1. Owners of a ship are not liable, under existing laws, for any loss,
damage, or injury by a collision, occasioned without their privity or
knowledge, beyond the amount of their interest in such ship and her
cargo at the time the collision occurred. The "Atlas," 302.

2. The true measure of compensation to an innocent party, in a case of
collision, is damages to the full amount of loss actually suffered by
him.

Id.

3. The shipper or consignee of the cargo of a vessel, being innocent of
all wrong, bears no proportion of the loss resulting from a collision.
He may pursue his remedy at common law; or in admiralty, by a
proceeding in rem, or by libel in personam against the owner of either
or both of the offending vessels.

Id.

4. A collision between two vessels, which were at fault, resulted in the
loss of the cargo of a third vessel which was not at fault. Its owner
proceeded in rem against one of the offending vessels, — Held, that
he was entitled to a decree against it for the entire amount of his
damages. Id.

--

5. The doctrine announced in The "Atlas," supra, p. 302, that where an
innocent party suffers damages by a collision resulting from the
mutual fault of two vessels, only one of which is libelled, the decree
should be against such vessel for the whole amount of the damages,
and not for a moiety thereof, reaffirmed, and applied to this case.
The "Juniata," 337.

6. The rule requiring a sailing-vessel to keep her course when approach-
ing a steamer in such direction as to involve risk of collision, does
not forbid such necessary variations in her course as will enable her
to avoid immediate danger arising from natural obstructions to navi-
gation. The "John L. Hasbrouck," 405.

7. Where well-known usage has sanctioned one course for a steamer as-
cending, and another for a sailing-vessel descending, a river, the
vessel, if required by natural obstructions to navigation to change
her course, is, after passing them, bound to resume it. Failing to do

ADMIRALTY (continued).

so, and continuing her course directly into that which an approach-
ing steamer is properly navigating, she is not entitled to recover for
a loss occasioned by a collision, which the steamer endeavored to
prevent, by adopting the only means in her power. Id.

ADVANCEMENT OF CAUSES.

See Practice, 1, 30.

AFFREIGHTMENT. See Contracts, 1.

AGENT. See Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes, 4; Common Car-
riers, 2-5.

1. The government is not bound by the act or declaration of its agent,
unless it manifestly appears that he acted within the scope of his
authority, or was employed in his capacity as a public agent to do
the act or make the declaration for it. Whiteside et al. v. United
States, 247.

2. Individuals, as well as courts, must take notice of the extent of au-
thority conferred by law upon a person acting in an official capacity.
Id.

AMENDMENTS.

Where no local statute or rule of local law is involved, the power to
amend is the same in attachment suits as in others. Tilton et al. v.
Cofield et al., 163.

APPROPRIATIONS

FOR IMPROVEMENT OF HARBORS ON

NAVIGABLE RIVERS. See Commerce, 5.

ARKANSAS, PRACTICE CODE OF. See Practice, 17.

ASSIGNEE IN BANKRUPTCY. See Contracts, 5.

1. Under the Bankrupt Act of March 2, 1867 (14 Stat. 517), the assignee
might sue in the State courts to recover the assets of the bankrupt,
no exclusive jurisdiction having been given to the courts of the
United States. Quare, Whether such exclusive jurisdiction is given
by the Revised Statutes. Claflin v. Houseman, Assignee, 130.
2. A suit pending against a party at the time he is adjudged a bankrupt,
may, after due notice to his assignee, be prosecuted to final judg-
ment against the latter in his representative capacity, where he
makes no objection to the jurisdiction and the bankrupt court does
not arrest the proceedings. Norton, Assignee, v. Switzer, 355.
3. Such judgment may be filed with the assignee as an ascertainment of
the amount due to the creditor by the bankrupt, and as a basis of
dividends, but it is effectual and operative for that purpose only. Id.
ASSISTANT SPECIAL AGENT OF THE TREASURY. See Con-
tracts, 3.

ASSUMPSIT. See Pleading, 3.

ATTACHMENT SUITS, POWER TO AMEND IN.

Where no local statute or rule of local law is involved, the power to amend
is the same in attachment suits as in others. Tilton et el. v. Cofield
et al., 163.

BAILMENT. See Mixture of Goods.

1. Actual delivery by the bailee on the demand of the true owner, who
has the right to the immediate possession of the goods bailed, is a
sufficient defence of the bailee against the claim of the bailor, and
there is no difference in this regard between a common carrier and
other bailees. The " Idaho," 575.

2. While a contract of bailment undoubtedly raises a strong presump
tion that the bailor is entitled to the thing bailed, it is not true that
the bailee thereby conclusively admits the right of the principal.
His contract is to do with the property committed to him what his
principal has directed, to restore it, or to account for it. He does
so account for it when he has yielded it to the claim of one who has
a right paramount to that of his bailor. Id.

3. If there be any estoppel on the part of the bailee, it ceases when the
bailment on which it is founded is determined by what is equivalent
to an eviction by title paramount; that is, by the reclamation of
possession by the true owner.

Id.

4. Nor can it be maintained that a carrier can excuse himself for failure
to deliver to the order of the shipper, only when the goods have been
taken from his possession by legal proceedings, or where the shipper
has obtained the goods by fraud from the true owner. Id.

5. Whether the shipper has obtained, by fraud practised upon the true
owner, the possession he gives to the carrier, or whether he mistak-
enly supposes he has rights to the property, his relation to his bailee
remains the same. He cannot confer rights which he does not
possess; and, if he cannot withhold the possession from the true
owner, one claiming under him cannot. Id.

6. While a bailee cannot avail himself of the title of a third person
(though that person be the true owner), for the purpose of keeping
the property for himself, nor in any case where he has not yielded
to the paramount title, he is not answerable if he has delivered the
property to its true owner at his demand. Id.

7. Without asserting that a title to personal property may not be created
between the issue of a bill of lading therefor and its delivery to the
ship, which will prevail over the master's bill, the court holds, that,
in the absence of any such intervening right, a bill of lading does
cover goods subsequently delivered and received to fill it, and that it
will represent the ownership of the goods. Their subsequent removal
from the vessel by a person other than the true owner, either with
or without the consent of her officers, cannot divest that owner-
ship. Id.

8. The taking possession of property by one not its owner, or authorized

BAILMENT (continued).

by him, shipping it, obtaining bills of lading from the carriers,
indorsing them away, or even selling the property and obtaining a
full price for it, can have no effect upon the rights of the owner,
even in the case of a bona fide purchaser. Id.

BANKRUPTCY. See Assignee in Bankruptcy; Jurisdiction, 2, 7, 12.
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS. See Practice, 31.

BILL OF LADING. See Bailment, 7, 8; Common Carriers, 1, 5.
The statutes of Louisiana prohibit the issue of bills of lading before
the receipt of the goods; but they do not forbid curing an illegal
bill by supplying goods, the receipt of which has been previously
acknowledged. The "Idaho," 575.

BILL OF REVIEW. See Practice, 15.

BILLS OF EXCHANGE AND PROMISSORY NOTES. See Evi-
dence, 2; Protest and Notice.

1. A bona fide holder of negotiable paper, purchased before its maturity
upon an unexecuted contract, on which part payment only had been
made when he received notice of fraud, and a prohibition to pay, is
protected only to the amount paid before the receipt of such notice.
Dresser v. Missouri & lowa Railway Construction Co., 92.

2. As the Statute of Limitations was suspended in Louisiana during the
war, a note dated Jan. 28, 1859, payable twelve months thereafter,
was not prescribed when the plaintiffs, the executors of A., made a
legal demand therefor by instituting an action, Jan. 5, 1870. The
defendant, by paying the note at that time, could, therefore, have
been subrogated to their rights, and could have maintained suit
against the maker in their names. Bird et al., Ex'rs, v. Louisiana
State Bank, 97.

3. The holder of a note which is secured by mortgage may proceed at
law and in equity at the same time, until he obtains actual satisfac-
tion of the debt. Ober v. Gallagher, 199.

4. In law, a person with whom a note is deposited for collection is the
agent of the holder, and not of the maker. The maker has no
interest in it, except to pay the note. Failing to do this, he leaves
it to be dealt with as others interested may choose. Dodge et al.
v. Freedman's Savings & Trust Co., 379.

-

5. Where a note, deposited in bank for collection by its owner, was paid
by a person not a party thereto, with the intention of having it
remain as an existing security, and the money so paid was received
by the owner of the note, Held, that such person thereby became
the purchaser of the note, and its negotiability remains after as
before maturity, subject to the equities between the parties. Id.
6. The order of the President of the United States of April 29, 1865 (13
Stat. 776), removed, from that date, all restrictions upon commercial

BILLS OF EXCHANGE AND PROMISSORY NOTES (continued).
intercourse between Tennessee and New Orleans; and neither the
rights nor the duties of the holder of a bill of exchange, drawn at
Trenton, Tenn., which matured in New Orleans before June 13,
1865, were dependent upon, or affected by, the President's proclama-
tion of the latter date (id. 763). Bond et al. v. Moore, 593.
BURDEN OF PROOF. See Domicile, 1; Letters-patent, 12.
Where the evidence on the part of the plaintiff in an action against a
railroad company for injuries received upon its road did not tend to
establish contributory negligence on his part, the court charged that
the burden of proving it rested on the defendant, and that it must
be established by a preponderance of evidence, - Held, that the
charge was not erroneous. Indianapolis & St. Louis R. R. Co. v.
Horst, 291.

CALIFORNIA.

Grants of land to. See School Lands.

Selections of land by. See Public Lands, 1–5.

CALLAWAY, COUNTY OF. See Municipal Bonds, 3, 4.

CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS. See Burden of Proof.

1. In an action against a railroad company for injuries received by a pas-
senger upon its road, it is not error for the court to instruct the jury
"that a person taking a cattle-train is entitled to demand the high-
est possible degree of care and diligence, regardless of the kind of
train he takes." Indianapolis & St. Louis R. R. Co. v. Horst, 291.
2. The rule of law, that the standard of duty on the part of a carrier of
passengers should be according to the consequences that may ensue
from carelessness, applies as well to freight-trains as to passenger-
trains. It is founded deep in public policy; and is approved by ex-
perience, and sanctioned by the plainest principles of reason and
justice. Id.

CAVEAT EMPTOR. See Purchasers at Judicial Sales, 1-3.

CHAMPAGNE WINES. See Import Duties.

COLLISION. See Admiralty; Practice, 23.

COMMERCE.

1. The compact between South Carolina and Georgia, made in 1787, by
which it was agreed that the boundary between the two States should
be the northern branch or stream of the Savannah River, and that
the navigation of the river along a specified channel should for ever
be equally free to the citizens of both States, and exempt from hin-
derance, interruption, or molestation, attempted to be enforced by
one State on the citizens of the other, has no effect upon the subse-
quent constitutional provision that Congress shall have power to
regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States.
South Carolina v. Georgia et al., 4.