manner in all respects as by a natural-born British subject. Chap. II. See Sharp v. St. Sauveur, 7 Ch. 343; De Geer v. Stone, 22 Ch. D. 243. There appears never to have been any testamentary Traitors, felons, and incapacity as such, affecting traitors, felons or suicides. They suicides. were not incapable of making wills, they were only incapable of disposing of such property as was forfeited for their offence. Thus a felo de se could make a will of realty which was. not forfeited, and could also appoint an executor by will. Norris v. Chambres, 7 Jur. N. S. 59; In bonis Bailey, 2 Sw. & T. 156. abolished. By 33 & 34 Vict. c. 23, forfeiture and escheat for treason and Forfeiture felony are abolished, and sect. 8 enacts that every convict shall be incapable during the time while he shall be subject to the operation of the Act of alienating or charging any property, or of making any contract. See Ex parte Graves; In re Harris, 19 Ch. D. 1. Sects. 9-17 contain provisions for the administration of the convict's property by administrators, and sect. 18 provides that the property shall be invested and accumulated for the benefit of the convict and his heirs and legal personal representatives, and shall revest in the convict upon his ceasing to be subject to the operation of the Act, or his heirs or legal personal representatives. The Act appears to leave the testamentary power of a convict untouched, and it would seem therefore that a convict may now dispose of his property by will. By 42 & 43 Vict. c. 59, s. 3, outlawry in any civil proceeding Outlawry. is abolished. Chap. IV. Knowledge of contents. Delegation of testamentary power. Legatee must prove knowledge. CHAPTER IV. REQUISITES FOR A VALID WILL. No will can be valid of which the testator does not know and approve the contents. Barry v. Butlin, 2 Moo. P. C. 480; In bonis Duane, 8 Jur. N. S. 752; 31 L. J. P. 173; Sutton v. Sadler, 3 C. B. N. S. 87; 26 L. J. C. P. 284; Hastilow v. Stobie, 1 P. & D. 64; Cleare v. Cleare, ib. 655; In bonis Hunt, 23 W. R. 553; 3 P. & D. 250; overruling Cunliffe v. Cross, 3 Sw. & T. 37; 32 L. J. P. 68. A testator cannot, therefore, delegate his testamentary power to another person; that is to say, he cannot adopt and execute a will made for him without knowing its contents. Hastilow v. Stobie, 1 P. & D. 64; Cleare v. Cleare, ib. 655. See ante, p. 14. But a will prepared in accordance with the testator's instructions is valid, though at the time of execution the testator remembers only that he has given instructions and believes the will to be in accordance with them. Parker v. Felgate, 8 P. D. 171. Whenever a will is prepared under circumstances which preparing will raise a well-grounded suspicion that it does not express the mind of the testator, it is for those who propound the will to remove such suspicion. Barry v. Butlin, 2 Moo. P. C. 480; Fulton v. Andrew, L. R. 7 H. L. 448; Brown v. Fisher, 63 L. T. 465; Tyrrell v. Paynton, (1894) P. 151. The fact that the will is prepared by or on the instructions of the person taking a benefit under it is a circumstance raising such suspicion. Paske v. Ollatt, 2 Phillim. 323; Ingram v. Wyatt, 1 Hagg. 388; Billinghurst v. Vickers, 1 Phillim. 187; Baker v. Batt, 2 Moo. P. C. 317; Scoular v. Plowright, 5 W. R. 99; 10 Moo. P. C. 440; Fulton.v. Andrew, L. R. 7 H. L. 448; Hegarty v. King, 5 L. R. Ir. 249; 7 ib. 18; Parker v. Duncan, 62 L. T. 642. See Donnelly v. Broughton, (1891) A. C. 435, P. C. Chap. IV. relation. But the influence of a person standing in a fiduciary relation Fiduciary to the testator may lawfully be exercised to obtain a will or legacy, so long as the testator thoroughly understands what he is doing and is a free agent; and the burden of proof of undue influence lies upon those who assert it. Hindson v. Wetherill, 6 D. M. & G. 301; Walker v. Smith, 29 B. 394; Parfitt v. Lawless, 2 P. & D. 462. The rules therefore applicable in the case of gifts inter vivos to persons standing in a fiduciary relation to the donor do not apply to wills. In the case of gifts inter vivos, such persons have to show that not only the donor intended to give, but that his intention was not influenced by the donee, a burden of proof which in most cases it is practically impossible to discharge, at any rate so long as the fiduciary relation subsists. influence. To establish a case of undue influence, it must be shown Undue that fraud or coercion has been practised on the testator in relation to the will itself, not merely in relation to other matters or transactions. Boyse v. Rossborough, 6 H. L. 2; Hall v. Hall, 1 P. & D. 481; Wingrove v. Wingrove, 11 P. D. 81. See Longford v. Purdon, 1 L. R. Ir. 75. A case of undue influence is more easily established where there is evidence to show that the person influenced was of feeble mental capacity or in a weak state of health. Hampson v. Guy, 64 L. T. 778. If a testator is prevented by threats from altering his will the Court of Probate may, if the case is proved, declare the persons exercising the coercion trustees of the benefits they ake under the will. Betts v. Doughty, 5 P. D. 26. A will which has been read over to the testator, or the Will read over. contents of which have been brought to his notice before execution, must, in the absence of fraud or coercion, be presumed to have been approved by him. Guardhouse v. Blackburn, 1 P. & D. 109; Goodacre v. Smith, ib. 359; Atter v. Chap. IV. Fraud and mistake. Omission of scandalous passages.. Atkinson, ib. 665; Rhodes v. Rhodes, 7 App. C. 192; Beamish v. Beamish, (1894) 1 I. R. 7. Words or clauses introduced into a will by fraud, accident, or mistake, without the knowledge of the testator, will be struck out of the will, although their rejection may affect the sense of the words which remain. In bonis Wray, I. R. 10 Eq. 267; In bonis Duane, 2 Sw. & T. 590; 31 L. J. P. 173; In bonis Oswald, 3 P. & D. 162; Morrell v. Morrell, 7 P. D. 68; Rhodes v. Rhodes, 7 App. C. 192; In bonis Boehm, (1891) P. 247; In bonis Gordon, (1892) P. 228; In bonis Moore, (1892) P. 378; In bonis Snowden, 75 L. T. 279. And clerical errors made in the engrossment have been corrected by substituting the right words. In bonis Bushell, 13 P. D. 7; In bonis Huddlestone, 63 L. T. 255. See, however, In bonis Walkeley, 69 L. T. 419. But where a testator has executed a will with knowledge of the contents, nothing can be added or omitted after his death on the ground of mistake. In bonis Dary, 1 Sw. & T. 262; Guardhouse v. Blackburn, 1 P. & D. 109; Harter v. Harter, 3 P. & D. 11; Collins v. Elstone, (1893) P. 1; Beamish v. Beamish, (1894) 1 Ir. 7. Where a residuary legatee prepares the will and is directed to give further legacies which he purposely omits, and at the time when the will is read over and executed the further legacies are not present to the mind of the testator as the residuary legatee knows, the will will nevertheless be admitted to probate. Mitchell v. Gard, 3 Sw. & T. 75. The remedy in such a case would appear to be to have the residuary legatee declared a trustee so far as regards the legacies omitted. As to whether such a declaration must be obtained in the Probate Division at the time when the will is proved, see post, p. 75. The Court has, it seems, power to direct a passage containing a gross libel to be omitted from the probate copy of the will, though it will not exercise the power merely on the ground that the charge is offensive and untrue. In bonis Wartnaby, 1 Rob. 423; Marsh v. Marsh, 1 Sw. & T. 528, 536 (passages omitted). Curtis v. Curtis, 3 Add. 33; In bonis Honywood, 2 P. & D. 251 (omission refused). Chap. IV. s. 8. By the Wills Act (1 Vict. c. 26), sect. 8, it is enacted that no Wills Act, will shall be valid unless it shall be in writing and executed in manner thereinafter mentioned. The requirements as to execution are as follows:-in the first place the will must be signed at the foot or end thereof by the testator or by some other person in his presence or by his direction. 1. Signature by testator. execute. The signature of the testator must be intended as an act Intention to of execution of the will. A signature to each page of the will, where the last page is left unsigned, is not primâ facie a sufficient execution. Sweetland v. Sweetland, 4 Sw. & T. 6; Burke v. Moore, I. R. 9 Eq. 609; In bonis Maddock, 3 P. & D. 169. The mark of the testator is a sufficient signature, whether he Mark. can write or not. Baker v. Dening, 8 A. & E. 94; Wilson v. Beddard, 12 Sim. 28; In bonis Bryce, 2 Curt. 325; In bonis Amiss, 2 Rob. 116; In bonis Douce, 2 Sw. & T. 593; In bonis Clarke, 1 Sw. & T. 22. A stamped name is sufficient. Jenkyns v. Gaisford, 3 Sw. & T. 93; 11 W. R. 854. name. Signature in an assumed name is sufficient. In bonis Glover, Assumed 5 N. of C. 553; In bonis Ridding, 2 Rob. 339; In bonis Clarke, 1 Sw. & T. 22; In bonis Douce, 2 ib. 593. A seal is not sufficient. Smith v. Evans, 1 Wils. 313; Seal. The case of Lemayne v. Stanley, 3 Lev. 1; 1 Freem. 538, is overruled. But a seal with the testator's initials, and acknowledged as his hand and seal, is sufficient. In bonis Emerson, 9 L. R. Ir. 443. Passing a dry pen over a written signature is not enough. Dry pen. Casement v. Fulton, 5 Moo. P. C. 130; Playne v. Scriven, 1 Rob. 772; see Keril v. Lynch, I. R. 9 Eq. 249. agent. Another person, though he may be also an attesting witness, Signature by may by the testator's direction sign the testator's name, or impress a stamp with the testator's name engraved on it, or |