letters describing local corruption to newspapers printed in other places, as the censors are by no means so severe on comments on matters taking place outside of their jurisdiction. It frequently happens, in the atmosphere of everlasting intrigue which hangs over all Russia, that the administration of one province is not unwilling to profit by matters which are to the discredit, even in Russia, of the administration of other provinces; but the small matters of everyday oppression, which in the aggregate are more important than the few greater ill-doings, are seldom sufficiently startling to make it worth while for any but a local paper to consider them.

One of the very greatest difficulties with which the actual administration has to contend is its absolute lack of trustworthy information. Any official report reaching headquarters, unless a special commission has been sent to take testimony on the spot, is likely to have passed through the hands of half a dozen functionaries, all of them interested in suppressing the actual condition, and each one is likely to have made some modification, so that when it reaches headquarters, after a lapse of many months or even years, the original information has been so distorted as to give no trustworthy results.

Unquestionably an untrammelled press would go over into wild license in Russia to an extent which it would be difficult for us to realize. Yellow journalism in this country is bad, though on the whole our press is dignified as compared with that of France; but probably even the anti-semitic journals of Paris would be moderate compared with Russian expressions in case the censor were suppressed, and the people are only too ready to credit any report of official corruption. It is almost a question, however, whether even this would not be worth risking for the sake of the information which is only obtainable by free discussion. As a step in this direction which would avoid the worst dangers and yet accomplish a part of what is desired while paving the way for better things, the best course which I can imagine would be to grant to the editor of some single paper, say the Novoe Vremya, or Novosti of St. Petersburg or the even Moskovskiya Viedomosti of Moscow, the valuable monopoly of perfect freedom from censorship for the space of six months, with the understanding that

if it worked well this freedom would be continued indefinitely. The privilege would be too valuable to be risked lightly, and as, when any article has once been allowed to be published in Russia, any other publication is allowed by law to republish it except as restrained by copyright, articles from this paper would have a tendency to be disseminated throughout the country and furnish a valuable basis for discussion, and letters to the editor would perhaps furnish a serious check on the everlasting peculations. and extortions of the chinovniks. It will not be difficult to believe that they are a unit in opposing liberty of the press; and it is due to them that the noble efforts of more than one Czar to improve conditions have been defeated. One man can do little. against a well organized system, as many an able man has found to his cost in Russia.

How corrupt they are is well shown by the secret report of a special commission sent to Poland early in the reign of the present Czar to study the causes of discontent there. Fifty copies of this were printed for the use of the Czar and his ministers. The London Times coveted one of these and the copy which it finally obtained bore notes in the Czar's own hand. The first point brought out in it was that all officials were so much underpaid that they could only exist by extortion unless they had private means, and it was recommended that their salaries should be made adequate, and that they should then be held strictly responsible. The Czar had noted in the margin here, "This is to be done as soon as the Treasury shows the necessary funds." What was there said of Poland seems to be true of all Russia proper except Viatka and one or two other provinces in the extreme north, where life was so unalluring that no court favorites coveted the positions, and where in consequence matters had not gone so far. The chinovniks will probably not welcome addition to their salaries on such conditions. Their exactions, doubtless, bring in far more than any salaries likely to be given them, and they are one of the many causes of the general poverty.

How inadequate Russian salaries are can be gathered from the fact that the governor of a province with a population of 2,000,000 gets the equivalent of $3,000 a year, on which he is supposed to keep up an imposing state in a country where all

articles of luxury are more expensive than with us.

Blackmail

is perhaps less open than twenty years ago, but it still exists on the largest scale and, as shown above, has become a recognized part of the Russian system. Minister Witte has recently stated that it is now impossible to purchase a judge or any higher official. He said that Alexander II had stamped out these forms of bribery. He added that unfortunately Alexander II had done nothing towards suppressing bribery among the police, but that if he himself were Minister of the Interior he felt sure that he could suppress it in two years. My own impression is that he would share the fate of Alexander II if he tried it. Perhaps the best commentary on the completeness with which it was stamped out in the higher circles lies in the fact, that a very large fund was put in the hands of one of the Grand Dukes (all members of the Imperial family) to build a memorial church over the spot where Alexander II was assassinated twenty-two years ago. The funds were all gone years ago, and, after standing unfinished for years, the church is now being completed out of other appropriations. It should be said of Minister Witte that his father was German, and that for vigor and energy and lack of ostentation he is as un-Russian as can well be imagined.

As to judges, I myself knew one who was in the habit of offering horses to prospective litigants at five times their normal value, and it was etiquette not to refuse to buy. I have heard of plenty of other cases. After Plevna Alexander II is said to have turned to his brother with the bitter remark: "You and I seem to be the only Russians who have not been bribed." After the close of the war he made a strong effort to break up the system, and this was followed up, after his assassination, by his son, Alexander III. With the aid of Prince Vorontzof-Dashkof they made considerable progress in some lines, but a well-known diplomat long stationed in Russia assures me that during the present reign things have been growing worse in this respect.

Foreigners are a little better off than natives with reference to blackmail, for sometimes their ambassadors will interfere when matters are pushed too far. A curious case of this kind occurred in May, 1902, which illustrates not only this but also how the class of workingmen are being cajoled by the authorities at present.

A great strike occurred at Moscow in the factory of M. Goujon, a Frenchman, and perhaps the greatest individual manufacturer in Russia. The strikers were encouraged by General Trepoff, the Chief of Police, who had military rations issued to them. Soon after this the strikers came to him to ask permission to establish a full fledged trades-union. Every organization of this kind is entirely repugnant to the Russian system, so Trepoff felt compelled to refuse, but volunteered instead to make Goujon yield to their demands, and thereupon called on Goujon and threatened him with police vengeance in case he did not yield. Goujon rushed to St. Petersburg and laid the case before M. de Montebello, the French ambassador, who took it at once to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs. President Loubet was then on his way to St. Petersburg for his state visit, and it was out of the question to have a row with the French embassador at that time, so Trepoff was severely reprimanded and sent in full uniform, with all his staff, to apologize at Goujon's house. There he had the door shut in his face and was refused admittance, which was probably the safest way to treat him. He could hardly have been made a friend of, and a Russian is much safer to deal with if he feels that the other man is important enough to make things very unpleasant in case he does not do right. A corollary to this story seems to lie in the fact that M. de Montebello was recalled from his place as French Ambassador only two or three months later.

For several years back, the factory hands have been petted by the government, special privileges being granted them, partly to provide workingmen enough for the factories which were being fostered by Minister Witte's policy, and partly to gain the favor of the new class thus to be built up as an offset against the students, who have long been regarded as a source of danger to the centralized administration. In fact, almost all the insurrectionary movements from 1870 to 1895 seem to have been the outcome of university movements. Of late, however, the workingmen have shown a strong tendency to fraternize with the students, and semi-political strikes have come up among them on an enormous scale, occasioning open clashes with the soldiers. Apparently this unfortunate development of Witte's industrial system has been a powerful weapon in the hands of his enemies.

It is not to be denied that this has intensified the unrest in Russia, and the stirring of the Russian population to trying to right their wrongs by force is of all things the most to be avoided by Russian statesmen who truly love their country. The paternalism of the Russian government continually brings it to a direct clash with personal interests of all kinds and so adds greatly to its enemies.

How far this interference goes is shown by the experience of the iron works. In 1901, after about a year of panic, the Taganrog Iron Works, a large concern on the Sea of Azof, with mainly foreign capital and one of the best plants in Russia, began cutting prices tremendously to obtain whatever work was offering anywhere in the country, so as to keep going, even if at a loss. Prices were cut to half what they had been a year or two before, and they were even making deliveries in the heart of the northeastern iron district, 2,000 miles away. This great fall in prices might finally have stimulated a legitimate demand, but it was not pleasing to other iron manufacturers. They appealed to Minister Witte, who advised them to form a syndicate to maintain prices, and promised to buy from the syndicate a quantity of rails at 1.25 rubles per pood, equivalent to about $36.00 per ton of 2,000 lbs. He also brought pressure to bear on the Taganrog works to force them into the syndicate, and when one maker, whose quota would not keep his works going, offered to furnish rails to the government at 1.15 if given enough to occupy his full capacity, his offer was refused with much show of indignation.

Since then this sop has proved insufficient, although it sufficed to defeat the low prices by which the public might have profited. It was much less than what the Minister had virtually promised to buy annually as an inducement for foreign capital to start iron works in Russia. Towards the close of 1902, he found it impossible to borrow enough to maintain even this reduced program, and was obliged to choose which he would let go to the wall of two of the great concerns built up by French and Belgian capital. He decided in favor of Briansk and in consequence the great works at Kertch, in the Crimea, failed with liabilities of over $9,000,000, and assets valued at about $440,000.