relative position of every thing-that, by such means, a precarious pacification of the scriptural and the patristic authorities might be effected.-Let this be done; and then what is the consequence as it affects the Inspired Books, in their forensic aspect, that is to say, as containing a body of law? There can be no question on this point. No persons who are conversant with the principles of legal argumentation can entertain any doubt in so plain a case.—

-If there be a code and a commentary, and if the two be not clearly coincident-the commentary not being explanatory only, or serving to show how the code, in its undoubted meaning, takes hold of particular instances-if the commentary be not such, but if it be exceptive, if it deal in limitations, and in extensions; and if it supersede, or so far abrogate or modify statutes, as that the practical consequence of living under the code, or under the commentary, is by no means the same, then-the Commentary is the Law. The two no longer stand on the same level;-the one is brought near to us; the other recedes; the one is obsolete, the other is in force.

In such a case, those who addict themselves to the study of law, in the abstract, will indeed continue to read the code; but in halls and courts of justice, in magistrates' rooms, and when man and man are in controversy, it will be held an idle pedantry to quote the code. The commentary is what we have to do with, and that alone.

A principle so clear and unquestionable as this, the church of Rome has ingeniously recognised; and upon it boldly acts. Ambiguity, vacillation, inconsistency, are with those only who, while adhering to the commentary, are placed under some inauspicious side-long influence, compelling them to render a homage to the code, which it can never be allowed to retain, in presence of the commentary.

In any such instance of the supervention of an interpretative commentary, practically rescinding original statutes, clear-headed and honest men will scorn to employ evasive language. They will say-The old law is good, or it was good once; but the commentary is what we go by; nor do we much trouble ourselves to ask how the old law might have affected this or that case, if there had been no commentary.

What is valid in law, must be so in theology; nay, more decisively so; for when the code and the commentary are both of human origination, there may, at all times, be room found for an open discussion of any difference appearing between the two: the two being homogeneous. But if the code be divine, and the commentary (by confession) human, and if nevertheless the latter be admitted to supersede, or practically to modify the former, it must do so by virtue of a dispensing power, of such weight and efficacy as must restrict and totally exclude all discussion. In any instance in which we might be tempted to go into a discussion of the difference between the divine code, and the human commentary, we have no alternative but either to denounce the commentary as an impious usurpation, or to submit to it implicitly, as paramount to the divine. Who shall not tremble before a power which assumes the right to abrogate a divine law?

This the church of Rome has fully understood in her controversy with 'heretics.' To contradict Scripture may have been a fault; but to contradict the church,' is always blasphemy.

We may easily bring these plain principles to the test of an instance :

If Matthew Henry's Exposition be any thing more to me than a very good and learned man's opinion of the meaning of Scripture-if it be any thing more, it is SCRIPTURE to me ;—it is my Bible, my law, my creed. But put the name of Ambrose in the place of that of Matthew Henry, and does logic demand a different conclusion?

Ambrose may be more to my taste than Matthew Henrythis is a question of private inclination. But if any essential condition distinguishes the interpretations of the bishop of Milan, from those of the nonconforming pastor of Chester, then that condition, bearing upon the religious use I am to make of the writings of the former, operates, so far as it goes, to remove the Scriptures from my eye, as the rule of belief and duty. Bring it to a matter of fact.- The Inspired Rule says, Let a bishop be a married man;-Ambrose says, Nay, not so; it is better, at least, that he be a cœlebs; or if he be married, let him live apart from his wife. The Scripture says, There is one Mediator between God and man, virtually forbidding our applying to any other.

The doctors of the ancient church tell us that the saints in heaven and especially the Mother of God, are efficacious intercessors with God; and they set us the example of commending petitions to this celestial suffragation.

These two diverse Rules cannot both be Law; one must be law obsolete, the other, a statute in force. The one may be reverently spoken of, but the other must be obeyed. Although the one continue to be called law, and the other is called interpretation, it is the interpretation that actually regulates belief and practice that is to say, if the interpretation be put forth as any thing more than 'such a one's opinion.' The present controversy turns entirely upon this-something more, which is alleged to attach to the interpretations that are gathered from the patristic volumes. If it be said that the legislative value, assumed to float somewhere within these volumes, actually belongs only to those things concerning which there appears a universal consent, and which therefore may be presumed to have come down from inspired sources, although they be not recorded in the canon of Scripture; then, if we confine ourselves to the extant writings of the earliest times, they are too few, and too vague and ambiguous, to sustain a fifth part of what is included in the scheme of church principles, as now revived. But if we come down lower, and include the writings of a later age-say, the fourth and fifth centuries, which are copious enough for the purpose, then these writings, with unanimous consent, recommend notions and practices so glaringly at variance with the spirit and letter of Scripture that, if we are to receive them, it must be on the ground of an hypothesis which allows the Fathers, in a sovereign manner, to overrule, and abrogate, the decisions of the Apostles.

It will not be admissible to place these two authorities side by side, and to say to the people-You are at liberty to yield to which you please; for this would be to nullify law, altogether. Law says, Do this, or abide by the consequences of disobedience. Where a man may do as he pleases, he is not under law.

No suavities of phrase, no blinding of the plain truth by gentle circumlocutions, will make any difference, if in fact the interpretation of a statute is to take effect, rather than the statute itself. The expositor may be pleased to say-I think this is the sense of

Scripture; or I humbly think it; but if those who hear this opinion have nothing to do but to accept it, and to conform themselves thereto-then it is law to them, however smoothly worded·

It would be doing an injury to the reputation of the illustrious men whose writings are in question, if we were to speak as if they had claimed, in their own behalf, any such power to interpret Scripture, despotically; or to legislate for the church in all following ages. They do no such thing. Whatever may have been their faults, this impiety is not of the number. It is altogether the product of the wicked despotism of a late age. None do the Fathers so grievous a wrong as do those modern champions of church principles who are attributing to them an authority which they themselves religiously disclaim. Who are the enemies of the Fathers?the men who now are thrusting them, by violence, and against their solemn protest, into Christ's throne.

The harsh treatment to which these good, but greatly erring men must unavoidably be exposed, in the rude struggle which is yet before us, for rescuing apostolic christianity, cannot but do an injury to their just reputation. In proving them to have grossly perverted the gospel, and to be among the worst guides which the church can follow, we are driven to the necessity of producing evidence which no motive less imperative would have led us to bring forward. The same happens in every analogous instance; to thrust a man into a position not due to him, is to expose him to the peril of being treated ignominiously.

Let it then be clearly understood that, in vigorously contending, as we shall, for the paramount and unshared authority of the Inspired Writings, and in demonstrating that the strongest and most peremptory reasons of fact, as well as principle, forbid the attempt to conjoin the records of the ancient church with them, we are at war, NOT WITH THE MEN whose writings are in question, but with those ill-advised champions of church power, in modern times, who have put these writings in the room of God's word. It is the modern mystery of wickedness, not so much the ancient error, which we are labouring to overthrow.

As a general, and I honestly believe, a conclusive reply to the greater part of what has been advanced in the several criticisms of the preceding numbers, I propose to show that, even if the whole

of the evidence already adduced were liable to objection (no one will imagine that I mean to grant this) yet the argument founded upon that evidence would remain entire, inasmuch as it may be made good, without any difficulty, from other sources.

That this is not affirming too much I hope at length to prove by various citations, so laid before the reader, as shall exempt the author from all responsibility, except that of a mere copyist. -At present, I shall cite only so much as may illustrate the restatement I am making of the argument.

Assuming then, That the pending controversy, so far as I am concerned with it, is open to the ordinary methods of historical investigation, and may be disposed of in a peremptory mode after due inquiry; and assuming also

That the subject matter of the controversy is comprised within the Ecclesiastical Remains of the first five or six centuries; and also

That the question, broadly expressed, is-Whether or not, some sort of authoritative value attaches to, or is embedded within, these Remains, such as does not belong to the various religious writings of our own, or of other eras; then I presume that this higher value, whatever it may be, or however defined, must be made to rest upon one of these three grounds; or partly upon each ;-as first, upon that of

The alleged FACT, that the ancient church, as represented, or as reported to us by the extant writers of those ages (including ecclesiastical documents of all kinds) was in a condition of such pre-eminent purity, both doctrinal and practical, as compared with the modern church, or the church of any intervening time, that its opinions, usages, decisions, and general sentiments, are entitled to our reverent and submissive regard; and may, with much advantage to ourselves, be set up as our pattern.

Now it is plain that, to disprove this allegation, it cannot be logically required of us to show that the ancient church was in fact far inferior to the modern, or to any other church. It rests with those who take this ground to make out their case, by positive, unexceptionable evidence; and to show that this evidence is not nullified by opposite testimony.

But if this allegation, as to the Fact, is not hazarded, then an