locutory injunctions had been allowed. In addition to this, it was shown that the action of the Circuit Court, in granting such injunctions, practically suspended not only "the enforcement of the revenue laws of Illinois against railroad corporations, but the collection of the taxes assessed upon the capital stock and franchises of all other corporations in the State, except so far as such corporations voluntarily pay such taxes." Under such circumstances, it is easy to see that questions of great public interest were involved, and that the operations of the government of the State would be embarrassed, so long as they remained undetermined by this court. Sufficient reason was shown, and the causes were accordingly advanced.

But here no such circumstances exist. The injunction operates only upon the property of a single corporation. The value of the property, or the amount of the revenue to be derived from it, is not shown. No question affecting the power of the State to tax other property is involved. The only dispute is as to the liability of the property of this single owner to taxation. The actual amount in controversy may be, and probably is, much less than that in very many other cases waiting their turn to be heard in the regular call of our docket. No disputed principle of law affecting any other case is, so far as we can discover from the record, presented for our determination.

We are of opinion, therefore, that a proper showing has not been made; but, as we have not before announced in so formal a manner the rule of practice which we have established for our government under this statute, leave is granted to the appellant to renew the motion if the defects which now exist in the showing can be supplied. Motion denied.

GAINES ET AL. v. HALE ET AL.

Where, in a suit between some of the claimants to the hot springs in Arkansas, the Supreme Court of that State by its decree refused aid to any of them against the other, except as to the improvements erected by each respectively on the property, and as to them saved the rights of the United States, this court, having decided in Hot Springs Cases, 92 U. S. 698, that the United States is the owner of the property, affirms that decree.

ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Arkansas. Submitted on printed arguments by Mr. W. M. Rose for the plaintiffs in error, and by Mr. Albert Pike, Mr. R. W. Johnson, Mr. J. B. Sanborn, and Mr. Frederick P. Stanton, for the defendants in error.

MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY delivered the opinion of the court. The decision made by this court in Hot Springs Cases at the last term, 92 U. S. 698, has disposed of the principal controversy between the parties in this case, by declaring that neither of them is entitled to the land in question, and that the same belongs to the United States. As the decree of the Supreme Court of Arkansas, in the present case, does not contravene this decision, but refuses aid to any of the parties against each other, except as to the improvements erected by each respectively, and as to these, saves the rights of the United States, we do not perceive any error in said decree on any Federal question. Decree affirmed.

SOUTH CAROLINA v. GEORGIA ET AL.

1. The compact between South Carolina and Georgia, made in 1787, by which it was agreed that the boundary between the two States should be the northern branch or stream of the Savannah River, and that the navigation of the river along a specified channel should for ever be equally free to the citizens of both States, and exempt from hinderance, interruption, or molestation, attempted to be enforced by one State on the citizens of the other, has no effect upon the subsequent constitutional provision that Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States.

2. Congress has the same power over the Savannah River that it has over the other navigable waters of the United States.

3. The right to regulate commerce includes the right to regulate navigation, and hence to regulate and improve navigable rivers and ports on such rivers.

4. Congress has power to close one of several channels in a navigable stream, if, in its judgment, the navigation of the river will be thereby improved. It may declare that an actual obstruction is not, in the view of the law, an illegal one.

5. An appropriation for the improvement of a harbor on a navigable river, “to be expended under the direction of the Secretary of War," confers upon that officer the discretion to determine the mode of improvement, and

authorizes the diversion of the water from one channel into another, if in his judgment such is the best mode. By such diversion preference is not given to the ports of one State over those of another. Quare, Whether a State suing for the prevention of a nuisance in a navigable river, which is one of its boundaries, must not aver and show that she sustains some special and peculiar injury thereby, such as would enable a private person to maintain a similar action.

THIS is a bill in equity, filed in this court by the State of South Carolina, praying for an injunction restraining the State of Georgia, Alonzo Taft (Secretary of War), A. A. Humphries (chief of the corps of engineers United States army), Q. A. Gilmore (lieutenant-colonel of that corps), and their agents and subordinates, from "obstructing or interrupting" the navigation of the Savannah River, in violation of the compact entered into between the States of South Carolina and Georgia on the twenty-fourth day of April, 1787. The first and second articles of that compact are as follows: :

"ARTICLE 1. The most northern branch or stream of the river Savannah, from the sea or mouth of such stream to the fork or confluence of the rivers now called Tugoloo and Keowee, and from thence, the most northern branch or stream of the said river Tugoloo, till it intersects the northern boundary-line of South Carolina, if the said branch or stream extends so far north, reserving all the islands in the said rivers Tugoloo and Savannah to Georgia; but if the head spring or source of any branch or stream of the said river Tugoloo does not extend to the north boundaryline of South Carolina, then a west line to the Mississippi, to be drawn from the head spring or source of the said branch or stream of Tugoloo River which extends to the highest northern latitude, shall, for ever hereafter, form the separation, limit, and boundary between the States of South Carolina and Georgia.

"ART. 2. The navigation of the river Savannah, at and from the bar and mouth, along the north-east side of Cockspur Island, and up the direct course of the main northern channel, along the northern side of Hutchinson's Island, opposite the town of Savannah, to the upper end of the said island, and from thence. up the bed or principal stream of the said river to the confluence of the rivers Tugoloo and Keowee, and from the confluence up the channel of the most northern stream of Tugoloo River to its source, and back again by the same channel to the Atlantic Ocean, is hereby declared to be henceforth equally free to the citizens of

both States, and exempt from all duties, tolls, hinderance, interruption, or molestation whatsoever attempted to be enforced by one State on the citizens of the other, and all the rest of the river Savannah to the southward of the foregoing description is acknowledged to be the exclusive right of the State of Georgia."

Congress enacted June 23, 1874: "That the following sums of money be, and are hereby, appropriated to be paid out of any money in the treasury not otherwise appropriated, to be expended under the direction of the Secretary of War, for the repair, preservation, and completion of the following public works hereinafter named."

"For continuing the improvement of the harbor at Savannah, $50,000." 18 Stat. 240.

The act of March 3, 1875 (18 id. 459), contains the following appropriation: "For the improvement of the harbor at Savannah, Ga., $70,000."

The work which the bill seeks to arrest is doing pursuant to the authority conferred by these acts.

The Savannah River, where it flows past the city of Savannah, is divided into two channels by Hutchinson's Island, which extends above and below the city, with a length of about six miles, and a width, where widest, of one mile or more. Of these channels, the more northerly is known as Back River, whilst that which passes immediately by the city of Savannah is called Front River.

The improvement consists in the construction of a crib dam at a point known as the "Cross Tides," for the purpose, by diverting a sufficient quantity of the water passing through the Back River into the Front River channel, of securing to the city a depth of fifteen feet at low water.

Mr. William Henry Trescot and Mr. Philip Phillips for the complainant.

1. The terms of the treaty of Beaufort are perpetual. Biordan & Duane, U. S. Laws, vol. i.; 1 Stat. So. Ca.; Wheaton's Int. Law, pt. 2, c. 2, sect. 268; Heffter, Droit Int., 170; Chirac v. Chirac, 2 Wheat. 259; Chappell's Historical Mis. of Georgia, pt. 2, 65; Bancroft, vol. viii. 137; vol. ix. 257; Articles of Confederation, Amer. Archives, vol. iv. 352–359.

2. Georgia and South Carolina were competent to execute

that treaty. Articles of Confederation; Harcourt v. Gaillard, 12 Wheat. 523; Spooner v. Mc Connell, 1 McLean, 347; Journal American Congress, vol. iv.; 2 Stat. 57.

3. The adoption of the Federal Constitution did not abrogate the treaty. Constitution of United States; Spooner v. McConnell, supra; Ordinance of 1787; Wilson v. Blackbird Creek Co., 3 Pet. 245; Hogg v. Zanesville Manuf. Co., 5 Ohio, 410; Woodbourn v. Kilbourn Manuf. Co., 1 Abb. 158; Pollard v. Hogan's Lessee, 3 How. 212; Permolli v. First Municipality, id. 589; Strader v. Graham, 10 id. 82; Dred Scott, 19 id. 396; Howard v. Ingersoll, 13 id. 405; American State Papers, Public Lands, vol. i. 103; President's Message, 1835, Dec. 8, Senate Doc. 1, p. 108; Engineer Report, 1838, MSS.; President's Message, February, 1840, Doc. 2; id. July, 1850, Ex. Doc. 19; Appropriation Acts, 1828-73; Annual Report, Gen. Gilmore, 1873, pp. 16, 17; Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 928; Fowler v. Lindsey, 3 Dall. 411.

4. The acts of Congress should be so construed and executed as not to invade the rights of the State under the compact (Aldridge v. Williams, 3 How. 24; Savings-Bank v. United States, 19 Wall. 237; Fisher v. United States, 2 Cranch, 385; United States v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 486; Dash v. Vankleek, 7 Johns. 502; Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264; Comm. v. Dounes, 24 Pick. 230), or to give preference to the ports of one State over those of another.

5. The State is the proper party complainant. Georgetown v. Canal Co., 12 Pet. 91; Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264; Georgia v. Stanton, 6 Wall. 75.

6. The equity side of the court is properly invoked. Wheeling Bridge Case, 13 How. 560; Georgetown v. Canal Co., supra.

7. The court will not enter into the question as to the degree of the obstruction. Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 2; King v. Ward, 4 Ad. & El. 384.

Mr. Solicitor-General Phillips, contra.

1. South Carolina and Georgia, by becoming members of the Union, stripped themselves of all power under the second article of their agreement of 1787, when the United States undertook to regulate the navigation of the river. Both States