boat's value at $70,000, and allowing thereon $25,000 insurance money paid the claimant, and $32,000 paid him by the government as aforesaid, leaving $13,000 additional on the value Iclaimed to be due to him.

The claimant's amended petition, praying for a recovery of the said sum of $25,000, for the use and benefit of said insurance. companies, was, with the leave of the court, filed Aug. 26, 1873. The court found as conclusions of law,

1. That, on the facts therein, the "Robert Campbell, Jr.," when destroyed by fire, was employed by the petitioner in the performance of a contract of affreightment, then subsisting between him and the United States; and they are not liable for her value.

2. That the claim of the petitioner against the United States, submitted by him to the third auditor, was not within the jurisdiction or authority of said officer, under the statute of 3d March, 1849; and his action thereon imposed no liability on the United States, and none has been assumed by them.

Judgment was rendered accordingly; and the claimant appealed to this court.

Argued by Mr. Joseph Casey for the appellant.

The steamboat was in the military service of the United States by "impressment," and, having been destroyed by inevitable accident, without fault or neglect of the owner, the case is clearly within the acts of March 3, 1849, and March 3, 1863. The fact of impressment and use creates an obligation to pay, from which an implied contract arises. United States v. Russell, 13 Wall. 623.

Mr. Assistant Attorney-General Smith for the appellee.

The claimant having remained in the possession, navigation, and command of his vessel, the arrangement was, in contemplation of law, a mere affreightment, sounding in a contract, and not a demise. Reed v. United States, 11 Wall. 600; United States v. Russell, 13 id. 623.

Being a contractor for the use of his vessel as a transport, neither the claimant nor his property was "in the military ser vice of the United States," within the meaning of the acts of March 3, 1849 (9 Stat. 415), and March 3, 1863 (12 id. 743). Guttman's Case, 9 Ct. of Cl. 60.

MR. JUSTICE FIELD delivered the opinion of the court.

If we could import into the findings of the court the facts stated in its opinion and in the brief of appellant's counsel, this case would be presented for our consideration with much greater completeness than at present. It would then clearly appear, that what is termed an impressment of the vessel of the claimant into the military service of the United States was only a notice to its captain from the assistant-quartermaster at St. Louis that the government would require its service for a trip to Memphis, Vicksburg, and other points, accompanied with a statement of the per diem compensation which would be allowed for its use, and for the subsistence of the men in addition to their wages, and fuel for the vessel; to which notice and service no objection was made by the captain or the claimant. It would also appear, that the claimant entered upon the service with alacrity, and that, in conformity with the terms designated as compensation, his account was rendered to the United States, and paid. Under these circumstances, the transaction could only be treated as a voluntary arrangement, notwithstanding the peremptory tone on the part of the assistant quartermaster-general, with which the negotiation with the captain was opened.

In Reed v. United States, reported in the 11th of Wallace, the same military officer at St. Louis, the assistant-quartermaster, in June, 1865, applied to the owners of another steamer, to transport supplies from that port to Fort Berthold, on the Missouri; but they declined the service, on account of the lateness of the season. He then ordered them to prepare for the trip, informing them, that, in case of refusal, the vessel would be impressed. They protested; but, under the orders given, put the boat in readiness, received the cargo, and performed the service required. With the order to prepare for the trip, the assistant-quartermaster, as in this case, fixed the per diem compensation for the use of the vessel, which appears to have been satisfactory to the owners; for it was received by them without objection. Upon this state of facts the court held, that, though the owners originally objected to the service, they in fact rendered it as matter of contract upon the compensation fixed by the assistant-quartermaster; and that the vessel

having grounded on its return trip, and been destroyed whilst thus grounded by an ice freshet, no liability for its value attached to the United States, under the second section of the act of 1849 (9 Stat. 414), or the fifth section of the amendatory act of 1863 (12 id. 743). The fact that the steamer remained, in performing the trip required, under the control and management of its owners, was considered as conclusive that it was not in the service of the United States, within the meaning of those acts; and that a vessel could only be regarded as in such service when let to the government, and the owners had parted with its possession, command, and management. So long as the owners retained the possession, command, and management of the steamer, the United States were only charterers of the same upon a contract of affreightment, and liable as such, and were not clothed with the character or responsibility of ownership. And it was also held, that the adjudication of the third auditor in allowing, in supposed conformity with the acts mentioned, for the value of the vessel lost, could not have any influence upon the decision of the court.

The facts stated in the opinion of the Court of Claims, and by the appellant's counsel in his brief, bring the present case fully within the reasoning and authority of Reed v. United States. And although the findings in the record are defective in not stating the particulars of the contract, and it is found that the steamer was impressed into the military service, yet it distinctly appears that the terms upon which the vessel would be employed were stated at the time by the assistant-quartermaster, and that the vessel, whilst performing its service, was manned by officers and men engaged by the claimant,— that is, that the vessel was in his possession and under his command and management, and not in the possession or under the command and management of the United States; and that his account with the government for its use and service as a transport, until its destruction by fire, was allowed and paid. We must therefore hold, as was held in the case cited, that whatever the force or coercion may have been which attended the original impressment, as it is termed, the transaction ultimately ended in a contract of affreightment, upon the terms stated by the assistant-quartermaster. As charterers of the vessel under

such a contract, the United States were not liable to the claimant for its loss, and, of course, could not be to the insurance companies which were subrogated to his rights. Macardier v. The Chesapeake Insurance Co., 8 Cranch, 39; The Schooner Volunteer, 1 Sumn. 551; The Brig Spartan, 1 Ware, 153; Donohue v. Kittel, 1 Cliff. 138. Judgment affirmed.

MR. JUSTICE MILLER dissented.

MR. JUSTICE STRONG did not take part in the decision.

SCHACKER v. HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY. The doctrine in Lee v. Watson, 1 Wall. 337, that, "in an action upon a moneydemand, where the general issue is pleaded, the matter in dispute is the debt claimed, and its amount, as stated in the body of the declaration, and not merely the damages alleged or the prayer for judgment at its conclusion must be considered in determining whether this court can take jurisdiction," affirmed and applied to the present case.

ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois.

Submitted on printed arguments by Mr. W. T. Burgess for the plaintiff in error, and by Mr. George O. Ide for the defendant in error.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE delivered the opinion of the

court.

On opening this record, we find that the action below was assumpsit upon a policy of insurance for $1,400. There are two counts in the declaration, but they are both upon the same cause of action; and although the damages, both in the writ and declaration, are laid at $3,000, it is apparent from the whole record that there could not be a recovery in any event for more than $1,400 and interest from July 14, 1873.

Our jurisdiction, when this writ issued, was limited in cases of this character to those in which the "matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, exceeds the sum or value of $2,000." Rev. Stat., sect. 692. Now, in the same class of cases, where

a judgment or decree has been rendered since May 1, 1875, the amount must be $5,000. 18 Stat. 316.

In Lee v. Watson, 1 Wall. 337, we held, that "in an action upon a money demand, where the general issue is pleaded, the matter in dispute is the debt claimed, and its amount, as stated in the body of the declaration, and not merely the damages alleged or the prayer for judgment at its conclusion must be considered in determining whether this court can take jurisdiction." Applying this rule, which is clearly right, to the present case, it is ordered that the writ of error be

Dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

GARFIELDE v. UNITED STATES.

The Post-Office Department, by public notice, invited proposals for conveying the mails on route No. "43,132, from Portland, Oregon, by Port Townsend (W. T.) and San Juan, to Sitka, Alaska, fourteen hundred miles and back, once a month, in safe and suitable steamboats." The notice, after fixing the time of departure and arrival from the terminal ports, contained the following: "Proposals invited to begin at Port Townsend (W. T.), five hundred miles less. Present pay, $34,800 per annum." Held, 1. That, under sect. 243 of the act of June 8, 1872 (17 Stat. 313), this was a sufficient notice that proposals were desired for carrying the mails between Port Townsend and Sitka. 2. That the acceptance by the Post-Office Department of the proposal of a bidder to so carry them created a contract of the same force and effect as if a formal contract had been written out and signed by the parties.

APPEAL from the Court of Claims.

In addition to the facts set forth in the opinion of the court, the court below found that the appellant's proposal was as follows:

"The undersigned, Selucius Garfielde, whose post-office address is Port Townsend, County of Jefferson, Territory of Washington, proposes to convey the mails of the United States from July 1, 1874, to June 30, 1878, on route No. 43,132, between Port Townsend, and Sitka, Alaska, under the advertisement of the Postmaster-General, dated Oct. 1, 1873, in safe and suitable steamboats, 'with celerity, certainty, and security' (law of June 8, 1872), for the annual sum of $26,000.