Loans and Subsidies on the part of Neutrals. Loans and on the part of Subjects of Neutrals. rises, and it becomes the conviction of the world at large that supply of arms and ammunition by subjects of neutrals is apt to lengthen wars, the rule will appear that neutrals must prevent such supply. § 351. His duty of impartiality must prevent a neutral from granting a loan to either belligerent. Vattel's (III. § 110) distinction between whether such loans are granted on interest or not, and his assertion that loans on the part of neutrals are lawful if they are granted on interest with the pure intention of making money, have not found favour with other writers. Nor do I know any instance of such loan on interest having occurred during the nineteenth century. What is valid regarding a loan is all the more valid regarding subsidies in money granted to a belligerent on the part of a neutral. Through the granting of subsidies a neutral becomes the ally of the belligerent in a similar way as by furnishing him with a number of troops.1 § 352. It is a moot point in the theory of International Law whether a neutral is obliged by his duty of impartiality to prevent his subjects from granting subsidies and loans to belligerents for the purpose of enabling them to continue the war. Several writers 2 maintain either that a neutral is obliged to prevent such loans and subsidies altogether, or at least that 1 See above, §§ 305, 306, 321. Justice Best only declared "that it was contrary to the Law of Nations for persons residing in this country to enter into any agree. ments to raise money by way of a loan for the purpose of supporting subjects of a foreign State in arms against a Government in alliance with our own. he must prohibit a public subscription on neutral territory for such loans and subsidies. On the other hand, the number of writers is constantly growing who maintain that, since money is just as much an article of commerce as goods, a neutral is in no wise obliged to prevent on his territory public subscription on the part of his subjects for loans to the belligerents. In contradistinction to the theory of International Law, the practice of the States has beyond doubt established the fact that neutrals need not prevent the subscription for loans to belligerents on their territory. Thus in 1854, during the Crimean War, France in vain protested against a Russian loan being brought out in Amsterdam, Berlin, and Hamburg. In 1870, during the FrancoGerman War, a French loan was brought out in London. In 1877, during the Russo-Turkish War, no neutral prevented his subjects from subscribing for the Russian loan. Again, in 1904, during the Russo-Japanese War, Japanese loans came out in London and Berlin, and Russian loans in Paris and Berlin. But matters differ in regard to subsidies to belligerents on the part of subjects of neutrals. A neutral is indeed not obliged to prevent individual subjects from granting subsidies to belligerents, just as he is not obliged to prevent them from enlisting with either belligerent. But if he were to allow on his territory a public appeal for subscriptions for such subsidy, he would certainly violate his duty of impartiality; for loans are a matter of commerce, subsidies are not. It must, however, be emphasised that public appeals for subscriptions of money for charitable purposes in favour of the wounded, the prisoners, and the like, need not be prevented, even if they are only made in favour of one of the belligerents. The distinction between loans and subsidies is certainly correct as the law stands at present. But there is no doubt that the fact of the belligerents having the opportunity of getting loans from subjects of neutrals is apt to lengthen wars. The RussoJapanese War, for instance, would have come to an end much sooner if neither belligerent could have borrowed money from subjects of neutrals. Therefore, what has been said above in § 350 with regard to the supply of arms and ammunition on the part of subjects of neutrals applies likewise to loans : they will no longer be considered lawful when the standard of public morality rises. Pilotage. VII SERVICES TO BELLIGERENTS Ullmann, § 165-Rivier, II. pp. 388-391-Calvo, IV. §§ 2640-2641— § 353. Since pilots are in the service of riparian States, neutrals are obliged by their duty of impartiality to prevent their pilots from piloting belligerent men-of-war and belligerent transport vessels. This does not, however, apply to piloting such vessels into neutral ports in case asylum is granted them, and through the maritime belt in case their passage is not prohibited, but only to piloting on the Open Sea, with the further excep tion of vessels in distress for the purpose of saving them from being lost. Accordingly, Great Britain prohibited her pilots, during the Franco-German War in 1870, from conducting German and French menof-war outside the maritime belt, the case of vessels in distress excepted. on the $354. It is generally recognised that the duty Transport of impartiality incumbent upon a neutral obliges him to prevent his men-of-war and other public Neutrals. vessels from rendering transport services to either belligerent. Therefore, such vessels must carry neither soldiers nor sailors belonging to belligerent forces, nor their prisoners of war, nor ammunition, military or naval provisions, nor despatches. The question how far such vessels are prevented from carrying enemy subjects other than members of the forces depends upon the question whether by carrying those individuals they render such service to one of the belligerents as is detrimental to the other. Thus, when the Dutch Government in 1901, during the South African War, intended to offer a man-of-war to President Kruger for the purpose of conveying him to Europe, they made sure in advance that Great Britain did not object. on the Merchant § 355. Just as a neutral is not obliged to pre- Transport vent his merchantmen from carrying contraband, so part of he is not obliged to prevent them from rendering Neutral services to belligerents by carrying in the way of men. trade enemy troops, and the like, and enemy despatches. Neutral merchantmen rendering such services to belligerents do this at their own risk, since such services are analogous to carrying contraband, for which belligerents can punish the merchantmen by capturing them, but for which the neutral 1 See below, §§ 407-413. Information regarding Military and Naval Operations. State under whose flag such merchantmen sail has to bear no responsibility whatever. § 356. Distinction must be made between information on the part of vessels, by couriers, by telegraph or telephone, and by wireless telegraphy. (1) It is obvious that the duty of impartiality incumbent upon a neutral obliges him to prevent his men-of-war from giving any information to a belligerent concerning naval operations of the other party. But a neutral bears no responsibility whatever for private vessels sailing under his flag which give such information. Such vessels run, however, the risk of being captured and confiscated, and their crews may eventually be punished as war criminals for espionage. (2) It is likewise obvious that his duty of impartiality must prevent a neutral from giving information concerning the war to a belligerent through his diplomatic envoys, couriers, and the like. But the question has been raised whether a neutral is obliged to prevent couriers carrying despatches from a belligerent over his neutral territory. I believe the answer must be in the negative, at least as far as those couriers in the service of diplomatic envoys and such agents are concerned who carry despatches from a State to its head or to diplomatic envoys abroad. Since they enjoy-as stated above, vol. I. §§ 405 and 457-inviolability for their persons and official papers, a neutral cannot interfere and find out whether these individuals carry information to the disadvantage of the enemy. (3) It is a moot point whether a neutral is obliged by his duty of impartiality to prevent belligerents from making use of telegraphs, submarine cables, 1 See Calvo, IV. § 2640. |