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INDEX

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THE PRINCIPAL MATTERS.

Of appeal.

ABANDONMENT.

Form of judgment: costs, 425. Poor,
XXIII. 1.

ACCEPTANCE.

Of bills. Bills, I.

ACCORD.

I. By what means.

By payment of a small sum with dis-
count, 664. Demand, I. 1.

II. Pleading.

1. What an insufficient allegation of
satisfaction compromise of action.

To a declaration in case, for infring-
ing a patent, defendants pleaded, in bar
of further maintenance of the action,
that, after declaration, it had been
agreed between plaintiffs and defend-
ants that defendants should admit their
liability to the action, as they then did
admit; that defendants should take, and
plaintiffs grant, a license for the use of
the invention; that defendants should
hand a cheque for 7 51. to a third person,
to be held till the grant of the license,

and then handed by him to plaintiffs;
that plaintiffs and defendants should
respectively bear their own costs of the
action; that "this action, and the
causes of action included in the same,
should be settled, satisfied, discharged
and terminated by the arrangement and
agreement before mentioned." Aver-
ment that defendants admitted their
liability, drew and delivered the cheque,
and had always been ready to perform
the agreement, take the license, and
pay their own costs; of which plaintiffs.
had notice.

Held bad, on special demurrer.

For that, if the agreement were con-
strued as an accord in respect of the
things to be done, there was no aver-
ment of satisfaction, the stipulations of
defendants not having been all per-
formed; and, if the making of the
agreement itself was relied upon, there
was no allegation, expressed or implied,
that the agreement was accepted in
satisfaction.

Also, because the plea left it ambi-
guous which of the two matters above
specified was relied upon as the accord
and satisfaction. Flockton v. Hall, 380.
2. Ambiguity as to what accepted in
satisfaction, 380. Antè, 1.

5. Absence of averment of acceptance
in satisfaction, 380. Antè, 1

Pleading.

ACCOUNT.

Plea setting out deed in denial of allegation in declaration.

Declaration in account stated that L., by deed (which was in defendant's custody, so that profert could not be made), settled land to such uses as L. should appoint, and, in default of appointment, to certain specific uses which were stated in the declaration : and that L. died without appointing; whereby the limitations in default of appointment took effect, under which plaintiff and defendant became tenants in common. From the limitations, &c., stated in the declaration, it appeared that they would become such tenants.

The declaration went on to allege that defendant received the rents and profits, and ought as bailiff to have rendered an account of what he received more than his share, but had not rendered such account.

The plea set out the deed, which appeared to be to the effect stated in the declaration and it alleged that L. did appoint, setting out the appointment, which shewed that plaintiff and defendant were not tenants in common. The plea concluded with a verification.

Held, on special demurrer, a good plea; for that the fact of this appointment ought not to have been pleaded as a traverse of the allegation of nonappointment, such allegation in the count being unnecessary; and that,

At close of plaintiff's case.

Held (before stat. 14 & 15 Vict. c. 99. s. 2.) that, in an action against several defendants, the judge might direct an acquittal of one, against whom no evidence appeared at the close of the plaintiff's case; and thereby render him competent to give evidence for his co-defendants; provided there were no special pleas which he, with the other defendants, would be liable to costs under the New Rules for not proving.

Notice of distress for rent under 1 stat. 2 W. & M. c. 5. s. 2. stated that the broker had taken the goods mentioned in the inventory underwritten, which inventory was: “One clock and weights, &c., and any other goods and effects that may be found in and about the said premises to pay the said rent and expenses of this distress." Held sufficient, it appearing that the distress was in fact meant to include all the goods on the premises. Wakeman v. Lindsey, 625.

II. Finality of, 529. Arbitration, I. 1.

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even if such allegation had been ne- Of settlement of lunatic pauper, 815.

cessary, it was still necessary for the plea to set out the appointment, in order to shew its effect. Ricketts v. Loftus, 482.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT.

I. By clerk to guardians, 287. Poor, XII. 1.

II. By relief and certificate, 287, 611. Poor, XII. XIII.

ACQUITTAL.

I. Of co-defendant.

Poor, XIX.

ADMINISTRATOR. Executors and Administrators.

ADMISSION.

I. Of documents under rule of Court,

What objections it waives.

A party who has been called upon in the ordinary form (Reg. Gen. Hil. 4 W. 4. § 20., and Form A.) to admit a document before trial, and has done

so, cannot, at the trial, object to such document on the ground that it has an interlineation not accounted for by evidence, unless it appear that the interlineation was made after the admission. Freeman v. Steggall, 202. II. By conduct, 611. Poor, XIII. III. In pleading. Pleading, IX. IV. In evidence. Evidence, II.

V. Of Welsh attorneys, 588. Attorney, I.

ADVERSE POSSESSION.

Not by user authorised by statute, 81. Crown, I. 1.

ADVOWSON.

I. Vested in trustees.

Remedy for cestuis qui trust to compel presentation of their clerk.

An advowson was vested in feoffees, in trust, upon every avoidance, to present to the Ordinary such person as should be elected by a majority of the landowners in a parish. On motion for a mandamus to the trustees to present a clerk, on the ground that he had been so elected: Held,

That either the remedy of the landowners against the trustees was in Equity for a breach of trust, or, if the landowners had a legal right, their remedy was by quare impedit; and that in either case the mandamus would not lie.

Held, also, that the remedy, if any, of the clerk was in Equity, and that he had no legal right. Regina v. Orton Trustees, 139.

stat. 1 & 2 Vict. c.'110. s. 3., may be sworn before a writ of summons has been taken out; and therefore, in an indictment for perjury in such an affidavit, it is not necessary to shew that an action had commenced before the affidavit was sworn.

2. Where an indictment contains several counts, and a defendant is convicted on each, a judgment, that the defendant," for the offence charged upon him in and by each and every count of the indictment aforesaid, be imprisoned in " &c. " for the space of eight calendar months now next ensuing," is correct, and means that the defendant shall be imprisoned for the same eight months upon the charge in

each count.

3. After a verdict of Guilty, on an indictment, and prayer of judgment, the record stated that it appeared to the Court" that the verdict was unduly given," and the Court "vacated and made void" the verdict, and all other process against the first jury, and ordered that a new jury should come, because the coroner and defendant had put themselves on the last mentioned jury. A second verdict of Guilty was found; and judgment passed thereon. Such entry is sufficient on writ of error, though no reason be assigned on the record for holding the first verdict to have been unduly given. King v. The Queen, 31.

II. In opposition to return to Habeas
Corpus, 554. Habeas Corpus, I. 1.
III. Perjury in.

Form of indictment, 31. Antè, I.

AGENT.

II. Nature of the clerk's right and re- I. Rights of, against principal. medy, 139. Antè, I.

AFFIDAVIT.

I. Time of swearing.

Affidavit to hold to bail.

By the Court of Exchequer Chamber:

1. An affidavit to hold to bail, under

Agent purchasing with his own money: condition on transfer to principal.

K. purchased corn at New Orleans for plaintiff, a London merchant, whose agent K. was. The purchase was made with K.'s money; and K. drew for the amount upon plaintiff, the bill being, in its body, expressed to be on account of the corn. K. sold the bill to defendant

at New Orleans, and, at the same time, handed to defendant a bill of lading of the corn, which had been drawn for delivery to K.'s order and indorsed by K. K. at the same time empowered defendant to sell the corn if the bill of exchange should not be paid. Afterwards K. advised plaintiff of the transaction, forwarded to him the invoice, which stated the corn to be shipped at the risk and on the account of plaintiff, and requested plaintiff' to accept the bill of exchange.

Held, that the inference from these facts was that K. did not transfer the property in the corn to plaintiff, subject to a lien, but only transferred the property to plaintiff on the condition of his paying the bill of exchange, and that, in the mean time, the corn was the property of defendant.

The corn having arrived in England, and the bills of exchange and lading having been forwarded to England by defendant, the bill of exchange was accepted by plaintiff. On its maturity, he offered to take it up: but it was not produced, owing to a mistake of defendant's agent in England as to its place of deposit. On a later day the bill of exchange was presented to plaintiff, who did not pay it.

Held, that defendant, under these circumstances, was entitled to retain the corn. Jenkyns v. Brown, 496.

II. Liability of.

On contract made by him in name of foreign principal.

for providing himself in provisions. During the outward passage, rations were to be served out to plaintiff on account of P. The contract to be understood to be in force for one year certain from the date; and, should plaintiff be discharged before that time, three months' wages to be paid in advance, besides finding him a passage home; P. being at liberty to confirm and continue the engagement on the terms stated, or to discharge plaintiff' and to find him his passage back to England: the wages to be payable up to the day of plaintiff's arrival in Eng land, unless he should be discharged for misconduct : one month's pay to be advanced for plaintiff's outfit for the voyage.

Held:

1. That the agreement did not require a stamp, being within the exemption "memorandum or agreement for the hire of any labourer," in stat. 55 G. 5. c. 184. Schedule, Part I. tit. Agreement.

2. That defendant was liable for breaches of this agreement by the not serving of rations during the outward passage, by the discharge of plaintiff before the T. arrived at Havana, and by the non-payment of three months' wages in advance. Wilson v. De Zulueta, 405.

III. Admissions by.

By clerk to guardians, as against one of his townships, 287. Poor, XII. 1.

IV. Things done to.

Publication of libel to plaintiff's agent for the purpose, 185. Defamation, I.

AGREEMENT.

Plaintiff and defendant being resident in England, and P. at Havana, and defendant being a foreign agent, a written agreement was entered into by plaintiff with defendant "in behalf and representation of P. of Havana" (so stated in the agreement), that plaintiff would proceed as fireman and stoker on board I. Pleading as an accord and satisfaction the T. steamer, then about to leave London for Havana, calling at intermediate ports, to be placed in the service of P., and would faithfully do the work of fireman or stoker on board the T., and obey the orders of the engineers. In consideration of the service, plaintiff

380. Accord, II. 1.
II. Generally. Contract.

ALTERNATIVE.

was to receive wages at 57. per month, In specification, one incorrect, 563. payable monthly, and 21. per month

Patent, II. 1.

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Substituting a name for a description of a person as unknown.

To a count for false imprisonment, defendant pleaded that his goods had been stolen by a person unknown to him; and that he had probable cause for suspecting plaintiff to have been guilty of the felony; also, that the goods had been stolen by a person unknown, and plaintiff had feloniously and knowingly received them: also, that a person unknown had feloniously received, and defendant had probable cause to suspect plaintiff of having been guilty of and concerned in the felonious receiving.

In support of these averments, proof was offered that the goods had been, in the first instance, stolen or received by P., a person known to defendant. The Judge amended the pleas, substituting P., by name, for the person unknown.

The Court, under stat. 5 & 4 W. 4. c. 42. s. 25., refused a rule for a new trial.

Though it was suggested that the person named had been tried for the felony and acquitted. Pratt v. Hanbury, 190.

AMOTION.

From benefice, 825. Benefice, III. 1.

ANNEXATION.

Of drawings to a plea, 363. Patent, I. 1.

APPEAL.

I. Whether it lies.

II. Right to appeal.

When the order sufficiently shews the appellant to be rated, 789. Poor, V.

III. Recognizance.

Notice of, when sufficient, 421. Post,
VII. 1.

IV. Statement of grounds.
Particularity, 327. Poor, XI. 4.

V. Abandonment.

After entry and respite: proper form of judgment, 425. Poor, XXIII. 1. Preliminary points.

VI.
Proper remedy for wrong decision, 789.
Poor, V.

VII. Judgment.

1. On disallowance for non-compliance with statutory conditions: confirmation improper.

An order of Sessions, whereby, after reciting that an appeal has been entered by a putative father against an order of maintenance, the Sessions (under stat. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 10. s. 5.) refuse to allow the appeal, for insufficiency of the notice of recognizance, and confirm the order of maintenance with costs, is bad by reason of the improper confirmation.

Notice of recognizance, under stat. 8 & 9 Vict. c. 10. s. 3., is sufficient, though it do not state that the recognizance has the several conditions required by that clause, but, only, that it is conditioned for trial of the appeal. Regina v. Holborow, 421.

2. When not quashed though erro neous in form, 425. Poor, XXIII. 1. VIII. Order on.

When it sufficiently shews jurisdiction, 789. Poor, V.

IX. Costs.

1. Not to be given on disallowance for want of locus standi, 421. Antè, VII. 1.

2. How given on dismissal after entry and respite, 425. Poor, XXIII. 1.

Not implied from mere inconvenience, X. Special Case. 815. Poor, XIX.

When the Court will notice that there

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