exceeding the term during which they would be entitled by law to such sole liberty, if the first representation or performance had been in the united kingdom. And also that, by order in council, her majesty may, as regards translations of books first published,—or of dramatic pieces first publicly represented,—in any foreign country, direct that the authors of such books or dramatic pieces shall be empowered to prevent the publication in the British dominions of any translation of such books, or the representation of any translations of such dramatic pieces not authorized by them, for such time as shall be specified in her majesty's order, not extending beyond five years from the time at which authorized translations shall be first published or represented respectively. Provision is, however, made that no such order shall have effect, unless, on the face of it, it be grounded on a due reciprocal protection secured by the foreign power therein named, for the benefit of parties interested in works first published in the dominions of her majesty; nor unless, within a limited time, the work sought to be protected be duly registered, and a copy thereof (if it be a book, a print (u), or a printed dramatic piece, or musical composition,) deposited at Stationers' Hall; nor (in the case of translations) unless the original work be registered, and a copy deposited in the united kingdom, in the manner required for original works as above mentioned; nor unless the author notifies on the title page his intention to reserve the right of translation; nor unless a translation, sanctioned by the author, be published within certain limited periods; nor unless such translation be registered, and a copy thereof deposited, as in the case of original works.

(u) If it be a print first published in a foreign country it must also by 8 Geo. 2, c. 13, have the name of the

proprietor on each copy as well as on the plate. See Avanzo v. Mudie, 10 Exch. 203.

CHAPTER IV.

OF TITLE BY GIFT AND BY ASSIGNMENT.

OUR attention will next be directed to the acquisition of things or chattels personal, by voluntary transfer from the existing owner; which corresponds with alienation or conveyance, in that branch of the law which relates to the title to real estate (a).

The property in things personal is transferable with absolute freedom, to the extent of the proprietor's interest; and if they are assigned by one man to another, subject to a prohibition to dispose of them, the prohibition is void, both as being repugnant to the gift itself, and as being against the policy of the law (b). There are some cases, however, where the right of alienation is, in respect of the incapacity of the owner, suspended; as to which it will be sufficient to remark, that the law laid down in a former place (c) with respect to the disability of infants, insane persons, and persons under duress, applies in general to personal as well as real property. A married woman, too, is in general under an absolute incapacity to make any transfer of things personal; for, with the exception of her equitable interest in property settled in trust expressly for her separate use, the goods and chattels which she may have possessed at the time of marriage, or subsequently acquired, belong, by the general rule of law, to her hus

(a) Vide sup. vol. 1. p. 465.

(b) See Co. Litt. 223 a; Brandon v. Robinson, 18 Ves. 429; Woodmeston v. Walker, 2 Russ. & Mylne,

197; Brown v. Pocock, ibid. 210; 2 Mylne & Keen, 189; Massey v. Parker, ibid. 174.

(c) Vide sup. vol. 1. p. 474.

band (d). There are also some few cases, where, in respect of the nature of the interest itself, its alienation is absolutely prohibited (e). Thus, generally, the pay or half-pay of a military or naval officer, or the salary of an officer of trust, is, on a principle of public policy, not assignable; the object being to secure to such persons, even against their own improvidence, the possession of those means which are essential to the maintenance of their station and the performance of their duties (f). The sale or transfer of public appointments themselves is also, in general, contrary to the policy of the law (g), and prohibited in most cases by the express enactment of the legislature (h). But besides these exceptions, there is another of a different and more general kind, relative to choses in action, or rights not reduced into possession (i). It is one indeed of a nominal rather than a substantial character, but it leads, nevertheless, to important consequences in our legal system.

[By the strict rule of the antient common law, no chose in action could be assigned or granted over, because it was

(d) See the cases cited, sup. n. (b). (e) As to the subject matter of the assignment being, at the time of assignment, in futuro, see Petch v. Tutin, 15 Mee. & W.110; Congreve v. Evetts, 10 Exch. 298; Lunn v. Thornton, 1 C. B. 385; Baker v. Gray, 17 C. B. 475.

(f) See Flarty v. Odlum, 3 T. R. 681; Lidderdale v. Duke of Montrose, 4 T. R. 248; Barwick v. Read, 1 H. Bl. 627; Aston v. Gwinnell, 3 Y. & J. 148; Wells v. Foster, 8 Mee. & W. 149. Such pay or half-pay will not pass to the assignees under a bankruptcy; Cathcart v. Blackwood, Co. B. L. 299: nor (upon a different principle) will the pension of an officer in the service of the East India Company Gibson v. East India

Company, 5 Bing. N. C. 262. As to the extent to which pay or pension is assignable under the insolvent law, see 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 56.

(g) 2 Sand. Us. 38; Ex parte Butler, 1 Atk. 210; et vide post, bk. IV. pt. 1. c. x.

(h) See 5 & 6 Edw. 6, c. 16; 49 Geo. 3, c. 126; 6 Geo. 4, cc. 82, 83. Et vide 3 & 4 Vict. c. 113, s. 42, and 9 & 10 Vict. c. 88, making void (except when under the augmentation and church building acts) any sale or assignment by any spiritual person of any patronage belonging to him in virtue of his office.

(i) Termes de la Ley, tit. Chose in Action.

[thought to be a great encouragement to litigiousness, if a man were allowed to make over to a stranger his right of going to law.] But this nicety is now not so far regarded as to render such a transaction really ineffectual. It is, on the contrary, in substance, a valid and constant practice; [though in compliance with the antient principle, the form of assigning a chose in action is in the nature of a declaration of trust, and an agreement to permit the assignee to make use of the name of the assignor, in order to recover the possession. And therefore where, in common acceptation, a debt or bond is said to be assigned over, it must still be sued in the original creditor's name,] for the bringing of which suit, the person to whom it is transferred has sufficient authority. [But the king is an exception to this general rule, for he might always either grant or receive a chose in action by assignment (k);] and our courts of equity, making the rule itself give way to the expediency (in a commercial point of view) of facilitating the transfer of property, allow the assignment of a chose in action as freely and directly as the law does that of a chose in possession (1).

The modes of acquiring property in things personal by voluntary transfer inter vivos, are two:-first, by gratuitous donation, usually called gift; and, secondly, by transfer, not gratuitous, but founded on some valuable consideration, the proper legal designation of which is an assignment, or bargain and sale; the latter term, however, being more strictly appropriate to the case where property passes under a contract of sale, of which we shall have occasion to speak in the course of the following chapter.

1. A gift (being purely gratuitous) is open (particularly when made in favour of a stranger, and not a relative) to

(k) Breverton's case, Dyer, 30 b. Bills of exchange and notes (as to which vide post, p. 110) are another

exception from the general rule.
(2) Lord Carteret v. Paschal, 3 P.
Wms. 199.

some degree of suspicion (m); and, as against creditors, to whom the party is indebted at the time, is void by 13 Eliz. c. 5(n), in the same manner as if it were a gratuitous conveyance of land (o). [And by 3 Hen. VII. c. 4, all deeds of gifts of goods, made in trust to the use of the donor, shall be void, because otherwise persons might be tempted to commit treason or felony,] by escaping the consequence which ordinarily results from these crimes, viz. the forfeiture of goods (p); and also [because the creditors of the donor might otherwise be defrauded of their rights.]

A gift, to be valid and binding, must either be accompanied by the solemnity of a deed, or by that of delivery of possession (q). But when so perfected, [it is not in the donor's power to retract it, though it were a mere gift, (that is, made without any consideration, or recompense (r),) unless it be prejudicial to creditors, or the donor were under any legal incapacity,-as infancy, coverture, duress, or the like, or were drawn in, circumvented, or imposed upon by false pretences, ebriety, or surprise.]

There is a particular species of gift, which, though conferred inter vivos, does not take effect till after the death of the donor; and which is consequently in the nature of a legacy, and of no avail against creditors in case of a deficiency of assets (s). It is called a donatio mortis causâ, and is, [when a person in his last sickness, apprehending his dissolution near, delivers or causes to be delivered to another, the possession of any personal goods, to keep in

(m) 2 Bl. Com. 144.

(n) Gale v. Williamson, 8 Mee. & W.405.

(0) Vide sup.vol. 1. p. 500. Such gifts, by a trader insolvent at the time, are also void as against his assignees when he becomes bankrupt; 12 & 13 Vict. c. 106, s. 126.

(p) 2 Bl. Com. 441. Et vide post, bk. VI. c. XXIII.

(9) See Jenk. Cent. 109; Irons v.

Smallpiece, 2 B. & Ald. 552; Martindale v. Booth, 3 B. & Adol. 506; Reeves v. Capper, 5 Bing. N. C. 139; 2 Sand. 47 a, (n.); Shower v. Pilck, 4 Exch. 478.

(r) Jenk. Cent. 109.

(s) Ward v. Turner, 2 Ves. sen. 434. It is accordingly subject to legacy duty by 36 Geo. 3, c. 52, s. 7 ; 8 & 9 Vict. c. 76, s. 4.