HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS,

&c. &c.

"The fact seems to be, that wars, in such cases, have originated from a total want of public opinion, from the ignorance of the people who allowed ambitious or unprincipled rulers successfully to employ every engine to influence their passions, and to excite the multitude to acts of destruction towards those of another country for no possible advantage. In future ages it will, perhaps, scarcely be believed, that rulers could have been so flagitious, or nations so brutalized, as to act in this manner."-Essay on the Rise, Progress, and Present State of Public Opinion. By W. A. MACKINNON. P. 244. Note.

WHERE a certain mode of thinking and acting has been long interwoven with the habits of mankind, there are commonly arrayed about it such a host of feelings, prejudices, and arguments, founded on prescriptive authority, that to call in question the propriety of its continuance, appears somewhat like attempting to throw a doubt on one of the fundamental laws of our existence. Should the reflecting philanthropist, therefore, in the course of his silent observations on the character and tendency of human actions, discover grounds for believing that a practice, upheld by the usage of past ages, and fostered by its accordance with selfish inclination, is yet equally at variance with the dictates of religion and sound policy, he will not indulge in any romantic expectations of suddenly overthrowing, by the unaided force of truth, the long-established customs of nations. But neither will he despair of the eventual improvement of his species. The experience of former times has taught him that the conclusions of the enlightened few, although slowly adopted, and strenuously contested by their contemporaries, are commonly but the forerunners of public opinion. The experience of his own day convinces him that by public opinion, which is ever progressive in power as it acquires continually fresh accessions of intelligence, the councils of nations, and the proceedings of mankind at large, will ultimately be directed. He has watched the effects of the gradual infusion of new ideas into the general mass; and he observes that these effects are

daily increasing in magnitude and importance. The system of social order is developing hourly new relations; and sentiments, moral and political, which, on their first introduction, were branded with the stigma of enthusiasm, have subsequently become the acknowledged standard of practical truth.

It is without any vain anticipation of effecting a sudden and miraculous change in the dispositions or practices of men, that the advocates of universal peace persist in appealing to public attention on behalf of the principles they maintain. Convinced that the system of war is no less inimical to the real interest of nations than it is opposed to the precepts of religion and humanity, they feel themselves bound to persevere in endeavouring to direct the minds of others to a calm investigation of its nature and consequences. And if they cannot expect that the conclusions they have embraced should in general meet with entire assent, it is, however, not unreasonable to hope that some may be led by them to study the records of war in a spirit of impartial research, that will aid in dissipating the illusive mists with which ignorance and prejudice have long invested the subject, and which are already in many instances beginning to disappear.

The argument against war derived from the tenor of Christianity they cannot but consider as unanswered and unanswerable. To those who are in the habit of implicitly submitting every moral sentiment to the test of revelation, no other argument is needed. But the opinions of the generality are regulated far less by a sense of abstract right than by their conformity with the standard of supposed expediency. Now in what manner is the question of expediency to be tried in the present instance? Surely by an appeal to experience. War is now generally admitted to be in itself an evil, fraught with incalculable hazard to the actors, and attended on every side by miseries, physical and political, against which it is impossible to guard. The question in debate, therefore, may be reduced to this: Are the results of war, deducting all its accompanying mischief, yet productive, upon the whole, of a counterbalance of good to the parties engaging in it? If not, does there nevertheless exist a class of exceptions sufficiently marked and numerous to authorize a departure from the general rule which an extensive collation of facts may have enabled us to deduce? In arguing this point, it is usual with the advocates of war to bring forward some imaginary case, in which one

of the parties is already reduced to extremities that could scarcely have occurred but from a series of mutual aggressions, and then, assuming that active force affords the only possible remedy for such a state of things, they triumphantly urge the charge of absurdity against their opponents. The friends of peace would rest their defence, not upon vague declamation, but upon the evidence of fact. In order, however, to make this evidence available, it is necessary that history should be studied with greater diligence, greater impartiality, and a more sedulous care to exclude every false light, than is commonly bestowed upon it. The searcher after truth must not be satisfied with superficial views. He must trace to their secret sources the several destructive wars which have been emblazoned in the annals of fame: he must observe their ruinous effects upon contending nations: he must investigate how far their proposed objects have been accomplished; and accurately distinguish between the alleged motives of statesmen, and the hidden springs by which the real authors of every contest have been actuated. Should the results of his examination be such as to warrant him in inferring that the greater number of wars have been as degrading in their origin, and futile in their end, as they are acknowledged to have been desolating in their progress, he must be cautious of recognizing probable exceptions in regard to events of immediate interest. An object may be seen too near to be comprehended in its due proportions. We can judge of its relative magnitude and position only by comparing it with others more distant, whose bearings have been previously ascertained. The warning of repeated failures has but little influence over the judgment in cases where the passions are brought into play. The gambler, who enters again and again upon the same hazardous speculation, still flatters himself with the assurance of ultimate success; but the cool by-stander will point to the tables in which his chances of gain and loss are calculated, and decide with unerring precision upon the probabilities of the future from the certainties of the past.

With the view of affording some hints that may assist in directing the inquirer into the proposed train of investigation, it is the plan of the present essay briefly to review the records of the most celebrated wars which distinguished the early periods of European history. An objection to the principle of peace is, however, sometimes started in

the very outset of such an inquiry. On unfolding the map of past ages, its most characteristic traits are observed to be those of universal violence. All its lines are lines of blood. From the first settlements of our infant race to the latest era of civilization and refinement, a system of reciprocal aggression appears to have entered into the very constitution of society. Hence it is alleged, that the law of force is part of the law of man's nature, the exercise of which being evidently interwoven with the whole scheme of Providence, does not admit of a dispute concerning its propriety. But this reasoning, if correct, would prove too much for it may be applied with similar, if not equal, plausibility to the justification of whatever enormities have at any time been extensively prevalent. Pursued to its consequences, it would disprove the existence of moral evil altogether: that is-since we cannot shut our eyes upon the fact— it would annihilate the distinction between evil and good. We must indeed confess, that the existence of moral evil, incomprehensible as it has been, and will probably ever remain to our limited understandings, must in some mode or other be reconcilable with the attributes of perfect wisdom and goodness. But the believer in divine revelation possesses a no less assured conviction that the actual commission of wrong is directly opposed to the will of the Deity, and that the ultimate design of his government is to promote its extirpation. The general prevalence of any practice cannot, therefore, be admitted in evidence of its moral rectitude, in other words, of its conformity to the Divine will, unless it be previously shown that such practice proceeds, not from the abuse and misapplication of powers originally bestowed on us for valuable ends, but constitutes their sole and legitimate employment. Will it be maintained that any of our faculties have been implanted for the express purpose of mutual hatred and destruction;-or that the instinct of self-love has no other field to expatiate in than the perpetration of injury to others; or that the intellectual and spiritual endowments of humanity were never designed to direct and restrain the use of the inferior propensities? Melancholy indeed would be the prospects of the human race, were the validity of such assertions to be allowed. The world is, then, exactly as it ought to be, and must ever remain ! No improvement is practicable, and none is required!

But it has been said, and justly said, that under the superintending