, if it had not been that of an expectant heir dealing for his expectancy during his father's life. To that class of persons this Court seems to have extended a degree of protection approaching nearly to an incapacity to bind themselves by any contract." 1824. RYLE v. SWINDELLS. July 23d. |