their respective shares of the estate, received the difference from those to whom land, valued at more than their respective shares, had been allotted; and thus the several cross demands, under the respective recognizances, were legally and equitably adjusted, and mutual releases executed. The rights and liabilities of the respective parties, however, were fixed at the time the recognizances were given, and could not have been changed without the consent of all concerned. In this connection it should be observed that the cash balance, $19,238.01, shown by the administrator's account, was embraced in said final settlement. zance and thus appropriating her, interest in the estate to the purpose contemplated by said agreement. Reuben Light, the husband, testified, in substance, to that understanding and agreement between himself and wife; that, in pursuance thereof, he appeared in Court and elected to take the land in controversy, at the valuation, for her benefit; that he did so at her request and in pursuance of their previous agreement that the owelty of partition should be paid out of her share of the estate, "her inheritance, her share, her part, that she was to receive from her father's estate." He further testified in relation to procuring sureties on the recognizance, the execution of that instrument by his wife, etc., and the appropriation of her entire interest in her father's estate to payment of the owelty, and that the deficiency, $1208.19, was raised and paid by himself. The testimony of Mrs. Light was to the same The purpart taken by Reuben Light, in right of his wife, and for her benefit as the jury found, was valued as $1208.19 more than her full share of her father's estate, including said cash balance. Under the terms of her recognizance Mrs. Light was, of course, bound to account for and pay that excess to such of her brothers and sisters as re-effect. Referring to the land in controversy, she ceived less than their full shares; and for some said, "My husband took it at the valuation for reason she could not have required either of them me. We talked about it, as to the manner in to pay anything to her on account of the purparts which it was taken, before we took it. We allotted to them respectively, because as a party agreed that he should take the land at the valuato the partition and an obligor in her own recog- tion for me and should pay for it with my inheritnizance, she was indebted to them in a greater ance 'My inheritance all went into sum. She was therefore bound to account to this farm." Again, referring to the recognizance, them for said $1208.19, excess over her own she said, "As soon as the land was taken at the share; but, it appearing that the money with valuation we went down in the office. Went which that amount was paid was furnished by down there to write our names to the paper. her husband, it was held that he thereby acquired went down right away after the land was taken. an interest in the land to that extent, amounting Reuben signed his name first, I wrote mine above to about (1) twelve eighty-fifths. There is not his name; he gave me the pen. I don't rea particle of evidence tending to show that he member whether the sureties were there or not.” contributed a farthing more than the sum named. . . . "A division was made of my father's estowards procuring the title to the property in con- tate after the land was taken at the valuation." troversy. It was virtually conceded that, in any event, Mrs. Light, as one of the seven heirs, was entitled to a verdict for one undivided seventh of the land. As to the greater part of the remaining six-sevenths, her contention was that she was entitled to recover under and by virtue of a resulting trust springing from an agreement between herself and husband, in pursuance of which he appeared in Court, and, in her right and for her benefit, elected to take the purpart in controversy, and her "inheritance" or interest in her father's estate was applied to payment of the owelty of partition. Evidence was introduced tending to prove the alleged agreement between Mrs. Light and her husband, that he should appear in her right and elect to take one of the purparts for her benefit, and that her "inheritance" should be applied to the payment of the interests of the other heirs in the valuation-money of the purpart thus taken, and that the agreement was carried out in good faith by her entering into recogni 66 We Both sureties in the recognizance testified that Reuben Light requested them to become sureties for his wife; "that she was taking the farm at the valuation," etc. Without referring more in detail to the somewhat voluminous testimony tending to prove that pursuant to previous agreement the land in controversy was taken by Reuben Light in right of his wife and for her benefit, and that, with the exception of the above-mentioned $1208.19, the owelty was provided for by a contemporaneous appropriation of Mrs. Light's entire interest in her father's estate, it is sufficient to say that the evidence was not only competent and proper to be submitted to the jury, but it was also clear and convincing. The question of the resulting trust, on which the case turned, was fully and fairly submitted in a comprehensive and well guarded charge, to which, as a whole, no just exception can be taken. After explaining to the jury the nature of the alleged resulting trust upon which the beneficial plaintiff mainly relied, the learned Judge said: "It is claimed that she is entitled | own right, and for his own benefit, and the great to a resulting trust in a considerable portion of care and caution that should be exercised in this land, based upon the fact, as alleged, that sustaining resulting trusts which are supported she furnished a considerable portion of the pur- by oral evidence alone, the learned Judge rightly chase-money; that she was the true buyer of this instructed the jury that the law properly requires portion, and that although her husband took the a more than ordinarily high degree of evidence. title, he took it under an agreement which com- "Every element of such a trust must be proved pels him to hold it in trust for her. It is con- by clear and explicit and unequivocal evidence, ceded, on both sides, that, in any event, she is and if any element of the case fails in these reentitled to an undivided one-seventh of this spects, although the other elements may be made land, and for that amount at least, a verdict must out by evidence which comes up to the proper be rendered in her favor. The dispute is whether standard, the case fails." she is entitled to any more than that." Referring to the testimony, as to what disposition was made of Mrs. Light's interest in her father's estate, he further said: " That it went into this land, and the circumstances under which it was actually applied to the payment of the valuationmoney are not in dispute, as I understand. I do not recall any contradictory evidence upon this particular point, and the jury will have no difficulty in finding from the evidence that at the time this property was taken and the legal title passed to the husband, no money was actually paid.” . . . . If she loaned the money to her husband she must abide by the risk, and if she loaned it to him without taking such security as she could have taken, she must bear the loss and not unload it on some other person. You will understand the question: What was the true agreement between the husband and the wife? If she lent the money to him, then she cannot recover anything more than the one-seventh already mentioned. If, however, there was an agreement between them, before the property was taken by him, to the effect that he was to take the property in her right, but for her benefit at least in part, and if the agreement was further that her share was to be used toward the payment of the valuation-money, and, in fulfilment of that agreement, he did take the title in his own name, but, in part at least, for her benefit, and, in further fulfilment of the agreement, the principal was largely paid for with money which was then her own, she has a good claim to a resulting trust in this property, that is, she may claim to be the true owner of it as against her husband or against the defendant, if you find that he bought with notice of her title. Notice, I believe, is not denied." Again, after referring to the closeness of the relationship between the parties to the alleged trust, and the fact, growing out of that relation, that the husband may properly do a great many things about his wife's property, really as her agent, although his acts may seem to be those of an owner in his own right; the circumstances relied on by the defendants to show that Mrs. Light's share of her father's estate was loaned to her husband to enable him to acquire title in his In the light of these and other pointed instructions, as to the facts necessary to constitute the alleged resulting trust, and the degree of proof required to establish those facts, the jury doubtless considered all the evidence bearing upon the questions of fact submitted to them. By their verdict they ignored the defendants' contention, and, sustaining that of the plaintiff, found in her favor for a fraction less than seventy-three eightyfifths (73-85) of the land in controversy. All the evidence was properly for the consideration of the jury, and having been fairly submitted to them, there appears to be no reason why their conclusions of fact, upon which the verdict must have been based, should not be accepted as correct. If the case were before us, on a motion for new trial, there might perhaps be some propriety in considering circumstances to which the jury appears to have attached less importance than did the defendants below, but we are not called upon to consider it in that light. The acts and declarations of Reuben Light, ignoring his wife's ownership of the land, permitting it to be assessed for taxation as his own, confessing judgment in favor of his wife, claiming the benefit of exemption law, etc., were susceptible of explanation. Moreover, they were acts of the husband alone, for which the wife should not be held responsible, unless she actively participated therein. The facts established by the verdict, that, pursuant to previous agreement, the land in controversy was taken by Reuben Light for the benefit of his wife, and her entire interest in her father's estate appropriated to payment of the valuation money, etc., raise a resulting trust in her favor to the extent of the amount thus contributed towards the procurement of the title. In the absence of rebutting circumstances, it is presumed that one who pays the purchase-money or furnishes the consideration for the conveyance of land, intends to become the owner of it, although as a matter of convenience, or for some collateral purpose the conveyance may be made to another; but the principle, recognized in Barnet v. Dougherty, 32 Pa. 371, and that line of cases, is that the consideration-whether it be money or other valuable thing-necessary to raise a resulting trust as to real estate, must be paid or furnished when the title is acquired. In | Light and his wife, made, as the jury found, on the was, in effect, executed at the time the legal title As It is claimed that the case now before us is not within the principle above referred to, because the beneficial plaintiff's interest in her father's estate was not actually applied to payment of the owelty of partition for several months after the legal title became vested in her husband by the decree of partition, and hence there can be no resulting trust in her favor arising from her having furnished part of the consideration when the title was acquired. This contention, we think, ignores the legal effect of the partition, and Mrs. Light's recognizance proprio vigore operated as an appropriation of her interest in the entire valuation-money, as far as it went, to the appraised value of the purpart taken by her husband for her benefit. The fact that the actual calculation and adjustment of owelty among the heirs was not made for several months after the recognizance was given could not affect the right of the other heirs to insist on having the valuationmoney applied as it was. The rights of the parties respectively were fixed when the recognizances were given and the partition completed. They were as absolutely fixed as if Mrs. Light had then and there assigned on the record all her interest in the valuation-money of the several purparts in payment pro tanto of the valuation-money of the purpart taken for her benefit. As already stated Mrs. Light was not in a position to have required any of the other heirs to pay her anything on account of her interest in the appraised value of Brief reference has already been made to the purparts allotted to them. Cross-claims or plaintiff in error's contention and the character demands were created by the respective recogniz- of the evidence relied on to support it. It is not ances against each of those to whom purparts were proposed to spend any further time in considering awarded. The claims and demands of the others it. It was all fairly submitted to the jury, and against Mrs. Light, under her recognizance, ex- has been passed upon by them. The logic of the ceed her claims against them. In other words, verdict is that it did not enter very largely into neither of them was her debtor for owelty. On the facts found by the jury. To enter upon a the contrary, as shown by the subsequent calcu- more extended consideration of the evidence lation, she was their debtor in the aggregate sum referred to would be merely threshing old straw of $1208.19. That sum was paid by her hus- over again-an occupation which generally reband, and to that extent only had he any interest sults in neither edification nor profit. in the land in controversy. Not a farthing more Judgment affirmed. was contributed by him to the procurement of the title in severalty. The residue, over $7000, November 11, 1891. PAXSON, C. J., diswas his wife's interest in her father's estate. senting. I regret that I cannot agree to this That sum was appropriated to the payment of the judgment. I think the decision goes one step owelty in pursuance of the agreement between Mr. beyond any heretofore decided, and I fear in the contracted debts on the strength of it, she has succeeded in setting aside a solemn deed, the decree of the Orphans' Court, and the rights of her husband's creditors. And this was done mainly upon the testimony of the husband and wrong direction. There is nothing more pernicious than secret parol trusts. The statute has done much to cut them up by the roots and we have left resulting trusts only, viz: trusts arising from the payment of the purchase-money at the inception of the title, and those resulting from wife. If there had been any evidence that a fraud in obtaining the title. This case comes, as I view it, within another class not heretofore recognized by the law, viz: trusts resulting from the loan or advance of money by a wife to her husband, after he has acquired the title, to assist him in paying for the property. fraud had been practised by the husband upon the wife, the case would present a different aspect. But there was none. As before observed, Mrs. Light knew all about it. She was present in Court at the allotment; she heard all that took place; she knew that the farm was awarded The case was this: Under proceedings in the to her husband, while the shares of her married Orphans' Court in partition, Reuben L. Light, sisters were at the same time awarded to them, one of the plaintiffs below, was allotted a pur- and not to their respective husbands; she knew part, consisting of the farm in controversy. He the title was placed in her husband's name, and took it in right of his wife, who was one of the in the course of her long examination and crossheirs, and joined with her in the recognizance. examination upon the trial below, she did not so He did not take her share of the farm; that much as hint that she was deceived in this remained in her; he took only the interest of the respect, or that a fraud had been practised upon other heirs. The allotment was confirmed by her. This silence was especially significant in the Court, and a deed therefor duly made to him. view of her declaration that she wanted her husNo money was paid at the time the title passed band to have the credit of owning the property, to Mr. Light; it was paid more than a year and strengthens the testimony upon this point. afterwards; Mr. Light furnished a portion of the Stripped of the gloss which has been thrown purchase-money; the balance thereof was paid by around the case, it is merely that of a married the application of his wife's share of the estate, woman who permits her husband to take the title the other heirs joining in a release to him. The in his own name; contributes a portion of the legal title thus passed to the husband; his wife purchase-money, not at the inception of the title, knew all about it; there is evidence that she but over a year afterward; allows him to retain wished him to have the credit of owning the the title and exercise acts of ownership over it property; there was neither allegation nor proof for ten years, and until he becomes insolvent, that any concealment, fraud, or imposition was practised upon her. With the title in this condition Mr. Light exercised acts of ownership over the property for several years. The buildings were insured in his name; in 1883 the barn was destroyed by fire together with its contents; Mr. Light made oath that both barn and contents belonged to him, and received the insurance money as his own; the property was assessed in his name from the time of the partition in 1874 until the sale by the sheriff in 1884, upon a writ of fieri facias issued in 1884; the husband claimed the product of the farm under the exemption laws as his own property, which was accordingly appraised and set apart to him under said claim, while his wife claimed only the household furniture. Finally, in the year last named, Reuben L. Light became financially embarrassed, and desiring to secure to his wife the money she had advanced him, confessed a judgment in her favor for $8000. The judgment, however, was too late to be of any practical use, as the farm was already heavily incumbered. It was therefore removed from the records by direction of Mrs. Light, and the bolder and more successful measure adopted of setting up a parol trust of the real estate itself. And thus, after acquiescing in her husband's title for ten years, after he had and then sets up her secret equitable title to defeat the claims of his honest creditors. Such a transaction may well be likened to a pirate ship at sea which hoists friendly signals to lure unsuspecting vessels within its reach, and then displays the black flag. That these parties regarded the transaction as a loan from the wife to the husband is at least morally shown by the fact of the confession of the judgment by the husband in his wife's favor. Had the judgment been available to protect her interest, we would never have heard of this alleged equitable title. It is true she repudiated it afterwards, doubtless by the advice of counsel, but few persons will believe that the judgment was confessed without her knowledge and approval in the first instance. I confess I am unable to see how the fact that Mrs. Light joined in the recognizance with her husband, operated by its own force as an appropriation of her share of her father's estate to pay for her husband's farm. Had she taken the farm herself this might have been the case. The actual appropriation, as before stated, was made more than a year after the partition. At that time she could have demanded her share of her father's estate, which would have compelled her husband to pay the money. This fairly illustrates the strain of the case, for under all the authori- | Reuben L. Light and his family until 1885, the ties the trust must result from the payment buildings being insured in his name and the of the purchase-money at the very inception property also assessed in his name. The propof the title. I have referred to this case as being a step in advance of any heretofore decided. In all of them, as I understand them, there has been fraud or concealment practised upon the wife. In such cases I would say, as the authorities say, let the wife recover. But I am utterly opposed to the species of financial legerdemain practised in this case. The rights of married women have been greatly enlarged by the course of recent legislation and judicial decision. This involves corresponding responsibility. The legal fiction of the unity of the person of husband and wife no longer exists to the extent that it formerly did. I am of opinion that our decisions should be moulded to meet the changed circumstances. The time has gone by for treating a married woman like a spoiled child who cries for her rattle. I would reverse this judgment. GREEN and MITCHELL, JJ., concur in this dissent. [See next case.] H. S. P. N. near erty was sold by the sheriff on November 1, Jan. '87, 448. February 18, 1889; February 18, 1890. said "what do you want with me?" A few days afterwards I came into Asaph Light's; I said I wouldn't give the money to anybody until I saw Resulting trust-Evidence to establish a parol Asaph; I wanted to ask the wife first what I Error to the Common Pleas of Lebanon County. Ejectment, by Susanna Light and Reuben L. Light her husband, for the use of the said Susanna Light, against Daniel W. Zeller, to recover possession of a lot of ground in Lebanon County. Some time prior to April 6, 1887, Reuben L. Light bought the lot of ground in question from Joseph Moyer, administrator of Sarah Moyer, deceased, at private sale for $180, and upon that date paid $150 on account taking a receipt therefor in his own name. The petition of the said administrator for confirmation of the sale recited that the lot had been sold to Reuben L. Light for $180, and the decree confirming the sale was made accordingly, and deed therefor made to Reuben L. Light, grantee, upon payment of the balance of the purchase-money on March 8, 1878. The lot and the house thereon were occupied by should do, because it was her money. She said I should lend it to Asaph-$1000. He further testified that $143 of the purchase-money of the lot was paid out of this $1000, that the balance of $150 paid on April 6, 1877, was the price of a sheep belonging to his wife sold to a man named Ulrich, and that the balance of the $180 was made up from the price of two sheep belonging to the wife sold for $12 and $18 from the products of the farm referred to in the preceding case. It also appeared that Light had claimed. the products of the farm under the exemption laws as against a fi. fa. issued upon a judgment against him, and that at a sale of the stock and farm implements, they were advertised as his property and the notes in payment for them were made by the purchasers to him. The building erected upon the lot in the early part of 1877, was paid for by Reuben L. Light. Plaintiff offered to prove by Joseph T. Light, one of the sureties upon the recognizance given by Reuben L. Light for the valuation-money of the farm (see preceding case) that he became surety upon Reuben's statement that he was taking it for his wife, and that the recognizance was signed as surety for the wife. Objected to, because the declarations of the witness tend to |