2. A divine constitution that is antecedent to that which establishes justification by a Saviour, (and indeed to any need of a Saviour) stands in the way of it, viz. that original constitution or law which man was put under; by which constitu tion or law the sinner is condemned, because he is a violator of that law; stands condemned, till he has actually an interest in the Saviour, through whom he is set at liberty from that condemnation. But to suppose that God gives a man an interest in Christ in reward for his righteousness or virtue, is inconsistent with his still remaining under condemnation till he has an interest in Christ; because it supposes, that the sinner's virtue is accepted, and he accepted for it, before he has an interest in Christ; inasmuch as an interest in Christ is given as a reward of his virtue: But the virtue must first be accepted, before it is rewarded, and the man must first be accepted for his virtue, before he is rewarded for it with so great and glorious a reward; for the very notion of a reward, is some good bestowed in testimony of respect to, and acceptance of virtue in the person rewarded. It does not consist with the honor of the majesty of the king of heaven and earth, to accept of any thing from a condemned male factor, condemned by the justice of his own holy law, till that condemnation be removed: And then such acceptance is inconsistent with, and contradictory to such remaining condemnation; for the law condemns him that violates it to be totally rejected and cast off by God. But how can a man continue under this condemnation, i. e. continue utterly rejected and cast off by God, and yet his righteousness or virtue be accepted, and he himself accepted on the account of it, so as to have so glorious reward as an interest in Christ bestowed as a testimony of that acceptance ?

I know that the answer that will be ready for this, is, that we now are not subject to that constitution that mankind were at first put under; but that God, in mercy to mankind, has abolished that rigorous constitution or law that they were under originally, and has put us under a new law, and introduced a more mild constitution; and that the constitution or law itself not remaining, there is no need of supposing that the condemnation of it remains, to stand in the way of the accept

ance of our virtue. And indeed there is no other way of as voiding this difficulty; the condemnation of the law must stand in force against a man till he is actually interested in the Saviour, that has satisfied and answered the law, effectually to prevent any acceptance of his virtue, before, or in order to such an interest, unless the law or constitution itself be abolished. But the scheme of those modern divines by whom this is maintained, seems to contain a great deal of absurdity and selfcontradiction: They hold, that the old law given to Adam, which requires perfect obedience, is entirely repealed, and that instead of it we are put under a new law, which requires no more than imperfect, sincere obedience, in compliance with our poor, infirm, impotent circumstances since the fall, whereby we are unable to perform that perfect obedience that was required by the first law: For they strenuously maintain, that it would be unjust in God to require any thing of us that is beyond our present power and ability to perform; and yet they hold, that Christ died to satisfy for the imperfections of our obedience, that so our imper fect obedience might be accepted instead of a perfect. Now, how can these things hang together? I would ask, What law these imperfections of our obedience are a breach of? If they are a breach of no law, then they be not sins, and if they be not sins, what need of Christ's dying to satisfy for them? But if they are sins, and so the breach of some law, what law is it? They cannot be a breach of their new law, for that requires no other than imperfect obedience, or obedience with imperfections; and they cannot be a breach of the old law, for that they say is entirely abolished, and we never were under it; and we cannot break a law that we never were under. They say it would not be just in God to exact of us perfect obedience, because it would not be just in God to require more of us than we can perform in our present state, and to punish us for failing of it; and therefore, by their own scheme, the imperfections of our obedience do not deserve to be punished. What need therefore of Christ's dying to satisfy for them? What need of Christ's suffering to satisfy for that which is no fault, and in its own nature deserves no suffering? What need of Christ's dy VOL. VII.

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ing to purchase that our imperfect obedience should be aes cepted, when, according to their scheme, it would be unjust in itself that any other obedience than imperfect should be required? What need of Christ's dying to make way for God's accepting such an obedience, as it would in itself be unjust in him not to accept? Is there any need of Christ's dying to persuade God not to do unjustly? If it be said, that Christ died to satisfy that law for us, that so we might not be under that law, but might be delivered from it, that so there might be room for us to be under a more mild law; still I would inquire, What need of Christ's dying that we might not be under a law that (according to their scheme) it would in itself be unjust that we should be under, because in our present state we are not able to keep it? What need of Christ's dying that we might not be under a law that it would be unjust that we should be under, whether Christ died or no?

Thus far I have argued principally from reason, and the nature of things......I proceed now to the

Second argument, which is, That this is a doctrine that the holy Scripture, the revelation that God has given us of his mind and will, by which alone we can ever come to know how those that have offended God can be accepted of him, and justified in his sight, is exceeding full in: Particularly the Apostle Paul is abundant in teaching, that "we are justified by "faith alone, without the works of the law." There is no one doctrine that he insists so much upon, and is so particular in, and that he handles with so much distinctness, explaining and giving reasons, and answering objections.

Here it is not denied by any, that the apostle does assert, that we are justified by faith, without the works of the law, because the words are express; but only it is said, that we take his words wrong and understand that by them that never entered into his heart, in that when he excludes the works of the law, we understand him of the whole law of God, or the rule which he has given to mankind to walk by; whereas all that he intends is the ceremonial law.

Some that oppose this doctrine indeed say, that the apostle sometimes means that it is by faith i. e. an hearty embracing the gospel, in its first act only, or without any preceding holy

life, that persons are admitted into a justified state; but, say they, it is by a persevering obedience that they are continued in a justified state; and it is by this that they are finally justi fied. But this is the same thing as to say, that a man, on his first embracing the gospel, is conditionally justified and par doned: To pardon sin, is to free the sinner from the punishment of it, or from that eternal misery that is due to it; and therefore, if a person is pardoned or freed from this misery, on his first embracing the gospel, and yet not finally freed, but his actual freedom still depends on some condition yet to be performed, it is inconceivable how he can be pardoned otherwise than conditionally; that is, he is not actually pardoned, and freed from punishment, but only he has God's promise that he shall be pardoned on future conditions; God promises him, that now, if he perseveres in obedience, he shall be finally pardoned, or actually freed from hell; which is to make just nothing at all of the apostle's great doctrine of justification by faith alone: Such a conditional pardon is no pardon or justification at all, any more than all mankind have, whether they embrace the gospel or no; for they all have a promise of final justification on condition of future, sincere obedience, as much as he that embraces the gospel. But not to dispute about this, we will suppose that there may be something or other at the sinner's first embracing the gospel, that may properly be called justification or pardon, and yet that final justification, or real freedom from the punishment of sin, is still suspended on conditions hitherto unfulfilled; yet they that hold that sinners are thus justified on embracing the gospel, suppose that they are justified by this no otherwise than as this is a leading act of obedience, or at least as virtue and moral goodness in them, and therefore would be excluded by the apostle as much as any other virtue or obedience, if it be allowed that he means the moral law, when he excludes the works of the law. And therefore, if that point be yielded, that the apostle means the moral, and not the ceremonial law only, their whole scheme falls to the ground.

And because the issue of the whole argument from those texts in St. Paul's epistles depends on the determination of this point, I would be particular in the discussion of it.

Some of our opponents in this doctrine of justification, when they deny, that by the law the apostle means the moral law, or the whole rule of life which God has given to mankind, seem to choose to express themselves thus, that the apostle only intends the Mosaic dispensation. But this comes to just the same thing as if they said, that the apostle only means to exclude the works of the ceremonial law; for when they say, that it is intended only that we be not justified by the works of the Mosaic dispensation, if they mean any thing by it, it must be, that we be not justified by attending and observing what is Mosaic in that dispensation, or by what was peculiar to it, and wherein it differed from the Christian dispensation; which is the same as that which is ceremonial and positive, and not moral, in that administration. So that this is what I have to disprove, viz. that the apostle when he speaks of the works of the law in this affair, means only the works of the ceremonial law, or those observances that were peculiar to the Mosaic administration.

And here it must be noted, that nobody controverts it with them, whether the works of the ceremonial law be not includ ed, or whether the apostle does not particularly argue against justification by circumcision, and other ceremonial observances; but all that is in question is, whether, when he denies jusjustificaton by works of the law, he is to be understood of the ceremonial law only, or whether the moral law be not also implied and intended; and therefore those arguments that are brought to prove that the apostle meant the ceremonial law, are nothing to the purpose unless they prove more than that, viz. that the apostle meant those only.

What is much insisted on is, that it was the Judaising Christians' being so fond of circumcision, and other ceremonies of the law, and depending so much on them, which was the occasion of the apostle's writing as he does against justification by the works of the law. But supposing it were so, that their trusting in works of the ceremonial law were the sole occasion of the apostle's writing, (which yet there is no reason to allow, as may appear afterwards;) if their trusting in a particular work, as a work of righteousness, was all