Cessation of Effectiveness. vessels entering into or escaping from the port, where such ingress or egress did not take place with the consent of the blockading squadron." § 382. A blockade is effective so long as the danger lasts which makes probable the capture of such vessels as attempt to pass the approach. A blockade, therefore, ceases ipso facto by the absence of such danger, whether the blockading men-of-war are driven away, or are sent away for the fulfilment of some task which has nothing to do with the blockade, or voluntarily withdraw, or allow the passage of vessels in other cases than those which are exceptionally admissible. Thus, when in 1861, during the American Civil War, the Federal cruiser" Niagara," which blockaded Charleston, was sent away and her place was taken after five days by the "Minnesota," the blockade ceased to be effective, although the Federal Government refused to recognise this. Thus, further, when during the Crimean War Great Britain allowed Russian vessels to export goods from blockaded ports, and accordingly the egress of such vessels from the blockaded port of Riga was permitted, the blockade of Riga ceased to be effective, because it tried to interfere with neutral commerce only; the capture of the Danish vessel "Franciska "2 for attempting to break the blockade was, therefore, not upheld. On the other hand, practice 3 and the majority of writers recognise the fact that a blockade does not cease to be effective in case the blockading force is driven away for a short time through stress of weather. English writers, further, deny that a blockade loses effectiveness through a blockading 1 See Mountague Bernard, Neutrality of Great Britain during the American Civil War (1870), pp. 237-239. 2 Spinks, 287. See above, § 370. 3 The Columbia, 1 Rob. 154. 4 See Twiss, II. § 103, p. 201, and Phillimore, III. § 294. man-of-war being absent for a short time for the purpose of chasing a vessel which succeeded in passing the approach unhindered.1 IV BREACH OF BLOCKADE See the literature quoted above at the commencement of § 368. of $383. Breach or violation of blockade is the un- Definition allowed ingress or egress of a vessel in spite of the of Breach blockade. The attempted breach is, as far as punish- Blockade. ment is concerned, treated in the same way as the consummated breach, but the practice of States differs with regard to the question at what time and by what act an attempt to break a blockade commences. But it must be specially observed that the blockaderunner violates International Law as little as the contraband carrier. Both (see below, § 398) violate injunctions of the belligerent concerned. Notice of without § 384. Since breach of blockade is, from the stand- No Breach point of the blockading belligerent, a criminal act, knowledge on the part of a vessel of the existence of a blockade is essential for making her egress or ingress a breach of blockade. It is for this reason that Continental theory and practice do not consider a blockade established without local and diplomatic notification, so that every vessel may have, or may be supposed to have, notice of the existence of a blockade. And for the same reason some States, as France and Italy, never consider a vessel to have committed a breach of blockade unless a special warning was given her before her attempted ingress 1 See article 37 of U.S. Naval War Code. What consti tutes an Attempt to break Blockade. by one of the blockading cruisers stopping her and recording the warning upon her log-book.1 British, American, and Japanese practice regarding the necessary knowledge of the existence of a blockade on the part of a vessel makes a distinction between actual and constructive notice, no breach of blockade being held to exist without either the one or the other. Actual notice is knowledge acquired by a vessel of the existing blockade, whether through a direct warning from one of the blockading men-ofwar or knowledge acquired from any other public or private source of information. Constructive knowledge is presumed knowledge of the blockade on the part of a vessel on the ground either of notoriety or of diplomatic notification. The existence of a blockade is always presumed to be notorious to vessels within the blockaded ports, but it is a question of fact whether it is notorious to other vessels. And knowledge of the existence of a blockade is always presumed on the part of a vessel in case sufficient time has elapsed since the home State of the vessel has received diplomatic notification of the blockade, so that it could inform thereof all vessels sailing under its flag, whether or not they have actually received, or taken notice of, the information.3 § 385. The practice of the States as well as the opinions of writers differ much regarding such acts of a vessel as constitute an attempt to break blockade. (1) The Second Armed Neutrality of 1800 intended to restrict an attempt to break blockade to the employment of force or ruse by a vessel on the line 1 See above, § 376. 2 See The Vrouw Judith, I Rob. 150; the Neptunus, 2 Rob. 110; the Calypso, 2 Rob. 298; the Neptunus, 3 Rob. 173; the Hoffnung, 6 Rob. 112. of blockade for the purpose of passing through. This is, on the whole, the practice of France, which moreover, as stated before, requires that the vessel shall previous to the attempt have received special warning from one of the blockading men-of-war. Many writers1 take the same standpoint. (2) The practice of other States, as Japan, approved by many writers,2 goes beyond this and considers it an attempt to break blockade for a vessel, with or without force or ruse, to endeavour to pass the line of blockade. This practice frequently sees an attempt complete in the fact that a vessel destined for a blockaded place is found anchoring or cruising near the line of blockade. (3) The practice of Great Britain and the United States of America goes farthest, since it considers it an attempted breach of blockade for a vessel, not destined according to her ship papers for a blockaded port, to be found near it and steering for it, and, further, for a vessel destined for a port the blockade of which was diplomatically notified to start on her journey knowing that the blockade has not yet been raised, except, "when the port from which the vessel sails is so distant from the scene of war as to justify her master in starting with a destination known to be blockaded, on the chance of finding that the blockade has been removed, and, should that not prove to be the case, with an intention of changing her destination." This practice, further, applies 3 1 See Hautefeuille, II. p. 134; Kleen, I. § 137; Gessner, p. 202; Dupuis, No. 185; Fauchille, Blocus, p. 322. 2 See Bluntschli, § 835; Perels, $51; Geffcken in Holtzendorff, IV. p. 763; Rivier, II. p. 431. See also $25 of the Prussian Regulations concerning Naval Prizes, and article 31 of the Japanese Naval Prize Law. 3 See Holland, Prize Law, § 133, and U.S. Naval War Code, article 42; the Betsy, I Rob. 332. the doctrine of continuous voyages1 to blockade, for it considers an attempt of breach of blockade to have been committed by such vessel as, although ostensibly destined for a neutral or an unblockaded port, is in reality intended, after touching there, to go on to a blockaded port.2 (4) During the Civil War the American Prize Courts carried the practice further by condemning such vessels for breach of blockade as knowingly carried to a neutral port cargo which was ultimately destined for a blockaded port, and by condemning for breach of blockade such cargo, without the vessel, as was ultimately destined for a blockaded port, the carrying vessel being ignorant of this ulterior destination of the cargo. Thus the "Bermuda," 3 a British vessel with a cargo, part of which was, in the opinion of the American Courts, ultimately destined for the blockaded ports of the Confederate States, was seized on her voyage to the neutral British port of Nassau, in the Bahama Islands, and was condemned for breach The so-called doctrine of continuous voyages dates from the time of the Anglo-French wars at the end of the eighteenth century, and is connected with the application of the so-called rule of 1756. (See above, § 289.) Neutral vessels engaged in French and Spanish colonial trade, thrown open to them during the war, sought to evade seizure by British cruisers and condemnation by British Prize Courts, according to the rule of 1756, by taking their cargo to a neutral port, landing it and paying import duties there, and then re-lading it and carrying it to the mother country of the respective colony. Thus, in the case of the "William "(5 Rob. 385), it was proved that this neutral vessel took a cargo from the Spanish port La Guira to the port of Marblehead in Massachusetts-the United States being neutral-landed the cargo, paid import duties there, then took in the chief part of this cargo besides other goods, and sailed after a week for the Spanish port of Bilbao. In all such cases the British Prize Courts considered the voyages from the colonial port to the neutral port and from there to the enemy port as one continuous voyage and confirmed the seizure of the ships concerned. See Remy, Théorie de la continuauté du voyage en matière de blocus et de contrebande (1902). 2 See Holland, Prize Law, § 134. The James Cook, Edwards, 261. 3 Wallace, 514. 3 |