actions, in their utter separation from those of the common herd by whom he is surrounded. Because you see in that man a depth of feeling and right principle, which you look in vain for in the ordinary run of the men you meet.

When, then, you hear any one giving himself airs, and despising his part in the world, you will say immediately, that he cannot have the true feeling of a gentleman; because, instead of looking into his own mind as the seat and source of honour, he descends to the external trappings and decorations of his office; and only regards himself with complacency, as he glitters in the eyes of others."

Again, should you unfortunately find yourself embroiled in any dispute or quarrel-which may occur to the most peaceable -and perceive, on reflection, that you have been betrayed by the heat of the moment into any intemperance, or that there is any one point in which you are not completely satisfied with yourself, -do not fancy it derogatory to your manhood to acknowledge your error, and to make a just reparation. You may, at first, have an idea, that it is inconsistent with true courage to make this concession, and that you should bear the brunt of the offence with a total disregard of personal consequences. But as you mix more with the world, you will find, that in very many cases a much higher degree of courage is necessary to the avowal of a fault, than to sustaining it. . . . . We should wish you to be firm as a rock in repelling an aggression or an insult;-but still we would strongly impress upon you, that it is, in every case, far more consistent with high courage and gentlemanly feelings to own a wrong than to defend it; and to allay, than to confirm an injury."

"When therefore you enter into society, whatever may be the state of your mind, put such a restraint on the expression of it,

that you shall appear pleased and cheerful. Consider, that people

meet together for instruction and enjoyment, and to rub out the cares and cobwebs of the day. You wish to join them to promote these good objects; and if you are so dispirited and careworn, that you cannot promote them, a just and correct tone of feeling would induce you to remain at home."

"There are two or three minor subjects that occur to me, which may be dismissed at once in a few words. On no account swear, or use cant terms. Never be inquisitive. Never interrupt a speaker. Always take off your hat to a woman. Scrupulously acknowledge the salute of a poor man. Eat slowly and quietly, and without any show of eagerness. This last is a serious solecism in good-breeding. Indeed, it is impossible for you to be too careful in your own person of the niceties of the table, and too vigilant of offending against its recognised proprieties. I will not attempt to give any description of them; as it would lead me

into a long detail of things which might seem trifling, and occasionally, perhaps, ridiculous; but you may receive it as an undoubted truth, that they bear great weight with them in the world; and that a disgust against a man is seldom more readily taken, than in a dereliction of these little points, either through ignorance or wilful rudeness.”—The English Gentleman.

There are many other topics on which you will have to exercise your reasoning powers. Among others, let me request you not to forget to inquire into the reasons for insuring one's life, and the reasons for making a will. You should also exercise your reasoning powers in the choice of your amusements. As, however, on this subject you will also consult your inclination, I will conclude with merely a quotation in favour of the game of chess :

:

"There are two important lessons to be learned at chess. "The first is the value of acquired knowledge. A person who has studied the game of chess and knows it, will beat with ease and certainty one of much more talent for the game, who understands its general principles only.

The second is, encouragement never to give up a losing game, but still to struggle on for success, playing only with increased caution and thought, as the difficulties muster around you. In life, as at chess, no one can anticipate the remote consequences of every position, and the skilful management of disastrous circumstances may be the road to prosperity."-Mayo's Philosophy of Living.

SECTION II.

THE APPLICATION OF THE ART OF REASONING TO HISTORY.

SOME years ago I commenced a work on the Philosophy of History. It was proposed to be written in the form of Lectures. After writing two Lectures, I was compelled, from want of leisure, to lay the subject aside, and it will probably never be resumed. The commencement of the work may now for the first time be useful by standing at the head of this Section :—

"Philosophy has been defined, 'the knowledge of the reasons of things;' in opposition to History, which is the bare knowledge

P

of facts; or to Mathematics, which is the knowledge of the quantity of things, or their measures. It is the province of philosophy to collect together those facts which have occurred; to investigate their causes and operations; and to classify them according to the principles they may have developed. It is thus that the chemist takes every object in nature, examines its constituent principles, notices their operation when brought into combination with other bodies, and from the effects he observes he forms those general rules, which are universally true, and which, when arranged and demonstrated, form what may be called the Philosophy of the Science.

Thus it is in every branch of experimental philosophy. At first the substances of water or air, or other natural objects, are merely observed. By and by a few experiments are made upon them. Other experiments follow, and either correct or confirm those which preceded. Experiments are multiplied, until it is found at last that in a variety of instances the same experiments are uniformly followed by the same results. These are then considered as established truths; the knowledge thus acquired is acted upon in the investigation of other bodies; fresh truths are elicited; and the whole body of truths or general principles thus established by repeated experiments, constitute what is termed Natural and Experimental Philosophy.

"But this course of procedure is not confined to material substances. The moralist observes minutely what actions conduce to happiness and what lead to misery. Those actions which lead to happiness, he calls good or virtuous; those actions which lead to misery, he calls bad or vicious. He examines the causes or motives from whence those actions proceed, and he considers the motives to be good or evil according to the good or bad actions they produce. Hence he forms general rules by which he declares that certain classes of actions or motives are good, and ought to be inculcated, while other classes of actions or motives are evil, and ought to be condemned. He compares these rules with the relations which man sustains in reference to other beings in the universe. Hence, to examine the reasonableness and propriety of moral conduct, and to investigate and lay down rules for moral action, constitute what is termed the Science of Moral Philosophy.

"Thus, too, the political economist views the increase and the diminution of those products which constitute national wealth. He traces the various circumstances by which either the one or the other may be promoted; and from the observation of individual examples and instances, he lays down general principles for the regulation of future conduct in affairs of state economy. This constitutes the philosophy of the science.

"Political economy bears the same relation to history as morals

do to biography. History records those facts which have occurred in the affairs of nations. From these facts political economy derives her principles. She arranges these facts, not according to their chronological order, but accordingly as they concurred in exhibiting the good or evil of any line of political conduct. So biography records those events that have occurred in the lives of individuals; and the moralist hence derives principles for the regulation of individual conduct.

"All philosophy, whether it refer to material or immaterial subjects, is founded on fact. It is not philosophy to build castles in the air; to fancy theories, and then maintain them in defiance of evidence. If we wish to lay any claim to the character of philosophers, we must not first assume principles, and then hunt for facts in order to establish them; but our principles must be deductions from the facts with which we were previously acquainted.

"When, however, the facts by which our principles are supported are so numerous or so decisive, that few persons are disposed to dispute the conclusion to which they lead, it is not always necessary, in teaching our general principles, to detail all the individual facts upon which they may be founded. A few pertinent examples are sufficient for the purpose.

"From what I have said, none of my auditors will be at a loss to conjecture what ideas I attach to the Philosophy of History. The Philosophy of History means those general principles which the facts of history clearly establish. It is not, therefore, my intention to detail all the events which are recorded in the page of history. I shall attempt to exhibit those principles which are deduced from those events, and shall consider those events themselves, not in their chronological order, but as they tend to establish the principles I had previously advanced.

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The philosophy of history takes a much wider range than political economy. The economist views only those facts which have an influence on the accumulation of national wealth. The philosopher views also those facts which have a reference to the character of man; to the development of his physical powers; the exercise of his intellectual faculties: his progress in scientific inquiry; the formation of domestic and civil society; and his performance of moral and religious duties.

"In pursuing these inquiries, I propose to deliver five lectures. The first will be on the Philosophy of Geographical History; the second, the Philosophy of Domestic History; the third, the Philosophy of Intellectual History; the fourth, the Philosophy of Political History; fifthly, the Philosophy of Ecclesiastical History.

"In the first lecture, upon the Philosophy of Geographical History, I propose to inquire what are the effects which history

records to have been produced upon man and upon human society by geographical circumstances-by the varieties of climate; by the mountainous character of countries; by the fertility or barrenness of the soil; or by the intervention of rivers or arms of the sea.

"In the second lecture, I shall inquire what is the language of history as to the relation of husband and wife; the institutions of polygamy and divorce; the relation between parents and children, masters and servants; and the rise and progress of domestic slavery. This lecture will be on the Philosophy of Domestic History.

"In the third lecture, on the Philosophy of Intellectual or Scientific History, I shall inquire into the circumstances which have developed the intellectual faculties; the rise and progress of the arts; the circumstances by which they are promoted or retarded; the advantages which the moderns have over the ancients; and the benefits to be expected from universal education.

"In the fourth lecture, upon the Philosophy of Political History, I shall inquire what is the evidence of history as to the origin of government; the advantages and disadvantages of particular forms of government; and the union of the simple forms in the British Constitution.

"In the fifth lecture, upon the Philosophy of Ecclesiastical History, I propose to examine whether it is obvious from history that man is endowed with a moral sense; to inquire what are the different forms of polytheism; and how far it is necessary that the church should be established by the civil power; and to trace the influence of religion upon the political, intellectual, and social happiness of man.'

We shall now point out some of the different ways in which logic is applied to history.

1. Logic is applied to history in examining the evidence either for or against the truth of disputed facts :

"Without this exercise of the reasoning faculties, books will as often mislead as instruct us. In making an estimate of the authenticity of historical relations, three principal rules are to be observed, the probability or improbability of the facts recorded, the nature of the evidence attesting them, and in what degree they are corroborated or contradicted by the general circumstances of the world in the period of time alluded to. On these principles the reader must exercise a discretionary power of yielding or suspending his belief; but he ought carefully to avoid the two extremes of scepticism and credulity, which are equally